

Mauro Galluccio *Editor*

Handbook of International Negotiation

Interpersonal, Intercultural, and Diplomatic
Perspectives

 Springer

Handbook of International Negotiation

Endorsements

A must read for all who wish to take part in managing international affairs in our complex and nervous world. The editor and author Galluccio, a political scientist as well as a psychologist, has been able to provide us with a unique and penetrating insight into the political and socio-cognitive world of international negotiation. Contributors to this remarkable book offer a penetrating analysis of the dual nature of negotiation—as a human and diplomatic experience. Their work opens a path to understanding negotiation as the way to building trust and the will to agree, the two key conditions for any negotiation to succeed.

Danilo Türk

Former President of Slovenia
Former UN Assistant-Secretary-General for Political Affairs

Dr. Galluccio's edited book, *Handbook of International Negotiation*, genuinely breaks new ground in the study of international negotiations. It melds neuroscience, psychology, anthropology, economics and political science in ways that provide a detailed and convincing account of the biological basis for cooperative as well as conflictual behavior. The results significantly change the dynamics in bargaining games and directly affect the training and tactics of negotiators.

Anne-Marie Slaughter

President and CEO of the New America Foundation
Former Director of Policy Planning for the US
State Department from January 2009 until February 2011
under Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

It has become only too evident that traditional methods of conflict prevention and resolution are no longer adequate or effective. This is why editor and contributor Mauro Galluccio's *present volume* appears to fill in an existing and ever more visible void in shaping an entirely new approach in modern-day diplomacy. The significance of this book can hardly be over-rated. It offers an entirely new political and psychological angle to transforming conflict by managing interpersonal dynamics and tailoring preventive behaviors. It alerts us to the crucial role of the mental heritage of conflicts and powerful emotions. In brief, it enhances an entirely new type of negotiation as a fundamental tool of managing, preventing, and resolving conflict by acknowledging the diversity of mental viewpoints about any given reality.

This volume can indeed serve as a handbook to practitioners—diplomats and decision-makers—in educating themselves, in reshaping their own outlook, and in even bettering themselves as individuals in positions of authority and responsibility for bringing positive change to the lives of millions of people.

Elena Poptodorova

Ambassador of Bulgaria to the United States

Galluccio has brought together a distinguished and diverse group of scholars and practitioners to address an enduring, if evolving, challenge to human well-being: violent conflict between nations and subnational groups. His aim is to organize the interdisciplinary character of the research, on which the authors draw, into coherent perspectives on the causes of conflicts and potentially effective interventions designed to prevent and resolve them.

There is much that is new here. Perhaps most important, there is a focus on the personal and emotional character of conflict—for those who engage in it and those who intervene to mitigate it. The passion, competence, and intensity that Galluccio brings to this edited volume is striking and appropriate, in light of the importance of the topic to those who have been or will be victims of violent conflict, but at no point does it detract from the intellectual rigor that characterizes the entire volume.

Robert L. Gallucci

US Ambassador-at-Large
Past President of the MacArthur Foundation
Former US Assistant Secretary of State

This timely volume and the work of Dr. Mauro Galluccio on international negotiation and mediation is extremely relevant in the current climate of conflict throughout the world and the potential perils that presently exist among nations. This collection of essays by renowned scholars, foreign policy experts, officials, psychologists, and other practitioners, ably assembled and edited by Dr. Mauro Galluccio, is so very welcome. This handbook highlights the complexity, and difficulty, of international negotiations. Fortunately, it also provides important and useful tools for those responsible for conducting diplomacy with terrorists and insurgents. It is sure to be widely read, cited, and used as a valuable reference work for years to come.

Mitchell Reiss

President of the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation
Past President's Special Envoy to the Northern Ireland Peace Process
Former Director of Policy Planning at the US State Department

Dr. Galluccio's work on conflict resolution and peace negotiations represents an international and multidisciplinary attempt showing us that the best way to advance research lies in interdisciplinary cross-fertilization. The challenge is to find ways to coordinate psychological expertise with the expertise afforded through other disciplinary perspectives and in my strong opinion Dr. Galluccio's work and this volume match high expectations.

Agostino Miozzo

Managing Director of the Crisis Response Department
The European External Action Service of the European Union

I wish to pay tribute to the editor of this book, Mauro Galluccio, a former staff member, who has invested now more than two decades in providing an ever wider and deeper insight in the multi-disciplinarity of international negotiations. It is my opinion that Galluccio's book is timely in light of the current climate of conflict among the nations throughout the world and the potential perils that presently exist among nations. It is quite fitting, in my opinion, that a proposal for the further development of a social-cognitive approach to negotiation and mediation would be of great value in facilitating effective agreements between various nations in the interest of achieving international peace.

Koos Richelle

Former Director General
European Commission of the European Union

Mauro Galluccio
Editor

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and Diplomatic Perspectives

 Springer

Editor

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EANAM European Association
for Negotiation and Mediation
Brussels, Belgium

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To Laura, Michele, Lorenzo and Gabriele

When man understands, he extends his mind to comprehend things; but when he does not understand, he makes them out of himself, and by transforming himself, becomes them.

Giambattista Vico, 1744

If a diplomat becomes so satisfied with himself to lose his interest in the psychology of others. And since psychological alertness is one of the most vital factors in negotiation, a diplomat who becomes lethargic in such matters has passed the period of usefulness.

Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy, 1939, p. 65

Foreword

Navigating the Geopolitical Landscape of the Future

David Hilbert, one of the world's most influential and universal mathematicians, gave a speech to the international congress of mathematicians in August of 1900. Hilbert cited more than a dozen unsolved mathematical problems bequeathed by the nineteenth to the twentieth century. Had Hilbert presented the great unsolved geopolitical problems of that era, he would have undoubtedly mentioned the state of world conflict and the lack of effective peace negotiation strategies that existed at that time.

Unfortunately, not much has changed since Hilbert's day. The weather vanes of conventional wisdom still point in a direction that yields disappointing results. The forecast for peace has remained tepid at best with most foreign negotiations. Many efforts in peace negotiation have been an exercise in contraction as opposed to protraction. Therefore, we must ask ourselves, how should this new world govern itself with all of the conflict that presently exists? How should the international system function in a manner that can embrace more effective peace acquisition? And most importantly, how can strategic preventive diplomacy executed by negotiators set the stage for awareness centered interventions?

Until recently, it appears that peace negotiation strategies have been devoid of a direct focus on conceptual distortions as well as emotional and motivational processes that seem pivotal to change. This is an aspect that is particularly important among nations that maintain conservative ideologies and are highly resistant to transformation. In this text, the contributors have highlighted a number of important aspects of the peace negotiation process from various disciplines which include cognitive and motivational factors, as well as emotional regulation. These aspects have been largely ignored in the past with negotiation strategies maintaining a daunting gap in the overall process.

Conflicts between nations pertain to the integrative operation of cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes including biological aspects combined with a preexisting repertoire of rigid supporting beliefs, world views, and emotions that result in selective and distorted information processing. Knowing what motivates another party's process of decision making is vital to unlocking the door to peace. Understanding the different nuances and cultural aspects of decision making helps negotiators gain a better grasp on the situation. Also, managing the emotional tensions during negotiation processes is an integral part of some of the skills that are required for successful

negotiations. Awareness of the emotional/cultural aspects increases with the capacity for empathic and sympathetic involvement. In addition, much of the negotiator's tendencies toward self-efficacy are necessary as a capacity and competence in their abilities to reach the stated goal. In fact, many believe that emotions are paramount to the process of negotiation, particularly when working with diverse cultures. Due to the fact that emotions have the same basic or universal cause from person to person and culture to culture, this notion of gain and achievement of happiness is a core ingredient to success.

Due to the fact that many individuals, societies, and nations are being forced to choose among competing interests, identities, and loyalties, this only creates complexity with the peace process. Underscoring the threat of competition and risk of loss with many of the conflicts that exist between nations is what undoubtedly fuels further conflict.

In keeping with the theme of interpersonal and intercultural perspectives, this edited text by Mauro Galluccio appropriately promotes the social, cognitive, and behavioral approach to human dynamics as a promising component toward future peace negotiations. The interdisciplinary approach to this book is one of the more appurtenant since it allows for adding the most appropriate approach we can muster in conflict across different cultural settings, increasing the awareness of training insights, and providing a cognitive and emotional resource for negotiators and mediators. The sacred values that Meichenbaum speaks about in his thoughtful chapter are core to understanding moral imperatives and circumstances that contribute to the notion of using many of the psychotherapeutic skills that cognitive behavioral therapists utilize in working with individuals, couples, and groups. Developing insight into conflict resolution in international negotiation is a fulcrum to implementing some of the aforementioned processes, insight, and awareness into how certain parties' perceptions are influenced by their interpretive framework. This dynamic helps us to make sense of the conflict negotiation interaction as they perceive it. Addressing cognitive filters and screening out information that is distorted or incompatible with operating assumptions are also germane to understanding this process and may help individuals become aware of this importance as well. Such lenses are required in order to increase the power of transforming the conflict. Remaining mindful of these proponents is essential to future success.

This is a timely and extremely valuable multidisciplinary volume edited by Mauro Galluccio, who since the early 1990s has been instrumental in promoting conflict resolution and transformation. As both a political scientist and psychologist, he has been able to assemble, persuade, and coordinate with competence and passion distinguished authors from various disciplines to investigate strategies to better apply and operationalize methods and tools to improve both the construction of relationships and conflict transformation. This book is a very intuitive contribution to the literature which aims to formulate proposals on how to best optimize the use of negotiation and diplomacy structures throughout training programs. It nicely integrates different tools presented by a broad range of contributors. There is a pressing need to have a coherent and tailored training program for negotiators and mediators. Galluccio's work in this area is cutting edge in that it is based on sound scientific principles for

improving international relations. This is a budding area that uses cognitive and affective processes to shape important judgments and critical decisions and will be used significantly in widening and understanding the relational abilities of individuals facing conflict and uncertainty.

It is hopefully with this groundbreaking work that a new dimension of peace negotiation can be embosomed, particularly at a time in which the world faces continuous conflict.

Department of Psychiatry
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Frank M. Dattilio

Foreword

From the beginning of my international career, I realized how the art of negotiation—with its complex set of skills and techniques—was central to my work and its effectiveness. Since then, I have dealt with both paramilitary groups and regular (if not necessarily friendly) armed forces. I engaged in strategizing international interventions in crisis areas, negotiating consistent international contracts, rarely immune to political interests on all sides. I eventually landed on what some diplomats describe as the “mother of all negotiations”—the Middle East Peace Process. I had the privilege to live and work in many different places: the Balkans, Turkey, Asia, the Middle East, and Brussels. Hence my professional adventure was (and still is) shaped by inter-culturally diverse contexts that rendered negotiations, diplomacy, and international affairs work in general an ever-changing experience. When Dr. Galluccio described to me the idea behind this book, I felt it matched my own desire (and possibly that of many other practitioners) to view negotiations in a structured and more comprehensive way. Negotiations are part of our political reality, part of our history, as well as part of our daily life; they are about people who are trying to reach an agreement on a given issue. In their most apparent form, negotiations may take place in an open market, at the store down the road or when purchasing a second hand car. Such negotiations—which domain gurus call distributive—focus on distributing a determined amount of value. We also negotiate when trying to agree on an important family matter with our spouses or partners or with our sons or daughters. These negotiations involve the individual interests of the parties engaged, and they reflect areas of common interest. The value of what is negotiated is not fixed but perceived, explained, and promoted from different perspectives. The importance of negotiations in our personal and professional life is self-evident from the examples above. The ways we conduct negotiations and the forces behind them are however much more complex and less obvious than one might think. The complexity increases when the interest of the negotiating parties is a collective one, whether of an organization, a state, or a group of states. The complexity may be even greater when negotiations aim at resolving an armed conflict or when the parties in question display no interest in negotiating. At this point, it is necessary for others to intervene and bring them to the negotiation table.

I recall being somewhere in the southern Balkans on a secondary road, when I was stopped by members of a paramilitary group. They decided to hold me and my staff at gunpoint, questioning me about the reason for the

delivery of the humanitarian cargo transported by the truck we were escorting. The conversation took place in some basic Serb-Croatian and some basic English, hence leaving not much room for nuanced explanation. It was clear, including their nonverbal communication, that they did not accept that our real mission was to deliver international aid to civilians in distress. Even if they understood that we were not foreign spies, they did not like what we were doing and they did not want to let us through the confrontation lines. The reader should make no mistake—that was a negotiation and a very important one. The content of that truck was crucial to the survival of hundreds of people, mainly women and children, whose lives were threatened by the war and by the merciless Balkan winter. In this instance, the negotiation was shaped by cultural diversity, a language barrier, misperceptions, emotions, and—no doubt—divergent objectives. On the other hand, it was evident that those guys dressed in fatigues were under no direct and strict order to stop humanitarian convoys. They wanted to make a point, and they wanted to express their rage against what we were doing. One thing was also clear—that guy leading a small paramilitary unit in the middle of a secondary road in the southern Balkans—wanted to engage and tell me something.

I will not go through the details of the conversation I had with that man. But it lasted over half an hour, an enormity considering the language gap. To a certain extent, it was a surreal negotiation carried out under asymmetric conditions dictated by the barrel of an AK-47 alternatively pointed at me and at my colleagues. My strategic interests were clear: staying alive, getting the truck through that improvised checkpoint, and delivering aid to the people in need. His objectives were far less evident. It was a judgment call based on his way to look, act, and talk. His personality traits and his psychology in a politicized and war environment shaped that negotiation.

I found myself in several similar situations during that period, and it was a real education, leaving me with me some important lessons: study the context, understand the multidimensional interest of the parties, and never underestimate the role played by the psychology of the person you negotiate with (i.e., cognitive and emotional processes). Such lessons as well as others had later proven precious in diplomatic negotiations.

Diplomats are only the representative of their political masters, and as such, they cannot afford to decide what the red lines and the objectives are. Diplomats are however relatively free to decide how to tackle negotiations. One could also add that diplomatic negotiators are not devoid of personal agendas and personal convictions. These latter, when related to the political substance of the negotiations, play a huge role in shaping negotiations' dynamics. No doubt that during my diplomatic career, I have witnessed several instances where the personality of negotiators was behind the success or disaster of the negotiations themselves.

On that road in the southern Balkans as much as in the formal atmosphere of one of the severe meeting rooms somewhere in the Middle East, I came to realize how the psychological dynamics of negotiations and the individual psychology of negotiators take a central role in shaping negotiations' outcomes. Emotions as much as cognitive processes are central to what human beings do and how they operate. When it comes to diplomatic negotiations,

the political dimension is often dominant, implying that perceptions, emotions, and motivations—always embedded within political positions—are an integral part of such processes.

It is for this reason that I enthusiastically acknowledge Dr. Galluccio's efforts toward the realization of this book. If many political science studies look into the art of negotiations, only few provide students and practitioners with such a deep sociopsychological view. Dr. Galluccio's project represents an international and multidisciplinary attempt to take stock of what we know and what we need to know: the best way to advance research lies in interdisciplinary cross-fertilization. The challenge is to find ways to coordinate psychological expertise with the expertise afforded through other disciplinary perspectives and in my strong opinion, Dr. Galluccio's work and this project in particular match high expectations. I congratulate Dr. Galluccio for the passion and dedication he showed toward political and psychological sciences and their application to conflict resolution. I am sure that many practitioners will find this volume very relevant and extremely useful. I certainly found it fascinating.

Deputy EU Special Representative
for the Middle East Peace Process
European External Action Service (EEAS)
Brussels, Belgium

Alberto Oggero

Foreword

Any analysis of the prevention and resolution of international disputes which rests solely on structural forces risks diminishing the extraordinary role of the negotiator in world history. The peacemaker is blessed by scripture, but too often we underestimate the importance of negotiation during and after conflicts and the agency that individuals can exert to prevent and resolve conflict through skillful negotiation.

This multifaceted work examines the role of negotiation in a variety of fields, including development cooperation, climate change, and conflict management. By drawing on examples from such varied processes, it exhibits its core strength. Appreciating and applying diverse perspectives in the field of negotiation is critical to achieving durable success and allows practitioners to develop creative solutions to seemingly intractable problems.

The need for such insights has become increasingly clear. While the past decades have seen the incidence of inter-state conflicts decrease, violence remains an all-too-frequent occurrence within states. Moreover, geopolitical change, resource pressures, and climate change are among the many factors threatening to spark conflict within communities, regions, and the world at large. Given such an environment, the need for effective conflict prevention is particularly acute. There is, therefore, an increasing need to train a new generation of international negotiators and to understand successful negotiation techniques by drawing on the experience of scholars and practitioners from a range of different disciplines.

This is a view reinforced by my own experience as a United Nations peacekeeper during the 1990s, where the value of negotiation was consistently underlined. Between 1992 and 1999, for example, the United Nations deployed an unprecedented and successful preventive mission, UNPREDEP, to ensure that violent conflict did not erupt in Macedonia. A major impediment to implementing the mandate which required UN peacekeepers to carry out border patrols was the lack of a demarcated border between Macedonia and Serbia. The dispute over the border also carried the risk of border incidents between civilians and the military of both countries. UN peacekeepers were often detained for hours by Serb authorities who claimed that they had entered Serb territory while on patrol. This problem was solved through the creativity of UNPREDEP officials who negotiated a “UN Patrol Line” between the Macedonian and Serbian authorities to facilitate patrolling by peacekeepers and to prevent border incidents which could escalate into conflict. Conflict management requires creativity, negotiating skills, and cooperation of the parties.

This *Handbook of International Negotiation: Interpersonal, Intercultural, and Diplomatic Perspectives* presents the nuanced and complementary perspectives of experts from a variety of backgrounds and disciplines. In an era where seasoned negotiators are always in short supply and where negotiation techniques are too often compartmentalized, this volume is a breath of fresh air. Particularly useful is the innovative application of theories from disciplines which are often outside the traditional realm of conflict resolution, with contemporary and historical examples of their relevance in practice such as the relevance of the “insight” approach in Northern Ireland and the relevance of cognitive, behavioral, and neural science related to “fairness” for the Chinese–Soviet border clash of 1969.

Few are better placed to bring together this extraordinary roster of contributors than Dr. Mauro Galluccio, whose own interdisciplinary perspective as both a political scientist and psychologist has provided him with a unique perspective on international negotiation throughout his career, which has served both the academy and policy-making institutions, especially within the European Union, itself well apprised of the value of iterative and positive-sum negotiation.

I am confident that this volume will make an important contribution to this essential field, reminding us that in the cause of peace, even where complex and uncertain processes are at work, the empathy, understanding and strategy of an individual can make an enormous difference.

President, The Hague Institute
for Global Justice
The Hague, The Netherlands

Abiodun Williams

Foreword Excerpts

This is a timely and extremely valuable multidisciplinary volume edited by Mauro Galluccio, who since the early 1990s has been instrumental in promoting conflict resolution and transformation. In this text, the contributors have highlighted a number of important aspects of the peace negotiation process from various disciplines which include cognitive and motivational factors, as well as emotional regulation. This book is a very intuitive contribution to the literature which aims to formulate proposals on how to best optimize the use of negotiation and diplomacy structures throughout training programs.

Frank Dattilio, Ph.D., A.B.P.P. (excerpt from the foreword)
Harvard Medical School

I enthusiastically acknowledge Dr. Galluccio's efforts towards the realization of this book. If many political science studies look into the art of negotiations, only few provide students and practitioners with such a deep psychological view. I congratulate Dr. Galluccio for the passion and dedication he showed towards political and psychological sciences and their application to conflict resolution. I am sure that many practitioners will find this volume very relevant and extremely useful. I certainly found it fascinating.

Alberto Oggero (excerpt from the foreword)
Deputy EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process

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Dr. Abiodun Williams (excerpt from the foreword)
President, The Hague Institute for Global Justice

Preface

It is vital to understand that we cannot discuss international negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution as if life conditions and situational contexts did not influence the thoughts, feelings, and actions of human beings. People actively construct their own experience. The more an individual action is conceived and guided by cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes, the smaller the probability that it can be accurately predicted, particularly on the scale of collective action. As a result, world leaders often seem surprised by the way events unfold, often with considerable rapidity. Early awareness for preventive problem-solving possibilities is, therefore, a strategic goal of negotiators: a willingness to look ahead for potential problems and to identify and heed the warning signals. Moving forward, it is important to keep hope and resilience alive among the conflicting parties. Training seems to be the best way to increase awareness of these issues. However, while it is possible to use rational training approaches to facilitate recognition of these problems, these approaches may actually be of limited value in producing change. Key to the process of reasoning is the development of core cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes, particularly those aimed at creating justice, fairness, and outcomes supporting the common good. This is especially the case in a global world where many individuals can be affected by the decisions of a few. Nowadays, our biggest challenge in international negotiation is to encourage negotiators to emphasize cooperative and justice-seeking motives as opposed to “trying to get the best deal for the home team.”

The main goal of this interdisciplinary volume is to expand the recognition that international negotiation represents a process that often rests on interpersonal relationships. Techniques may be applied among parties to reformulate situations to prevent future conflicts through persuasion skills and efforts to shift perspectives. In fact, negotiation should not be seen solely as a tool for identifying non-bellucose solutions and reaching agreements to international issues. Negotiation happens in everyone’s daily life and can be regarded as a basic mode of human interaction. We negotiate at the market, with our friends when we organize a trip and during romantic meetings. At the end of the day, we have to deal with the sometimes conflicting goals, needs, and desires of a counterpart. Life itself is about compromises, and, therefore, it is about reaching agreements. In this regard, the social functional role played by cognition and emotions that are at the heart of negotiation tells us just how they are essential features in human communication more generally. Just as negotiation is a social dynamic process, so too are the thoughts and feelings of negotiators.

The social cognitive approach described in this book is one that has only quite recently started to gain traction among scholars. The most recent findings in cognate fields such as neuroplasticity, affective neuroscience, cognitive sciences, and cultural studies call attention to the limitations of explaining social behavior in terms of power, economics, and resources. Emerging concepts in these fields make evident the relevance of a more constructivist philosophical, anthropological, and psychological approach to knowledge. That said, we are aware of the institutional constraints within which we negotiate. Nevertheless, we find in the figure of the negotiator a sort of bridge to powerful decision-making elites, enabling changes in perceptions and belief, which may in turn influence the processes of decision making. In the final analysis, the goal is to be able to affect leaders' decision-making process and policy shaping. Moreover, international negotiation usually includes parties with different languages, with different meaning attributions, operating with frameworks based on different cultural and ethical models. Hence "reality" may be categorized according to divergent frames and semantic fields. In this light, there is always a gap between a message sent and a message received: the more such a gap is filled, the more likely the communication will be a successful one. To this extent, it is important for negotiators to be aware that every negotiation—as in every communication process—is a subjective dynamical and interactive process, in which both parties are in some way actively responsible for mutual understanding. In this volume, we have made an attempt to explore the relevance of research to complex cases. It is our hope that the work presented in the chapters to follow contribute to a widening of horizons and an awareness that multiple perspectives can be brought to bear on the practice of peace negotiations.

There is a saying in Brussels in the EU institutional framework: "everybody calls for coordination, but nobody wants to be coordinated." Our biggest challenge is coordination. But I am proud to have been the coordinator of this team of the very distinguished contributors. The coordination process has been smooth and, above all, a great learning opportunity. I am indebted to all the contributors for their cooperation, professionalism, and enthusiasm in being part of this interdisciplinary venture. But it is also hoped that readers will benefit in a more practical way by tailoring the authors' concepts to their own training venues, so that they appreciably could increase the mastery, effectiveness, and sustainability of peace negotiation strategies.

It may be evident that I am passionate about this volume. It is a first step in the direction of developing effective approaches to conflict resolution through negotiation. A second step will be to integrate the approaches toward a larger vision of negotiation and related attempts to understanding human sociopsychological mechanisms to bring about conflict transformation and, most important, to sustain changes. It is very satisfying to see this volume in print and have an opportunity to expose people from many parts of the world to these ideas, constructs, and operational approaches.

Rome, Italy
Brussels, Belgium
July 2014

Mauro Galluccio

Introduction to the Book

Diplomacy and International Negotiation in Time of Uncertainty: Our Contribution to Conflict Transformation and Resiliency Processes

The world is experiencing an ever accelerated process of change. Change is now life. It is the omnipresent condition for both the environment and human society. Consider, for example, the extremely rapid pace of globalization and the information revolution. Change at this rate produces unprecedented social conflict at the interpersonal, intergroup, and, most importantly, the international level (the latter topic conventionally includes conflict between ethnic groups as well as between nation states). And conflict often spawns violence, which becomes a major human problem. The possibilities of intervention and control of nature which new technologies have provided to human beings are huge. We live in an era with unprecedented destructive potential as never before. To deal with this problem, there is an increasing need for activities aimed at conflict prevention, resolution, and transformation, produced by the involved parties or outsiders. In our view, negotiation—the search for conflict solutions through talking—lies at the core of most of these activities. Hence, the topic of this book is international negotiation.

Mental Health Deterioration in Prone Conflict Zones

In recent decades, the international community has been facing several conflicts in which one or both of the conflicting parties carried out war crimes with the purpose of destroying the psychological resilience of the “enemy.” Mostly these war crimes occurred among civilians, whose only “sin” was to share the same culture or ethnicity of the enemy. We all have in our eyes the atrocities of the 1991–1999 Yugoslav violent conflicts. As we are assisting at the gross human rights violations in Syria, with UN reporting of 100,000 deaths, 2 million refugees and more than 6.5 million Syrians had been displaced. And the situation in Ukraine, so far broadly under control, could escalate any moment due to the attempts of both parties, Maidan activists and pro-Russians, to fuel the conflict and lead to an open fight, as shown by the Odessa massacre, dated May 2, 2014. The confrontation led to the tragedy that left 46 people dead and over 200 injured as radicals burnt the protesters camp and then set on fire the Trade Unions House with pro-Russia activists

trapped inside. Recent developments in the Ukraine are a reason for great concern about the further unfolding of the conflict and the potential negative impacts on human rights, well-being and health of people in Europe. What seems to have in common with these conflicts is the involvement of civil societies causing suffering of individuals, families, groups, adults, children, and babies without any distinction. The heavy heritage of these conflicts is represented by traumas, posttraumatic stress disorder, related negative emotions and moods, and mental health problems in general apart of economic and political problems.

Well-Being and Resiliency

The book takes a widely interdisciplinary approach. It is a gathering of leading scholars and experts in cognitive and social psychology, psychotherapy, political science, sociology, international relations, and diplomacy. Contributors to this book are well aware that to really contribute to the field of international relations and to the construction and dissemination of a culture of peace, cooperation among all the international actors and scholars from different disciplines should work toward an in-depth understanding of the roots of conflicts in general and that of violent conflicts in particular. Sometimes anthropological-cultural elements are tragically subtended to social dynamic development, and they often greatly influence the way people think. These cognitive and cultural processes are indeed distant from the desirable “neutrality” of the researcher (Aquilari and Galluccio 2008). Yet when decision making is interactive—as it is in negotiation, where each party’s anticipated choices affect the other’s—it is important to assess what the other side will *probably* do in order to limit uncertainties, prevent misunderstandings, and balance the maximization or minimization of risks. Negotiation requires a social mentality that accommodates a cultural sensitivity for both or more sides, which is often very difficult to achieve (Gilbert 2011). Political and psychological processes of transforming conflict consist also of accompanying measures and techniques that can help to (a) increase the cognitive and emotional resources of parties, (b) enhance behavior modification, (c) pave the way for reconciliation, and (d) monitor peace processes (Galluccio 2011). Our interdisciplinary approach could also help in developing and strengthening, through tailored training programs for negotiators, resilience skills in the face of stress, which represent an important element of the mental capital.

Mental capital encompasses both cognitive and emotional resources. It includes people’s cognitive flexibility and efficiency at learning and their emotional competence, social skills, and resilience in the face of stress (Beddington et al. 2008). Resiliency is the remarkable capacity of an individual to withstand considerable hardship, to bounce back in the face of adversity, and to go on to live a functional life with a sense of well-being (Galluccio 2011). When developing policies and designing interventions for conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation, it is best to consider integrated negotiated agreements. These agreements should also

take into account the fostering of the mental capital and mental well-being of individuals and most of all of the right timing when to intervene to train and foster change processes, relationship transformation, and reconciliation. There are so many situations where local people are instead disconnected from peace agreements. Social cohesion can only be strengthened through the cognitive and emotional inclusion of citizens in the reconstruction dynamics in order to achieve a sense of ownership of the peace agreements.

Handbook Aim and Structure

In their chapters, the contributors underscore the process of negotiation and offer various useful methods and approaches to implement it from different perspectives. This book aims to reinforce the foundation of a new field of study and research at the intersection of social sciences, specifically between political science, international relations, diplomacy, and socialcognitive psychology. It seeks to promote a coherent and comprehensive approach to international negotiation from a multidisciplinary viewpoint generating a new wave of integrated cooperative research and fostering networking processes that respond to changes and differences in our societies and to the unprecedented demand for international conflict prevention and resolution. There is a need to increase cooperation, coherence, and efficiency of international negotiation. It is necessary to focus our shared attention on new ways to better formulate integrated and sustainable negotiation strategies for conflict resolution that combine hard and soft power into a more integrated form of power. This book encourages innovative approaches to a new context of international challenges which do not have a one-off solution to a single target-oriented negotiation process. It brings together leading scholars and researchers from different relevant disciplines—diplomats, politicians, senior officials, psychologists, psychotherapists, and a cardinal of the Holy See—to give their contributions and make proposals on how best to optimize the use of negotiation and diplomacy structures, tools, and instruments. The book emphasizes processes that effectively operationalize tools to reduce or face uncertainty and ambiguity toward the goal of achieving better outcomes in international reality-based negotiation.

Organization and Contents of This Handbook

The chapters of this book are organized into seven different parts. Part I is titled *Decision-Making Approaches to Negotiation*, and it is composed of four chapters. In Chap. 1, Daniel Druckman and Esra Cuhadar focus on the role of group and national identity in decisions to take collective action and about factors that influence those decisions. Their study expands this focus by examining the influences of a variety of variables on decisions made by role players to mobilize for war. They show that regime type is only one of the many factors that influence decisions, thus expanding and refining our understanding of democratic peace theory. In Chap. 2, Thomas Dowd

describes several constructs of tacit knowledge that underlie the negotiation process. These include the negotiators' culture, their religion, their native language, and the epistemologies (ways of knowing) and cognitive heuristics (cognitive rules) they use. Dowd discusses how these differences, both in initial assumptions and in the resulting decision-making processes, can influence the outcome in profound ways. In Chap. 3, Michael Meichenbaum considers the potential value of including, what he calls a decision-making consultant (DMC), as a neutral observer of the political decision-making process. He describes how the DMC can use, on an ongoing basis, a variety of evidence-based interventions and strategies to educate and train political leaders and peace negotiators in the decision-making process. He includes in his provocative chapter examples from his work on stress inoculation training that could be used with political leaders and negotiators on a preventative basis. In Chap. 4, Alfred McAlister and Brittanie Wilczak elucidate the construct of moral disengagement from Albert Bandura's social cognitive theory and illustrate how it is applied to understanding why national populations choose to support war and how they can be made for resistant to what the authors term "war fever." After describing the concepts and research providing empirical evidence for their validity, they describe how they relate to recent contemplations of military action against Syria by the United States and United Kingdom and propose training on how they may be applied to prevent future military disasters.

Part II is titled *Reframing Approaches to Negotiation* and is composed of four chapters. In Chap. 5, Nicholas Wright explains how to negotiate successfully with another: we should understand their decision making. Neuroscience combined with psychology and economics provides a powerful new account of human decision making. He discusses three aspects of this account: cooperation, the fairness motivation, and neural "prediction error." He shows how each affects international negotiation through historical cases and gives practical policy recommendations. In Chap. 6, Niel Sargent and Andrea Bartoli examine the implications of viewing the parties to any negotiation as historically situated social actors, whose subjective understanding of the past is likely to impact on their goals, strategies, and tactics in negotiation. Especially where the objective of the negotiations is aimed at reconstituting the terms of the future relationship between the negotiating parties, it is not only the parties' respective visions of the future which is under negotiation but also their understandings of the past. In Chap. 7, Daniel Bar-Tal, Eran Halperin, and Ruthie Pliskin are convinced that intensive and violent intergroup conflicts could potentially be resolved if not the powerful sociopsychological barriers which fuel and maintain them. The chapter elaborates on the nature of these sociopsychological barriers and proposes preliminary ideas of how to overcome them. In Chap. 8, Barry Hart explains how transformative negotiation processes benefit from a comprehensive understanding of the concept and practice of dignity. The influence of honoring dignity deepens the interdependence of the negotiating parties and enhances agreement outcomes that meet the long-term social and emotional needs of the parties represented in the negotiation.

Part III is titled *Conflict Resolution and International Negotiation* and is composed of five chapters. In Chap. 9, Louis Kriesberg affirms that negotiations to reach an agreement between adversaries are an episode in the course of the dynamic relationship between the adversaries. On that premise, he maps out different kinds of goals for different contenders in different relationships. He then discusses transforming relations over a longish period and sees a negotiated agreement as a possibly pivotal episode in an ongoing series of transitions. In Chap. 10, Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson, Pamela Aall, and Simon Palamar focus on the challenges for mediation that arise from the complexities of current conflicts and a rapidly changing international environment. The authors point out the serious problems caused by the inconsistency in the supply of mediators, compounded by a more serious inconsistency in international support for the mediation process. Taking the case of Syria as an example, the chapter looks at two mediation attempts and shows how the combination of fractures both among the conflict parties and among the UN Security Council sponsors (especially the United States and Russia) has made mediation in this complex conflict very difficult. In Chap. 11, Dean Pruitt gives a step-by-step account of the development of readiness theory, which concerns how a disputant decides to enter negotiation aimed at settling an intractable conflict. A cumulative case study method is used, involving sequential examination of the peace processes in three conflicts between dominant and subordinate ethnic groups. In Chap. 12, Cornelia Nauen and Ursula Hillbrand argue that greater focus on people—and meaningful conversations about what matters to the parties—has the potential to reduce conflict and take advantage of the wide range of expertise and experience that not only exists in different departments of government but across many sub-sovereign, professional, civic organizations, and individuals. Their experience in hosting conversations among international groups of people provides empirical evidence that such formats are well suited to entice participants in the process to engage and to own the process and its results.

Part IV is titled *Emotions Regulation in Negotiation* and it is composed of four chapters. In Chap. 13, Carolyn Saarni in her brief essay explores how thoughtful negotiators manage the tension that is inevitable in trying to maximize their own outcome yet recognize that by creating mutually shared value in the negotiation process, both sides are more likely to attain their respective goals. She lists a set of skills that comprise emotional competence, which will benefit negotiators personally as well as the interests of their constituencies and superiors whose positions they are expected to represent. In Chap. 14, David Caruso talks about emotions which are a core component of successful international negotiations. This chapter views emotions as a source of information and describes a set of emotional skills and a blueprint for emotions which can assist negotiators in all aspects of their work. In Chap. 15, Felicity de Zulueta states that aggression and fighting is what drives most of humanity. But as luck would have it, new scientific research emphasizes that humanity's basic desire is to co-operate, to live in peace, and to find solutions to our conflicting needs. The need to stay calm and empathic to the "other" while keeping our brain functioning at its optimum capacity is an achievable goal

as this chapter illustrates. In Chap. 16, Mauro Galluccio and Jeremy Safran focus their joint attention on self-reflective processes, especially in understanding the emotional attitudes which drive our actions and behaviors. In this chapter, they discuss the importance of better understanding negotiators' human cognitive, metacognitive, emotional, and motivational processes and mind structures that create meaning and influence decision-making processes. They suggest that mindfulness-based training can be adapted to enhance negotiators' skills by refining their capacity for mentalizing and mastering their cognitive processes and emotional intelligence in the context of difficult and stressful negotiations.

Part V is titled *Cognitive and Behavioral Approach to Negotiation* and is composed of four chapters. In Chap. 17, Mauro Galluccio and Aaron T. Beck highlight the potential relevance of the cognitive approach to international relations and negotiation processes. They focus their joint attention on conflict and negotiation by inquiring into the mental mechanisms triggering both cooperative and conflicting approaches of international (and human) relations. This chapter emphasizes the crucial importance of the meaning people attach to their interpersonal exchanges. It demonstrates how cognitive biases can spark violence and explores their pivotal role in arousing anger, hostility, hatred, and related maladaptive behaviors. In Chap. 18, Robert Leahy explores how international negotiation is often characterized by a wide range of distortions in thinking, including personalizing, labeling, discounting the positive, catastrophic thinking, and fortune-telling. He identifies the egocentric/narcissistic negotiation style which can lead to overestimating one's own position and underestimating the position of the opposition. Specific cognitive therapy interventions are suggested to offset the risk of egocentric styles of negotiating. In Chap. 19, Paul Gilbert explains that in a world of increasing conflicts, over a variety of resources, and with a need for humans to work together to solve common problems, the area of international negotiations is central to these endeavors. This chapter also argues that we have a species-wide potential for altruism, cooperation, and compassion. If we learn to cultivate these qualities, along with mindfulness, we may well find new ways of negotiating. In Chap. 20, Aimee Karam outlines the specific aspects of the current Lebanese conflict. It emphasizes the raising activism of the civil society in resisting and resolving threats and violence and the vacuum created by severe divisions. Understanding the several facets of a conflict, its cultural meanings, its ideological roots, and how it impacts the beliefs, emotions, and behaviors of a community may serve as a powerful tool, informing the task of the negotiators and the mediators.

Part VI is titled *The Intercultural Dimension of International Negotiation*, and it is composed of four chapters. In Chap. 21, Anthony Marsella talks about truth and reconciliation assumptions and procedures that have been used in local, national, and international to resolve conflicts and to promote harmonious solutions. The role of cultural differences of the parties involved is important. The assumption that truth and reconciliation processes (e.g., confession, apology, penance, restitution, forgiveness) have universal validity and application is a major conceptual error. A multivariate equation is proposed that identifies critical cultural variables that need to be considered for

a successful resolution of conflict. In Chap. 22, David Barash argues that although human beings may have a biological potential for interpersonal violence, this is very different from a “natural instinct” for organized, group-directed violence. He also points out that some scholars—anthropologists as well as evolutionary biologists—have erred in proclaiming that warfare is an ancient adaptation on the part of *Homo sapiens*, whereas the evidence challenges this assumption. In Chap. 23, Nichole Argo and Jeremy Ginges affirm that international political negotiations that include sacred values (SVs) often fall apart, or, when concluded, prove unsustainable. To improve this track record, they apply findings on SVs to the challenges inherent in international negotiations. They suggest an outline for an SV-tailored negotiation training and propose a dual (in-group and intergroup) process-based platform that negotiators can use to prepare parties for negotiations involving SVs and for managing the negotiations themselves. In Chap. 24, Morton Deutsch, Eric Marcus, and Sarah Brazaitis employ social psychological knowledge of groups to discuss the development of the global community. It is critical to form a cooperative global community to manage effectively the urgent problems facing the people on planet Earth. In forming such a community emerging conflicts will require constructive, problem-solving negotiations to be resolved successfully. They consider four social psychological problems and also address the need for nonviolent methods of influence when the other is unwilling to engage in cooperative processes.

Part VII is titled *Diplomacy and International Negotiation*, and it is composed of six chapters. In Chap. 25, His Eminence Cardinal Renato Maria Martino deals with the issue of peace and war. He gives us an interesting insight on the relationship between the two concepts, through the stance of the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church and within the context of the ongoing globalization process. The reasons leading to war between human beings and potential solutions aimed at achieving peace universally are inquired not only through the lenses of theological philosophy but rather according to a multidisciplinary approach focusing on a thorough study of the contemporary international relations. In Chap. 26, former Ambassador Cameron Hume explains why more than ever before diplomacy and business require multi-stakeholder cooperation on divisive issues. Analysis of the negotiating process most frequently keeps a focus on two-party negotiations with an emphasis on how power decides who wins or loses most. Today, however, many important international negotiations are better understood as discussions among members of a stakeholder community, with the goal of agreeing on joint action that can create additional value for stakeholders. Negotiators must form ties with dissimilar partners, build coalitions, and create value through dialogue. The successful negotiator cannot have too many friends, but just one enemy could be too many. In Chap. 27, the Senior State Department negotiator Richard Smith writes of his experience in negotiating numerous environment and science agreements as the Cold War came to an end. These included, for example, the London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer, building and operating an international space station, ending the destructive practice of drift net fishing on the high seas, and preserving the world’s largest trans-boundary caribou

herd. It offers insights into how obstacles to agreement were overcome. The author provides an insider's view not only of the negotiations themselves but also of the intense interplay among government agencies through which a US negotiating position is developed and sustained. In the closing section, it analyzes some of the reasons why the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol failed to deal effectively with the problem of climate change. In Chap. 28, Erik J. Leklem affirms that the field of security sector reform and advising negotiations provides a rich context for examining strategies for and the conduct of negotiations; the author's experience as a security sector advisor in Afghanistan is used as a case study. The chapter examines how the micro-negotiations of an advisor's tradecraft advance capacity building in small, measured ways. A survey of the main challenges in advising and advisor negotiations is presented, followed by a review of restorative best practices that should inform security sector advisors seeking greater and more sustainable success. The author concludes by examining why training for security sector advisors is critical, but often not well done, and provides a proposal for improved advisor training. In Chap. 29, Ambassador Gerardus Gielen focuses his attention and builds on previous research on positive negotiation factors and concrete examples from his more than 20 years of experience in negotiations between the EU and the Group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific States. The chapter explains the very specific context of the partnership between the European Union and 78 African, Caribbean, and Pacific States (ACP-EU partnership) and what it takes to negotiate effectively in such a multi-actor setting. In Chap. 30, Mauro Galluccio and Laura Vivani acknowledge how the improvement of scientific cooperation to foster and improve foreign policy and to drive economic and diplomatic strategies is a challenging exercise. This chapter will try to understand the way negotiation can be used to improve the cooperation in the field of science diplomacy. More precisely, it will focus on whether science diplomacy can be a useful tool to strategically boost development in international relations while fostering public engagement and improving the well-being of citizens.

Concluding Remarks

This book does not offer an ultimate conclusion. Rather, we hope to spark a general interest in this perspective on peace. The hope is to encourage cooperation within fields of academic and practitioner expertise and to initiate a change process that may bode well for future generations. This interdisciplinary approach challenges professionals from a wide variety of fields to ponder such questions as: "Am I mentalizing and framing the issues correctly?" And, if yes, "Do these frames drive my actions (writing, training, making political decisions) toward a path of practical applications that further peace processes?" "Am I merely performing an intellectual exercise that has little impact on the everyday violence that creates vulnerable and fearful worlds for millions of people?" We cannot influence a world or environment that we do not understand. Major challenges in today's changing world are to better understand the conditions of people in their own cultural environments and to

confidently implement strategies for improving those conditions through negotiating peace processes that lead to sustainable outcomes. Time would seem to be of the essence.

Indeed, time stops for none of us!

Rome, Italy
Brussels, Belgium
July 2014

Mauro Galluccio

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Mauro Galluccio

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Part I

**Decision Making Approaches
to Negotiation**

Representative Decision-Making: Challenges to Democratic Peace Theory

1

Esra Cuhadar and Daniel Druckman

Introduction

This chapter continues our focus on the role of group and national identity in decisions to take collective action and asks about factors that influence those decisions (Druckman et al. 2010). As in the previous chapter, we approach this problem from the standpoint of the decision-maker who usually represents a group, organization, or nation. The interest is less about those decision-makers' own identities and attachments than about various drivers and constraints on their decisions to act.

The earlier findings suggested a two-factor theory of action. One factor refers to decisions taken in external conflicts such as violence and humanitarian actions. The decision drivers were severity of threat and extent of public support. Another factor refers to decisions taken in

internal conflicts such as nonviolent protests. The key drivers were the durability of national identity and severity of threat. Interestingly, the decision-maker's political system, as either democratic or autocratic, was only a weak influence on decisions to act in any of the scenarios, external or internal conflicts. This finding challenges a key hypothesis from democratic peace theory. It is the basis for the study reported in this chapter.

Two explanations for this finding are suggested. One is that the theory applies only to decisions to go to war; the empirical evidence provided by the democratic peace theory deals primarily with those decisions. There are numerous instances where democratic nations intervene militarily in the affairs of other democracies short of war (Hermann and Kegley 1995). Our scenarios dealt with decisions to act rather than the act itself. Another explanation is that the democratic peace theory applies to dyadic relations where both own and other regimes are taken into account (Russett 1993). Our earlier study focused only on the decision-maker's regime rather than on the pairing of regime types. These explanations are addressed in the current study. Two types of decisions are compared: reactions to an attack by another country and reactions to a humanitarian crisis involving the deployment of peacekeeping troops. A review of the democratic peace theory arguments precedes a discussion of the variables hypothesized to influence decisions for both types of actions. A set of hypotheses are presented before launching into the methods used and results obtained from the study.

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Democratic Peace Theory

The finding that democracies do not go to war with one another is considered one of the most robust results in international relations during the last two decades (Levy 1988; Russett 1990). Since then, the discussion mainly focused on first why democracies do not go to war with one another and second how the concepts of democracy and war are conceptualized and measured.

Two arguments have been put forward about the decision, made by democracies, to refrain from initiating a war with other democracies. One is referred to as the institutional/structural explanation (Maoz and Russett 1993; Rummel 1983). Democracies favor peace because of the constitutional checks and balances that tie the hands of decision-makers as well as public constraints such as a democratic civil society that includes an antiwar electorate (Ungerer 2012: 16). These constraints remind decision-makers that they are likely to face high political costs for using force (de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). Democratic states are unable to act quickly, and this cautious attitude reduces the likelihood that a conflict will escalate into war (Hermann and Kegley 1995).

Another argument is referred to as the normative/cultural explanation (Maoz and Russett 1993; Doyle 1986). It emphasizes the constraining role played by societal norms favoring peaceful settlement of disputes. States externalize their domestic nonviolent means of conflict resolution by including other democracies within the same moral community. At the same time, they exclude nondemocratic states from the same shared norm of conduct (Ungerer 2012: 17).

In both structural and normative explanations, the common idea put forward is that democratic *structures* or cultural *contexts* constrain *democratic states* from choosing wars, and thus, they are less likely to escalate conflicts into full-fledged wars. After several decades of discussion, there remains a cloud of doubt regarding which of these mechanisms restrain democracies from waging large-scale war against other democracies, although the weight of evidence comes

down on the side of normative explanations (Rosato 2003; Ungerer 2012).

On a more fundamental note, Hermann and Kegley (1995) criticized the theory for not taking into account other types of military interventions undertaken by democracies against both democracies and non-democracies. The fact that democracies are not restrained from engaging in military actions short of war raises interesting questions about both the structural and normative explanations. The key is the dependent variable used in the empirical evaluations of the theory. But, the argument also encourages a closer look at the process leading to decisions about taking actions against other democracies short of war (Hermann and Kegley 1995). A decision-making perspective has received only limited attention in this literature. The research reported in this chapter is an attempt to fill the gap.

A variety of other conceptual and methodological problems have been identified. Conceptual problems include disregard for incentives (rather than constraints) that compel democratic leaders to opt for the use of force. We know little about the circumstances under which decision-makers choose to obey or challenge the constraints against war as well as which constraints they choose to consider (for a study on how democratically elected leaders respond to structural constraints, see Cuhadar et al. [forthcoming](#)). Focusing on incentives, Mintz and Geva (1993) showed that motivations for diverting attention from domestic problems often encourage democratic leaders to become adventurous in their foreign policy decisions, although the actions taken may differ for democratic versus autocratic foreign regimes. The first experiment on the topic was conducted by Rousseau (2005) with US college students. His study was similar to ours in two ways: It was conducted with college students and placed the students in the role of chief political advisor to the president in a fictional scenario. Rousseau randomly varied three variables: the southern neighbor's political regime (democratically elected government versus single-party dictatorship), the balance of military forces (strong versus weak), and the domestic political position of the president

the student was advising (strong versus weak). The students were then asked whether they would advise the president to use military force to settle the dispute. He found that they were less likely to recommend using military force against a democracy than against a dictatorship. A more recent survey experiment by Tomz and Weeks (2013) used public opinion polls in the UK and the USA. They found that individuals are less supportive of military action against democracies than against otherwise identical autocracies. They argued that this is because shared identity of democracy pacifies the public primarily by changing perceptions of threat and morality, not by raising expectations of costs or failure.

With regard to methodology, issues of reverse causation and collinearity have been discussed. On the former issue, it is plausible to suggest that peace causes democracy, particularly in cases involving the termination of civil wars (Tomz and Weeks 2013). Implementing peace agreements often give rise to democratic institutions. On the latter issue, possible confounding variables include shared security and economic interests as well as the development of capitalistic institutions (Mousseau 2003; Gleditsch 1992). These variables are likely to be correlated with democratic political structures and norms. These issues are unlikely to be resolved with events data sets where correlational statistics are used. They are addressed more directly with experimental approaches to the study of decision-making.

Decision Drivers

Democratic peace theory places its bets on the importance of regime type as the key driver of decisions to pursue war. The body of relevant empirical evidence addressing this variable has been based largely on analyses of events or actions. A much smaller set of experimental studies (Mintz and Geva 1993; Rousseau 2005) focused on decisions made prior to action. However, the experiments, like the events data analyses, have explored the sovereign factor of regime type. Both regime type (as an IV) and decisions (as a DV) are included in our research

as well. But they are construed as part of a research design that places them in a larger context that includes other variables.

The set of influences encompasses motivational, readiness, and identity variables along with regime type. Motivation is defined as the severity of threat coming from the target country. Readiness is the organization of resources and preparation for combat or conflict management in the face of external threat. These variables are also emphasized by Gurr and Davies (2002) in their research on collective action in ethnic conflict. The identity variables include durability and spread of constituent support for taking action. These variables are part of Druckman's (2001) three-factor theory of collective action and were included in our earlier study (Druckman et al. 2010). The third identity variable, referred to as type of identity, is defined as the extent to which identities are coerced or voluntary. It is operationalized in terms of the distinction between autocratic and democratic political regimes. This distinction connects identity theory to the democratic peace hypothesis. In this study, we create the dyadic version of the democratic peace theory by assessing the influence of both one's own national regime and the target country's regime.

Building on the Hermann and Kegley (1995) critique of democratic peace theory, we consider two versions of actions. One version consisted of a choice between mobilizing troops for war and placing troops on alert in the face of a threatening neighbor. This choice is highlighted in democratic peace theory. Another version consisted of a choice between sending and not sending peace-keeping troops to a country in the throes of a humanitarian crisis. This choice reflects decisions taken short of war and, as such, addresses the critique about the limited focus of the theory on military actions that lead to or plunge a democracy into war. Of particular interest is the question whether own or other's regime type is the key influence on decisions: Does regime type trump the impact of other factors on decisions to take action? Is regime type a stronger influence on decisions to go to war than on other military decisions short of war? These questions are a basis for the hypotheses to follow.

Hypotheses

A central tenet of democratic peace theory is that regime type is the key factor in decisions to respond to threats by going to war. Two hypotheses follow from this proposition:

- H1: Democracies will choose to place troops on alert—rather than attack—when threatened by another democracy.
- H2: Democracies will choose to attack or mobilize for war when threatened by an autocratic government.

The theory also suggests that regime type does not influence decisions about actions short of war. The following hypotheses follow from this proposition:

- H3: Democracies will send peacekeeping forces to manage conflicts in or provide aid to both democratic and autocratic nations.
- H4: The regime type of the other nation more strongly influences decisions to go to war than for decision short of war.

Other theoretical perspectives challenge the above hypotheses. Realism suggests that the key factors in decisions to use force—including military and peacekeeping troops—are the severity of threat and readiness for combat rather than regime type. This perspective suggests the following hypotheses:

- H5: The more severe the threat from another nation, the more likely a target nation will act irrespective of type of regime.
- H6: Readiness for action will encourage nations to act irrespective of regime type.

Another variable investigated in our earlier study was spread of popular support for national action. This variable was shown to strongly influence decisions for collective action in both violent and humanitarian situations (Druckman et al. 2010). It derives from a body of work referred to as representation theory and emphasizes the impact of constituencies on decisions in negotiation and in

collective action situations (e.g., Druckman 2006). The key hypothesis is as follows:

- H7: Wide popular support within a nation will encourage decisions to act irrespective of regime type.

A final variable is suggested from the literature on identity theory. Referred to as durability of identity, this variable is also hypothesized to influence collective decisions to act in the face of a threat. By durability we refer to the extent of commitment to the nation varying from strong to weak national identities. Strong identities are easier to mobilize for combat. They are also more likely to sustain participation in the campaign (Druckman 2001). Durability would encourage taking action in response to a threat from another nation as summarized by the following hypothesis:

- H8: More durable national identities will encourage decisions to take action irrespective of regime type.

An attempt is made to evaluate this set of hypotheses. In particular, we are interested in comparing predictions from democratic peace theory (hypotheses H1–H4) with those that emanate from other theoretical sources (H6–H8). A key question is whether regime type is a stronger or weaker influence on collective decisions than the other variables also hypothesized to influence actions (threat, readiness, spread, and durability): Do democracies act differently in response to other democracies or to autocracies? Or are decisions to act by democracies influenced more by other factors? (same paragraph). These questions are addressed with an experimental methodology that facilitates the task of sorting the hypothesized influences in terms of their relative contribution to decisions. We turn now to a discussion of these methods.

Approach

Our focus on the democratic peace hypothesis highlights the role of regime type in decisions made to pursue or restrain from going to war

against a threatening nation. Thus, we are interested in comparing the decisions made by leaders in democratic countries confronting actions taken by other democratic or autocratic nations. This distinction is the key variable in this study.

Participants, in their roles as democratic decision-makers, are confronted by one of the two scenarios, a threat from a democratic or autocratic country. The decision task is embedded in two types of narratives, referred to as violent threat or humanitarian missions. In the violent threat narrative, role players were faced with a threat on their border and asked to choose between mobilizing their troops to attack and placing the troops on a readiness alert (see Appendix 1). In the humanitarian narrative, role players were faced with a crisis in another country and asked to choose between sending and not sending peacekeeping forces to aid that country (see Appendix 2). For both narratives, the other nation's regime type was either democratic or autocratic. Thus, the study was construed as a 2×2 design with the other nation's type of political system (democratic, autocratic) and type of narrative (violence, peacekeeping) as the variables.

The narratives provided information about four other aspects of the situation. One refers to motivation and is defined in terms of the severity of the threat, as an aggressive force on their border or as a severe crisis. Another is referred to as efficacy and is defined in terms of readiness of troops for combat or for peacekeeping. A third variable is spread, defined in terms of popular support for the military or peacekeeping campaign. The fourth variable is durability, defined as a strong identity among the citizens of the nation being represented. Unlike our previous study, reported in Druckman et al. (2010), each of these variables is geared in the direction of action, for example, an intense threat, a force ready for combat, widespread support, and durable identities. Thus, these factors are construed as background information rather than variables. This design decision serves to highlight regime type as the key variable. The comparison of interest is the relative importance of the other nation's regime type (which is varied) versus each of the other factors (which is not varied) as influences

on decisions. Since each of the factors is geared toward action, this may be considered a strong test of the democratic peace hypothesis: Does the other's regime type influence decisions in situations of severe threats, high readiness, and so on? This focus does however preclude comparisons of impacts of the five factors, for example, high versus low threat severity compared to high versus low readiness.

Participants were students at Bilkent University majoring in political science or international relations. The study was performed as part of a course requirement. One-hundred and four role players were assigned randomly to one of the four dyadic conditions: Equivalent political science classes were assigned the violence or humanitarian narratives with 42 receiving the former and 62 receiving the latter package; there were no systematic differences between these classes. They were asked to play the role of a national decision-maker facing a collective action decision whether to send military or peacekeeping forces in the face of a crisis. Following the decision, they were asked to make pair comparison judgments about the five factors highlighted in the scenarios. In order to prevent any priming effect, the explanation about the matrix was not given until the participants finished reading the scenarios. The entire process took about 45 min to complete.

The paired comparison mechanics require a "more or less important" comparison for all pairs of factors, a total of 15 comparisons. For example: "Is your country's (Aland) political system more/less important in your decision than the political system of the opponent country (Zland)?" The last page of the survey included open-ended questions asking participants to elaborate on their paired comparison judgments.

These judgments are coded and analyzed according to the procedure given in Guilford (1954: 554–558). The method produces values on a psychological scale. The procedure gives the number and proportion of times each element is judged as being more important than each of the other elements. A proportions matrix is then converted into areas of the normal curve (*z*-scores). Based on Thurstone's law of comparative judgment, the procedure is suited especially for

similar elements such as colors judged for pleasantness, samples of handwriting judged for excellence, or vegetables judged for taste. In this study, as in Druckman et al. (2010), we asked participants to judge the *different* elements for importance. To the extent that the pairwise comparisons can be made, we have confidence that the resulting scales are meaningful. The result is an ordering of the six elements. An advantage of this procedure is that it allows for direct comparisons of situations and actions, which is the goal of this study. Furthermore, it allowed us to come up with a ranking for four different conditions that render conclusions about the hypotheses stated above.

Results

The results are organized in the order of the hypotheses stated above. We begin with the two key hypotheses from democratic peace theory:

- H1: Democracies will choose to place troops on alert—rather than attack—when threatened by another democracy.
 H2: Democracies will choose to attack or mobilize for war when threatened by an autocratic government.

Answers to the question about decisions in the face of violent threats address these hypotheses. In the democratic-democratic (DD) condition, 24 % of the role players decided to mobilize in preparation for war, while 76 % decided to put the army on readiness alert. This result supports hypothesis 1. Thirty-eight percent of the role players in the democratic-autocratic (DA) condition decided to mobilize the nation's army in preparation for war, while 62 % decided to put the nation's army on readiness alert. This result supports hypothesis 2. More role players decided to mobilize for war in the DA condition, a difference of 14 %. Additional analyses provide further support for these hypotheses. Seven of eight role players in the DA condition who chose to mobilize also indicated that the key source for this decision was the other nation's regime type (autocratic). Only 3 of 13 who chose the alert option indicated that the other's nation

Table 1.1 Decision by source for the violent threat DA condition

		Decision	
		Mobilize	Place on alert
Source	Own nation	1	10
	Other nation	7	3

Table 1.2 Violence narrative

Democratic–autocratic dyad	Democratic–democratic dyad	
Threat	0	Own system 0
Spread	.03	Threat .07
Other's system	.13	Durability .18
Readiness	.27	Spread .20
Durability	.41	Readiness .28
Own system	.42	Other's system .29

(autocratic) drove the decision. This is shown below in Table 1.1. The relationship between decision choice (mobilize or alert) and source for decision (own versus other) is strongly significant by chi-square (chi-square = 8.24, 1 df, $p < .004$, two-tailed). The relationship between decision and source for the DD condition is not significant. These findings provide support for the democratic peace theory explanation.

Further evidence comes from the pair comparison data shown in Table 1.2. As can be seen from the rankings, the other nation's political system is modestly important (ranked third out of six factors) in the DA condition but least important in the DD scenario. Thus, the other's regime is somewhat important for decision-makers in the DA condition but is unimportant in the DD condition. Of note also are the relative rankings of own nation's political system, in this case a democracy: It is the most important factor in the DD condition but least important in the DA condition.

Hypothesis 3 deals with decisions short of war.

- H3: Democracies will send peacekeeping forces to manage conflicts in or provide aid to both democratic and autocratic nations.

Answers to the question about decisions in the face of humanitarian crises address this hypothesis. Eighty-seven percent of the role players in DD condition indicated that they would send peacekeeping troops to the nation in crisis. Ninety percent of the role players in the DA

Table 1.3 Humanitarian narrative

Democratic–autocratic dyad		Democratic–democratic dyad	
Spread	0	Own system	0
Readiness	.18	Spread	.09
Own system	.20	Economy/history	.22
Durability	.36	Readiness	.26
Economy/history	.51	Durability	.59
Other’s system	.55	Other’s system	.97

Table 1.4 Democratic–autocratic dyads

Violent narrative		Humanitarian narrative	
Threat	0	Spread	0
Spread	.03	Readiness	.18
Other’s system	.13	Own system	.20
Readiness	.27	Durability	.36
Durability	.41	Economy/history	.51
Own system	.42	Other’s system	.55

Table 1.5 Democratic–democratic dyads

Violent narrative		Humanitarian narrative	
Own system	0	Own system	0
Threat	.07	Spread	.09
Durability	.18	Economy/history	.22
Spread	.20	Readiness	.26
Readiness	.28	Durability	.59
Other’s system	.29	Other’s system	.97

condition gave the same answer. These data provide strong support for the hypothesis: The other nation’s regime does not influence this decision. Further support for this hypothesis comes from the pair comparison rankings shown in Table 1.3. The opponent’s political system is the least important factor in both conditions.

Hypothesis 4 compares the two narratives: violent threats and humanitarian missions.

H4: The regime type of other nation more strongly influences decisions to go to war than for decision short of war.

The pair comparison data shown in Tables 1.4 and 1.5 address this hypothesis for the DD and DA conditions. As can be seen in Table 1.4 (the DD condition), the other nation’s political system is the least important factor for both the violent threat and humanitarian narratives. As can be seen in Table 1.5 (the DA condition), the other

nation’s political system is modestly important (ranked third of six factors) for the violent threat but least important for the humanitarian narrative. Thus, contrary to this hypothesis, regime type is relatively unimportant in both narratives.

Hypothesis 5 deals with the importance of the severity of threat.

H5: The more severe the threat from another nation, the more likely a target nation will act irrespective of type of regime.

This hypothesis is addressed with the pair comparison data shown in Table 1.2. Threat is the most important factor motivating the decision made in the DA condition and second most important factor in making the decision about troops in the DD condition. These data provide strong support for the hypothesis. Further analyses reinforce support for this hypothesis. Nineteen of 21 role players in the DA/violent scenario indicated that threat was more important than own regime type. Only two indicated that country’s own regime type was more important than threat. For the seven people who said they will mobilize troops in the DA/violent scenario, all indicated that threat was more important. The comparison between other’s regime type (autocracy) and threat for those who chose to mobilize troops in the DA condition (eight representatives) shows that those who think other’s regime type (autocracy) is most important and those who think severity of threat is most important are equal. However, threat is less relevant as a factor in the humanitarian narrative. As shown in Table 1.3, that factor (referred to as economy/history) is ranked third in the DD condition and fifth in the DA condition.

Hypothesis 6 deals with the troops’ readiness for taking action.

H6: Readiness for action will encourage nations to act irrespective of regime type.

This hypothesis is also addressed with the pair comparison data shown in Tables 1.2 and 1.3. Readiness is among the least important factors in both the DA and DD conditions of the violent threat narrative. It is among the more important factors in the DA, but not the DD, condition for the humanitarian narrative. Thus, the hypothesis receives only marginal support.

Hypothesis 7 concerns the spread of popular support for collective action.

H7: Wide popular support within a nation will encourage decisions to act irrespective of regime type.

This hypothesis is generally supported across the narratives and conditions. Spread is particularly important in the humanitarian narrative as shown in Table 1.2. It is relatively important in the DA condition of the violent threat narrative but less important (ranked fourth of six factors) in the DD condition.

The final hypothesis concerns the durability of national identity.

H8: More durable national identities will encourage decisions to take action irrespective of regime type.

The pair comparison ratings shown in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 address this hypothesis. Across the narratives and conditions, durability is a less important source of decisions. The highest ranking for this factor is third in the DD condition of the violent threat narrative. Thus, it is among the least important factors in both types of narratives (see also Tables 1.4 and 1.5).

Taken together, the data suggest that the other nation's regime motivates decisions to mobilize troops for attack when the other nation is autocratic. Overall, however, across the various conditions, the other's regime is relatively unimportant as a source of decisions. The threat posed by the other nation is, however, very important in the violent threat narrative, and the spread of public support for actions is a strong source of decisions in three of the four narratives/conditions. Interestingly, one's own political system, democracy in these scenarios, is the most important factor for the DD (but not the DA) condition for both narratives. We turn now to a discussion of these findings.

Discussion

Democratic peace theory was initially formulated in two versions: (a) the monadic and (b) the dyadic proposition (Russett 1993). Although these two propositions differ in the extent to which the regime type of the target state is considered

important, they both suggest that democracies are less likely to go to war. According to the monadic proposition, democracies in general are more reluctant to engage in military action (Maoz and Russett 1993). This proposition suggests the importance of institutional constraints in a democracy. They serve to restrain decision-makers from going to war regardless of the regime type of the other country (Russett 1993). According to the institutional approach, democracies favor peace because of the constitutional checks and balances that tie the hands of decision-makers and the existence of a democratic civil society. These constraints present decision-makers with the prospect of high political costs for using force (de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). Moreover, democratically elected leaders are unable to act quickly, and this cautious foreign policy behavior reduces the likelihood that a conflict will escalate into war (Hermann and Kegley 1995).

In contrast, the dyadic proposition suggests that democracies are more pacific only when they confront other democracies. The pacifying effect of a democracy was also argued for lower-level conflicts and disputes. Our results indicate stronger support for the dyadic version of the democratic peace theory. Regime type matters most when the threat comes from an autocratic country: Respondents in the DA condition indicated more support for mobilizing troops when threatened compared to respondents in the DD condition. Regime type is important not because the country receiving a threat is a democracy but because the threatening country is an autocracy. However, despite this difference between the two conditions, a minority of role players in both the DA and DD conditions favored military action against the threatening country. This can be interpreted as modest support for the monadic proposition. Respondents' ranking of the variables in the DD condition further strengthens this point. The country's democratic system is regarded as the most important factor by the respondents in the DD condition, whereas the country's democratic regime is not important when the country is threatened by an autocratic country. In sum, our study supports the dyadic proposition in democratic peace theory, but it does not disconfirm the monadic argument. Being a democracy was regarded as the most

important variable when the country was faced with a threat from another democracy.

The higher ranking of the other's regime in the DA condition encourages a closer look at in-group–out-group dynamics in threatening situations. The key factor may be shared or unshared identity evoked by the other's regime type. In our study, the kind of identity, as fluid or strong, was not ranked as being important by the respondents. However, even though durability was regarded as being relatively unimportant, shared identity in the DD condition may make respondents less likely to support military action, while unshared identity may facilitate support for military action. This may be the reason why regime type of the other country is ranked as being more important in the DA than in the DD condition. Thus, unshared identity may be triggering out-group bias, whereas shared identity may be triggering in-group favoritism. This line of thought has been largely ignored by the democratic peace theory literature. Further research is encouraged to ascertain the role played by shared or unshared identity as explanatory processes that help to navigate the difference between monadic and dyadic versions of the theory.

Democratic peace theory has isolated the effect of regime type in order to create a parsimonious theory of militarized state behavior. It has often been regarded as a robust theory that supports the liberal approach to understanding militarized interstate disputes. Our results challenge these assumptions by showing that the effect of regime type is contingent on several conditions, including the other's regime, the severity of threat, and spread of support. Threat is an important factor in all of the conditions. An autocratic counterpart enhances the severity of threat and increases the likelihood of military action.

These two variables are further consolidated when we add spread as a third variable. Thus, it is necessary to understand the relationships among the three variables in future research concerning democratic peace theory. How does threat and regime type interact and what happens when public support or lack of support is included in the scenario? Our results spotlight these variables. More broadly, they address several theoretical traditions relevant to state behavior: liberal and realism paradigms as well as representation theory.

The addition of representation theory raises other interesting questions. For example, does popular support strengthen the will of democratic decision-makers to embark on violent foreign adventures against authoritarian regimes as was the case with the Iraq war? Does a lack of popular support reduce the motivation of decision-makers to react to threats from authoritarian regimes? Does a lack of popular support result in domestic friction that hampers mobilization and effective campaigns as was the case with the Vietnam War? These questions move the democratic peace debate in the direction of multiple, contingent causation for national decisions. They can be explored as hypotheses to be evaluated with experimental methods. This approach is especially useful for untangling relationships (relative variance explained) and discerning paths (mediating variables) among the three variables.

This study presents thought-provoking results on another contested issue within democratic peace theory: decisions that require mobilizing army in situations short of war. The results obtained in the humanitarian conditions showed that the other country's regime was considered to be relatively unimportant. Thus, the argument about the "shared" versus "unshared" identity distinction may be less relevant in these situations. Spread in the form of support for action is the most important factor in both DA and DD conditions of the humanitarian narrative. This finding corroborates the argument developed in the democratic peace literature favoring the role played by constitutional checks and balances in constraining the actions taken by decision-makers (Ungerer 2012). However, this is not because these constraints make democracies act slowly or cautiously. Rather, these constraints remind decision-makers that they are likely to face high political costs when their actions are not supported by the public. This is evident by the importance of spread in both conditions of this narrative: It is the most important factor in the DA condition and second most important in the DD condition. It is also evident in the results for ranking of own political system, ranked as most important in the DD condition and third in the DA condition.

In humanitarian situations, it appears that one's own system is a more important influence on

actions than the other’s system. When there is need for humanitarian intervention, states most likely do not externalize their domestic nonviolent means of conflict resolution by including only other democracies within the same moral community. They treat both democracies and autocracies with the same shared norm of conduct based on the framing of a humanitarianism intervention rather than on the basis of a framing of “us” versus “them.” The way that contexts (violent threats, humanitarian missions) influence the perception of the “other” (as part of or outside of a shared moral community) is an interesting topic for further research.

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Appendix 1: Violence Narrative

The Situation

You are a national decision-maker from Aland, which has a democratically elected government where citizens are encouraged but not required to show loyalty to the government. You are faced with the following situation and must make a decision.

Your country has had a history of contentious relations with a neighboring country, Zland, which has a nonelected autocratic regime (replaced with elected democratic regime for the DD version) where citizens are required to show loyalty to the government. They have mobilized their troops along your border. Your sophisticated, well-organized, and trained army is ready for

action. Your public is generally unified with regard to most government policies including the suggestion that action be taken against Zland, and most of your citizens have strong ties to the nation which they regard as their primary group identity. The majority of your citizens consider themselves to be strongly nationalistic.

You must now decide whether to act against this threat. Based on the information you received above, will you mobilize your army for action against your neighbor Zland or only put them on readiness alert? (Circle one.)

You will notice that there are six underlined elements in this situation. These must be taken into account in making your decision: *your nation’s Aland political system, the severity of the external threat, the sophistication of your army, the spread of support throughout your population, and the strength of your citizens’ identity within the nation, and the political system of the threatening country, Zland.* We ask you to compare these features of the situation in terms of their relative importance in influencing your decision. This is done with the following procedure.

The matrix below lists each of the elements along the side and at the top. You will compare each element with each of the other elements as a pairwise comparison. For example, if you think that your nation’s Aland’s political system is a more important influence on your decision than the severity of the threat, circle *more*; if the army’s sophistication is less important than the severity of the threat, circle *less*, and so on. Please make a decision of more or less influence on your decision for each of the 15 comparisons. Remember you are being asked to compare the row factor with each factor in the five columns.

	The political system of threatening country (Zland)	Threat	Military sophistication	The spread of citizen support	The strength of citizens’ identity within your nation
Is your country’s (Aland) political system	More/less	More/less	More/less	More/less	More/less
Is threatening country’s (Zland) political system		More/less	More/less	More/less	More/less
Is the severity of Threat			More/less	More/less	More/less
Is military sophistication				More/less	More/less
Is the spread of citizen support for policies					More/less

A more or less important factor in your decision than:

Please answer the following questions in a few sentences:

1. What was the most important factor and *why*?
2. Did your country's (Aland) and the threatening country's (Zland) political systems influence your decision? *Why* and *how*?

Appendix 2: Humanitarian Narrative

The Situation

You are a national decision-maker from Aland, which has a democratically elected government where citizens are encouraged but not required to show loyalty to the government. You are faced with the following situation and must make a decision.

A far away country, Zland, which has a non-elected autocratic regime (replaced with an elected democratic regime in the DD version) where citizens are required to show loyalty to the government, is a failed state and relies on the support of international community, including your country, to provide security and to distribute humanitarian aid to its impoverished people, whose survival is threatened by the local warlords in the country. Your country is a well-developed nation, which historically has been a major contributor to international peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Your military and civilian supports are well trained in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Public opinion polls show there is widespread support among your citizens for sending your peacekeepers on a humanitarian mission to Zland and

most of your citizens regard their national identity as one of their several group identities. The majority of your citizens regard themselves as internationalists.

You must now decide whether you want to send your peacekeepers on a humanitarian mission to Zland which aims at providing security and humanitarian assistance to the people there. Based on the information you received above, will you send your peacekeepers to Zland to help the people there or not take any action at all? (Circle one.)

You will notice that there are six underlined elements in this situation. These must be taken into account in making your decision: *your nation's (Aland's) political system, the economic situation and the historical record of your country, the training and readiness of your peacekeepers, the spread of support throughout your population for your actions, the strength of your citizens' identity within the nation, and the political system of the host country, Zland*. We ask you to compare these features of the situation in terms of their relative importance in influencing your decision. This is done with the following procedure.

The matrix below lists each of the elements along the side and at the top. You will compare each element with each of the other elements as a pairwise comparison. For example, if you think that your nation's (Aland's) political system is a more important influence on your decision than the economic situation and historical record of the country, circle *more*; if the peacekeeper's readiness is less important than the spread of support, circle *less*. Please make a decision of more or less influence on your decision for each of the 15 comparisons. Remember you are being asked to compare the row factor with each factor in the five columns.

	The political system of host country (Zland)	Your economy/historical record	Your peacekeeper's readiness	The spread of citizen support	The strength of citizens' identity within your nation
Is your country's (Aland) political system	More/less	More/less	More/less	More/less	More/less
Is host country's (Zland) political system		More/less	More/less	More/less	More/less
Is your economy /historical record			More/less	More/less	More/less
Is your peacekeepers' readiness				More/less	More/less
Is the spread of support					More/less

A more or less important factor in your decision than:

Please answer the following questions in a few sentences:

1. What was the most important factor and *why*?
2. Did your country's (Aland) and the host country's (Zland) political systems influence your decision? *Why and how*?

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Tacit Knowledge Awareness and Its Role in Improving the Decision-Making Process in International Negotiations

2

E. Thomas Dowd

It is commonly assumed that the negotiation process, whether political or personal, is a rational and aboveboard process, wherein each participant attempts to achieve the best possible overall outcome, is willing to compromise, and assumes that all participants possess roughly equal amounts of good will. But all negotiators bring their tacit cognitive knowledge structures and cultural and social history, as well as their native languages, to the negotiating table. These structures and histories are often very different; yet all participants tend to assume tacitly that their own assumptions are similar to those of the others. In this chapter I shall discuss how these differences, both in initial assumptions and in the resulting decision-making processes, can influence the outcome in profound ways.

The Importance of Culture

Let me first address the impact of culture. Because much of the current psychological literature was developed within the context of western society and embodying the values and assumptions of the European Enlightenment, we tend to assume that these constructs are cultural universals rather than cultural specifics. Within the field of psychotherapy, Freud made the same mistaken assumption,

assuming that the psychological difficulties of affluent nineteenth-century Central Europeans were inherent and invariant to all people everywhere (Dowd 2003). In the immediate post-World War era of unbridled individualism and self-expression, both Donald Winnicott and Heinz Kohut placed the masterful and bounded self at the center of social life (Cushman 1995, p. 211). Carl Rogers' client-centered therapy can be seen as reflecting two cultural aspects of mid-twentieth-century American life: the increasing egalitarianism that reduced the status of the therapist and the increasing material affluence that permitted the leisurely exploration of one's inner life. By contrast Buddhist writings speak of the "imposture of the ego" and argue that the self has no real existence at all. People commonly mistake the transient, impermanent, and constructed self for something enduring and central. True mental health (release from suffering), in Buddhist eyes, involves ending the attachments to possessions, the ego, one's sense of the way things should be, and one's sense of selfhood.

Jeffrey Young (Young et al. 2003) and his colleagues likewise developed their early maladaptive schemas (EMSs) within the context of an American and Western European worldview. They argued that these EMSs were caused by difficulties stemming from early experiences with caregivers and other adults and suggested that everyone has some residual difficulties somewhere. This resulted in the creation of EMSs that would not necessarily be pathological in other

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societies. For example, enmeshment/undeveloped self (an excessive emotional involvement and closeness with significant others at the expense of full individuation) might be considered normative in cultures not possessing the high level of individualism characteristic of standard American society and even normative in certain American subcultures such as the Amish religious group which stresses individual subordination to the group. Indeed, a major divide between eastern and western societies is the relative emphasis placed on the individual versus the group. Western societies, especially the American, stress the enhancement of individualism and individuation (“Be all that you can be!”), while eastern societies stress conformity to group norms and values. This is illustrated by an American saying, “The squeaky wheel gets the grease.” In Japan, however, a comparable saying is, “The nail that stands out gets pounded down.” Western societies tend to advocate overcoming one’s difficulties, while eastern societies often advocate acceptance.

These tacit cultural assumptions are automatically laid down early in life by our constant interaction with our culture and thereafter only elaborated upon rather than radically changed. They are experienced by people as a “given,” so obvious as to require no explanation. If challenged on their tacit cultural assumptions, people tend to say, “but that’s just the way things are. That’s just reality. Everyone knows that!” In other words, we see what we expect to see and we find what we expect to find. Rather than “seeing is believing,” a more accurate phrase might be “believing is seeing.” Because these cultural assumptions are so deeply embedded in one’s very sense of personal identity, they are defended vigorously and there is a strong tendency to label those whose cultural assumptions are very different from one’s own as wrongheaded, stupid, or even malevolent and evil. If these challenges are serious and sustained, however, individuals may experience a crisis, partially decompensate, feel depersonalized, and begin to lose their sense of identity. This may be expressed by statements such as, “I don’t know what’s real anymore or I don’t even know who I am anymore.” Some of

these feelings can be experienced by those who are caught between two very different cultures, sharing assumptions of both. In international negotiations these tacit cultural assumptions may surface without either side realizing it.

The Role of Religion

A major cultural variable strongly influencing one’s worldview is that of religion (Dowd and Nielsen 2006). Religious beliefs and other (sub) cultural assumptions can be seen as examples of tacit or implicit knowledge structures that are developed automatically at an early age. The tacit assumptions behind religion affect us all profoundly, even if we no longer practice our cultural religion, and it is very difficult for those raised in and inculcated with the basic assumptions of Christianity to understand just how deeply these assumptions may differ from those of other religions. For example, the Christian notion of sin as the central human problem and salvation as the answer is foreign to other world religions. Furthermore, Christianity is considered to be an incarnational religion, where God became human flesh, and the invitation is to a relationship with Jesus: a construction found in no other religion. But in Islam, the notion that humans are “children of God” (a central Christian assumption) can be seen as an “arrogant conceit” (Dowd and Nielsen 2006, p. 13). In Islam pride is the central problem and submission is the solution; in Buddhism the problem is suffering and the solution is awakening (Prothero 2010). Significant differences can even exist between and among variants of Christianity; for example, the “close cousins” of western Catholicism and eastern Orthodoxy differ significantly on their views of the incarnation and original sin. And Robert Wuthnow (1988) has referred to the conservative–liberal divide in American Christianity as splitting different Christian groups from within, so that liberals in different groups have more in common with each other than with conservatives in their own groups and vice versa. Other religions may possess the same divide. This tendency has been described as “Man creates God in his own image.”

Across and even within different religions, there is another issue which can affect how religions determine one's worldview and that is the extent to which individuals take their faith seriously. Gordon Allport (Allport and Ross 1967) referred to this as the distinction between an *intrinsic* and an *extrinsic* religious orientation. The former is seen in people who find great personal meaning and direction in their beliefs, tend to internalize them, try to follow them fully, and live by them. They tend to be exclusivist, in that they see their own religion as being true and complete, whereas others as more or less false and incomplete. By contrast, the latter is seen in people who make use of religion for their own ends. They may find religion useful in many ways: for self-justification, security, comfort, and social connections with others. But the total acceptance and embrace of the specific creeds and religious behaviors are lightly held or shaped to individual needs and they tend to be quite relativistic in their beliefs. The latter tends to be characteristic of religious expression in North America and Western Europe; in fact American religiosity and spirituality has been described as a mile wide and an inch deep. By contrast, people in other societies and adhering to other religions may live their faith in a way secular westerners find uncomfortable. There are even significant differences between the religious assumptions and expressions held by European and North American Christians on one hand and African and Asian Christians on the other. For example, African Catholics tend to be more socially and sexually conservative than those in Europe and North America; the former generally more consonant with current official church teachings. Some African languages are reputed not to have a word for "homosexual." Individuals who possess an extrinsic orientation would not necessarily describe themselves that way because it sounds superficial. But to the extent they do possess an extrinsic orientation; they may find it quite difficult to understand those whose religious orientation is intrinsic, seeing them as rigid, intolerant, and judgmental. By contrast, those possessing an intrinsic orientation may see those of an extrinsic orientation as faithless, irreligious, or worse. One person's strong sense of values can be another per-

son's intolerance. Indeed, should people even tolerate intolerance?

These differences play out even within American society as well as potentially in international negotiations. For example, a major point of current controversy within American society is the degree to which people of "deep religious faith" (i.e., intrinsic religious orientation) can and should be allowed to discriminate against others whose values and lifestyles the former find offensive. This has featured most prominently in the desire of some conservative Christians to refuse services to gay people.

Why are religious expressions important to people and why do they appear to be universal throughout human history? There is a general and a specific answer. Humans are fundamentally meaning makers; their cognitive structures do not easily adapt to ultimate meaninglessness. Indeed, a perceived lack of meaning is deeply frightening to people, and they will go to great lengths to find (or create if necessary) meaning in confusing situations and events. In addition, religion enables people to make meaning out of the fact that they will die. A major message of all religions is that death is not a problem.

There is another societal force which may also be fueling the role of religion as a major source of tacit cultural differences affecting international negotiations. In another context, I (Dowd 2005) have referred to the worldwide "clash of cultures" resulting from rapid communication and transportation, as groups previously separated from one another come into close contact. This can be profoundly unsettling and upsetting to people in both cultures, as each argues for its own concepts of goodness and morality and sometimes attempts to force them and their own cultural assumptions on those in other cultures. The intermingling that results can be gentle or it can be harsh. But both cultures are changed in the process, although not necessarily to the same degree. It is easiest to see this cultural clash between two different religions, such as Christianity, Islam, or Buddhism. But it can also exist within the same broad religion, such as between different Christian or Islamic groups, religious liberals and conservatives, or the religious and the spiritual. It has also played a part in

political divisions within the United States, especially around hot-button topics such as abortion and gay marriage which have politico-socio-religious implications. Each group has its own vision of the “good and noble life” which is not necessarily shared by other groups, and it is easy to see the others as not just wrong but as “evil” or malevolent. These tacit religious assumptions have the ability to undermine and poison many international negotiation processes.

Epistemologies in Human Cognition

The role of epistemologies in tacit human cognition is a major source of problems in negotiations. An epistemology is simply a way or method of knowing something, and we all use them even if we aren't aware of them or can't define them. Different cultures, subcultures, and even individuals use different epistemologies as a way of understanding and making sense of the world, and they can therefore be a tacit point of contention in the negotiation process. For the purpose of this chapter, I shall identify and discuss several that have implications for tacit cognitive constructs affecting international negotiations.

1. The method of tenacity says something is true because it has always been true. This epistemology is characteristic of traditional, deeply conservative cultures and individuals. It is very difficult to overcome precisely because it is so deeply embedded in the past and in unquestioned assumptions about the nature of reality itself. Isolated cultures and individuals tend to exhibit it the most.
2. The method of authority says something is true because one or more authority figures say it is. This epistemology can be found in many (although not all) religions, especially those which are hierarchical in nature. Problems can develop when different authority figures between or within groups argue for different interpretations of truth or when authoritarian pronouncements change over time (and they do). References to authorities from the past can cause problems in international negotiations, especially if these authorities are religious in nature. Religion involves people's passions precisely because it is passionately important. But when matters of high principle are at stake, it becomes very difficult to compromise because it can be seen as “selling your soul.”
3. The “a priori” method is that of logic, reason, and intuition. Since the European High Middle Ages, it has been a major and preferred epistemology, especially among philosophers and academics. For example, there have been a variety of proofs of God's existence which have been offered, as well as those purporting to deny the existence of God. The response of believers has often been that no proof is necessary, while to nonbelievers no proof is plausible. But Western negotiators who rely on logic and reason, especially of a secular nature, and expect others to see the logic of their positions are often confounded by those using methods 1 and 2 and arriving at entirely different conclusions based on entirely different cognitive processes. They are operating on parallel tracks which do not meet.
4. The empirical method has been a favorite of scientists since the Enlightenment; indeed they can often neither see nor admit to any other epistemology at all. It relies on observation and sensory experience and is most obviously demonstrated by those carrying out controlled experiments. A tacit assumption is, “if I can't see it (i.e., apprehend it with the senses) and measure it, it doesn't exist.” A major problem with this epistemology is that most of what humans know is not acquired by direct experience but by vicarious experience. In addition, it assumes that reality is fixed and invariant and need only be apprehended. Its use within and against religious assumptions has been very problematical, even within the American society.
5. The fifth method is the most difficult to describe and understand because it directly counters deeply held tacit assumptions of most, if not all, people. It has been known by several labels; postmodernist, antirealist, deconstructionist, and constructivist. Its fundamental assumption is that reality is not

fixed or invariant, as the empirical method postulates and that the other methods tacitly assume, but that it is socially constructed by the human mind existing within a cultural and linguistic community. Postmodernists argue that the final and complete understanding of “truth” is not possible, at least in the sense of that transcending all cultures and time. “Truth” is only possible within a cultural and linguistic community because socially mediated knowledge is produced out of the shared experience of a language and cultural community. Thus, it is not simply solipsism to say, “Your truth is not my truth.” To postmodernists all knowledge is socially mediated.

6. In philosophy, the most famous of the deconstructionists are Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Friedrich Hayek. In cognitive psychology, the constructivist movement is exemplified by Walter B. Weimer (1977), who argued that the human mind is an active and constructing organ (motor theory of the mind), rather than simply an apprehender and organizer of reality “out there.” In psychotherapy constructivism is represented most strongly by the narrative therapy movement and by such thinkers as Michael J. Mahoney (1991). Its basic and tacit assumption is that people construct their own unique realities out of their lived experiences in the world. These concepts begin to approach Buddhist notions of emptiness and impermanence.
7. A pure form of constructivism is very difficult for anyone to hold in the mind for very long. It is possible to deconstruct anything into its culturally and socially relative constituent parts; even the deconstructionist’s arguments can themselves be deconstructed, a task of which not even the deconstructivists approve. Metaphorically it is like finding one’s self with no place to stand, with no fixed ideas about anything from which to operate. It is like a cognitive form of the infinite regress. One keeps coming back, because one must, to one’s own tacit social, religious, and cultural assumptions. This can cause problems in international negotiations, especially between negotiators from very different societies. However much they

may attempt to understand the positions of the other negotiators, they still fall back on their own tacit assumptions.

Comparison and Contrast in Human Cognition

“In a universe in which everything is blue, we could have no concept of blueness.” “A fish is the last creature to know it is wet.” Statements such as these, attributed to Benjamin Whorf (1956), nicely illustrate a central component of tacit human thinking processes; that in order to form concepts, we must postulate an opposite or an alternative. Thus, in order to form a concept of God as the ultimate good, we must also create a concept of ultimate evil, variously known as Satan, the Devil, Beelzebub, Mephistopheles, etc. It is then typical to see ourselves as typifying the good whereas other people, to the extent they disagree with us, are seen as personifying evil (i.e., not good). Likewise, in order to decide who is in a group (our people), we must decide who is outside the group (“the others”). Groups develop markers to identify who is in or out; for example, the Catholics make the sign of the cross from left to right, while the Orthodox make the sign of the cross from right to left. Who is in and who is out can and will change over time, but the fact that there must be insiders and outsiders remains constant. Thus, all human societies must have an enemy or opponent of some kind if they are to remain organized and cohesive. For example, during the fall of the Soviet Union, one Russian official told his American counterpart, “We are going to deprive you of an enemy!” If societies do not have an opponent or enemy of some kind, internal divisions may surface and weaken the society. This can have profound implications for international negotiations because the different sides may have a vested interest in not arriving at a solution lest they no longer have an opponent/enemy with which to provide cohesion and internal organization to their group. Negotiators can hardly admit this, of course, and may not even be able to consciously articulate it, but this issue may be a cause of intractable and protracted

negotiations that drag on endlessly without resolution.

Language as Tacit Knowledge

The languages of the negotiators can also hamper negotiation processes, especially if they are radically different from each other. This is illustrated by the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis (Kay and Kempton 1984), which states that there are certain concepts and ideas of individuals in one language that cannot be understood by those who use another language. The hypothesis states that the way people think is strongly affected by their native languages. It postulates that structural differences between languages are paralleled by nonlinguistic cognitive differences, so that language affects basic cognitive processes. Furthermore, language structure can strongly influence the entire worldview (used in generating and applying knowledge) of those who speak that language. This may be more difficult to see in languages closely related to each other, for example, those of Indo-European origin, but it becomes increasingly obvious in languages that possess entirely different structures and concepts. Thus, the Inuit are capable of talking more comprehensively about snow because their language contains more snow-related words and concepts. Many European languages, such as French, Spanish, and German, still use a formal–informal distinction in personal address, which English no longer uses, leading perhaps to Americans’ famous informality which many Europeans still find unsettling. Some African languages may not possess words like “homosexual.” Likewise, certain languages have words and structures which reflect (and perhaps determine) a concept of fate (e.g., *inshallah*; “if Allah wills it” or “God willing”) which is at variance with the highly individualistic American language and culture that stresses the power of individual agency. Thus, languages may not contain words or expressions which their societies find culturally problematical and languages in turn shape the thinking processes of those who use them.

Personal experience also dictates both tacit cognitive activity and linguistic structure,

nowhere better illustrated than by the investigations of Alexander Luria and Lev Vygotsky in Soviet Central Asia in 1931–1932 (Luria 1976). They collected data on the cognitive processes of remote villagers in Uzbekistan and Kirghizia. They looked at the villagers’ thinking processes in the areas of perception, generalization and abstraction, deduction and inference, reasoning and problem-solving, imagination, and self-analysis and self-awareness. They found that in these cultures, the thinking and linguistic processes were closely tied to immediate, practical, and concrete experiences and that the villagers were unable to think abstractly and to generalize from experience in a way that is commonplace for those with a Western education. Furthermore, they were not able to imagine or fanaticize well, a common activity among Western children. They were not as aware of themselves as separate beings and when asked what they were like as people tended to describe what they possessed or lacked in material possessions. Their cognitive and linguistic activities were devoted to solving and dealing with the normal and concrete tasks of their everyday lives. By contrast, much or most of Western education is devoted to training students to think abstractly and to form cognitive concepts. This is not a matter of intelligence but of education and training. The conclusion is that cognitive processes, including language, are the result of direct experience, and it is difficult for individuals raised in one cultural and linguistic community to communicate easily with those raised in very different cultural and linguistic communities.

In an earlier chapter, I (Dowd and Roberts Miller 2011) described some cognitive heuristics individual negotiators use that can affect the negotiation process. A heuristic is a cognitive rule that assists individuals in making sense of the world and/or deciding on a course of action. Here I would like to describe some additional heuristics that may also determine the negotiation process.

Gigerenzer and Brighton (2011) have summarized a number of heuristics for which there is evidence of utility. Several have implications for the international negotiation process.

Tit for Tat Use of this heuristic directs one to cooperate first and then imitate your partner's last behavior. This can be useful if the other negotiators also play tit for tat. The rules of this game make it difficult to divorce one's self from the process regardless of the proximal and distal outcomes. Initially cooperative behaviors may lead to more of the same, but if one negotiator responds with competition, the other will too. Any change will lead to a resulting charge from the other side. Once in this mode it can be difficult to extricate one's self from it.

Imitate the Majority Use of this heuristic directs one to consider the views and behavior of the majority of one's peer group and imitate it. Thus, if a majority of the negotiator's peer group favors a certain point of view or behavior, it is to that end the negotiator will push.

Imitate the Successful Use of this heuristic directs one to consider the views and behavior of the most successful member, not the majority. Thus, the negotiator might imitate the most successful member of the group or the most successful previous negotiator. This heuristic has been shown to be especially effective, outproducing the *imitate the majority* heuristic (Garcia-Retamero et al. 2011).

de Dreu et al. (2001) have described several heuristics that may affect the negotiation process, as well as individual differences in the use of these heuristics. Of particular interest is the concept "need for cognition." Individuals lower in this need have been shown to engage in less systematic, thorough processing of relevant information to the judgment or decision than those higher in this need. They simply rely less on cognitive heuristics and are more likely to engage in "hasty encoding" or jumping to conclusions (Dowd and Roberts Miller 2011).

Individuals also differ in their "uncertainty orientation." Those with high certainty orientation prefer to stick to tried and true beliefs (see the earlier discussion of the Type 1 epistemology) to achieve maximum clarity. Individuals with low certainty orientation seek new information to attain this clarity. Both individuals with

high certainty orientation and those with a low need for cognition are more likely to rely on cognitive heuristics for judgments and decisions. Using these data, Ari Kruglanski (e.g., Kruglanski and Webster 1996) argued that there exists a single dimension, termed "need for cognitive closure." Those high on this dimension tend to exhibit cognitive impatience, rigidity of thought, and use inconclusive evidence. Those with low need for closure prefer to suspend judgment, search extensively for information, and can generate multiple interpretations of fact. Perhaps different types of individuals may be more or less useful in different types of international negotiations, although it is likely that those with a low need for cognitive closure may be useful in more situations. In particular, those who are low in need for closure should fare well in negotiation situations characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty. de Dreu et al. (2001) also report that negotiators who have a high need for cognitive closure make smaller concessions when their opponent is in a competitive group than when their opponent is in a cooperative group, thus demonstrating an interaction effect between person and situation.

There is also an important situation-based variable and that is fear of invalidity, of making invalid and incorrect decisions. When this fear is high, individuals tend to postpone judgments until they have processed all the available information or they have depleted their cognitive resources (Kruglanski and Webster 1996). Essentially they all tend to exhibit less need for cognitive closure, regardless of their preferred style. Fear of invalidity is particularly high when the task is personally involving and the outcomes are important, a situation perhaps characterizing all or most international negotiations. In this case, individuals resist premature closure and engage in as thorough information processing as they can.

Individuals also differ in their relative degree of cooperation and competition. There appear to be three types: cooperators (prosocials), individualists, and competitors (de Dreu et al. 2001). The first try to maximize joint outcomes, the second try to maximize their own outcomes, while the third try to maximize their advantage over

others. Furthermore, prosocials have been shown to frame their arguments in terms of good versus bad (morality), whereas competitors frame theirs in terms of weak versus strong (might). Not surprisingly, prosocial negotiators have a preference for cooperative heuristics, while individualists and competitive negotiators prefer competitive heuristics.

There is another variable of interest and that is the extent to which negotiators use System 1 or System 2 (Kahneman 2011) thinking. System 1 is fast, intuitive, and emotionally oriented, while System 2 is slower, more deliberative, and logical. Each has its strengths and weaknesses; System 1 thinking can result in faster decisions but is more prone to error, while System 2 thinking is often more accurate but requires considerably more cognitive effort, which most people find distasteful. There is also a greater aversion to losses than an attraction to gains, so that negotiators are more keenly aware of what they will give up than of what they will gain. Furthermore, there is typically an anchor point from which negotiations begin—usually the status quo but sometimes a reference point in a mythical past. These negotiations are especially difficult if the pie (the total amount available to all) is static or is shrinking because then the potential losses become even more painful and the gains minimal. In other words, it's not easy to manage decline!

Implications for International Negotiations

There are a number of implications which flow from the previous discussion. All international negotiators begin (because they must) the negotiation process from within the structure of their own tacit assumptions about the nature of reality and the best practices regarding those negotiations. From a Western perspective (American and Western European), these negotiators may begin with several assumptions:

1. All parties to the negotiating process want to reach a solution. They are willing to compromise to make that happen. There is overlap in their respective positions. But for some

negotiators, their tacit assumption might be, "If I am weak I can't afford to compromise. If I am strong, why should I compromise?" For others the negotiation process may be more about trumpeting old grievances, especially for internal consumption, than about reaching a real solution.

2. The other negotiators are enlightened secularists for whom the role of religion in their lives is secondary to their primary goal of living and prospering in their society. But for some negotiators, religion may play a central role in their assumptive world and can lead to absolutist thinking.
3. The other negotiators are abstract and conceptual thinkers and are not bound by the cognitive structures of their concrete daily experiences. But for some negotiators concrete and immediate experiences are paramount.
4. The other negotiators share a language and corresponding linguistic structure similar to English or other Indo-European languages conceptually. It is mostly a problem of translation of words and phrases into other languages which are similar structurally. But some languages are structurally and conceptually so different from Indo-European languages that a shared meaning structure becomes difficult.
5. The American culture especially is relatively new on the world scene and American negotiators may tend to think ahistorically. Most Americans derive from Europe or European-oriented cultures and likely understand the world in those terms. They may not understand the deep history and historical sense of triumph and grievance which can be characteristic of other, often very different, cultures with a long history.
6. Western negotiators may tend to be empirically or constructivistly oriented epistemologically. They may find it very difficult to understand those from cultures which are more oriented around authoritative and traditional ways of knowing. Indeed, they may not see those epistemologies as leading to knowledge worth having or even as knowledge at all, simply as unbridled superstition. The data-

based attitude and open-mindedness characteristic of many American and European negotiators simply may not be found in negotiators from very different cultures. Indeed it is difficult for me to write about this without demonstrating my own cultural bias because the opposite of open-minded is closed-minded and that has a very negative connotation in American society. But it is important to remember that one person's perceived rigidity is another's strong sense of values and responsibility. It truly is in the eye of the beholder.

7. There is a strong tendency in all people to reason backward, that is, to arrive at their conclusions first and then marshal evidence in support of those conclusions. While we all do this to some extent, it is easier to see it in others than in one's self. This tendency is most pronounced in areas of great personal meaning. International negotiations usually involve areas of great personal meaning for at least some of the participants so that they may tend to come to the negotiating table with assumed conclusions in mind.
8. It is often not appreciated by negotiators just how much all sides in the negotiation process may need an external opponent, foe or enemy to foster their own internal cohesion and organization. If agreements truly are reached, the search may then begin for another opponent.
9. The construct of "need for cognitive closure" may be useful in screening those who would be appropriate negotiators in different situations. Webster and Kruglanski (1994) have developed the *Need for Closure Scale* which should be useful. Those high in need for closure may tend to use System 1 thinking while those low may tend to use more System 2 thinking. It would also be helpful to screen potential negotiators for their relative degree of cooperative/prosocial versus competitive orientation.
10. There appears to be a strong tendency for negotiators to reflect the views and behavior of those in their larger society and especially the more successful. The negotiators may also play off each other in a "dance for two." This can make it difficult to reach new agreements

because old ideas and past negotiations that have not been productive are simply rehashed endlessly. It is the process, not the outcome or agreement, which is the goal.

A Tentative Training Project for International Negotiators

In this section, I would like to frame the development of a negotiator and mediator training program to foster awareness of these tacit knowledge structures and how they might affect the negotiation process. In addition, another goal is to use this awareness to change the ways in which negotiators and mediators operate.

A cursory Google search of the Internet revealed a number of programs and degrees in negotiation and conflict resolution. These include the Program on Negotiation, including international negotiations, at Harvard Law School, the Master of Science in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution at Columbia University, the Influence and Negotiation Strategies Program at Stanford University Graduate School of Business, the International Mediation and Conflict Resolution Program at Creighton University, and the Negotiation and Conflict Resolution Program at the UCLA School of Law. There are also negotiation training programs run by organizations. Rather than attempting to replicate these programs, I'd like to offer some ideas that flow from the tacit knowledge structures described in this chapter.

Tacit knowledge, by its very nature, is not immediately accessible to people's conscious experience. Following Freud's famous goal of psychoanalysis as making the unconscious conscious, a goal of training for international negotiators is to make their tacit knowledge structures and cultural values explicit. That is, time should be spent helping negotiators in training to understand the tacit cultural and linguistic knowledge from which they operate. One methodology for doing that is reflection training, based on Sternberg's theory of practical intelligence (Matthew and Sternberg 2009). Matthew and Sternberg asked a group of military officers and a

group of college students to undergo brief training interventions in the form of guided critical reflection thinking exercises. They found modest support for the efficacy of this training in improving practical problem-solving. This reflection could be about either the condition or action aspects of the problem. In addition, explicit training in different epistemologies, the structure of their native language (e.g., English), and their cultural and religious assumptions could be followed by a guided reflection by the participants on their own tacit knowledge in these domains.

Another useful framework for training is that developed by Rogers et al. (2013) on fostering complexity thinking. They advocate deep reflection providing for transformational learning and internalization of not only intellectual complexity (knowing) but also lived complexity (being and practicing). They developed a list of frames and habits of mind for fostering complexity. These include:

1. Openness, which they described as a willingness to accept, use, and internalize different perspectives to be encountered when dealing with diverse participants in an interdisciplinary situation. Openness requires conscious acceptance that notions such as ambiguity, unpredictability, serendipity, and paradox are as important as knowledge, science, and fact.
2. Situational awareness or the appreciation of context and time in complex systems. This makes it more difficult to take cognitive refuge in eternal truths that are always applicable. As an example, all ethics are situational ethics.
3. A healthy respect for the restraint/action paradox. They argue that leadership and decision-making in complex systems constitute a balance between the risks associated with practicing restraint and the risks in taking action. Negotiators require time to let the process unfold but need courage to act in the face of uncertainty and the absence of an objectively correct decision. There will never be a perfect time or a perfect decision.

They argue that critical habits of mind to encourage include holding one's strong opinions lightly and adopting a slowness of cognitive and

behavioral operations, which together open time and space for shared reflection and learning.

All individuals use both System 1 and System 2 thinking processes, but few are aware of the differences and fewer still are aware how they themselves use these two systems and under what conditions. After training in their conceptual and practical differences, guided reflection should help negotiators understand how and when they use each. Because the use of System 2 is more effortful, extra practice would be useful.

Initial screening of negotiators on dimensions important for the negotiation process should also be performed. The Webster and Kruglanski (1994) need for closure scale is an obvious choice. Also useful may be the Personal Need for Structure and the Personal Fear of Invalidity scales (Thompson et al. 2001). At the least, these scales and others like it may help potential and actual negotiators understand their tacit cognitive processes better.

Training in the cultural assumptions of the negotiators on the other side could be very helpful in assisting one's own negotiators in understanding their counterparts' culture from the inside out. Likewise training on the linguistic structure of the other negotiators native language could be helpful. I emphasize that this is not simply a translational process but a process of deep understanding of the internal structure of the language. Training in the cultural history and religious and cultural assumptions of their counterparts should also be useful.

These and other training strategies should help to prepare negotiators for the increasing complex task of international negotiations.

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A Psychotherapist's View of Decision-Making: Implications for Peaceful Negotiations

3

Donald Meichenbaum

Introduction

"I am the decider!" President George Bush

For the last 35 years, I have been a practicing psychotherapist and researcher who helped develop evidence-based cognitive behavioral therapy procedures. In this capacity, I have worked with a variety of clientele who experience intractable conflicts such as distressed couples and dysfunctional families; who evidence impulsive explosive disorders such as aggressive behaviors; who experienced traumatic events, but who are reluctant to seek treatment; and who experience depression and are suicidal (see Meichenbaum 2007, and papers on the website www.melissainstitute.org).

A major focus of these cognitive behavioral psychotherapeutic interventions is the client's cognitive and emotional processes that contribute to their distress and on ways that clients can learn to alter their mind-set. A central concern are the barriers that impede behavioral change such as misperceptions, miscalculations, unrealistic expectations, perfectionist standards, cognitive

distortions, mental habits, faulty decision rules, entrenched beliefs, and sacred values. Cognitive behavioral psychotherapeutic interventions have been informed by the research literature of cognitive science on how individuals make decisions under conditions of uncertainty and stress (Kahneman 2011; Kahneman et al. 1987; Sternberg 2002; Thaler and Sunstein 2003).

Can any of these psychotherapeutic strategies be used to improve political decision-making and foster peace negotiations? This question has been addressed by a number of previous cognitive behaviorally oriented psychotherapists (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008, 2011; Bandura 2002; Beck 1999; Ellis 1992). In each instance, these authors have highlighted the nature of the cognitive processes that political leaders engage in, or that they fail to engage in, that impact their decision-making process.

The need to focus on the decision-making process of political leaders and peace negotiators has been underscored by numerous historians, journalists, and various Royal Commissions who conduct "postmortem analyses" of political and military decisions. Irving Janis (1982, 1989) has documented a number of "historical fiascos" that have resulted from defective policy planning and faulty decision-making. Whether they are military initiatives such as the Bay of Pigs or Iraq War invasions, or the absence of actions as in the case of preventing genocide in Rwanda (Dallaire 2003), or decisions that impact the world's climate, there is an

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urgent need to educate, monitor, and improve political leader's decision-making skills.

The central premise of this paper is what would be the potential benefits if political leaders included in their cabinet, or in their inner decision-making circle, a "neutral observer" who is an expert in the area of decision-making and behavior change processes and knowledgeable about the types of mistakes and faulty cognitive processes that escalate violence and that undermine engaging in peace negotiations.

Put simply, why wait for misconceptions and miscalculations, or "historic fiascos," to occur and then lament their occurrence, after the fact. Imagine that a "neutral observer" could provide ongoing feedback at the time when such decision-making activities were occurring. The task for this decision-making consultant (DMC) would be to act like a supportive coach who provides constructive feedback. The DMC would be sworn to secrecy and would use all of the psychotherapeutic skills that go into developing, maintaining, and monitoring a "therapeutic alliance" with the President, Prime Minister, Peace Negotiator, and other political and military leaders. The DMC would need to establish trusting, nonjudgmental, respectful relationships and would wait for the invitation to provide feedback on the decision-making process. The DMC would use the "art of Socratic questioning" and discovery learning to provide feedback and conduct psychoeducation for political leaders. This is not psychotherapy, but consultation in the tradition of Kelman's (2002) scholar-practitioner model.

Imagine the following feedback session between a President and a DMC:

Mr. President, could you walk me through the steps of how you came to the decision to do X?

How did you judge the credibility of the information that was provided to you?

What other alternative options did you consider and how did you come to choose this one?

What do you consider both the short-term and long-term risks and benefits of making this decision? Would it be okay if we, once again, used our decisional balance sheet in evaluating your decision to do X? (2 × 2 balance sheet of pros and cons, short-term and long-term).

I noticed that in your press conference you used certain historical analogies and metaphors. Could we take a moment to discuss whether

these fit the current situation (similarities and differences) and how using such analogies/metaphors and "like a" statements impacts your decision to do X?

Have your advisors adequately thought through the potential barriers and obstacles of taking this action and put in place backup contingency plans?

Have any of your advisors "gamed the system" by strategically bypassing or misrepresenting other advisor's positions?

Mr. President, I noticed and I was wondering if you noticed any possible omissions and questionable decision-making steps that need to be reconsidered? I know you like to "trust your gut" in these matters, but permit me to share some of the lessons learned from the past that might apply in this case. We have discussed multiple examples of historic fiascos as well as successful actions of your predecessors. Let's see if we can be on the lookout for these avoidable errors. For instance, has there been a poor information search, a lack of curiosity about credibility of the sources of information, selective confirmatory biases, "cherry picking" of the data, absence of consequential thinking, inadequate contingency planning, cognitive distortions, failure to perspective take, presence of mental habits, unquestioned assumptions, and the like?

I greatly appreciate the opportunity to share my observations about the decision-making process with you. I hope my comments will prove helpful. May I ask, how do you feel about our chatting like this about the decision-making process? Is there anyone else among your advisors that you would like me to share these observations?

Note that the DMC probes all focused on "what" and "how" questions and not on "why" questions. The focus of the feedback is on helping political leaders and peace negotiators become more aware and how to be more on the lookout for possible motivational and cognitive errors and limitations that can undermine the decision-making process.

Table 3.1 provides a checklist of potential "thinking errors" political leaders and peace negotiators may make (see Meichenbaum 2011, for a more extensive description of each thinking error). The DMC could use this checklist to provide specific constructive feedback to political leaders. In the same way that airplane pilots or doctors use checklists (see Gawande 2009), the DMC could ensure that political leaders could receive similar feedback.

Two examples of cognitive processes warrant special attention when it comes to conducting

Table 3.1 Checklist of motivational and cognitive errors in decision-making*What to watch out for*

1. Use of thinking shortcuts—mental heuristics and habits of thought
2. Use of confirmatory bias—seek information that is only consistent with prior views. Ask for opinions of only those who agree with you
3. Engage in tunnel vision—stubbornly hold beliefs and “cherry-pick” data that one wants to hear
4. Lack of curiosity—fail to question the credibility of the source of information
5. Inadequate consideration of how questions are framed—frames always trump facts
6. Engage in stereotypic thinking—demonize others, use escalating images, lack of perspective taking, not rethinking the conflict
7. Use of historical analogies and metaphors—use “like a” statements that do not fit the current situation
8. Inadequate consequential thinking—lack of conducting a barrier analysis and accompanying contingency planning
9. Think defensively—blame others (attribution bias effect), denial
10. Make snap impulsive decisions—“hidden agendas” influence decision-making
11. Use groupthink processes—strive for unanimity, group cohesiveness, solidarity, homogeneity of decision-making
12. “Game the system”—strategically bypass and misrepresent other advisor's positions. Presence of hubris and unquestioned self-confidence
13. Hold a “fixed entity” mind-set and embrace “sacred values” that undermine the negotiation process

peace negotiations. Carol Dweck (2012) and her colleagues (Halperin et al. 2011) have examined the influence of individual's and group's mind-sets or implicit theories and the causal role they play in molding attitudes and behaviors. They have drawn a distinction between “fixed” mind-sets or what they call “entity” theories *versus* “growth” mind-sets or “incremental” theories. Individuals and groups who hold a fixed mind-set tend to affix labels, hold stereotypes, reject information that runs counter to their stereotypes, consider problems as intractable, and hold deep-seated attitudes that other groups are “evil” or aggressive forever and not malleable. Political leaders who hold a fixed mind-set are likely to support statements such as the following:

Groups can do things differently, but the important parts of who they are can't really be changed.

Groups that are characterized by violent tendencies will never change their ways.

Every group or nation has basic moral values and beliefs that can't be changed significantly.

In contrast, individuals and groups who possess a “growth” mind-set or “incremental” theory hold deep-seated attitudes that other groups are capable of change and they have a willingness to interact and compromise. Their attitudes are not frozen as they are more likely to seek challenges, view obstacles as learning opportunities, and view greater resilience in the face of setbacks.

Dweck (2012) reports on examples of how an incremental mind-set can be primed and nurtured in order to facilitate Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and reduce prejudice and aggression. Elsewhere (Meichenbaum 2012), I have described how the mind-set of traumatized and victimized individuals, including returning service members, can be impacted in ways that bolster resilience. Cognitive behavioral interventions have proven effective in altering mind-sets from a “fixed” entity perspective to a “growth” incremental perspective.

Another potential barrier to entering peaceful negotiations is that the respective parties involved may hold what are called “sacred values” (Atran and Axelrod 2008; Ginges et al. 2007, 2011). Sacred values represent moral imperatives that circumscribe certain actions including terrorist acts and self-sacrifice for a cause and for one's support of group members. A central feature of sacred values is a sense of honor that cannot be violated, nor challenged. Such sacred values may be political, religious, or personal and can disrupt negotiations and contribute to intransigence. A commitment by individuals and group members to such sacred values can contribute to religious martyrdom and undermine instrumental cost-benefit calculations that underlie the negotiation process. Such sacred values can be viewed as an issue of national pride, tied to historical exploitation and past affronts. Any efforts at using financial incentives as a negotiation position can lead to moral outrage and backfire, as described as “taboo trade-offs” by Tetlock et al. (2000).

If the negotiation process is going to be undertaken successfully, there is a need to recognize the “sacred values” of the other groups as well as one’s own sacred values and how they impact the consideration of behavioral options. Ginges et al. (2011) highlight that in order to address such barriers, there is a need to engage in symbolic acts that reflect an understanding and respect of the sacred values and honor of all negotiating parties. There is a need to carefully frame requests and offer negotiation positions so they are not viewed as challenging sacred values. As Pruitt (2011) highlights, there is a need for peace negotiators to avoid demonization of the other parties but instead to rethink the conflict from the other’s perspective, to scale down one’s aspirations, to be hopeful, to engage in symbolic acts that nurture trust, and to engage in back-channel communication, often using third parties, in order to “test the waters” and discover common ground.

As Ginges et al. (2011, p. 515) observe:

Although words—of an apology, recognition or respect—are not enough on their own, they are a beginning; they are the things that just might make the other side willing to listen and calm the heat in their anger. Words have the power to change emotions. They can express the abstract and the factual, but also change and inspire.

The thrust of the present proposal is that a dialogue between experts who study and conduct negotiations (Faure 2011; Janis 1982, 1989; Kelman 2002; Kremenjuk 2002; Pruitt 2011; Thompson 2006) and experts in cognitive behavioral interventions could prove quite fruitful. Cognitive behavioral therapists are constantly addressing issues such as how to:

1. Establish, maintain, and monitor the quality of communication processes and ways to address “ruptures” in such working relationships (Galluccio 2011)
2. Foster participation using motivational interviewing procedures
3. Conduct psychoeducation by helping individuals and groups become more aware and vigilant about potential cognitive pitfalls and increasing their understanding of the connections between emotions, cognitive processes

(implicit beliefs, sacred values, mind-sets), and chosen actions

4. Engage in collaborative goal setting that nurtures hope and “unfreezes” core beliefs
5. Employ social discourse, perspective taking, empathy-compassionate activities, symbolic acts, and problem-solving skills
6. Anticipate and address potential barriers and obstacles in the form of relapse prevention Such interventions can be conducted by a DMC, not only on an ongoing consultative basis but on a preventative basis as well. My work on the development of stress inoculation training (Meichenbaum 2007) has raised the possibility that political leaders and peace negotiators can be presented with case studies of both “historic fiascos” and successful instances of negotiations (negotiations involving Northern Ireland, South Africa, and the Oslo Middle East talks as described by Pruitt 2011) and other examples. The stress inoculation training has three phases: (1) a psychoeducation phase that educates individuals and groups to ways in which stress influences decision-making, especially under conditions of uncertainty and time pressure, and increases awareness of the interconnectedness between core beliefs, sacred values, decision-making errors, and thinking traps; (2) a skills training phase where individuals and groups have an opportunity to learn from case examples and then practice communications and negotiation skills; and (3) an application phase of training using both imaginal and in vivo (real-life) negotiation settings. There is a need to build into the stress inoculation training regimen guidelines to increase the likelihood of generalization.

Political leaders and their advisors should be able to recount and be aware of such historical events. As the philosopher George Santayana observed: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

It is time to introduce decision-making consultants (DMCs) into political circles, negotiation rooms, and business and military boardrooms and to critically evaluate how their presence and feedback influence the social discourse and decision-making process. It is an experiment worth trying.

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Moral Disengagement in “War Fever”: How Can We Resist?

4

Alfred L. McAlister and Brittanie Wilczak

Introduction

War and other forms of collective violence are major causes of death, illness, and suffering worldwide (Ghobarah et al. 2004; Li and Wen 2005). An estimated 191 million people died as a result of military violence in the twentieth century, and the myriad public health costs of war continue to mount largely uncounted (WHO 2002; Sidel 2008). Notably, the consequences of military actions and war spread far beyond the suffering of soldiers and affected noncombatants. Excess military spending associated with making war and establishing a high level of military preparedness for war exert the highest toll on public health by taking funds that could be used for public health programs and social actions to alleviate or overcome poverty as diminishment in funds for those purposes stem from high levels of military spending (Hunt 2008; Zwi et al. 2008). In the USA, during the past decade, national resources

for public health action and research have been sharply curtailed, largely because of accrued debt related to this nation’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Stiglitz 2008), and many thousands of soldiers and noncombatants, and dependent family members, have died or have been given to lives of suffering because of these potentially avoidable military actions.

Theoretical explanations of the causes and prevention of military violence have been provided from economic, political, religious, and psychological disciplines (Sidel 2008; WHO 2002; McAlister and Vélez 1999). Disparate streams of research in media studies (Kellner 2002) and the politics of international negotiation (Hoffman et al. 2013) show the different ways in which societies can be enticed into support for military action. However, no coherent model has been articulated to explain the complex social psychological processes, acting at the collective level, that lead populations professing love for peace to provide popular support for military actions.

In this chapter, we review selected research on social psychological factors underlying the phenomenon of “war fever,” which we define here as *dangerous ways of thinking that justify the unnecessary use of military force, evade responsibility, minimize perceived consequences, and dehumanize enemies, leading to popular support for national actions that are later regretted*. There are many examples of largely regretted wars, ranging from the American war in Vietnam to the

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invasion of Iraq and, currently, the US-sponsored military actions in Afghanistan. In each of these conflicts, many look back and realize that the participating nations chose to go to war because of both deliberately misleading information from national leaders and dysfunctional thoughts about enemies and the consequences of using military force against them that, at the time, convinced a majority of their population that military action was preferable to diplomatic negotiation, economic sanctions, or other measures that do not require the use of lethal weapons on a mass scale. What exactly are the social psychological processes that engender public support for military actions that are later regretted? How can they be studied and acted on to make populations more resistant to leadership rhetoric and pressures from elite media sources that seek to build strong and emotional popular support for military attacks on another nation? Some answers may come from theorization and research that are here summarized.

Moral Disengagement and Support for Military Aggression

The eminent psychologist Albert Bandura, as part of his “social cognitive theory” (Bandura 2001), provides a detailed articulation of the psychology behind guilt-free support for injurious aggression. According to his theory, in the development of moral agency, individuals construct standards of right and wrong that serve as guides for pro-social actions and deterrents for aggressive conduct. Individuals judge their conduct against these personal and collective standards and take perceived situational circumstances into account when they react to their own actions with “affective self-sanctions” (emotionally evaluative feelings and thoughts that correspond to what might be called *pride* or *guilt*) or the anticipation of these self-evaluative reactions (Bandura 1986, 1991). Thus, people do things that give them satisfaction, and a sense of self-worth, and refrain from behaving in ways that violate their moral standards, because such conduct will bring self-condemnation. It is through the ongoing exercise of these evaluative self-sanctions that moral conduct is regulated, including conduct that con-

forms to common social proscription of injurious aggression toward others.

However, the development of self-regulatory capabilities that restrain violence does not create an inflexible moral self-control system. Self-regulation of moral conduct does not operate unless pro-social self-evaluative standards are activated, and there are several psychological maneuvers through which moral self-sanctions can be selectively disengaged from inhumane conduct. Bandura (1999) refers to these as *mechanisms of moral disengagement* with four loci of action: At the (1) *behavior locus*, people transform lethal actions into praiseworthy ones through moral justification, advantageous comparison, and sanitizing language. At the (2) *agency locus*, they are relieved of a sense of personal accountability by displacement and diffusion of responsibility. At the (3) *outcome locus*, the injurious effects of aggressive actions are disregarded, minimized, or disputed. At the (4) *recipient locus*, foes are dehumanized and blamed for bringing the suffering onto themselves.

Violent military actions pose grave moral predicaments not only because they require killing combatants but also because modern warfare inevitably takes a heavy toll of civilian casualties. When a nation goes to war, it must create conditions that enable soldiers to inflict death without exacting heavy personal costs of chronic stress, guilt, and anguish. But in societies where warfare requires public support, the nation must also create conditions that enable a majority of the populace to allow suffering to be caused without collective recrimination, anguish, or guilt. According to Bandura’s (1999) conceptualization, this can be achieved by suspending moral self-sanctions through psychological mechanisms of moral disengagement at four loci of action, described below.

Behavior

Moral justification plays a key role in sanctifying violent behaviors (Kramer 1990; Rapoport and Alexander 1982; Reich 1990). In this process, destructive conduct is made personally and socially acceptable by portraying it as serving worthy moral purposes. For example, moral

justification can be provided by applying the utilitarian standard that injurious actions will prevent more suffering than they cause. Moral justifications can be used in the service of just causes or wrongful ones. Evaluation of moral justifications involves judgments of how well the military interventions meet the standards for a justifiable war and how they are implemented militarily.

Advantageous comparison, in which one's injurious conduct is contrasted with more flagrant inhumanities, is another way of excusing aggressive actions. If individuals can say to themselves that what they are doing is not nearly as bad as what others have done, it can make their own actions seem less blameworthy. Advantageous comparison is also invoked when peaceful diplomatic or reasonably coercive economic sanctions are viewed exaggeratedly as vastly inferior to military aggression for achieving national aims.

Euphemistic labeling provides a convenient means for masking lethal activities or even conferring a respectable status upon them (Lutz 1987; Smith 2002). Activities can take on a markedly different character depending on what they are called. For example, in military euphemisms, bombings and drone attacks are labeled as "surgical strikes," in the likeness of a medical procedure, while the civilians who are killed are labeled "collateral damage." In interpersonal conflicts, people behave much more aggressively when assaulting a person is given a sanitized label (Diener et al. 1975).

Agency

Moral control operates strongly when people acknowledge that they are active contributors to injurious outcomes and feel responsible for actions they perform or support. Two disengagement mechanisms permit irresponsibility by operating through disavowal of personal agency in actions that directly or indirectly injure others.

Displacement of responsibility occurs when people view their actions as stemming from the dictates of authorities rather than feeling that they are personally responsible for them (Kelman and Hamilton 1989; Milgram 1974). Because they do not see themselves as the actual agent of their actions, they are spared self-censuring reactions.

Diffusion of responsibility occurs when personal agency is obscured by disavowal of personal and individual responsibility for detrimental behavior (Bandura et al. 1975; Zimbardo 2004). Kelman (1973) designated several ways of diffusing personal accountability: group decision-making so that no one really feels personally responsible, division of labor that fractionates a destructive enterprise into seemingly harmless subtasks when viewed in isolation, and action that affords anonymity and minimization of personal contributions to harm caused collectively. Through these self-exonerative social arrangements, people need not view themselves as the agent of injurious actions and thus do not consider themselves personally accountable for what they do collectively or under chains of command.

Outcome

Minimization of perceived effects of aggressive actions is another way of weakening moral self-sanctions. As long as harmful outcomes are unnoticed, minimized, or disputed, there is little reason for self-sanctions to be activated. In studies of obedient aggression, people are less compliant to the injurious commands of authorities as the victims' suffering becomes more evident or when its infliction is personalized (Milgram 1974). Even a high sense of personal responsibility for the harmful effects of one's actions is a weak restrainer of injurious conduct when aggressors do not see the harm they inflict on others (Tilker 1970).

Recipient

Dehumanization is a moral disengagement mechanism that operates on the recipients of detrimental acts. To perceive another in terms of common humanity activates empathetic emotional reactions to the plight of others through perceived similarity and a sense of social obligation (Bandura 1992; McHugo et al. 1982). Self-censure for harmful conduct can be disengaged by stripping people of human qualities or attributing bestial qualities to them (Bandura et al. 1975; Haritos-Fatouros 2002). For example,

during wartime, nations cast their enemies in the most dehumanized, demonic, and bestial images to make it easier to kill them (Ivie 1980; Keen 1986). Humanization serves as a restraining influence. People refuse to behave cruelly, even under authoritarian pressure, toward humanized others (Bandura 2004; Bandura et al. 1975).

Blaming the victims for bringing the suffering on themselves is still another expedient that can serve self-exonerative purposes (Ferguson and Rule 1983; Suedfeld and Epstein 1973). People view themselves as faultless victims driven to injurious conduct by offensive provocation. Violent conduct then becomes a justifiable defensive reaction to belligerent actions. Victims get blamed for bringing suffering on themselves. Self-exoneration is also achievable by viewing one's harmful conduct as forced by compelling circumstances rather than as a personal decision. By fixing the blame on others, or on compelling circumstances, one's own injurious actions are not only excusable, but one can even feel self-righteous in the process.

Rapid radical shifts in lethal conduct through moral justification are most strikingly revealed in military action. According to social cognitive theory (e.g., McAlister et al. 2006), the conversion of peaceful people into combatants dedicated to killing foes is achieved not by altering their personality structures, aggressive drives, or moral standards. Rather, it is accomplished by restructuring the morality of lethal actions so they can be free from self-censure. In many societies, military strikes and longer term campaigns require initial ongoing public support for the use of force in international disputes. According to the theoretical concepts advanced here, that support depends upon collective moral disengagement within the war-making society.

Research on Moral Disengagement and Support for Military Action

The relationship between moral disengagement and support for war has been examined in cross-sectional, prospective, and experimental studies. This research is reviewed in the following sections.

Cross-Sectional Studies

The first cross-sectional study of moral disengagement in support for military action was conducted by McAlister (2001). A 15-question scale was created to measure the four types of moral disengagement mechanisms on rating scales in which respondents agreed or disagreed with statements about the use of military force. The entire scale is provided in the cited publication. Excerpted examples of rated statements about conditional support for military force included situations when "use of force will prevent more suffering than it causes" (moral justification), "the United Nations asks for military help" (displacement of responsibility), "we join other nations to fight" (diffusion of responsibility), "killing of innocent people is avoided" (minimization), and "foreign groups must be punished for beastly acts" (dehumanization). In rural communities in both Virginia (USA) and Helsinki (Finland), secondary-school students completed this rating scale and rated their support for military action for two contemporary concerns at the time of this study (1998): military action by NATO against Yugoslavia and military action by the USA against Iraq. The results showed that those with higher scores on the moral disengagement scale were 3–4 times more likely to support military actions related to these concerns than those with lower scores. Additionally, female respondents were much less likely than male respondents to give favorable ratings to statements expressing moral disengagement. Overall, the Finnish students were less likely than the US to give favorable ratings or endorse military actions.

A subsequent and much more ambitious study was conducted by McAlister and colleagues, in cooperation with the International Federation of Medical Students' Associations (a UN-chartered group composed of leaders of national medical students' associations worldwide), as part of a project labeled PeaceTest (Grussendorf et al. 2002). Paper surveys were completed among selected large groups of medical, university, and secondary students in 21 nations, using a moral disengagement rating scale very similar to the

one employed in the study described above, with questions rating support for their own nation's use of military force against others. As with the preceding study, in every nation, the rated level of moral disengagement was markedly higher among those who supported military actions than among those who did not. Again, males generally expressed higher levels of moral disengagement and support for military action than females. Notably, although this was not a random sampling study providing reliable estimates of national levels of moral disengagement, the mean levels in each nation were significantly associated with national levels of defense spending.

More recently, a team of peace psychologists based at Boston University, with many international colleagues, conducted surveys regarding justifications for invasion of one nation by another in all regions of the world (Malley-Morrison et al. 2013). Questions about these justifications were patterned largely after the items used to measure moral disengagement in the two studies described above. Findings showed that moral justifications for the use of military force were strongly related to support for invasion globally. Interestingly, examination of national differences found that the highest degrees of moral justification for military action were expressed by respondents from NATO nations, which were, at the time of these studies, heavily committed to military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan (McAlister et al. 2013).

Prospective Research

In 2001 a randomly sampled telephone survey designed to measure moral disengagement and support for military force was conducted in the USA (McAlister et al. 2006), with samples selected nationally, in Texas, and in the Texas counties containing Houston and Austin. Although the initial purpose of this study was to further validate the relationship between moral disengagement and support for military force and examine regional and local differences in these factors, the September 11, 2001, attacks on

New York and Washington, DC, occurred when the survey was only approximately two-thirds completed. The survey was halted immediately after this event and then restarted 2 weeks later, thus providing a potential prospective study of how that event influenced moral disengagement and support for military actions against both Afghanistan and Iraq by the USA. This study revealed interesting regional and local differences, with almost all Texans and respondents from Houston expressing more support for war than those in the nation as a whole, or in Austin, Texas. Moreover, the most notable finding concerned changes that occurred, evidently, as a result of the attacks on the USA. Levels of moral disengagement increased sharply after the attacks, as did support for bombing (which was ongoing against radar sites) of Iraq. For example, the proportion agreeing with the dehumanizing statement "in some countries the leaders and their followers are no better than animals" rose dramatically, as did support for the moral justifiability of attacking another nation before it attacks us. Support for the bombing of Iraq also increased significantly. Multivariate analyses found that moral justification, minimization, irresponsibility, and dehumanization were distinct factors. When structural equation modeling (SEM) was employed to examine the effect of the attack on the USA (comparing responses before and after that event), results showed that the increase in support for bombing of Iraq was entirely mediated by increases in moral disengagement, particularly by the increased levels of moral justification and dehumanization after the attacks. Regarding strikes against Afghanistan, demographic differences in the degree of support for that action were entirely mediated by differences in levels of moral disengagement.

Experimental Studies

A small experimental study was conducted as part of the research reported by McAlister (2001). A large class of introductory sociology students at the University of Texas at Austin completed

paper surveys measuring moral disengagement and support for US military actions against Yugoslavia and Iraq. Students were then divided into two groups and, in separate rooms, were read brief essays that were intended to either provide support for moral disengagement or urge students to resist these ways of thinking (complete text available in cited publication). Subsequently, both groups were asked to, again, provide answers to the survey and to sign letters to the congressman representing Austin, Texas, either supporting or opposing his vote in congress against a resolution calling for bombing of Serbian cities in Yugoslavia. The students exhibited changes in levels of moral disengagement between the first and the second survey (all done within a single long class session), and changes in support for these specific military actions, corresponding to the persuasive communications they received. Notably, students who were exposed to the communication favoring resistance to moral disengagement were significantly more likely to sign the letter of support to their congressional representative for his vote against the attack on Yugoslavia.

A larger and very public experimental study was conducted by McAlister and colleagues via the Internet during the summer of 2004, when the USA was thoroughly engaged in military actions in Iraq (Howard et al. 2007). With assistance from the International Federation of Medical Students' Associations, a website was created that was named "PeaceTest" and advertised as a place where one could test one's resistance to war fever and learn about what leads one to support military solutions to international conflicts. The website was designed to start with an online questionnaire patterned after those used in previous studies (see appendix). Afterward, depending on their answers, the screens either congratulated them on their ability to resist war fever through low levels of moral disengagement or warning them that they were susceptible to war fever due to high levels of moral disengagement. After that, the visitors were given the option to click on a link to "learn more" which led to international medical students' photographs and statements

about why they resist moral disengagement. For example, regarding a questionnaire item about support for military force when economic security was threatened, a medical student from Finland was depicted saying (abridged quotation), "Military force means killing people. Economic security means money. No I don't agree with killing people for money."

In the online "PeaceTest" study, approximately 6,000 website visitors completed the pre-test and more than 300 (6 %) completed the second questionnaire after viewing the persuasive online experience. These individuals exhibited statistically and practically significant increases in resistance to moral disengagement, with the greater change seen among women than men. However, the most notable result of this experiment was in the nature of responses among the vast majority who visited the site after secondary promotion via pro-war blogs and websites taking a critical view of the website. The responses among this group were overwhelmingly negative. Furthermore, the publicity generated by this project (Harkinson 2004) included highly negative reactions and was accompanied by an effort among supporters of the second Iraq invasion in Houston to have the primary author of this chapter fired from his university professorship for unsanctioned political speech. Although that did not occur, this incident led to deletion of the website from the university server and the conclusion that a state university, in an aggressor nation, during a time of war, was not an appropriate venue for such controversial research. Although some additional published international research and anti-war action were carried out by project participants from the International Federation of Medical Students' Associations (Madžarac et al. 2003), without continuing leadership or financial support, very little of this work has been sustained.

Other relevant experimental research on inoculation against war fever has focused exclusively on dehumanization and the closely related phenomena of racism and of national, ethnic, and social class discrimination and prejudicial attitudes toward "out groups." Experimental research

on this topic has shown that the so-called extended contact—i.e., vicarious contact with “out groups” in the form of stories and media depictions of positive experiences and discarded prejudices—can help make others appear more human and thus restrain aggression against them (e.g., McAlister et al. 2000; Liebkind and McAlister 1999).

Increasing Resistance to War Fever: Research, Training, and Public Education

Based on the research and experiences reviewed here, it is reasonable to suppose that Bandura’s (1999) theoretical mechanisms of moral disengagement are a significant contributor to try to explain and prevent the arousal of war fever when nations enter wars that many later regret. There is no doubt that in the USA and elsewhere, rhetoric from national leaders who call for military action is often designed to engage these mechanisms by presenting moral justifications (Drury et al. 2010), e.g., arguing that military action will prevent more suffering than it causes or that diplomacy has failed (Hoffman et al. 2013). Moral disengagement is also encouraged by media coverage of supporters of military action who express opinions about the necessity of “preemptive war” and dehumanizing attitudes toward enemies that invoke conflicts between religions (Kellner 2002)—recognized since the writings of Erasmus as a pernicious source of “war fever” (Vance 2013). Further justification for unwise military actions is provided by those who claim that modern methods of warfare can achieve acceptably low levels of harm to innocent noncombatants (e.g., Ryan 2004). When the costs of a war exceeds its originally perceived value, it is notable that the perceived effects of ceasing hostility on national reputation provide moral justification for continuation of what may ultimately be fruitless military actions (Sullivan 2008).

It has been evident for many decades that military expenditures in the USA are influenced by the enormous fortunes to be made by purveyors

of war material (e.g., Adams 1982). Veiled private economic incentives undoubtedly played an important role in US leaders’ appeals for public support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Bonn 2010). Financial conflicts of interest in privately owned mass media in the USA appear to have led to slanted news coverage and biased analyses of the conflict with Iraq (Barstow 2008). This economic pressure has become stronger as military actions are increasingly privatized (Singer 2005). The geopolitical advantages of successful warfare, which can potentially confer riches on the elites in aggressor nations, provide powerful motivation for seeking public endorsement for military actions (Jhaveri 2004; Mouritzen 2006).

Looking toward the future, we can anticipate that the systemic socioeconomic pressure from the private interests who will profit from warfare will inevitably motivate national leaders to reject negotiation and mediation and instead seek support for military actions when international conflicts arise. These leaders, and allied mass media opinion makers with corresponding financial interests, can be expected to pose high-minded moral justifications for the use of force. They can also be expected to create the illusion of multilateralism to diffuse national responsibility and to minimize the perceived human and economic consequences of military actions. Most perniciously, war supporters can be expected to dehumanize enemies by exaggerating cultural differences between their own population and their intended victims’—and to demonize enemy leaders through rhetoric and imagery. These efforts to disengage moral standards that restrain violence are entirely predictable. How can we resist?

The experimental studies described here, though far from conclusive, strongly suggest that, before an unnecessary war begins, it may be possible to psychologically “inoculate” populations to resist support for war by educating them about the mechanisms of moral disengagement and how they can be resisted. Psychological inoculation (McGuire 1964) is a well-known and effective technique for preparing people to resist persuasion, e.g., for helping adolescents resist peer pressures to smoke cigarettes (McAlister

et al. 1979). It is also a demonstrably effective way to prepare individuals to respond functionally to stressful events, e.g., military casualties and extreme traumas associated with battlefield experiences (Rausch 2012). Although more research is needed to determine how this potential can be fully realized, research on this topic should be worthy of international investment. War is almost certainly one of the greatest threats to global public health. But, while public health agencies such as the US National Institutes of Health spend billions for research on the treatment and prevention of chronic and infectious diseases, only a tiny fraction of that amount is spent for research on how unnecessary wars can be prevented through public education and persuasive communication.

Very recent international events illustrate how resistance to moral disengagement in support for military actions can be engendered or averted by recollections of experience and enlightened journalism. When the British House of Commons rejected a resolution calling for military actions against Syria in September 2013, a widely cited reason was parliamentarian's increased resistance to calls for military action based on leaders' claims of intelligence about atrocities or potential atrocities, attributed to recollections during debate to the negative learning experience of having previously acted on similar claims in the invasion of Iraq 10 years earlier. Restraint may have also been strengthened by the work of investigative journalists questioning the factual basis for the proposed attack on Syria (Hersch 2013). Another notable event that restrained support for military action by the USA against Syria (beyond the lack of diffusible responsibility afforded by an international coalition of support) was US newsmaker Charlie Rose's extended interviews with Bashar al-Assad. The widely viewed interview is credited by many, both supporters and opponents of the attack, with "humanizing" the Syrian leader and thus reducing US support for aggression against his regime (Fung 2013).

These actions decreasing moral disengagement in collective national contemplations of military attacks against Syria in the autumn of 2013 were neither organized nor theoretically based. But they illustrate elements of a more

comprehensive approach to making national populations less willing to endorse warfare. Through vigorous professional training and public education in advance of or during early stages of future international crises and responses terrorizing attacks, it may be possible to avoid the preventable tragedies of unnecessary wars by using "psychological inoculation" to strengthen public resistance to mechanisms of moral disengagement in war fever.

We recommend training in the conceptual model of moral disengagement and in practical actions for inducing resistance for all professionals involved in international negotiation, mediation, and diplomatic efforts to avert war. By providing a common nomenclature for describing the discrete ways of thinking that make up this phenomenon, this would make it easier for professionals to communicate among themselves and with the public during times of crisis. The ability to anticipate and identify the specific mechanisms of moral disengagement detailed in this chapter can also enable negotiators to react to their deployment rapidly during dialogues between antagonistic and allied when conflicts threaten irrevocable escalation. But training for negotiators in the concepts advanced in this chapter can potentially do much more than increase their own competence in communication during crises.

Firstly, negotiators and related experts can be trained to educate journalists and others who shape the content of mass media about these concepts. Training of journalists and media professionals in topical material is a standard practice in the field of public health, as threats such as pandemic influenza are accurately explained in advance of their occurrence to prevent inaccurate or irresponsibly sensational reporting in the event—and to promote helpful reporting on things like hand washing, cough hygiene, etc. Similar training in the collective cognitive processes that are involved in moral disengagement and "war" fever could lead to more helpful and proactive reporting and editorializing in advance of pending military crises.

Secondly, negotiators and related experts can be trained to construct public education to make

populations more resistant to moral disengagement in support for war. Just as public health leaders are trained to work with media producers to inspire and guide productions of documentary and entertainment programming that deals with public health problems such as alcohol or contagious disease, leaders involved in negotiation and reconciliation can learn to work with media producers to inspire and guide production of media content that deals with how "war fever" can be avoided. In circumstances where resources are available for this purpose, experts engaged in this field can also be trained to organize public education activities themselves. The "PeaceTest" online war fever inoculation experiment described in this chapter can provide a useful reference point for future effort by peace promotion professionals to use new social media for this purpose.

Given the enormous economic and geopolitical motivations that influence nations toward warfare in the face of international conflict, it will not be easy for their populations to resist war fever and enlightened action is needed now. In this chapter we have presented empirically valid concepts and models of action that may underlie future efforts to avert futile and disastrous military actions.

Appendix: Measuring Moral Disengagement in Support of War

This illustrates how we assess individual and group differences in levels of concepts in the construct of moral disengagement with printed questionnaires, telephone interviews, and online surveys. Answers are scored from 2 (strongly agree) to -2 (strongly disagree) with a midpoint of 0 (not sure). These scores are then summed and divided by the number of statements rated for that concept.

Please rate your agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements about why or when you will accept the use of your nation's armed forces (Likert scale response set: strongly agree, agree, not sure, disagree, strongly disagree).

Moral Justification

- War is necessary to settle conflicts between nations.
- Military force is necessary when other nations threaten our economic security.
- If another nation threatens our military security, it is right to attack them before they attack us.

Advantageous Comparison

- Military force should be used when diplomacy and negotiation drag on without resolving conflict.
- It is right to use military force because it can prevent more suffering than it causes.
- Military actions my nation may take are not as bad as the much worse actions of other nations.

Minimization of Consequences with Euphemisms

- Precision missile attacks and surgical bombings rarely harm civilians.
- Those who sympathize with our enemies exaggerate the number of civilian casualties that result from military actions.
- Some collateral damage is an acceptable part of a military operation.

Evasion of Responsibility

- Nations that join a multinational defense force are not responsible for the actions of other members of the force.
- When military decisions are made by a group, no single member should be held accountable for the group's decisions.
- Soldiers should not be held responsible for following their commanders' orders.

Dehumanization

- Terrorists deserve to be treated like animals.
- In some nations, the leaders and their followers are no better than animals.

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Part II

Re-framing Approaches to Negotiation

The Biology of Cooperative Decision-Making: Neurobiology to International Relations

5

Nicholas D. Wright

Introduction

To negotiate, cooperate or compete successfully with another, we should know what motivates them and how they make decisions. Neuroscience combined with psychology and economics tells us much about both this human motivation and decision-making. In this chapter, I describe three aspects of this neuroscientifically grounded account of decision-making that are central to negotiation and describe how each impacts on international negotiation and cooperation amongst states. Of course, neuroscience is no panacea, but we need the best evidence to negotiate, and neuroscience provides an important extra source of evidence.

In this chapter, I first discuss the broader biologically informed understanding of decision-making that draws on neuroscience, biology, psychology and economics [called neuroeconomics by some authors (Glimcher and Rustichini 2004; Glimcher and Fehr 2013)] and why it's arisen now. Second, I examine evidence from biology and neuroscience about how human cooperation emerges and is controlled. Third, I examine the neural bases of the fairness motivation and their importance in international negotiation. Fourth, I describe the neural phenomenon

of “prediction error” that affects the impact of our actions on others and how they will decide to respond to our actions. Fifth, I take a step back to give four simple rules for using this understanding of individual human decision-making to address policy issues in international negotiation. I give historical cases and practical policy recommendations throughout.

Combining Economics, Psychology and Neuroscience to Understand Decision-Making

Accounts of choice based in rational choice theory (RCT) (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) have dominated much of economics since the mid-twentieth century and more recently much of political science. The core concept in RCT is that an agent's choices are consistent, which is what makes the agent “rational”. RCT models individual choices through accounts such as expected utility theory, and models social choices through game theory. But although providing some useful tools, RCT fails to predict many aspects of human choice. To improve these models, over the past three decades, a subfield of economics, called behavioural economics, has aimed to “increase the explanatory power of economics by providing it with more realistic psychological foundations” (Camerer and Loewenstein 2004). However, “it is important to emphasize that the behavioural economics

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approach extends rational choice and equilibrium models; it does not advocate abandoning these models entirely” (Ho et al. 2006). This combination of economics and psychology has, for example, sought to modify expected utility theory with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and game theory with behavioural game theory (Camerer 2003)—but many core aspects of decision-making are still not captured.

Biologically based, neuroscientific approaches to choice have a long theoretical and empirical tradition, for instance, the vast literature on associative learning (Thorndike 1911; Mackintosh 1983). Over the past decade or so, this has been added to the combination of economics and psychology—to provide an extra source of evidence to understand decision-making (Glimcher 2004; Glimcher and Rustichini 2004; Camerer et al. 2005).¹ In this new field, the main object of interest is the study of value-based decision-making, that is, when an agent chooses from several alternatives based on the subjective values it places upon them. This interdisciplinary approach permits the introduction of new richness and robustness into models of human behaviour, within a mathematically specifiable and empirically grounded framework.²

Why has this arisen now? The advances in our understanding of human decision-making over the past decade were made possible by new, non-invasive brain imaging technologies. The key new technology has been functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). fMRI measures changes in brain activity, through tightly coupled changes in local blood flow (Frackowiak et al. 2004), whilst individuals actually make decisions. The reason that these new technologies have precipitated such rapid advances in our understanding of decision-making is the neural scale on which they work—they provide data on

the level of systems within the brain, enabling us to link the vast existing neuroscientific literature from animals and humans directly to human behaviours previously described by psychology and economics. This neuroscientific grounding in particular helps us choose between competing explanations at the behavioural level (O’Doherty et al. 2007), it provides an additional independent source of evidence that increases the robustness of the conclusions (Wilson 1999) and it enhances our prior belief about the generalisability of findings across cultures that is crucially important in international negotiation. I address these and other general issues further in the Discussion.

Cooperation

A classic game capturing the tension between cooperation³ and self-interest is the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) (Flood and Drescher 1950). Consider two prisoners brought in for questioning by the KGB and placed in separate cells. If both stay silent (i.e. cooperate), they both receive 1 year in prison. If they both accuse the other (i.e. defect) they both get 4 years in prison. If one stays silent and the other defects, the cooperator gets 10 years in prison and the defector gets off scot-free. Game theory specifies that defection is the only rational choice, because it is superior whatever the other’s choice. However, if instead of both defecting the two players could cooperate, then they would receive a mutually more beneficial outcome.

Against the expectation of game theory, humans in the laboratory cooperate about half the time, even in a one-shot anonymous PDG (Kagel and Roth 1995; Camerer 2003). Of course, self-interest is also a motivation: individuals also respond to incentives, for instance raising the tempting payoff to defect (Kagel and Roth 1995; Camerer 2003). Humans are driven by both

¹ This may be referred to as neuroeconomics.

² Before continuing, I do not want to give the impression that RCT has little descriptive power in all games (e.g. the matching pennies game where individuals must keep their opponents guessing) (Camerer 2003). Furthermore, even where RCT does not well predict behaviour, it can give a useful conceptual perspective and mathematical framework.

³ Here I define cooperation as the voluntary acting together of two or more individuals that brings about, or potentially brings about, ends that benefit one, both or all, which are over and above the benefits arising from individualistic behaviour (Dugatkin 1997; Brosnan and de Waal 2002).




Fig. 5.1 Key brain regions for reward-based decision-making are the striatum and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). Cooperation engages reward mechanisms in the brain

cooperation and self-interest—and both are based in their biology. This presents a different account of human motivation to that in RCT.

Neural Bases of Cooperative Behaviour

Humans and other animals have sophisticated neural machinery for reward-based decision-making, for example, to gain juice (in animals and humans) or money (in humans), in which it is well established that two key brain regions are the striatum and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (O’Doherty 2004; Glimcher and Fehr 2013). As discussed below, these same brain structures are also implicated in the human drive to cooperate (Fig. 5.1).

One can study people in the brain scanner whilst they play the PDG or similar games for money. This shows that reward-related activity in the ventral striatum and OFC is elicited by mutual cooperation in an iterated PDG (Rilling et al. 2002) and in the closely related trust game (King-Casas et al. 2005). In the “trust game”, one player is given an amount of money (e.g. \$20) each round and can invest any portion of it (e.g. \$10) with a second player. Then the investment triples,

and the second player decides how much to repay (e.g. returning \$13 and keeping \$17). Cooperation, in which higher amounts are invested and then paid back, benefits both sides but carries the risk of exploitation. In both the PDG and the trust game, the amount of striatal activity relates to greater cooperation or reciprocity in subsequent rounds (Rilling et al. 2002; King-Casas et al. 2005). Unreciprocated cooperation in the PDG was associated with increased anterior insula activity (Rilling et al. 2008), a brain region known to be associated with emotion including responses to aversive stimuli (Dayan and Seymour 2008).

Even a task without monetary rewards can show reward-related activity for cooperation. An example is a study using a computer game that involved arranging a visual pattern, which people either undertook in cooperation with another, in competition with another or alone. Cooperation led to greater activity in OFC than competition (Decety et al. 2004).

Other studies have looked at the neural processing related to reputations acquired in such games. Encountering those who had gained a reputation for cooperation in a PDG also elicits activity in reward-related ventral striatum and OFC (Singer et al. 2004). Further, when men were scanned whilst watching electric shocks administered to those they had previously played in a PDG, this led to reward-related activity when defectors were shocked but led to empathy-related responses in pain-related areas when cooperators were shocked (Singer et al. 2006).

A further study examined brain activity during a trust game, in which participants learned the reputations of others who were more or less cooperative (Phan et al. 2010). As before, participants’ ventral striatum and OFC were engaged by positive reciprocity from others. Interestingly, here this signal in ventral striatum was seen when interacting with partners who had gained a reputation for reciprocity, but absent for partners without a reputation for reciprocity. The authors suggest this reflects a mechanism involving reward-related brain regions, which initiates and sustains cooperative relationships.

In summary, contrary to the expectation from influential models that suggest humans are only

self-interested, the evidence presented here is consistent with the idea that cooperation also itself engages reward mechanisms in the brain. We next ask how the balance between the drive to cooperate and more self-interested motivations is managed over time.

Managing the Balance Between Cooperation and More Self-Orientated Behaviours

The success of social animals, particularly humans, depends on how well individuals manage a critical day-to-day trade-off between cooperative and more self-motivated behaviours. Biological mechanisms controlling this trade-off must tune behaviour to the social environment.

Because of the dominant conception from RCT that humans are only self-interested, much research has focused on identifying factors that increase a propensity to cooperate. As described above, cooperative behaviours are thought to co-opt neural reward mechanisms (Phan et al. 2010). Evidence also suggests such behaviours are causally promoted by the peptide hormone oxytocin, which has various important roles in humans and has been administered to human participants in a variety of studies (MacDonald and MacDonald 2010). For example, oxytocin increased cooperation within groups in a PDG (De Dreu et al. 2010) and also increased measures of trust in a trust game (Kosfeld et al. 2005).

However, without opposing factors, this form of control mechanism would be lopsided. Testosterone has been shown as such an opponent endocrine influence, which promotes more self-orientated behaviour and reduces cooperation (Wright et al. 2012). This gonadal hormone is secreted in men and women and modulates a range of behavioural trade-offs in humans and other animals, for example, the trade-off between parenting and courtship (Wingfield et al. 1990; Alvergne et al. 2009). Administering testosterone selectively and causally disrupted cooperation by increasing egocentricity in decision-making, operationalised as an enhanced weighting of one's own relative to another's evidence (Wright

et al. 2012). We can also see related function in non-human primates, for example, where before competitive interactions between the self and others, anticipatory testosterone rises are seen in chimpanzees but not in more cooperative and egalitarian bonobos (Wobber et al. 2010).

These hormonal influences also illustrate an advantage of a biologically based approach. One way to improve the assumptions of game theory is to invoke the concept of "other-regarding preferences" (Fehr and Camerer 2007). For example, in a game between me and you, my utility function (i.e. what I value) would include not only what I personally receive but also what you receive (weighted in some fashion). This approach can be useful, for example, providing quantified metrics on a trial-by-trial basis for use in neuroimaging analyses involving a model-based approach as described for the ultimatum game below (Wright et al. 2011). However, without the addition of enormous complexity, such models cannot explain critical features of social behaviour that can be comfortably accommodated by a biological perspective. An example is our knowledge of the endocrine system (e.g. oxytocin and testosterone above), which helps explain how the trade-off between social and self-interested motivations is dynamically modulated in response to environmental contingencies, which is critical for success of social animals such as humans.

Finally, we can look in more detail at an interesting brain imaging study that examined how humans maintain and repair breakdowns in cooperation in the trust game (King-Casas et al. 2008). When collaboration falters and investments are low, individuals often build cooperation by making unilateral conciliatory gestures in the form of high repayments, even though these may be taken and not reciprocated. These gestures are precisely tracked in individuals' anterior insula cortex, a brain region that processes important emotional responses. Successful resolution of breakdowns in negotiation can be one of the most influential means for transforming a conflict (Galluccio 2011:225). Humans use such cooperative gestures as one tool to manage the critical balance between cooperative and more self-orientated motivations.

International Negotiations

We now illustrate accommodative signals in international negotiation. During the China–US crisis over Taiwan in 1958, the United States used a combination of positive inducements as well as military stick (Spangler 1991). During the crisis, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, a very tough operator, made accommodative gestures: firstly the accommodative signal of wish to resume talks and most notably 3 weeks later when he disavowed any commitment for a Nationalist return to the mainland and hinted at future troop reduction on the islands. These accommodative gestures, each subsequently reciprocated by mainland China, were central to resolution of the crisis.

A contemporary example is the election of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in 2013. This followed almost a decade of near-ceaseless hostility with Western powers and reflected the desire for accommodation amongst the Iranian people. Rouhani's pragmatism distinguished him from his more ideological competitors during the presidential campaign. Regarding negotiations with the West over Iran's nuclear program, discussed further below, he asserted in one presidential debate: "It is good to have centrifuges running, provided people's lives and livelihoods are also running" (Wright and Sadjadpour 2014).

Policy Recommendation

Expect accommodative and conciliatory gestures as natural and common. Do not mistake others' positive gestures for weakness.

Fairness

A second social motivation for which there is good concordant behavioural and neural evidence is fairness. This social motivation matters because humans are prepared to pay high costs to reject unfairness. Fairness relates to how intentional agents should divide resources amongst potentially entitled recipients (Kahneman et al.

1986) and has interested economists (Akerlof 1979), sociologists (Homans 1961), as well as neuroscientists (Sanfey et al. 2003).

A classic illustration of fairness is the ultimatum game (UG). In the UG one player (the proposer) is given an endowment (e.g. £10) and proposes a division (e.g. keep £6/offer £4) to a second player (the responder), who can accept (both get the proposed split) or reject (both get nothing) the offer (Güth et al. 1982). Game theory predicts that if individuals maximise only their own payoffs, then responders should accept any offer (1 penny is better than nothing) and, knowing this, proposers should offer as little as possible.

Instead, humans are prepared to pay a high cost to reject unfairness and reject offers below 25 % about half the time (Camerer 2003). This has been shown across diverse cultures (Henrich et al. 2006) and with large stakes (Slonim and Roth 1998; List and Cherry 2000; Andersen et al. 2011). Further, even in a version of the UG with the responder's ability to reject the offer removed (called a dictator game), proposers still do not offer zero, suggesting that "fair-minded" behaviour is not only due to fear of rejections (Camerer 2003).

Neural Bases of the Fairness Motivation

Neurally, considerable work links the insula cortex to the fairness motivation (Fig. 5.2). Within insula cortex, distinct fairness-related processes appear to be expressed in segregated regions (Wright et al. 2011) of this extensive (over 5 cm long) and cytoarchitecturally diverse brain region (Flynn 1999; Varnavas and Grand 1999). We can consider posterior insula, the part more towards the back of the head, and anterior insula that is more towards the front.

In the UG, in each trial a precise measure of inequality can be calculated (e.g. an 8:1 split would have an inequality of 7)—and neural activity in posterior insula negatively correlated with this measure of inequality (Wright et al. 2011). The same negative correlation with inequality in




Fig. 5.2 Insula cortex is a large and diverse region that serves a number of functions, including important emotional responses

posterior insula was also seen in a very different task, in which participants chose between distributions of meals for African children that varied in inequality (measured in this case by the Gini coefficient) and amount (see Fig. 4 in Hsu et al. 2008). These concordant neural findings are striking, as Hsu et al. used decisions about third parties rather than first-party decisions (e.g. the UG in Wright et al. 2011), a difference known to markedly affect choice in behavioural experiments (Camerer 2003).

However, whilst posterior insula activity negatively correlated with inequality, anterior insula activity positively correlated with inequality (Sanfey et al. 2003), a result replicated in a task-matched study (Halko et al. 2009). This increased anterior insula activity for more unfair offers was related by the authors to moral “disgust” at the unfair offers, in light of the region’s role in processing disgust more broadly (Sanfey et al. 2003).

Since these human fMRI studies, a causal study in non-human primates using stimulation in insula has shown results highly consistent with this segregation (Caruana et al. 2011). As described above, in the human studies, posterior insula negatively correlated with inequality or put another way showed increased activity with

more prosocial behaviours (Hsu et al. 2008; Wright et al. 2011), whilst anterior insula positively correlated with inequality (Sanfey et al. 2003). Applying electric current to stimulate more posterior regions of insula led to affiliative behaviours, whilst stimulation more anteriorly led to more disgust-related behaviours (Caruana et al. 2011).

In addition to insula cortex, reward-related brain regions have also been associated with the fairness motivation in decision-making. Fair treatment in the UG has been linked with reward-related activity, where comparing fair offers with unfair offers of equal monetary value showed increased activity in regions including striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC, a reward-related region next to OFC) (Tabibnia et al. 2008). Patients with lesions to vmPFC are more likely than control subjects to reject low offers in the UG (Koenigs and Tranel 2007). In tasks outside the UG, striatum and vmPFC showed greater activity for inequality-reducing wealth transfers in a task where subjects rated wealth transfers to themselves or another individual, one of whom at the beginning of the experiment was randomly rendered “rich” and the other “poor” (Tricomi et al. 2010).

Finally, we note behavioural evidence in non-human primates of rejection of unequal treatment. In a well-known example, when two capuchin monkeys were instructed to carry out the same task and one received tasty grape whilst the other received humdrum cucumber, there was rejection of the latter food (Brosnan and De Waal 2003).

Fairness in International Negotiations

The motivation to reject unfairness and the humiliation from unfair treatment can form a central part of national narratives and are reflected in national decision-making. In a powerful Chinese narrative, “unequal treaties” in the nineteenth century with external powers, mostly Western, unfairly exploited China’s weakness, leading to a “century of humiliation” (Wang 2012). This instils a sense of entitlement to

recover and receive restitution for past losses. This played into the Chinese border clash with the Soviet Union in 1969, where scores died on both sides and nuclear threats were levelled (Gerson 2010). The Chinese were motivated in part by the desire to revise one of the old unequal treaties with Russia—the 1860 Treaty of Peking, for which the Soviets had refused the Chinese request 4 years before to recognise as an unequal treaty. And the specific objection was how to split the uninhabited, useless islands in the river Ussuri between the two countries: the Soviets wanted them all, the Chinese an equal split. It was the Chinese who initiated the military confrontation despite overwhelming Soviet nuclear and local conventional superiority.

Robert Shiller and George Akerlof, both recent Nobel laureates in economics, show how fairness shapes our national economies, for example, being central to wage negotiations (Akerlof and Shiller 2009). International economics is also affected. In 2003 World Trade negotiations, countries like Brazil walked away from a deal in which they felt developed nations did not give up enough, even at the cost of giving up gains for themselves (Kapstein 2008).

Iran has been prepared to reject perceived unfairness even at substantial cost. In 1951, Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, rather than accede to an inequitable 10–90 oil deal with the British-run Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, subjected his country to a crippling embargo and a British-American-aided coup that brought about his demise. Contemporary Iran has not been deterred from continuing to develop its nuclear programme, despite costs over \$100 billion (Wright and Sadjadpour 2014). As Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif asked in a YouTube message during the nuclear negotiations: “Imagine being told that you cannot do what everyone else is doing. Would you back down? Would you relent? Or would you stand your ground?” (Zarif 2013). From an Iranian perspective, the situation is one where six global powers who together possess thousands of nuclear weapons seek to dictate terms to Iran, and India and Pakistan did not sign the nuclear proliferation treaty (NPT) and secretly acquired nuclear

weapons but are accepted by the international community whilst Iran (an NPT signatory) is chastised. This impulse to reject perceived unfairness arguably motivated Iran’s nuclear ambitions far more than an actual desire or need for nuclear energy (Wright and Sadjadpour 2014).

Fairness also shapes possible deals and political necessities. First, in contemporary Iranian nuclear negotiations consider the “right” to enrich. It is hard to explain convincingly to an Iranian why Iran isn’t allowed to do something its neighbours—India, Pakistan and Israel—can do. Iran has been, and will continue to be, prepared to pay heavily to reject this inequality (Wright and Sadjadpour 2014). Any viable agreement will likely enable Iranians to say they have that right, even if the word isn’t in the text. Second, the social motivation can shape the specific form of events during a crisis. For example, in 2001 a US EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese fighter collided, which led to the loss of the Chinese pilot and forced the US plane to land on Hainan in China. The key Chinese demand was for an apology (Swaine et al. 2006).

Policy Recommendations: Fairness

1. Use knowledge of this motivation to understand intentions and so build a better account of the other. The injunction to look from the other’s perspective is a very broad recommendation—and understanding this social motivation gives a targeted question: “Was this seen as fair or unfair?” This helps explain key facts, e.g.: Why has contemporary Iran borne costs estimated at \$100 billion to pursue its nuclear programme? Why does China care so much about territory related to the unequal treaties and associated events? Training for negotiators and mediators can include cognitive, emotional and motivational insights to understand intentions and behaviours (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008).
2. Forecasting the other’s decision calculus: These forecasts can be incorrect without incorporating the value of unfairness. To correctly understand another’s decision calculus,

we must consider social motivations. Ask the targeted question: “Is this seen as fair or unfair?” Consider the Sino-Soviet border conflict described above, where there was a failure of deterrence despite massive Soviet conventional and nuclear superiority—the Soviets incorrectly forecast the Chinese decision calculus. Consider a China-US escalation scenario: when the Chinese deal with the Japanese over territorial issues, it may take more to deter the Chinese than might otherwise be understood.

3. Know how fairness shapes possible deals: Anticipate these political realities, such as in the descriptions above of contemporary Iranian nuclear negotiations and Sino-US crisis management. This helps you understand what the other side values highly that you may not value so highly, enabling you to make a favourable trade.

The Neural Phenomenon of “Prediction Errors” Exerts Impacts Throughout Diplomatic and Military Signalling

Finally, to manage negotiations, it is necessary to forecast how the other will decide to respond to our actions. Consider the situation where the other has made an action to which we must respond. How do we implement a calibrated response? To exert our intended degree of impact on their decision-making, we must understand how the psychological impact of actions is modulated by a key quantity in the brain’s decision-making circuits. This quantity is the difference between what happens and what was expected. It is called “prediction error”. The prediction error associated with an event modulates the event’s impact on decision-making, and the bigger the prediction error, the bigger the impact. We must understand prediction errors to forecast the impact of our actions on others—and they provide a simple, powerful tool.

Prediction errors are best understood neuroscientifically in the case where animals and humans get rewards or punishments (Schultz et al. 1997; O’Doherty et al. 2004), but the broader idea is

	Event not expected	Event expected
Event occurs	a) Associated with prediction error	b) No prediction error
Event not occur	(trivial case)	c) Associated with prediction error

Fig. 5.3 Illustrating prediction errors

involved in many neuroscientific models (Friston 2010). From **simple tasks** (Niv and Schoenbaum 2008) to more complex **social** interactions (Behrens et al. 2009), it is central to how humans understand, learn and decide about the world. (Note this section draws on Wright, 2014).

Signalling Between Nations

Prediction errors exert far-reaching impacts, and these can be captured by a simple framework. Considering a simple definition of prediction error as the difference between what happened and what was expected (i.e. $prediction\ error = actual\ event - expected\ event$). This gives a simple framework: the event can either occur or not occur and either be expected or not expected (Fig. 5.3).

A dramatic illustration of the three non-trivial types of event in Fig. 5.3 is given by the psychological impact of strategic bombing during wartime (Quester 1990; Lambert 1995). First consider an event that occurs and was not expected, so has a large associated prediction error (Fig. 5.3a). German air raids on London in the First World War using zeppelins were small scale, but being so unexpected, they had a large impact and caused panic.

Between the wars, highly influential airpower theorists like Douhet extrapolated from this to suggest that more powerful and recurrent bombing would, largely through psychological impact, paralyse adversaries and rapidly make them collapse. But what actually happened illustrates an

event that occurs but is well expected (Fig. 5.3b). In the Second World War, recurrent bombing exerted much greater destructive power, for example, the “Blitz” on London, but being expected it had much more limited psychological impact than forecast.

Third, an event is expected but doesn’t occur, so the absence of a predicted event leads to large prediction error (Fig. 5.3c). In the Vietnam War, during regular US bombing of North Vietnam, the United States used prolonged bombing pauses as a conciliatory signal.

The cases above involve punishing events, but prediction errors equally apply to conciliatory acts. Consider the actions of Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat in 1977. Egypt had lost two wars to Israel in 1967 and 1973, after which he made conciliatory efforts that did not markedly change the attitudes of Israeli decision-makers or public (Mitchell 2000). However, in 1977 he made the highly unexpected novel offer to go and speak in the Israeli Knesset—and this had a big psychological impact on both Israeli decision-makers and the public and opened the path to reconciliation (Mitchell 2000).

We can also consider the nuclear negotiations with contemporary Iran in late 2013 (Wright and Sadjadpour 2014). A number of unexpected gestures helped create the opportunity for the negotiations. In 2009 there was US President Obama’s unexpected video to the Iranian people and “leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran” and two unprecedented private letters to Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei. These overtures helped persuade the Iranian public of America’s interest in change. In September 2013, there was the unexpected “Twitter diplomacy” of newly elected Iranian President Rouhani and Javad Zarif, which shifted the tone of America’s foreign policy debate about Iran. Then in September 2013, there was the unprecedented Obama-Rouhani phone call during the UN General Assembly, which built confidence in both countries.

Finally, we note that a prediction error framework subsumes and explains core concepts in negotiation. For example, the psychological impact of surprise is an instance of prediction error, where an event has occurred

but is not well predicted (Fig. 5.3a). It also encompasses other concepts, including habituation, expectation management, learning and adaptability, and signposting.

Policy Recommendations

We can consider policy recommendations first when making actions and second when receiving actions.

Making Actions

The core idea is to use prediction errors as a tool in signalling.

1. *When preparing potential options for a decision-maker, for each option ask: “How unexpected will it be for the other?”* For each option describe its associated prediction error from the other’s perspective and how that modulates its signalling impact.
2. *Manipulate predictability.* The other side of the coin of prediction error or surprise is predictability. This manipulates the signalling impact of actions, e.g. signpost or telegraph actions.

Receiving Actions

The core idea is that prediction errors are unavoidable, so we must manage their effects on oneself.

1. *Manage effects of prediction errors:* Prediction error may lead to a large psychological impact on decision-makers and they should be aware of this so they react appropriately.
2. *Learning:* Prediction errors are the best material to improve our models of the world and our models of the other.

Discussion and Conclusion

Biological and neuroscientifically based approaches to choice have a long theoretical and empirical tradition (Thorndike 1911; Mackintosh 1983)—and have more recently been combined with economics and psychology to provide an extra source of evidence about decision-making. Above I gave three insights from the neuroscien-

tifically grounded account of choice that help us forecast how an adversary will decide to respond to our actions. Next, I describe four general rules (Wright, 2013) for using neuroscience, and the behavioural decision sciences more generally, to address practical policy issues.

First, are we sure enough of the neuroscience? In a rapidly advancing field like neuroscience, there are a plethora of ideas and findings. For this reason I focused on robust findings.

Second, does it matter in the real world? Such findings may be very convincing in individuals making particular decisions, for example, in a lab—but in the real world, with all its complexities and existing structures and unintended or unpredictable consequences, we may not see such an effect. Here I adopt a similar approach to the seminal work of Robert Jervis who applied insights from psychology to international relations (Jervis 1976). Specifically, here I use perspectives from a neuroscientifically grounded account of decision-making and show how they explain a variety of historical cases across different contexts. With respect to how these aspects of individual decision-making affect international negotiation, they may directly affect decision-makers themselves and/or shape the reactions of the public or key interest groups and so influence the political landscape in which the decision-makers must operate.

Third, even if it is true in the real world, is it worth adding to the policy process? Given all the many important considerations when developing or using policy, adding yet another consideration can carry a big opportunity cost. Here, for instance, instead of adding to the analytic burden faced by decision-makers and their staff, the prediction error framework described above replaces and simplifies across a wide range of important phenomena.

Fourth, what does the neuroscience add that behavioural approaches, such as psychology or economics, do not already give us? There is the important concept of “consilience” (Wilson 1999): psychology is only one source of evidence to explain behaviour, and we can be more confident of a particular explanation if it is supported by both psychological and neuroscientific evidence. Neuroscience can help choose between otherwise similarly plausible behavioural explanations, by

looking in the brain for parts of the mechanism proposed to underlie behaviour (O’Doherty et al. 2007). Further, a robust biological basis for a decision-making behaviour enhances our prior belief about the generalisability of findings across cultures, which is crucial in international negotiations—if we know prediction errors play an important role in decision-making across a wide variety of different species, including in humans, then it is much more likely that they play an important role in, for example, both the United States and China. A biological perspective also helps improve our prior beliefs about generalisability within countries or cultures, for example, as key policymakers have usually undergone an involved selection process and so may differ from the general population. No single approach—including neuroscience, psychology or economics—explains human decision-making, and neuroscience provides an important extra source of evidence.

I have presented three insights from the rapidly advancing field that combines neuroscience, psychology and economics. I have also provided historical examples and practical policy recommendations. This new approach helps provide a robust explanation of human motivation and decision-making in international negotiation.

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Psychological Dynamics of Insight: Relevance to International Negotiation

6

Neil Sargent and Andrea Bartoli

Introduction

In this chapter we examine the development of the Insight approach to conflict resolution and how it can be applied to the practice of international negotiation. The Insight approach to conflict (Picard and Melchin 2007; Melchin and Picard 2008; Sargent et al. 2011; Picard and Jull 2012; Price 2013) views conflict resolution as a communicative learning process through which parties gain greater understanding or insight into the cares and threats that motivate both the self and the other and which in turn fuel the conflict or create obstacles to a collaborative decision-making or negotiation process. Central to the Insight approach is an awareness of how the parties' perceptions are influenced by the interpretive framework the parties develop for making sense of the conflict or negotiation interaction. Cognitive filters operate to selectively screen out information that is incompatible with the operating assumptions on which the parties construct their own definition of the interaction, while information that confirms this working hypothesis is selectively identified, coded, and retrieved

to orient subsequent decisions or actions. Parties may often be unaware of the psychological processes by which they attribute intentions or motivations to the other and how these attributions in turn influence each party's evaluation of the other's actions or responses, often resulting in miscommunication or misunderstanding which may inhibit the possibilities for more constructive dialogue or negotiation. The Insight approach assists the parties become more reflexively aware of how these processes of meaning-making influence the way they frame the interaction and orient their responses to the other. This in turn reduces the risk of miscommunication and attribution errors and opens up the possibility for more collaborative decision-making and more integrative negotiation outcomes.

Decision-Makers as Historically Situated, Purposive Actors

The Insight approach was first developed by Picard and Melchin (2007, Melchin and Picard 2008), in an attempt to generate a clearer understanding of the process that sometimes takes place in a negotiation or mediation context, when one or more parties experience a shift in perspective that enables them to orient towards the other in different ways, thus opening up the space for more collaborative efforts at resolving the conflict. Melchin and Picard observed that conflict

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was often most difficult to resolve when either side believed that what deeply mattered to them—their cares—was threatened by what mattered to the other party. Following the work of philosophers Bernard Lonergan (Morelli and Morelli 1997) and Charles Taylor (1985), the concept of “cares” in the Insight approach is understood to involve more than just the pursuit of our material interests or needs. Cares also include our value-based expectations of others and our sensitivity to the manner in which others might view us (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). Our cares, therefore, are not just concerned with ourselves but also involve us in judgements of others, and the ways in which how we view the world are valued or respected by others. Issues of identity and value are thus often involved in mediation or negotiation processes, even in contexts which otherwise seem to be predominantly distributive in nature (Sargent et al. 2011).

A central claim within the Insight approach is the idea of the social nature of the self (Melchin and Picard 2008; Sargent et al. 2011). The parties in any negotiation situation are not just self-referential actors whose goals, strategy, and tactics are predominantly self-generated, but need to be seen as historically situated social actors, whose perceptions, values, and motivational structures are significantly influenced by the sets of social, cultural, political, and historical affiliations they are embedded in (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008: 45–46). As social actors, we live our lives in networks of relationships that are meaningful to us and from which we generate much of our sense of social identity (Melchin and Picard 2008; Tajfel 1982; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner 1987; Fiske 2004; Sargent et al. 2011). Consequently, our actions have an impact on others, even when they are directed to the pursuit of our own ends. Likewise, their actions, perceptions, and beliefs have an impact on us, even if they are not directed towards us (Sargent et al. 2011). As Niebuhr puts it, we are responsive as well as purposive actors (Niebuhr 1963). Our actions take place in a social and political context in which we are forced to take into account the responses of others and the conditions in the environment towards which we direct our actions. Part of the way in which we act on our

environment is to try to shape the ways in which others respond to us (Goffman 1967). As purposive actors, therefore, we are constantly engaged in a process of trying to develop interpretive frameworks through which we can make sense of the factors that influence our present condition, precisely because this is the only way we can anticipate and seek to orient the future.

At the same time, our encounters with others in the present are necessarily influenced by our memories of prior encounters with others in the past. Consequently we carry our pasts with us into the present, and they provide us with habits of mind, response patterns, and interpretive frameworks, through which we seek to make sense of the present and to assimilate information about present conditions with our memories of past events (Niebuhr 1963; Melchin and Picard 2008). As Niebuhr puts it, the past is always with us as part of our present (1963). Our sense of ourselves as historically situated actors implies that we carry with us traces of our past encounters with others. And these traces, or subjective historical experiences, are likely to have some influence on the ways in which we respond to other negotiation situations we may encounter.

As such we can never fully bracket the memory of past encounters, even when we are engaged in a negotiation process that is more concerned with reshaping the conditions of the future. Any purposive, goal-directed action tends to have a reflexive or two-sided quality to it (Niebuhr 1963; Argyris et al. 1985; Sargent et al. 2011). On the one hand the action looks forward, prospectively, towards a future it seeks to modify in some respect in accordance with the actor’s conscious intention or purposes. In this sense the actor has to coordinate his or her intended actions with an image of this imagined future already operative in the decision-making process. Yet the vision of the future that organizes the actor’s decision-making process is also contingent on the manner in which the social actor is able to make historical sense of the present and to identify the causal factors that are likely to influence the conditions of this imagined but not yet experienced future.

Looked at from a standpoint of methodological individualism, the goal-directed action appears as

the product of an internal cognitive process whereby the actor isolates the salient features of the situation or problem towards which the action is directed, sets objectives, and then selects among the available means to attain the pre-set objectives, based on the information available to the actor at the time. Seen from this linear or “intentionalist” perspective, it is the actor’s purposes or interests which set the action in motion and drive the selection of means from among the available repertoire of action responses open to the actor. Moreover, the success or effectiveness of the action can be measured by reference to how closely the observable effects generated by the action correspond with the predetermined goals of the actor.

Looked at from an interactional or systems theory perspective, however, a rather different picture emerges (Watzlawick and Weakland 1977; Schon 1983; Argyris et al. 1985; Turner 1988; Senge 2006; Sargent et al. 2011). No longer viewed in linear causal terms as the product of a conscious deliberative choice with no prior history, the decision comes to be seen as part of an ongoing sequence of action, feedback, and response patterns, often involving interactions between differently situated social actors, in which each actor seeks to make sense of its environment as well as to act purposively on it (Niebuhr 1963; Schon 1983; Argyris et al. 1985; Senge 2006; Sargent et al. 2011). Seen from this reflexive or “action science” perspective, the information gathering or hypothesis formation stage of the act is not separable from the performative dimension of the act (Schon 1983; Argyris et al. 1985). Rather, the two are connected in a form of circular causality, in which the response generated by the act on the part of those towards whom the action was directed provides the actor with informational feedback with which to reflectively determine whether the definition of the situation that generated the action was operationally valid or not. Every purposive action thus has a hypothetical or experimental quality to it, in which it is the product of a working hypothesis about conditions in the actor’s environment and, at the same time, seeks to test this very hypothesis at one and the same time (Schon 1983; Argyris et al. 1985).

Cognition and action are thus integrally related, not conceptually distinct. Not only are our actions generated by preexisting hypotheses about the objective conditions operating in our environment or what we believe to be the motivations or beliefs of other actors, but through the response elicited by our actions, we obtain useful information that enables us to verify or to modify the operating assumptions on which our previous actions were based (Schon 1983; Argyris et al. 1985; Senge 2006; Sargent et al. 2011).

This reflexive action science perspective supports Fiske’s contention that cognition is an inherently social process that involves taking into account the actual, implied, or imagined presence of others (Fiske 2004). In many negotiation situations, the participants need to be conscious not only of how their actions are likely to be perceived and responded to by the other parties at the table, but also of how their actions and responses are likely to be perceived by other audiences whose ongoing support may be critical to the success of the negotiations (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993; Aquilar and Galluccio 2008).

The implied presence of others may be structured into the negotiating process itself, for example, where a negotiating team is given a predetermined negotiating mandate that limits the options they can explore or where any decision reached in negotiation needs to be ratified by an external body. But the imagined presence of others may also be felt in other situations in which negotiators have to manage the tension between “in-group” and “between-group” negotiations (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008: 81–82; Galluccio 2011; Pruitt and Carnevale 1993; Walton and McKersie 1965). Unofficial “back channel” negotiations, for example, often involve a delicate balance between signaling a degree of openness to more dialogue with an adversary and, at the same time, being able to deny that any such dialogue is taking place. Thus, the imagined presence of others may exert a strong influence on the parties’ behavior in negotiations, and even on their communication styles, as participants may decide to sacrifice transparency in communication for more opaque forms of communication that are open to different interpretations by different intended audiences.

Once again, this requires us to view the participants as situated historical actors, whose behavior is influenced by their concern not only with what gains they seek to achieve at the bargaining table but also how their actions can be interpreted by others (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Pruitt and Kim 2004). Too much willingness to enter into dialogue, or to make concessions in negotiation, carries a risk that this could be perceived by a domestic audience, or other imagined audiences, as a sign of weakness or lack of commitment to the collectivity's goals. The avoidance of such "image threats" (Pruitt and Kim 2004) may cause negotiators to maintain a strongly positional bargaining stance, even where negotiation theory would suggest that willingness to explore more collaborative options could result in a better deal for all parties involved (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993; Mitchell 1999).

Feelings as Carriers of Values

Related to this issue of the reflexive nature of social action is the idea of feelings as carriers of values. A key theme of the Insight approach is that emotions or feelings are not separable from the parties' cares or values. Rather, feelings operate as carriers of values, such that the emotion is often triggered by the experience of threat to the parties' cares, whether this operates at the level of material interests and patterns of expected cooperation or goes more deeply still to the values associated with the parties' personal or social identities (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Melchin and Picard 2008). As Melchin and Picard (2008) put it, the particular value or care at stake may not always be apparent on the surface of the conflict, but the feeling triggered by the care or value often is and provides an indicator of the importance of the care or value to the parties concerned.

Often the experience of threat to our cares or values in negotiation may be triggered by memories of past events. As indicated above, the sense of the past that we carry with us as social actors into the present is not so much concerned with objective historical facts, but rather with affec-

tive responses associated with memories of past events. We experience the emotion attached to the memories more directly than we may be aware of the value attached to the feeling. But the value is embedded in the feeling and orients the ways in which we unconsciously make sense of the situation that triggered the past memory (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Melchin and Picard 2008).

Melchin and Picard state that feelings do their work as carriers of value in several ways. First, the emotion associated with the past memory connects the present with the past in a way that may color the actor's attitude towards the present (2008). The experience of past conflict is often associated with feelings of anger, hurt, fear, blame, disappointment, or loss, and these powerful emotions can influence the parties' behavior in significant ways (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Melchin and Picard 2008; Pruitt and Kim 2004). Pruitt and Kim suggest that feelings of anger and blame can often result in escalated retaliatory spirals, as one party seeks to punish the other for past injustices or perceived wrongs, leading the other to adopt a defensive response, which further inhibits the capacity for collaborative negotiation. Feelings attached to memories from past encounters between the parties may not only cause the parties to stay entrenched in their positions but also distort or adjust their motivational goals in unhelpful or unproductive ways (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Fisher and Shapiro 2005; Melchin and Picard 2008; Pruitt and Kim 2004).

Second, feelings do their work as carriers of values by being inscribed within wider structures of symbolic meaning that not only influence the parties' attitudes towards their pasts but also how they imagine or structure the future. As Melchin and Picard observe, our values may be grounded in past associations, but their impact is not limited to interpreting these past events. "These pasts situate us within particular interpretations of the present, that lead to specific expectations about the future" (Melchin and Picard 2008: 86). In this sense, how we respond emotionally towards others is not just a function of our past encounters with them, but is also influenced by feeling-laden value narratives that we may not

even be consciously aware of and that we project onto our future encounters with others (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Melchin and Picard 2008).

This phenomena is operative in all our inter-subjective relations with others but is perhaps most evident in the context of cross-cultural encounters, when there is a greater risk that participants may misread each other's intentions, motivations, or communication signals (Galluccio 2011). How we present an image of ourselves in our interactions with others and how we expect others to respond to us (Goffman 1967) may be coded differently in different social and cultural contexts. If a participant in a communicative exchange is unaware of the symbolic or emotional resonances unconsciously embedded in their own message, they risk generating responses that may be very different from their intentions (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). As Watzlawick et al. (1967) point out, all messages operate at least two levels, the level of content and the level of affect, or relationship. What a message communicates to its recipient about how they are perceived by the sender may have as much influence on the recipient's response as the direct content of the message. Yet experience suggests we are often ill-equipped at decoding others' emotional communications or in predicting others' emotional responses to our own messages (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Jervis 1976). In the context of international negotiations when the parties do not necessarily share a relationship of trust or common cultural values, the risks of miscommunication or misreading the emotional messages attached to other's communications is obviously high (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008: 47–50).

The manner in which the emotional side of the brain exercises an influence on the cognitive processes of reasoning and evaluation is becoming more clearly understood as a result of recent advances in neuroscience research as Aquilar and Galluccio (2008) have extensively talked about in their seminal book. According to Antonio Damasio (1994; in Aquilar and Galluccio 2008), the emotional part of the brain does not function separately from those parts of the brain associated with logical reasoning, but is functionally connected through complex neural networks that

link both parts of the brain together. Research subjects who suffered injury to those parts of the brain that are associated with the processing of emotions and feelings, but not to that part of the brain that involved reasoning capacity, were discovered to be unable to function successfully in many situations involving practical decision tasks or choices. Damasio theorizes that emotions provided somatic markers which assist in the decision process by associating choices with the recall of emotional responses grounded in past experiences (1994; in Aquilar and Galluccio 2008: 60). The inability to tap into the emotional somatic markers provided by these past experiences interfered with the decision process, such that the subject was unable to connect the analysis of potential future outcomes with past feelings of pleasure, pain, anxiety, or fear. The inability to make use of these feelings associated with past memories to frame the choice and select among options left research subjects often trapped in an endless cycle of weighing options without ever being able to arrive at a decision (Damasio 1994; in Aquilar and Galluccio 2008: 60).

The implications of this research on the ways in which feelings as somatic markers impact on the decision process are clear. Emotions associated with past experiences and deeply held cares often do have an influence on the parties' behavior and are likely to impact on the manner in which parties make decisions or respond to the actions or gestures of others in the negotiation process (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Fisher and Shapiro 2005; Melchin and Picard 2008). Skilled negotiators therefore need to have training on the ways in which feelings operate as carriers of values within the negotiation process. As we have seen, this often occurs unconsciously, without the parties themselves being aware of this. Cognitive theorists refer to this behavioral tendency in terms of the availability heuristic, when parties tend to exaggerate similarities between present events and past situations, interpreting ambiguous information in terms of what is most strongly remembered about past events (Fiske 2004: 137; Stein 2005; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Melchin and Picard (2008) observe that when

parties become more aware of the impact of their feeling-laden value narratives on the way they frame the conflict or negotiation situation, they may be more able to separate or “de-link” the negative emotions associated with memories of past events from the negotiation task they confront in the present. Along similar lines, Aquilar and Galluccio (2008) emphasize the need for negotiators to become more skilled in registering and responding to the emotional communication dynamic that takes place within negotiation.

Perceptions and Cognitive Schema

The title of Damasio’s book, *Descartes’ Error*, draws attention to the ways in which we are perhaps unconsciously programmed in Western culture to distinguish between the affective and the rational, between “mind” and “body,” with mind in the driver’s seat, so to speak, while the feelings are given a secondary role in any instrumentally rational decision-making process. In a similar fashion, the treatment of perception and cognition as distinct psychological processes, with perception associated with the body’s sensory receptors, while cognition is associated with the mind, tends to obscure the ways in which unconscious associations and cognitive biases may also influence the process of perception by selectively focusing the attention of the observer on certain aspects of the perceptual field (Barry 1997: 37, 51–56; Fiske 2004: 81–85; Dowd and Miller 2011: 76–78).

What has been called the “halo effect,” for example, has to do with judging or evaluating a person, place, or event, by reference to a single trait or experience (Thorndike 1920). A politician may be considered as trustworthy or competent, for example, by viewers watching a televised debate, based on the visual and oral impression made on the voters watching, through their tone of voice, physical stance, or degree of eye contact made with the audience by looking directly into the camera. Failure to talk directly to the other candidates or not looking directly at the camera may be perceived by viewers watching as an indication that the candidate is uncomfortable with

the political positions they espouse and thus less competent or electable as a candidate. The visual or oral impression made on the observers through the candidate’s demeanor may operate to offset the impression made by the substance of the candidate’s presentation, a phenomenon that is also familiar to trial lawyers in preparing their witness for a jury trial. The decision to allow the accused to testify in a criminal trial, for example, may be influenced by the lawyer’s view of the impression likely to be made on the jury or the judge by the witness’s demeanor if they take the stand. A verdict of guilt or innocence could thus be influenced by the visual impression made on the observers by a witness’s demeanor in the courtroom (Efran 1974).

The halo effect operates through a process of unconscious association, whereby the sensory data observed, the tone of voice, or visual demeanor of the candidate or witness is then associated in the viewer’s mind with value judgements of likeability or unlikeability, of trustworthiness or untrustworthiness, or of confidence or lack of confidence that the viewer associates with the behavior observed. In this sense, the value judgement, or the valence, associated with the behavior observed is not inscribed in the sensory information itself, but is attributed to the behavior as a result of the observer’s own preexisting expectations.

It might be, for example, that the politician’s failure to speak directly to the camera when engaged in a debate with others is due to a lack of media experience. Likewise, a witness’s failure to answer questions directly on the witness stand, or to look the jury or the cross-examining lawyer in the eye, may have more to do with cultural habits on the part of the witness, in which looking another person directly in the eye may be perceived as a sign of disrespect or challenge, especially if the other person is a person of authority. But the cultural meaning attached to the witness’ behavior is likely to be misinterpreted by the observers, who rely on their own cultural assumptions in interpreting the behavior.

The example illustrates the ways in which heuristics and cognitive schema may influence the perception or decision-making process (Pruitt

and Carnevale 1993; Vertzberger 1990). Heuristics can be thought of as sets of mental inference rules that are relied on to organize and interpret information. A heuristic enables the observer to process information more rapidly, by picking out salient features of the information obtained and assimilating it with information already available to the observer (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993; Stein 2005; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). As Pruitt and Carnevale put it (1993), as social actors we are cognitive misers, who are always in receipt of more information from our environment than we can cognitively process. So we rely on heuristics as informational shortcuts to speed up the information processing capacity of the brain and enable us to make judgments or inferences about other people's observed behavior (Fiske 2004; Fiske and Taylor 1991; Stein 2005; Tversky and Kahneman 1974).

Heuristics do their work as mental inference rules and carriers of values not only at the level of the individual decision-maker but also at the level of the group. Research on in-group and out-group biases has identified several ways in which processes of group identification may have an impact on the perceptions of those who share the same group affiliations. In one study of students who had witnessed a college football game, researchers found that students who identified as Princeton supporters believed that the Dartmouth team had committed twice as many fouls on the Princeton team as the Princeton team had committed. But students who identified as Dartmouth supporters thought both teams had committed approximately the same number of infractions (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993). Selective perception thus appears to be influenced by group affiliation, a process that is reinforced, according to Pruitt and Carnevale, by selective memory and attributional distortions, in which the behavior of one group is often interpreted by members of another group in accordance with their preexisting expectations of the other group (1993). Information that is inconsistent with the prior expectations may often be ignored or explained away by temporary situational factors, without impacting on the stable characteristics of the in-group's perception of the "out-group" (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993; Stein 1996, 2005).

Another mechanism through which social actors function as cognitive misers (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Pruitt and Carnevale 1993) in processing information is through the use of cognitive schemas. Pruitt and Carnevale define schemas as "cognitive structures that contain information about aspects of a particular situation or a general class of situations," that enable social actors to construe or classify situations in a particular way (1993). For instance, a physician or paramedic arriving at the scene of a medical emergency will perform a triage analysis in order to determine what forms of medical intervention are immediately necessary for the patients requiring care. The triage analysis is intended to assist the medical professional in efficiently allocating limited medical resources, or time, by determining the priority of patients' treatments based on the severity of their condition. Likewise, a law firm, contacted by the family with a view to making a personal injury claim in response to the injuries suffered in a car crash, is likely to make what amounts to a legal triage analysis in the first interview with the clients, to determine what legal resources should be allocated to best address the clients' legal needs.

Cognitive schemas are often based on previous training and experience and facilitate information processing by enabling the decision-maker to concentrate attention on salient features of the environment in order to frame the decision problem and establish parameters for action or response. Stein suggests that people use schemas to organize their environment and develop "scripts" to make sense of people or events (2005). When the salient features of the presenting situation are compatible with the observers' preexisting schema or scripts for coding information, few problems are likely to arise for the decision-maker (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). The new information can be assimilated to the observer's previous experience, and a definition of the situation can be arrived at, objectives reviewed, and an assessment of the means to accomplish the desired goals determined on. But if the presenting situation contains features that are not fully compatible with the observer's preexisting experience or cognitive schema, then an

information processing and evaluation problem is likely to arise. The observer or decision-maker can try to address this information processing difficulty by adapting the preexisting schema to correspond with the new situation or by retrieving from memory another schema that might prove more useful in framing the situation or processing the new information (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). Frequently, however, the cognitive filtering and evaluation processes at work, especially those that operate tacitly, without the conscious awareness of the observer, may function to suppress or to parse the “dissonant” information or to shunt it to a cognitive siding, so to speak, where it may not interfere with the decision-framing or problem-solving process.

Argyris refers to this kind of tacit information selection and evaluation process as a paradoxical form of “skilled incompetence” (1986). The more the observer is successful in relying on familiar cognitive schema for framing new situations and sorting, filtering, and evaluating new information, the less reflective the observer is likely to be in examining their own internal inference rules for processing information or verifying whether their framing of the situation is necessarily valid or accurate. Frequently, cognitive biases enter into the problem framing and decision process, biases that may not be apparent to the decision-maker, even while apparent to an outside observer (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). When tacit assumptions and cognitive biases are unconsciously entrenched, the process may give rise to the phenomenon of the “self-fulfilling prophecy,” as the observer selectively pays attention to new information that confirms the observer’s prior expectations or framing of the situation while disregarding or filtering out information that does not conform (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Faure 2011; Jervis 1976; Merton 1996; Pruitt and Kim 2004).

The self-fulfilling prophecy works through a process of circular causality, in which new information generated in response to the action of the observer feeds back to confirm the premise on which the observer initially responded. According to Merton (1996), the self-fulfilling prophecy begins with a false definition of the situation,

which then elicits a certain form of behavior that then appears to “cause” the original prediction to come true. This then perpetuates what Merton refers to as a “reign of error” (1996: 185), since the holder of the false definition can then point to subsequent events as proof that he or she was right from the very beginning.

Psychotherapists have observed the effects of the self-fulfilling prophecy in the context of small group or family dynamics, for instance, when one member of the group feels themselves to be misunderstood or distrusted by other members of the group and responds by withdrawing from communication or interacts with other members of the group in mistrustful or hostile ways, thus generating a response that further proves the initial hypothesis that they do not like me (Watzlawick et al. 1967). Bateson’s concept of the communicative “double bind” also involves group dynamics that operate in ways akin to the self-fulfilling prophecy. The double bind occurs where a person sending a message encodes within it two incongruent or contradictory instructions (Bateson 1972; Watzlawick and Weakland 1977; Watzlawick et al. 1967). A typical example might arise in the family situation indicated above, in which a parent instructs a youth who has been rude or aggressive to another family member to apologize while at the same insisting that the apology must be authentic. The purpose of demanding an apology from the perceived wrongdoer is to de-escalate the situation and reduce feelings of resentment caused by the rude behavior. But for the situation to de-escalate, the other family members must be convinced that the apology was sincerely meant. But how can this be determined if the apology was mandatory? Moreover, if the youth feels that the apology was forced and the reaction to his or her conduct was excessive, this may fuel feelings of resentment on the part of the “wrongdoer,” leading to further violations of family norms in the future, in a self-reinforcing spiral.

These negative communicative dynamics do not just manifest themselves in small group settings but also apply to situations of international conflict or in the context of international negotiations. Actors who mistrust each other’s

intentions tend to orient their behavior towards each other in ways that generate responses that confirm the initial hypothesis (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Jervis 1976; Pruitt and Kim 2004). Particularly where there has been a history of conflict between the parties, negotiators have to be wary of unintentionally framing any positions presented at the negotiation table in the form of a double bind. Parties who experience themselves caught in a double bind often have difficulty extricating themselves from its pathological effects without fulfilling the prior behavioral expectations of the other party (Watzlawick et al. 1967), a consequence very typical of both sides' thinking in situations of entrenched conflict (Faure 2011; Kelman 1987; Pruitt and Kim 2004; Stein 1996, 2005).

Bar-Tal (2000) examines these kinds of dynamics in his discussion of the psychological changes needed for reconciliation to take place following the termination of a protracted conflict. The minimum requirement for peace is a negotiated end to the conflict. But for peace to take root, there needs to be a change in the "conflict ethos" that has sustained the conflict for so long, especially in situations of intractable conflict that have lasted for more than one generation, so that a generation has come to maturity knowing no other reality but the conflict (Bar-Tal 2000). A conflict ethos consists of an amalgam of several interrelated elements, including a strong sense of group identity; willingness to make sacrifices or endure suffering for the sake of the group; a belief in the justness of the "cause"; a positive self-image, which operates to attribute positive traits to one's own group; and a corresponding negative image of the other, which functions to delegitimize the other side's conflict goals and to attribute negative traits to the "enemy" (Bar-Tal 1989, 2000; Pruitt and Kim 2004; Stein 2005).

According to Bar-Tal, these schemas of self and other constitute a psychological infrastructure which provides members of the conflict group with a coping mechanism to endure the strain and the costs of protracted conflict and the motivation to continue with the struggle (2000). In a study of the negotiation process that led to the signing of the Good Friday peace accords in

Northern Ireland in 1998, Curran and Sebenius (2003) indicated that many of these psychological dynamics were present and functioned as inhibitors to the willingness of either side to trust the other or to move towards a negotiated settlement. One of the factors noted by the study's authors was what Pruitt and Kim (2004) refer to as the "mirror image" phenomenon, in which each side's negative image of the other as an implacable enemy intent on denying the group the possibility of ever achieving its legitimate conflict goals was almost a mirror image of the other side's view of the conflict (see also Kelman 1987; Faure 2011; Moore 1993). In the Northern Ireland context, both Unionists and Republicans adhered to strongly entrenched schemas of the self as a historically marginalized community, whose right to self-determination and historical connection with the territory in dispute was both materially and symbolically threatened by the claims of the other side (Curran and Sebenius 2003; Mitchell 1999). Both sides were thus used to framing the conflict in symbolic terms as a zero sum contest, in which recognition of one side's legitimate conflict goals could only be achieved at the expense of the other side's (Kelman 1987; O'Leary and McGarry 1996; Nic Craith 2002; Pruitt and Kim 2004). Processes of selective memory further reinforced both side's schemas of victimization by legitimizing or leaving out of memory instances in which the threatened group inflicts retaliatory violence on the other group (Curran and Sebenius 2003; Pruitt and Kim 2004).

The study by Curran and Sebenius focused on the strategy of the mediator (former Democratic majority house leader in the United States Senate, George Mitchell, and his team) to foster a "willing coalition of the center" against the extremists on either side, who tended to dominate the dialogue and suppress more moderate voices on either side who were in favor of power sharing and cooperation (2003). Blocking coalitions of extremists had effectively prevented all previous attempts to arrive at a negotiated end to the conflict (Curran and Sebenius 2003; Mitchell 1999).

Complicating the process of building a coalition of moderates on both sides was that various

positions on either side of the conflict tended to be framed in terms of radically incompatible views of the future (Curran and Sebenius 2003). For those political parties associated with the Unionist cause, the vision of the future that informed their negotiating positions was based on maintaining the political union with Britain, as part of an industrialized, modern, democratic English-speaking political community that was also part of the European Community. This vision of the future encompassed both economic and security concerns and at the same time important symbolic dimensions (MacDonagh 1983; Nic Craith 2002). For many of those associated with the Catholic or Republican cause, the vision of the future remained linked to a vision of a United Ireland, which had been a goal pursued by the leaders of the Home Rule struggle against British colonial rule in the nineteenth century and echoes of which remained imbued in memories of the civil war that followed the partition of Ireland following negotiations with the British government that led to the creation of the Irish Free State in 1921 (Curran and Sebenius 2003; Keogh and Haltzel 1993; MacDonagh 1983).

On both sides of the conflict, therefore, and for moderates no less than for extremists, the vision of the future could not easily be disconnected from memories of the past. This was rather chillingly illustrated by a slogan shouted at a rally in 1973, which was used as a title for another study of the negotiation process, “To hell with the future, let’s get on with the past.” (Curran and Sebenius 2003: 122). This suggests that the ghosts of the past still cast a shadow over the negotiation process and influenced not only the goals and strategies of those political parties directly participating in the negotiations but also the mind-sets of those who were witnesses to the negotiation process and whose continued support remains necessary for any negotiated peace to be sustainable (Keogh and Haltzel 1993; MacDonagh 1983; Mitchell 1999).

Consequently, it may not always be possible or easy for the participants in any international negotiation to separate their vision of the future from their remembered experience of the past. As Melchin and Picard (2008) observe, feeling-

laden value narratives from past experiences influence the ways in which parties and their constituencies are able to engage in dialogue with each other in the present and imagine the future. At the same time, viewing the parties as historically situated actors whose attitudes and values are necessarily shaped by their remembered experience of past encounters with others is not to imply that the future is always in thrall to that past in any predetermined way. Rather, what we argue is that in any negotiation situation, particularly one which holds the potential for differently structuring the relationship between the parties, what is under negotiation is not just the conditions of that future relationship to which the various parties around the bargaining table may be committed, to a greater or a lesser degree. At the same time, the very process of seeking to realize a differently imagined future through negotiation involves, however indirectly, an attempt at reconfiguring the parties’ preexisting relation with their own pasts. And this process of renegotiating the participants’ own relationship with their pasts may be one of the most complex and least understood psychological dynamics of the negotiation process (Bar-Tal 2000).

Conclusion: Implications for Insight

In this chapter, we have tried to show how the Insight approach to conflict resolution helps focus attention on many of the underlying psychological dynamics that may impact on the interaction between the parties in the negotiation process. The Insight approach focuses on the parties becoming more reflexively self-aware of how the interpretive frameworks or scripts (Stein 2005) they use for understanding the conflict or negotiation situation operate to constrain their horizons for action. When parties are “certain” about the attitudes or intentions of the other, they consciously or unconsciously organize their own response to the other party in ways that reflect this degree of certainty. Feelings triggered by processes of selective memory reinforce this tendency and make it hard for parties to shift their horizons or to explore different trajectories for

action that are not already pre-scripted in terms of their prior sets of beliefs about the other. For this reason, the Insight approach places emphasis on negotiation less as a structured bargaining process through which parties arrived at solutions to jointly defined problems and more as a communicative learning process through which parties can discover more about self, the other, and the cares and threats that underlay the parties' respective negotiating positions. Gaining insights into what motivates the other or what threats to cares underlay the other's bargaining positions may help parties become more uncertain about each other's intentions and to explore horizons for action that might have been formerly closed to them.

The Insight approach is based on four principles, all of which are applicable to the preceding discussion concerning psychological dimensions of the negotiation process. First, the parties to any conflict or negotiation are historically situated social actors, whose attitudes and values, perceptions, and motivations are shaped by their group affiliations, which in turn are likely to feed back into the parties' goals and strategies in the negotiation process. As such the parties at the negotiation table are not simply rational decision-makers concerned with maximizing their subjective utility under conditions of uncertainty. As representatives of collective group interests, the negotiating parties often have to be concerned with maintaining group solidarity and at the same time engaging in negotiations with other parties. This process of engaging communicatively on two fronts, with different audiences, at one and the same time, creates risks of miscommunication or miscalibration of intentions. Parties may be forced to shift their negotiation standpoint as a result of pressure from domestic political constituencies while at the same time trying to reassure other negotiating partners that they remain committed to a collaborative process. In this context, managing the political climate in which the negotiation takes place may often be as important to the success of the negotiations as the terms actually agreed on by the parties.

Second, as historically situated actors, the parties' motivations are shaped not just by their

own interests but also by their belief structures or values (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). As Insight theorists put it, our cares extend beyond the self (Melchin and Picard 2008). Normative considerations often enter into the negotiation process, especially where there has been a history of conflict or rivalry between the parties. As indicated above, the negotiations leading up to the signing of the Good Friday peace accords in Northern Ireland in 1998 were significantly influenced by memories of past grievances, on both sides of the conflict, often stretching back decades or even centuries. Negotiating parties thus have to be very circumspect in dealing with the past. On the one hand, failure to acknowledge emotions triggered by memories of past grievances may be a factor which inhibits one or more of the parties from entering into negotiation or reaching agreement with former adversaries (Mitchell 1999). On the other hand, too much attention given to memories of past grievances may prevent the parties from moving beyond this past reality to create the conditions for a new relationship that is not based on memories of past conflict. The past thus still imposes its grip on the present, even where negotiators seek to navigate their way around it.

Third, it follows from the preceding point that negotiators do not just act as instrumentally rational calculators, as suggested by economic theory, but also as political actors who need to be conscious of the symbolic dimensions of the negotiation process. Symbolic issues often have great emotional significance for the parties. Emotions act as carriers of values; and values are what drive the parties' emotional attachment to the conflict (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Melchin and Picard 2008). Again negotiators have to be aware of this psychological dynamic. Symbolic gestures of recognition may be significant in modifying party attitudes and opening up space for parties to engage in collaborative negotiations. Lack of symbolic recognition often results in hardening of negotiating positions, making parties less willing to make concessions or to enter into collaborative negotiations. How parties extend symbolic recognition to each other's interests in the negotiation process also affects

negotiation dynamics. Again, this is not simply an instrumental calculus. Symbolic gestures of recognition have to be meaningful for the parties; otherwise, they are likely to have little effect in shifting party attitudes.

Fourth, awareness of these psychological dynamics is important in helping negotiating parties navigate this unknown psychological terrain successfully (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008: 83). The ways in which feelings act as carriers of value, or memories of past encounters continue to influence our ways of making sense of the present, often operate unconsciously, without the parties being consciously aware of this. Schemas and heuristics function as cognitive shortcuts, enabling us to process information more rapidly and to make rapid assessments of the conditions in the environment towards which our purposive actions are directed. These are not isolated instances of deviations from a norm of rationality, but practical strategies decision-makers adopt in trying to manage all the various sources of information available to them (Vertzberger 1990). We rarely have access to perfect information or time to evaluate all the information that is available. Instead, we selectively parse the available sources of information, discounting or discarding that which we cannot make use of. Perhaps the most famous literary example of such information parsing strategies is that of the fictional detective Sherlock Holmes, who claimed to neither know nor care whether the sun revolved around the earth, or the earth around the sun, because he did not have room in his cranial storage capacity to store such—to him—useless information. For Holmes it was more useful to have a comprehensive knowledge of the different soils of London, or the ways in which different occupations could be discerned from slight traces on a person's clothing, than to have a detailed knowledge of the solar system. So he discounted, or in his case discarded, all information that he considered to be irrelevant to his profession, that of catching criminals and solving fictional mysteries.

In Holmes' case we are confident as readers that he will not "misread" others or overlook

anything of importance in solving the mystery he is presented with. But for most practical decision-making tasks in the real world, we can never be sure of this. Frequently, we are not even aware that we may be ignoring relevant information that could help us to solve problems or to reach an agreement. On the contrary, the cognitive tools we rely on for making sense of other's intentions or behavior towards us, our schemas of self and other, often mislead us into thinking that what we believe to be true about the situation we confront, or about the other's intentions, is in fact the truth. Yet this space between representation and reality, how the world appears to the consciousness of an observer, and how it really is can often provide the space in which negotiators can find room for collaborative negotiated settlements. For this gap to open up and new horizons for decision-making to emerge, the parties first have to become less certain about their own presuppositions and more aware of how their own frame of reference may in fact inhibit the search for more integrative solutions to the problems that led them to the negotiating table in the first place. It is this self-reflective aspect of the decision-making process that the Insight approach to conflict resolution was developed to address (see Chap. 16; Aquilar and Galluccio 2008, 2011; Melchin and Picard 2008; Price 2013).

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Why Is It So Difficult to Resolve Intractable Conflicts Peacefully? A Sociopsychological Explanation

7

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Introduction

Intergroup conflicts are an inherent part of human relations, having on a large scale taken place continuously and constantly throughout all millennia of history. Of these, intractable intergroup conflicts,¹ which still rage in various parts of the globe—in Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Chechnya, or the Middle East—are of special interest. Conflicts in this category stem from disagreements over contradictory goals and interests in different domains such as territories, natural resources, economic wealth, self-determination, and/or basic values, and these real issues must be addressed in conflict resolution processes. Nonetheless, it is assumed that these disagreements could potentially be resolved if not for the powerful sociopsychological barriers which fuel and maintain the conflicts (Arrow et al. 1995; Bar-Siman-Tov 1995, 2010; Bar-Tal and Halperin 2011; Ross and Ward 1995).

¹ Intractable conflicts are violent, fought over goals viewed as existential, perceived as being of zero sum nature and unsolvable, preoccupy a central position in the lives of the involved societies, require immense investments of material and psychological resources, and last for at least 25 years (Bar-Tal 2007a, 2013; Kriesberg 1993).

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These barriers inhibit and impede progress toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict. They are found among both leaders and society members and stand as major obstacles to beginning negotiations for a solution, to maintaining these negotiations, to achieving an agreement, and later to engaging in a process of reconciliation. In our view, the sociopsychological barriers to conflict resolution refer to the integrated operation of cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes, combined with a preexisting repertoire of rigid conflict-supporting beliefs, worldviews, and emotions that result in selective, biased, and distorted information processing (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2011). This processing obstructs and inhibits the penetration of new information that can potentially contribute to progress in the de-escalation or peacemaking process.

The chapter will first present the evolution of the culture of conflict that provides the foundation for the emergence of sociopsychological barriers to conflict resolution. Subsequently, it will describe the barriers' functioning on the societal level, focusing on the mechanisms employed to maintain the culture of conflict. The next part will introduce a general integrative model of sociopsychological barriers on the individual level, focusing on cognitive, motivational, and emotional factors, and introducing the concept of self-censorship. A conceptual framework will follow, proposing ways to overcome the sociopsychological barriers. Finally, the significance of this framework and the findings supporting it will be discussed.

Development of Sociopsychological Barriers to Conflict Resolution

Evolvement of an Ideology of Conflict

Our point of departure is that intractable conflicts have an “imprinting” effect on the individual and collective lives of the participating societies’ members. The above described characteristics of intractable conflict imply that society members living under these harsh conditions experience severe and continuous negative psychological effects such as chronic threat, stress, pain, uncertainty, exhaustion, suffering, grief, trauma, misery, and hardship, both in human and material terms (see, e.g., Cairns 1996; de Jong 2002; Milgram 1986; Robben and Suarez 2000). An intractable conflict also demands the constant mobilization of society members to support and actively take part in it, even to the extent of the willingness to sacrifice their own lives. In view of these experiences, society members must adapt to the harsh conditions by satisfying their basic human needs, learning to cope with the stress, and developing psychological mechanisms that will be conducive to successfully withstanding the rival group.

We propose that in order to meet the above challenges, societies in intractable conflict develop a repertoire of functional beliefs, attitudes, emotions, values, motivations, norms, and practices (Bar-Tal 2007, 2013). This repertoire provides a meaningful picture of the conflict situation, justifies the society’s behavior, facilitates wide mobilization for participation in the conflict, effectively differentiates between the in-group and the rival, and enables the maintenance of a positive social identity and collective self-image. These elements of the sociopsychological repertoire, on both the individual and collective levels, gradually crystallize into a well-organized system of shared societal beliefs,² attitudes, and

emotions that penetrates into the society’s institutions and communication channels and become part of its sociopsychological infrastructure. This infrastructure includes collective memories, an ethos of conflict, and collective emotional orientation³ that are all mutually interrelated—they provide the major narratives, motivations, orientations, and goals that society members need in order to carry on with their lives under the harsh conditions of intractable conflict, while supporting its continuation.

Collective memory of conflict describes the outbreak of the conflict and its course, providing a coherent and meaningful picture of what has happened from the societal perspective (Bar-Tal 2007, 2013; Devine-Wright 2003; Papadakis et al. 2006; Tint 2010). Complementing the collective memory is the *ethos of conflict*, defined as the configuration of shared central societal beliefs that provide a particular dominant orientation to a society at present and for the future (Bar-Tal 2000, 2007, 2013). It is composed of eight major themes about issues related to the conflict, the in-group, and its adversary: (1) *societal beliefs about the justness of one’s own goals*, which outline the contested goals, indicate their crucial importance, and provide their explanations and rationales; (2) *societal beliefs about security* stress the importance of personal safety and national survival and outline the conditions for their achievement; (3) *societal beliefs of positive collective self-image* concern the ethnocentric tendency to attribute positive traits, values, and behaviors to one’s own society; (4) *societal beliefs of victimization* concern the self-presentation of the in-group as the victim of the conflict; (5) *societal beliefs of delegitimizing the opponent* concern beliefs that deny the adversary’s humanity; (6) *societal beliefs of patriotism* generate attachment to the country and society by propagating loyalty, love, care, and sacrifice; (7) *societal beliefs of unity* refer to the importance of ignoring internal conflicts and disagreements

²Societal beliefs are the building blocks of narratives. They are defined as shared cognitions by the society members that address themes and issues that the society members are particularly occupied with and which contribute to their sense of uniqueness (Bar-Tal 2000).

³Collective emotional orientation refers to societal characterization of an emotion that is reflected on individual and collective level in sociopsychological repertoire, as well as in tangible and intangible societal symbols such as cultural products or ceremonies (Bar-Tal 2001, 2013).

during intractable conflicts to unite the society's forces in the face of an external threat; and, finally, (8) *societal beliefs of peace* refer to peace as the ultimate desire of the society but are not attached to any concrete sacrifices that must be made toward this end.

The described themes of ethos of conflict also appear in the collective memory of conflict. Together, they form a kind of ideology that provides a general worldview about the reality of conflict. As an ideology, the presented themes create a conceptual framework that allows society members to organize and comprehend the world in which they live and to act toward its preservation or alteration in accordance with this standpoint (Eagleton 1991; Jost et al. 2009; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Shils 1968; Van Dijk 1998). The ideology reflects genuine attempts to give meaning to and organize the experiences and information provided by life in the context of intractable conflict, as well as conscious or unconscious tendencies to rationalize the way things are, or alternatively, the wishes of how they should be (e.g., Jost et al. 2003). Moreover, it is a determinative factor in affecting the evaluation and judgment of conflict-related issues. The ideology affects the way society members view events of the conflict, interpret their experiences, and judge various issues that arise throughout time, including different proposed solutions to resolve the conflict. In addition to the noted functions, the ideology also strengthens unity, interdependence, and solidarity, as it creates a shared view of the conflict reality based on common experiences and socialization.

In this conception, it is of crucial importance to note that this ideology provides a conservative outlook on the reality of intractable conflict (Krochik and Jost 2011). Indeed, Hogg (2004) proposed that ideologies that tend to develop under extreme uncertainty (such as intractable conflict) are conservative ideologies that resist change. In this line, the described ideology with its themes comes to preserve the existing order of continuing the conflict and thus to maintain the known and familiar without taking any risks in moving into the unknown and ambiguous territory of peacemaking. The ideology focuses on potential threats and losses in moving toward

compromises with the rival and emphasizes stability and security within the present situation (Jost et al. 2003). It expresses a fear of change, because as Thórisdóttir and Jost (2011) noted, “the status quo, no matter how aversive, is a known condition and is therefore easier to predict and imagine than a potentially different state of affairs that could be either better or worse” (p. 789).

It is therefore not surprising that we found that a general conservative outlook, reflected in right-wing authoritarianism (RWA—Altemeyer 1981), predicts adherence to the ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal et al. 2012). Ethos of conflict and RWA as worldviews reflect a conservative orientation of adhering to traditional goals and known situations, closure to new ideas, and mistrust of the other—elements that lead to readily detecting threats and dangers in possible changes. This study also shows that adherence to the ethos of conflict is related to unwillingness to support compromises needed to resolve the conflict. It is individuals' ideology about the conflict that closes them to new possibilities and makes them intransigent (see also Halperin and Bar-Tal 2011).

Eventually, the described infrastructure becomes institutionalized and is widely disseminated. Consequently, it serves as a foundation for the development of a culture of conflict that dominates societies engaged in intractable conflicts.

Culture of Conflict

A *culture of conflict* develops when societies saliently integrate into their culture tangible and intangible symbols that have been created to communicate a particular meaning about the prolonged and continuous experiences of living in the context of prolonged and violent conflict (Bar-Tal 2010, 2013; Geertz 1973; Ross 1998). Symbols of conflict become hegemonic elements in the culture of societies involved in intractable conflict: They provide the dominant meaning about the present reality, about the past, and about future goals and serve as guides for individual action. Ann Swidler's (1986, p. 273) discussion of culture as “a ‘tool kit’ of rituals, symbols, stories, and world views”, which people

use to construct “strategies of action,” is an important theoretical addition and can serve as a foundation for the present discussion. Bond (2004) elaborated on this psychological conception of culture in a manner fully congruent with the discussion of a culture of conflict, by defining culture as follows:

“A shared system of beliefs (what is true), values (what is important), expectations, especially about scripted behavioral sequences, and behavioral meanings (what is implied by engaging in a given action) developed by a group over time to provide the requirement of living... This shared system enhances communication of meaning and coordination of actions among culture’s members by reducing uncertainty and anxiety through making its members’ behavior predictable, understandable, and valued” (p. 62).

We suggest that the sociopsychological infrastructure’s solidification, as an indication of the development of a culture of conflict, includes the four key features: (1) *Extensive sharing*—The societal beliefs of the sociopsychological infrastructure and the accompanying emotions are widely shared by society members.⁴ (2) *Wide application*—The repertoire is not only held by society members but is also put into active use by them in their daily conversations, being chronically accessible. In addition, it is dominant in the public discourse propagated by societal channels of mass communication and is often used by leaders to justify and explain decisions, policies, and courses of actions. Finally, the repertoire is also expressed in institutional ceremonies, commemorations, memorials, and so on. (3) *Expression in cultural products*—The sociopsychological infrastructure is also expressed through cultural products such as literary books, television programs, films, theater plays, visual art, monuments, etc. (4) *Educational materials*—The sociopsychological infrastructure appears in the textbooks used in schools, and even in higher

education institutions, as a central theme of socialization.

The above analysis aimed to present the basis on which the sociopsychological barriers to conflict resolution evolve and grow. These barriers, which serve as powerful forces in societies involved in intractable conflicts, are grounded in the culture of conflict, with the ideological themes of the ethos and collective memory as its pillars. These themes are also grounded in shared emotions, which constitute another powerful vector to the functioning of the barriers. Taken together, these factors play a major role in preventing the processing of new information and consequently the adoption of new perspectives that could facilitate a peacemaking process. We will now elaborate on these sociopsychological barriers.

The discussion of the sociopsychological barriers is divided into two parts. The first part presents the societal mechanisms that play an active role in creating barriers to the flow of alternative information. The second part describes the nature and functioning of the barriers on the level of individual society members involved in intractable conflicts and supporting them. The main argument advanced in this chapter is that although sociopsychological barriers function on the individual level, this functioning is greatly affected by the dominant culture of conflict, which acts a filter for information about the conflict. They provide the social environment in which individual society members collect information, form experiences, and subsequently process them (see Fig. 7.1).

We propose that societies involved in intractable conflict use various societal mechanisms to block the appearance and dissemination of information providing an alternative view of the conflict, the rival, the in-group, and/or the conflict’s goals: alternative information that humanizes the rival and sheds a new light on the conflict; that suggests compromises can be made; that sees a partner on the other side with whom it is possible to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict; that views peace as beneficial and the conflict as costly; that views continuation of the conflict as detrimental to the society; and that may even provide evidence that the in-group also holds responsibility for the conflict’s continuation and

⁴It is recognized that not all members of societies involved in intractable conflict share equally the repertoire. Societies differ in the extent of sharing the societal beliefs of ethos and of collective memory. Moreover, there are societies that hold contradicting ethos even at the height of the conflict and others may develop it with time.




Fig. 7.1 Formation of a culture of conflict: macro and micro levels

has been acting immorally. This tendency to block alternative information can be found in every society involved in intractable conflict in the phases of escalation. At the very least, formal institutions and channels of communication practice this tendency, while informal, and often marginal, institutions and organizations may provide the alternative information even in the early phases of the conflict.

These societal mechanisms that constitute barriers will now be described.

Societal Mechanisms as Barriers

Societal mechanisms are in place to block alternative information and narratives from entering social spheres and guarantee that even when these do penetrate, they will be rejected, and society members will be unpersuaded by their evidence and arguments (Bar-Tal 2007; Horowitz 2000; Kelman 2007). Such societal mechanisms can be used by the formal authorities of the in-group—in some cases of the state—or by other

agents of conflict, who have a vested interest in preventing dissemination of alternative information. The former can be governments, leaders, and societal institutions, and the latter can be NGOs and various organizations, as well as individuals who are in positions of gatekeepers of information.

1. *Control of information.* This mechanism refers to the selective dissemination of information about the conflict within society, as practiced by formal and informal societal institutions (e.g., state ministries, the military forces, and the media). These institutions provide information that sustains the dominant conflict-supportive narrative while suppressing information that may challenge it. This is done, for instance, by selecting friendly agents for the dissemination of information, by establishing a central organization to oversee the dissemination of the official conflict-supportive narratives, and by preventing journalists or monitoring NGOs from entering particular areas of conflict-related action (Dixon 2010).

The Russians' method for dealing with the local media during the second Russia-Chechnya War illustrates this mechanism's employment. They established the Russian Information Center that briefed journalists and instructed Russian officials on what to tell the media. In addition, the separatists from Chechnya were effectively cut off from the media, and the Russians exercised strict control over journalists' movements in Chechnya. Even when journalists were allowed to enter war zones, they were accompanied by Russian officials who decided where they could go and what they could see (Caryl 2000). Moreover, we can see strategic manipulations of the information through a mechanism called "gaming the system." For instance, some members of government's teams could selectively frame and/or distort the information through its proactive manipulation to misguide and actively bias the information that will be allowed to decision-makers (Galluccio 2011).

2. *Censorship*. This mechanism refers to the prohibitions on the publication of information in various products (e.g., newspapers articles, cultural channels and official publications) that challenges the themes of the dominant conflict-supporting narratives. These products typically have to be submitted to a formal institution for approval before they become public (Peleg 1993). This method was used, for example, by the government of Sri Lanka in its struggle against the Tamil minority. In 1973, the government enacted the Press Council Bill that formed a censoring council whose members, appointed by the president, were authorized to prohibit the discussion in the mass media of sensitive policies and political and economic topics related to the way the conflict was being handled (Tyerman 1973).
3. *Restricting access to archives*. This mechanism aims to prevent the public disclosure of documents stored in archives (especially state archives) that may contradict the dominant narrative (Brown and Davis-Brown 1998). Usually, such documents are evidence of the in-group's misdeeds, including atrocities, missed opportunities to make peace, or, alternatively, information that may contradict the negative view of rival groups as depicted in the conflict-supporting narrative, such as evidence of sincere peace initiatives put forward by these groups. The prevention of access to archived documents can be comprehensive—applying to all people and all documents—or selective. For example, since World War I, the Ottoman and later the Turkish archives were closed to the public with regard to documents that pertain to the Armenian Genocide. State officials had access to such documents but only to search for documents that supported the Turkish "no genocide" narrative. In 1985, the archives were partially opened, but even then, access granted to the documents was highly selective (Dixon 2010; Safarian 1999).
4. *Monitoring*. This mechanism, employed by formal and informal societal institutions, refers to the regular scrutiny of information that is being disseminated to the public sphere (e.g., school textbooks, NGO reports, mass media news, studies of scholars, and so on) in order to identify information that contradicts the conflict-supporting narrative, expose the sources of such information, and sanction them to prevent further dissemination of such information (Avni and Klustein 2009). The objects of this monitoring are typically mass media outlets, studies by scholars and research institutions, history textbooks, and peace NGOs' reports. The monitoring is conducted by formal and informal societal institutions. An example of the use of monitoring can be found in the Israeli-Jewish society, with organizations such as Israel Academia Monitor (IAM) and NGO Monitor employing this mechanism widely to single out individuals, groups, and NGOs that, in their view, undermine Jewish-Zionist interests (IAM 2011).
5. *Discrediting of counter-information*. This category encompasses methods for portraying information that supports counter-narratives and/or its sources (individuals or entities) as unreliable and as damaging to the interests of the in-group. Occasionally, these methods reach the level of delegitimization of individuals

and organizations that disseminate such information (Berger 2005). The Greek population in Cyprus exemplifies extensive employment of this mechanism. Conflict-supporting governments as well as political parties, NGOs, and individuals have tried, continuously and systematically, to discredit and even delegitimize individuals, groups, and organizations that have engaged in the dissemination of information countering the prevailing views about the Turkish Cypriot conflict, the rival, and the Greek society (Papadakis et al. 2006).

6. *Punishment.* When individuals and entities challenge the hegemony of the dominant narrative, they may face sanctions. These sanctions can be formal and/or informal and may be of social, financial, and/or physical nature. They are aimed at discouraging such challengers from conducting their activities and thereby effectively silence them (Carruthers 2000). As an illustration, this mechanism was used extensively in El Salvador during the civil war. Journalists, scholars, and students who criticized the government were constantly labeled as “destabilizers” and traitors; they were harassed, arrested, and physically attacked; their residences and offices were bombed, and some were even murdered. Harsh measures were also taken against the institutions themselves, including newspapers and even the National University of El Salvador (Matheson 1986).
7. *Encouragement and rewarding.* This mechanism consists of “carrots” given to those sources, channels, agents, and products that support the sociopsychological repertoire of the conflict. Authorities may reward and encourage such sources for providing narrative-supporting information, knowledge, art, and other products. In the case of the mass media, for example, a particular correspondent may receive exclusive information or interviews for such favorable coverage. In the case of cultural products, the writer or painter may receive a prize for her creative work that supports the culture of conflict. The goal is to show that those who follow the line reap

benefits and rewards and should serve as models for others. In this line, the Israeli minister of culture decided to award an annual prize for cultural work in the area of Zionism that comes to “express values of Zionism, the history of the Zionist movement and the return of the Jewish people to their historical homeland” (http://www.mcs.gov.il/Culture/Professional_Information/CallforScholarshipAward/Pages/PrasZionut2011.aspx).

Taken, together, these mechanisms show that societies involved in intractable conflict actively work to maintain the conflict-supporting narrative and prevent any penetration of alternative beliefs that may undermine its dominance. This social situation may be described as *the monopolization of patriotism* (Bar-Tal 1997). In other words, society’s dominant sector, which wishes to sustain the conflict, situates the themes of the ethos of conflict and collective memory as the only ideology that reflects true patriotism. In these cases, only those society members who accept this ideology are considered patriots, while other society members who are attached to the nation and country but do not embrace this ideology are then labeled non-patriots. Monopolization of patriotism in this case becomes a mechanism of exclusion for society members who do not hold the ideology. Consequently, society members must display unquestioning loyalty not only to the nation and state but also to the ideology.

When patriotism is monopolized, especially by a group in power, society members may conform to avoid being labeled as non-patriots. Those group members who have differing beliefs regarding the conflict and/or the rival may prefer to hide them (Mitchell 1981), as the label “non-patriot” is in itself a sanction. Other extreme labels may include “traitor,” “enemy,” or “foreign agent” and could bring about more severe sanctions in the form of tangible punishments. In addition, social psychologists have proposed that society members may accept the view of the majority and even internalize it (Allen 1965; Kelman 1961). This type of conformity essentially indicates a process of persuasion or socialization and occurs when individuals accept the view of the majority when constructing their own

reality. It reflects the considerable influence that society has on individuals' adoption of views, either through compliance, internalization, or identification processes (Kelman 1958). Such conformity may be especially present in societies that block the flow of alternative information.

In addition, when the monopolizing group is in power, it may enforce conformity not only through sanctions but also through widespread indoctrination. It may impart the limiting definition of patriotism with the ideology of conflict through various agents of socialization such as the mass media or schools. The pressure for conformity is especially effective when the regime has the control over the socialization and communication institutions on the one hand and has the power to sanction dissenters on the other.

The described societal barriers illuminate the context in which societies function on the collective level. Nevertheless, it is important to note that although in every society these mechanisms appear to at least some degree, societies involved in intractable conflict differ with regard to the extent of their use. Their appearance depends on various cultural, political, societal, and even international determinants. One of the important categories of variables that influence the development of these processes is the society's structural characteristics and especially its political culture (Almond and Verba 1989). Of special importance is its level of openness, pluralism, tolerance, and freedom of speech, elements that have determinative influence on overall control of information, freedom of expression, openness to considering alternative information, free flow of information, availability of free agents of information, access to global sources of information, and so on. The higher the level of control the society exercises over its members, the less freedom there is to consider alternative information. A society that limits pluralism, skepticism, or criticism prevents the emergence of alternative ideas that may push toward the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Societies in conflict also differ from one another with regard to the need to use societal mechanisms to obstruct the flow of alternative information. In asymmetrical conflicts, one

society may have a more solidified moral epistemic basis in line with international moral codes than the other. This epistemic basis requires less employment of societal censorship mechanisms, as, for example, in the case of Blacks in South Africa or Algerians in Algeria demanding an end to legal discrimination and colonialism, respectively. Other societies, however, may need to construct epistemic bases that negate the normative moral codes of intergroup behavior. Such societies will also need to use societal mechanisms in order to uphold this narrative, as in the case of the Whites in South Africa and the French during the Algerian War.

Moreover, it is important to note that the described societal processes and mechanisms greatly influence the way society members think, process information, and act. Individuals' behavior is embedded within the societal context with its special conditions. The context not only provides the space in which society members can act cognitively, emotionally, and behaviorally, but also serves, as noted, to encourage or limit these actions. The more leeway is provided to individuals, the more they can flourish and provide new, creative, and innovative ideas. We now turn the discussion toward the functioning of the sociopsychological barriers on the individual level.

Individual Sociopsychological Barriers

The discussion of the sociopsychological barriers on the individual level must begin with the understanding that in all the societies involved in intractable conflicts, in their climax, at least a significant portion of the society members hold in their repertoire the ideology of the ethos of conflict and collective memory, and some even hold them with great confidence (Sharvit 2008). These ideological conflict-supporting narratives form the pillars of the culture of conflict, illuminating the conflict in a particular light. Theoretically, the conflict-supporting narratives could be easily changed in the face of persuasive arguments that provide information about the costs of the conflict, the rival's humanity, the

rival's willingness to negotiate a peaceful resolution, past immoral acts by the in-group, and so on. In reality, however, this change rarely occurs over a short period of time⁵—even when society members are presented with valid alternative information that refutes their beliefs, they continue to adhere to them. Sociopsychological barriers, defined as “an integrated operation of cognitive, emotional and motivational processes, combined with pre-existing repertoire of rigid conflict supporting beliefs, world views and emotions that result in selective, biased and distorting information processing” (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2011, p. 220), are a central reason for the described stalemate. Thus, the barriers' operation at the level of the individual results in one-sided information processing that obstructs and inhibits the penetration of new information that may lead to support for the conflict's peaceful resolution. Consequently, regardless of the availability of such information, individuals are not even interested in exposure to alternative information that may contradict their long-held ideological narratives about the conflict.

The reason for this unwillingness to hear alternative information is *freezing* of these beliefs, which is the essence of barriers' functioning (Kruglanski 2004; Kruglanski and Webster 1996). The state of freezing is evidenced by the continued reliance on the conflict-supporting narratives, the reluctance to search for alternative information, and the resistance to persuasive counterarguments (Kruglanski 2004; Kruglanski and Webster 1996; Kunda 1990). The narratives of the culture of conflict freeze due to the operation of cognitive, motivational, and emotional processes, as well as a number of sociopsychological factors on which we will now elaborate (see also the integrative model of sociopsychological barriers to peacemaking in Bar-Tal and Halperin 2011 for further elaboration). We begin by describing the cognitive processes, with a focus on the rigid structure of these societal beliefs.

The Cognitive Structural Factor

“Cognitive processes are the modalities, with which every individual structures the knowledge of himself and of the world, and they are ‘imbued’ of emotions and meanings” (Aquilari and Galluccio 2008, p. 40). As a cognitive process, freezing is fed by the rigid structure of the societal conflict-supporting beliefs of the narratives. Rigidity implies that these societal beliefs are resistant to change, as they are organized in a coherent manner with little complexity and great differentiation from alternative beliefs (Tetlock 1989; Rokeach 1960). Several factors cause this rigid structure. First, societal beliefs about the conflict are often interrelated in an ideological structure. These beliefs, together, subscribe to all the criteria for being an ideology, and as such, they provide a well-organized system that may withstand counterarguments and new information and is difficult to change (Jost et al. 2003). Second, as stated earlier, these beliefs satisfy important human needs such as needs for certainty, meaningful understanding, predictability, safety, mastery, positive self-esteem and identity, differentiation, justice, etc. (Bar-Tal 2007; Burton 1990; Kelman and Fisher 2003; Staub and Bar-Tal 2003). Because they fulfill such primary needs, any change in these beliefs may be psychologically costly to the individual. Finally, the beliefs are ego-involving and are also held by many society members with high confidence as central and important, contributing to their stability. All these factors contribute to the rigid structure of the societal beliefs of the ethos of conflict and collective memory, preventing it from transformation in more conciliatory beliefs (Petrocelli et al. 2007; Eagly and Chaiken 1993, 1998; Fazio 1995; Jost et al. 2003; Krosnick 1989; Lavine et al. 2000).

It is important to note in the discussion of the cognitive factor that this closed-mindedness is also affected by *general worldviews*, which are systems of beliefs that are unrelated to the particular conflict but provide orientations that contribute to the conflict's continuation because of the perspectives, norms, and values forming them (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2011). Since their childhood,

⁵ Still the process of change may take place with great difficulty, duration and obstacles.

individuals develop certain beliefs about themselves, other people, and the world, which drive the perception, processing, and recall of information. People core beliefs are understandings that are so fundamental and deep that they regard them as absolute truths (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). The list of these general worldviews is a long one, but prominent examples include political ideology (such as authoritarianism or conservatism) that is not directly related to the conflict (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1981; Jost 2006; Sidanius and Pratto 1999), specific values such as those related to power or conservatism (Schwartz 1992), religious beliefs (Kimball 2002), and an entity theory about the nature of human qualities (Dweck 1999). All these worldviews influence how society members perceive the conflict and form their beliefs about the nature of the conflict, the rival, and their own group (see, e.g., Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle 1997; Dweck and Ehrlinger 2006; Golec and Federico 2004; Jost et al. 2003; Maoz and Eidelson 2007; Sibley and Duckit 2008).

The Motivational Factor

The second factor leading to freezing is motivational because the held societal beliefs have at their base specific closure needs (see Kruglanski 1989, 2004; Chap. 16). That is, society members are motivated to view the narratives of ethos of conflict and collective memory as truthful and valid because they fulfill for them various needs (see, e.g., Burton 1990). Therefore, society members use various cognitive strategies to increase the likelihood of reaching particular conclusions that are in line with these narratives (Kunda 1990). As part of this motivational process, they reject information that contradicts the held conflict-supporting narratives but readily accept information that supports their desired conclusion.

The Emotional Factor

The third factor that affects freezing comprises enduring negative intergroup emotions. They function to limit the psychological repertoire of

society members and strengthen the rigidity of their societal beliefs. The emotions are linked to the societal beliefs through their appraisal component: Each and every emotion is related to a unique configuration of comprehensive (conscious or unconscious) evaluations of the emotional stimulus (Roseman 1984), and this means that emotions are both interpreted in view of the societal beliefs and reinforce the beliefs once they are evoked. Hence, emotions and beliefs are closely related and reinforce each other continuously. More specifically, the societal beliefs of the culture of conflict are strongly related to negative emotions such as fear, hatred, and anger, widely shared by society members. Once these emotions are established and maintained as lasting emotional sentiments, they activate thoughts in line with the societal beliefs of the ethos (Halperin et al. 2011b).

A typical example of a negative emotion that often has an obstructing effect on peacemaking processes is the chronic fear that is often an inherent part of the psychological repertoire of society members involved in intractable conflict. In many cases, fear in this violent context may even lead to the development of collective angst, which indicates a perception of the group's possible extinction (Wohl and Branscombe 2008; Wohl et al. 2010). The prolonged experience of severe fear leads to a number of observed cognitive effects that intensify freezing. It sensitizes the organism and the cognitive system to certain threatening cues. It prioritizes information about potential threats and causes extension of the associative networks of information about threat. It causes overestimation of danger and threat. It facilitates the selective retrieval of information related to fear. It increases expectations of threat and dangers, and it increases the accessibility of procedural knowledge that was effective in coping with threatening situations in the past (Clore et al. 1994; Gray 1987; Isen 1990; Lazarus and Folkman 1984; LeDoux 1995, 1996; Öhman 1993). It may also lead to repression and, consequently, to the unchecked influence of unconscious affect on behavior (Czapinski 1988; Jarymowicz 1997).

Moreover, once fear is evoked, it limits the activation of other regulatory mechanisms and limits consideration of alternative coping strategies,

due to its egocentric and maladaptive patterns of reaction to situations that require creative and novel solutions for coping. Indeed, empirical findings demonstrate that fear has limiting effects on cognitive processing, and it tends to cause: adherence to known situations and avoidance of risky, uncertain and novel ones; cognitive freezing, which reduces openness to new ideas; and resistance to change (Clore et al. 1994; Isen 1990; Jost et al. 2003; Le Doux 1995, 1996; Öhman 1993).

Taking a societal approach, the collective fear orientation tends to limit society members' perspective by binding the present to past experiences related to the conflict and by building expectations for the future exclusively on the basis of the past (Bar-Tal 2001). This seriously hinders the disassociation from the past needed to allow creative thinking about new alternatives that may resolve the conflict peacefully. As fear is deeply entrenched in the psyche of society members, as well as in the culture, it inhibits the evolvment of hope for peace by spontaneously and automatically flooding the consciousness, making it difficult for society members to free themselves from fear's hold (Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal 2006). This dominance of fear over hope is well documented in previously presented studies of negativity bias.

In an experimental survey conducted among a representative nationwide sample of Jewish-Israelis in the week prior to the Annapolis peace, Halperin (2011) demonstrated the operation of certain negative emotions. The study's findings demonstrated that fear and hatred function as clear barriers to the peacemaking process. Fear was found to reduce support for territorial compromises that might lead to security problems. Hatred was found to be an even stronger emotional barrier to peace, and it appears to be the only emotion that reduces support for symbolic compromises and to reconciliation and even stands as an obstacle to every attempt to acquire positive knowledge about the Palestinians. In addition, hatred was found to increase support for halting negotiations and, when coupled with fear, it predicted support for military action (see also Bar-Tal 2001; Baumeister and Butz 2005; Lake and Rothchild 1998; Petersen 2002).

The Process

In sum, freezing, triggered by numerous factors, is the dominant reason why the societal beliefs of the culture of conflict function as sociopsychological barriers. These barriers lead to selective collection of information, which means that society members involved in intractable conflict tend to search and absorb information that validates their held societal beliefs while ignoring and omitting contradictory information (Kelman 2007; Kruglanski 2004; Kruglanski and Webster 1996; Kunda 1990). But even when ambiguous or contradictory information is absorbed, it is encoded and cognitively processed in accordance with the held repertoire through bias, addition, and distortion. Figure 7.2 graphically depicts the described process.

Recently, intriguing experiments by Klar and Baram clearly demonstrated that exposure to the narrative of the other side is an ego-depleting experience, meaning that it demands significant energy and mental resources, as it is a psychological burden. They also illustrated how rival groups process information about competing narratives. In their study, participants, both Jewish and Arab, were each presented with one of two identical stories—but the protagonist in each was different: either a real Jewish or a real Palestinian leader of a paramilitary group. Ninety minutes later, the participant was asked to reconstruct the story. The results showed that both Jews and Arabs added positive details to the story of *their group's hero* and omitted negative ones. On the other hand, the participants also added negative details and omitted positive ones from the story about *the rival group's leader* (Klar 2011; Klar and Baram 2011). Other studies along this line have demonstrated that cognitive processes are so biased in favor of the initial narratives people possess, that it is very hard for them to change these narratives, even when the narratives are proven to be wrong (Ecker et al. 2010; Lewandowsky et al. 2009).

Moreover, because the repertoire is imparted on society members in the early years of childhood via societal institutions and channels of communications, almost all members of the young generation presumably absorb the contents




Fig. 7.2 Sociopsychological barriers to peaceful conflict resolution

of the societal beliefs of the culture of conflict. A recent study by Ben Shabat (2010) confirmed this assumption, showing that young Israeli children at the age of 6–8 tend to adhere to societal beliefs of the ethos of conflict even when their parents support peacemaking. Thus, it appears that the systematic presentation of these themes in cultural products and educational institutions leads society members, even at a very young age, to view the conflict-supporting societal beliefs as valid and truthful. When a serious peace process begins and progresses, at least some of these society members may acquire alternative beliefs that promote peacemaking, but recent important empirical findings in Israel reveal that even when society members acquire and adhere to alternative beliefs and attitudes that support peacemaking, the learned repertoire at the early age continues to be stored in their minds as implicit beliefs and attitudes. Consequently, it has an automatic influence on information processing and decision-making in times of stress (Sharvit 2008).

Self-Censorship

Self-censorship is another sociopsychological phenomenon that contributes to freezing and closure (Bar-Tal 2013). Self-censorship is defined as an act of voluntarily and intentionally withholding information from others on the basis of a belief that it may have negative implications for the individual and/or the collective. In intractable conflicts, self-censorship takes place when society members, as individuals, intentionally withhold information that they think may shed negative light on the in-group. We differentiate between two types of individuals who may practice self-censorship: gatekeepers and ordinary individuals. Gatekeepers are individuals officially charged with information dissemination. That is, they work in institutions that provide, transmit, and disseminate information (e.g., mass media, governmental information-provision institutions, schools, etc.). In contrast, ordinary individuals are individuals who do not fulfill roles related to information dissemination

in the society but may nonetheless come into possession of information with relevance to society and decide not to reveal it. We suggest that there are at least three ways of receiving information that may reflect negatively on the in-group and consequently self-censored. A person may obtain it firsthand through an experience (e.g., participating in a controversial event), a person may find such information as recorded by another person (e.g., finding an archived document), or a person may obtain the information from another person who either heard/read about it or experienced it. As stated, the possessed information may harm the group's positive image and/or goals, and/or it may provide an alternative view of the conflict, incongruent with the dominant conflict-supporting narrative. In any of these cases, the information negates the dominant beliefs that are widely shared by society members. Thus, the dominant motivation to practice self-censorship is the wish to avoid harming the society or its central beliefs. A person may also be motivated to self-censor out of a fear of negative sanctions that may be imposed on him/her for exposing the information. This sociopsychological mechanism is widely practiced by society members involved in intractable conflict, especially among those who participated, observed, or heard about immoral acts committed by the in-group.

Recently, Nets-Zehngut et al. (2014) carried out a study to examine whether, how, and to what extent gatekeepers in Israeli state institutions practiced self-censorship with regard to information that was incongruent with the dominant conflict-supporting narrative in Israel. Specifically, gatekeepers in the governmental Publications Agency of the National Information Center, the Information Branch in the Israeli army Education Corps, and the Ministry of Education self-censored information about the causes of the Palestinian exodus in the 1948 War, which saw approximately 700,000 Palestinians leave the area in which the State of Israel was established. Despite the fact that even Israeli historians provided unequivocal evidence that some of these Palestinians were forcefully expelled,

the gatekeepers, confessing to self-censorship, continued to publish only information reflecting the Israeli-Jewish-Zionist narrative that takes no responsibility for the exodus, attributing it solely to the Arabs and Palestinians, for encouraging flight or fleeing, respectively. With regard to the same case, Ben Ze'ev (2010, 2011) interviewed Jewish soldiers who participated in the 1948 War. She found that many of them imposed silence on themselves, practicing self-censorship in order to block information about immoral acts committed during this war that may have shed a negative light on the Jewish fighters and leadership.

Obedience

Another sociopsychological mechanism on the individual level that leads to solidification of culture of conflict and stability is obedience. Obedience refers to the blind execution of orders without any consideration of their meaning or implication, as demonstrated in Stanley Milgram's (1974) seminal studies. It "is the psychological mechanism that links individual behavior to political purpose. It is the dispositional cement that blinds men to systems of authority. Facts of recent history and observation in daily life suggest that for many people obedience may be a deeply ingrained behavior tendency, indeed, a prepotent impulse overriding training in ethics, sympathy and moral conduct" (Milgram 1974, p. 1). Obedience leads first and foremost to blind acceptance of the conflict ideology and thus supports the conflict's continuation as advocated by the authorities. Moreover, it often leads to severe consequences in the cases of intractable conflicts, as many society members, blindly following orders, participate in acts of violence, including severe violations of laws, moral codes, and human rights principles (Benjamin and Simpson 2009). This is one of the plagues of human beings, and its imprinting effects can be found in most of the atrocities, massacres, ethnic cleanings, and genocides throughout history. The violent nature of intractable conflicts provides ample opportunities for

human beings to exhibit such behavior, with all its inhumane implications. They obediently follow the orders in line with the beliefs delegitimizing the rival, without considering their moral implications. This sociopsychological mechanism is mostly carried out by active fighters in the conflict, whose role is to face and fight the enemy, but is also widely practiced by society members fulfilling different roles in the well-developed system that sustains the conflict.

Conclusion and Future Directions

The theory and findings presented thus far help understand the many factors contributing to the perceived intractability of intractable conflicts. First and foremost, societies in conflict develop conflict-supporting ideologies, consisting of societal beliefs that serve as building blocks of narratives about the past (collective memory) and the present (ethos of conflict). These ideologies become highly central and deeply entrenched in these societies on both the individual and collective levels, forming an all-encompassing culture of conflict that permeates into every aspect of collective, and often individual, life. Several mechanisms exist on the societal level to maintain and further promote this culture of conflict. The leaderships in societies in conflict usually operate official bodies for the dissemination of information, granting them *control* over which facts are presented to the public and how. To further maintain control over what the public knows, these leaderships also work to *restrict access to official archives*, *monitor* unofficial organizations attempting to disseminate alternative information, and *discredit alternative information* when such is successfully disseminated. Furthermore, mechanisms for actual *censorship* of information may be employed, and anyone presenting information undermining the accepted societal beliefs may be severely *punished* for doing so. Conversely, individuals and organizations disseminating information in line with these beliefs may be encouraged to continue doing so through tangible and symbolic *rewards*.

But the culture of conflict is also maintained on the individual level. Various psychological factors contribute to the tendency for *freezing* among individuals in societies involved in intractable conflict. First, a central *cognitive factor* contributing to freezing is the tendency to adhere to certain general and specific worldviews for the sake of organizing reality and one's approach to it and attending only to information that conforms to these beliefs. Second, *motivational factors*, such as people's desire to maintain a positive self- and collective self-view and their desire to avoid sanctions, contribute to such freezing. Finally, because the reality of living in an intractable conflict is wrought with emotion, people's group-based *emotions* are a central factor in their need to maintain the beliefs of the culture of conflict. In addition to these three psychological factors, and in line with the societal mechanisms limiting the penetration of alternative information, people may voluntarily practice *self-censorship* with regard to alternative information, for fear that it may lead to negative consequences for the group or the self. Thus, many factors act together and separately, placing barriers before attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully.

Overcoming Barriers to Conflict Resolution

While the combined action of sociopsychological barriers to conflict resolution may paint a bleak picture as to the possibility to move intractable conflicts into the stage of resolution and reconciliation, the literature also provides many indications that such barriers can be overcome given the right circumstances or interventions. In most of the cases, peacemaking requires bottom-up processes in which groups and individuals publicly support the ideas of peacebuilding and act to persuade the leadership leaders. But it also requires top-down processes in which emerging leaders join efforts or initiate peacemaking processes and work to persuade society members of the necessity of a peaceful settlement of the conflict. For these to occur, conditions on the ground must become favorable (Bar-Tal 2013).

Conditions for Change

Some scholars of conflict resolution argue that the success of peacemaking processes depends on specific conditions that create *ripeness* for the conflict's resolution. For example, Zartman (2000, pp. 228–229) proposes that “if the (two) parties to a conflict (a) perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and (b) perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for resolution (i.e., for negotiations toward resolution to begin).” Indeed, the thought of peacefully resolving the conflict often emerges and spreads when changes in the context of the conflict are observed. These changes pertain to major events and/or information that may facilitate the process of peacemaking and may be termed “facilitating conditions.” Among the most salient of these are *confidence-building actions by the rival*, which may change perceptions of the opponents' character, intentions, and goals. Another facilitating condition pertains to the emergence of major information about the society's endurance. *The realization of the costs to the society* in continuing the conflict may lead to greater willingness to compromise or peace. *Third party intervention*, including third party guarantees, may also be a determining condition in changing views about the conflict or about the risks contained in resolving it. The noted conditions are neither exhaustive nor exclusive, and each may arouse new needs or goals that could foster societal change. They may also lead to *unfreezing* of the conflict-supporting sociopsychological repertoire on the individual level, a key factor in moving both of conflict resolution processes forward.

Unfreezing Process

According to the classic conception offered by Lewin (1947/1976), every process of societal change has to begin with cognitive change. In individuals and groups, this indicates unfreezing, which is thus a precondition for the acceptance and internalization of any alternative beliefs about the conflict. In many of the conflict situations, this process begins with a minority, which needs also to have courage in order to present the alternative ideas to society members in the face

of the societal mechanism in place to prevent the dissemination of such ideas. On the psychological individual level, the process of unfreezing usually begins as a result of the appearance of a new idea that is inconsistent with the held beliefs and attitudes and causes to some kind of tension or dilemma (e.g., Abelson et al. 1968; Bartunek 1993; Kruglanski 1989). This new idea is called an *instigating belief*, since it motivates society members who construct it to evaluate the held societal beliefs of culture of conflict (see elaboration in Bar-Tal and Halperin 2009). Due to the powerful nature of the societal mechanisms in place to prevent the penetration of new ideas, the instigating belief must be of high validity, and/or coming from a credible source, forcing the individual to pause and consider the conflicting information.

Once such an idea is absorbed and considered, it may eventually lead to the emergence of a new *mediating belief*, calling for a change in the context of intractable conflict. The mediating belief is one logical outcome of the tension caused by the instigating belief, if it is resolved in the direction of accepting the new belief (see the intrapersonal sociopsychological process described by Kruglanski 1989). Mediating beliefs are usually stated in the form of arguments: “We must change strategy or we are going to suffer further losses,” “Some kind of change is inevitable,” “We have been going down a self-destructive path; we must alter our goals and strategies,” “The proposed change is clearly in the national interest; it is necessary for national security” (Bar-Siman-Tov 1995). These arguments open a discussion of alternatives to the present reality, including a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Empirical evidence for the effects of such ideas comes from a study conducted together with other colleagues (Gayer et al. 2009). In this study, conducted among Jews in Israel, we found that instigating beliefs that include information about future losses in various aspects of life (e.g., economic and demographic aspects, as well as potential negotiations with Palestinians) unfreezes Israelis' predispositions about the peace process with the Palestinians.

However, for such beliefs to take hold substantially, several barriers on the individual level

must be overcome. A few promising indications in the recent literature in political psychology indicate that it may be possible to tangibly overcome these barriers by tackling each of the three factors contributing to the freezing of the conflict-supporting ideology: the cognitive factor, the motivational factor, and the emotional factor. *The cognitive factor*, which includes long-standing beliefs, may appear most resistant to change, but in a recent series of studies, Nasie and colleagues have shown that merely raising people's awareness to a common psychological bias may facilitate unfreezing of long-standing beliefs. When both Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel were made aware of naïve realism, a cognitive bias limiting their ability to recognize beliefs other than their own as valid, they were more open to new information presenting the adversary's beliefs on the conflict, even though this information was entirely incongruent with their own long-held beliefs (Nasie et al. 2013).

Indications also exist that various conditions may serve to change important *motivational* factors contributing to freezing. In the classical literature on obedience, there are already indications that altering the conditions of the situation may lead to decreased obedience to authority—countering the central motivation to obey authority so as to gain rewards and avoid sanctions. More specifically, Milgram has identified the victim's proximity, closeness to the authority figure, and the salience of a tension or dilemma as conditions that may be changed so as to decrease people's willingness to obey orders that may hurt others (Milgram 1965). Similarly, scholars studying conformity have identified a minority influence effect, by which the presence of others doubting the majority's view, even if they are few, decreases the likelihood an individual would be motivated to conform (for a review, see Wood et al. 1994). More recent indication that the motivations underlying freezing may be changed exists as well. For example, Čehajić-Clancy and colleagues have found that affirming a positive aspect of the self can increase one's willingness to acknowledge in-group responsibility for wrongdoing against others, countering the

motivation to maintain a positive view of the in-group at all costs (Čehajić-Clancy et al. 2011).

Finally, many studies conducted over the past decade have indicated that changing the *emotional factor* contributing to freezing may be an important key for overcoming psychological barriers to conflict resolution, as emotions are both powerful engines for action and highly changeable (Halperin 2014), through the study of emotion and emotion regulation in political conflicts (e.g., Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Halperin et al. 2011b). For example, these studies show that by employing well-established methods of emotion regulation, previously tested only on the personal level, group-based emotions may be changed as well, consequently influencing inter-group attitudes (e.g., Halperin et al. 2014). More importantly, it appears that teaching people how to regulate their emotions using such strategies may increase their willingness to compromise for peace even several months after the initial intervention (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Halperin et al. 2013). Another interesting approach to affecting emotional change, and consequently attitudinal change, is to tackle a key appraisal implicated in a certain discrete emotion, thereby changing the emotional reaction as well. For example, studies employing this approach have succeeded in reducing group-based hatred (Halperin et al. 2011a) and increasing group-based hope (Cohen-Chen et al. 2014) and guilt (Čehajić-Clancy et al. 2011).

Taken together, these empirical developments provide important evidence that despite the many challenges facing those who want to achieve peaceful resolutions to long-standing violent conflicts, such resolutions are not altogether elusive. Understanding the sociopsychological barriers to conflict resolution, which are important contributors to the intractable nature of such conflicts, helps understand how such barriers can be overcome. A downstream consequence of such scientific findings may be an improvement in practitioners' ability to affect the social change needed to create the conditions for peacemaking to succeed in societies engulfed in intractable conflict.

Peace should not be a dream but a practical goal that human beings should strive to achieve. Violent conflicts are not natural disasters but well-planned events by human beings who also deliberately kill and are killed. The efforts, resources, and mobilization that are invested in eruption of conflicts and their continuation should be redirected to peacemaking. Human beings can make peace.

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Dignity in Negotiation: Its Transforming Power

8

Barry Hart

Introduction

Adopting a transformative approach to negotiation is a means to address important perceptions, values, and needs of the parties engaged in the negotiation process. Like transformative mediation for difficult conflicts, negotiations based on transformative theory and practice are meant to empower the parties in ways that increase their willingness to define issues and decide on outcomes and settlement terms that reflect and meet these values and needs (Bush and Folger 1994; Lederach 2003). Unlike transactional negotiation or distributive negotiation that are both positional-based and brinkmanship oriented, transformative negotiation is about building trust, getting to know the other involved in the process, as well as their perspective on and interests in the issues to be addressed. The negotiator(s) in transformative negotiation is focused on the dynamics of the interaction and developing a full range of options that meet the interest of all parties involved in the process (Abramson 2006).

Parties engaged in transformative negotiation recognize that conflicts are both harmful and too often deadly, but they also provide an opportunity to redefine the nature of what has taken place and

the relationships between the conflicting parties (Putnam 2004). The potential for such redefinition opens up the possibility for parties in conflict to engage in discussion in ways that reflect a level of respect and trust that helps empower them to envision together a different future. Transforming conflicts in this way support theories of change that speak to the importance of relationships as foundational to the development of creative and workable negotiated agreements (Allen Nan et al. 2010). Moreover, this approach to transformational change points to the high relevance of the manner in which parties communicate and how that communication requires a set of values and skills that match the level of complexity of the conflict being negotiated.

The manner in which communication is understood and takes place in transformative negotiations, particularly regarding complex and violent conflicts, is central to this chapter, but needs to be considered as most effective when practiced within and as a response to the transforming power of dignity. An important aspect of both communicating well and practicing dignity is deep listening and both reflect an understanding of the need to integrate the critical role of identity in the negotiation process. The examination of these issues as well as psychosocial ones tied to the stress and trauma of complex conflicts and several critical elements of dignity, such as acceptance of identity, safety, acknowledgment, understanding, and trust-building, will be explored as factors of importance in a transformative

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negotiation processes. Hospitality will also be examined as an element of dignity and shown how it creates the physical and emotional space for transformational change to take place in difficult negotiations. Finally, the chapter addresses the implication of understanding the theory and practice or *operationalization* of dignity's power in the negotiation process.

Communication and Deep Listening

Critically important to transformative negotiation are the values and use of communication skills that are a level above traditional "good communication" methods of listening for facts and feelings, paraphrasing, and paying attention to nonverbal cues. All of these skills are important in any negotiation process, but at the next level of communication, something more is required. Theologian and psychologist Morton Kelsey (2012) calls it *Deep Listening*, or a form of listening that is used to understand others to the greatest degree possible. In order to do so, one is called to listen intellectually, emotionally, physically, and intuitively. Communication at this level helps build trust and engages the parties around their common humanity, interdependence, or recognition of the parties' need for each other. Understanding this provides major access to the means of developing constructive ways of transforming the problems on the "table"—whether that table be present literally or figuratively depending on the culture and context.

The power of deep listening used in transformative negotiation implies a certain vulnerability, but the kind that can be identified as courage (Brown 2012). This vulnerability/courage, executed wisely, has the potential to open the way to a greater sense of interdependency between the negotiating parties. Although the use of this dynamic listening approach requires risk-taking and may be construed as an element of weakness by the opposing parties, its power to start a constructive change process has been demonstrated in a range of listening practices such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Hamber 2009), to the multiple month listening

process of the traditional elders in the peace negotiations in Somaliland (Hart and Saed 2010). Moreover, the risk can be further mitigated by doing a thorough assessment of the issues needing to be addressed prior to the negotiation, where familiarity with these issues helps focus the listener's attention. Similarly, gathering available information concerning the individual or team members negotiating these issues for the "other side" prior to the negotiation will add depth and meaning to the process of listening to understand (Schirch and Camp 2007). Both help negotiators to be better prepared to engage the other side with more confidence and to listen for the most helpful insights to move the negotiation forward.

Alongside and included in the deep listening process are the psychological forces of self-knowledge and the need for negotiators to regularly reflect on who they are and how best to emotionally self-regulate or the ability to calm oneself when upset as well as act consistently with one's deepest values (Stosny 2011). These are the hallmarks of highly competent actors in a negotiation process, and though this may not always be part of everyone's personality or skill set, those negotiators who incorporate/practice self-reflection and regulation are better able to provide a platform and relational space for deep listening to happen and dynamic negotiation to take place. The potential for creating more respect between the parties is the result of interactivity based on these hallmarks and related tools of engagement which help provide the means for all parties to be receptive to reaching agreement (Cohen 2002). More will be said in the next section about the importance of respecting self and others involved in the negotiation and why the concept and practice of dignity is foundational to trust-building for the purpose of creating the most constructive negotiated agreements.

Respecting Dignity

Trauma recovery specialist Al Fuertes notes that "Dignity honored will enhance healing" (2013). This statement implies its opposite, since at several or multiple points along a continuum where

violence is done to others, their humanity and related dignity has been *dishonored*. The results are more often than not broken relationships between individuals, ethnic or religious groups or nations. The further consequences of this dignity violation and related identity manipulation is high stress and/or trauma for those in conflict or those oppressed as minorities within structures of inequality and disempowerment (Volkan 2004). Other emotional and psychological damages to individuals or groups are loss of safety, identity, and meaning leading to a decent into a victim cycle that takes away hope or evolves into desire for revenge in order to “right the balance” of the injustice experienced (Aquilar and Galluccio 2011; Botcharova 2001).

Within a transformative negotiation process, dignity, which Hicks (2011) defines as “the *feeling* of inherent value and worth,” is about honoring others and valuing their humanity and worth, even when they are considered to be the *enemy*. Though similar to respect, which refers to the way we treat people and asked to be treated by them, dignity resides in all people. Unlike respect, which Rosenberg (2004) refers to as “everyone’s right,” dignity does not have to be earned or bestowed and is not understood as a right but as inherent in all people, at least from the perspective of western enlightenment theory and Human Rights doctrine (Donnelly 2009, UNDR 2014). Beginning with the premise of the importance of recognizing and respecting the fundamental dignity of every participant in the negotiation allows this human condition and connection to define the process and not other factors such as anger, pain, and fear—although they may be part of the larger set of feelings and issues that are reflected in the conflict being negotiated.

As negotiators it is important to keep these multiple, complex, and mostly intangible issues in mind. Acknowledgment of these intangible issues as part of a dynamic negotiation process will help address the more measurable tangible issues needing to be negotiated, such as the agreed-upon length of a cease-fire or the time frame for removing troops from a conflict zone (Katunga 2003). Balancing these intangible and tangible factors requires insight, focus, patience, and clarity about one’s own dignity and related identity and a certain

insight about those factors in others at the table. What follows is a detailed examination of identity in negotiation, along with another important element of this process, psychosocial trauma. The importance of dignity in negotiation will be revisited within this framework through addressing safety, acknowledgment, understanding, trust-building, and hospitality—which may be considered by some to be an outlier in the negotiation process.

Identity

Dignity understood and practiced (*operationalized*) in a transformational negotiation process also requires specific attention to identity. As Kateb (2011) states, “...when the truth of identity is at stake, existence is at stake...” Therefore, when an individual’s (or group’s) identity is being negotiated as part of a process to determine an outcome agreement, their very humanity and existence may be perceived by them to be at stake. Assuming this level of importance, it is essential to reflect in depth about the power of identity in transformational negotiation processes. In this regard, philosopher Oscar Nudler says that an individual’s need for identity “is the first and most fundamental need of the person, since the alternative is disorganization and death” (Fisher 1990). Nudler is also noted for his comment that *individuals would rather die than lose their identity*. They and the groups they belong to are also willing to kill to protect those ethnic, religious, or other core identities that they perceive define who they are.

Within a negotiation process, awareness of the power of identity violation allows for a greater sensitivity to the pain and fear of one or both sides in the conflict and a corresponding sensitivity to the issues that are brought to the table. Identity violations, like those of dignity, if not addressed may provide explicit or implicit reasons for the parties in the negotiation to not reach settlement and may give impetus for renewed conflict. As Amartya Sen (2006) states, “the cultivated violence associated with identity conflicts seems to repeat itself around the world with increasing persistence.” This cycle of violence

needs to be broken and negotiators highly familiar with the emotional factors and basic human need issues associated with identity have the potential to help break this cycle. They, like Sen, see that the antidote to this manipulation of identities is to acknowledge and use constructively the strength of the various identities represented in the negotiation. This provides the basis for moving the process forward and establishes a foundation for avoiding any future destructive conflicts.

The Healthy Relationships Theory (Allen Nan et al. 2010), which addresses divisions within communities between ethnic or religious groups and points to activities of negotiation and problem solving between such groups, is an important starting point for the type of change envisioned by Sen. Such a theory is needed by negotiators applying transformative methods of change in the negotiation process. Later in the article, theories of change and specific examples will be given to describe how negotiators are able to help create safe spaces for naming critical issues needing to be negotiated as well as ways to strategically act on these issues.

Identity and Psychosocial Trauma Awareness

Negotiators, for the most part, are not highly trained social scientists or psychologists, but they and/or their team's awareness of identity and psychosocial trauma issues are of substantial importance to their work. Complex and violent circumstances are regularly at the center of and the reason for negotiations in the first place. This violence manifests itself in multiple ways (physically, psychological, spiritually, etc.) and its destructive elements alienate people from each other providing fuel to escalate and strengthen the cycle of violence. In multiple cases, violence occurs primarily in circumstances of direct violence stemming from dehumanizing words or destructive actions such as those found in acts of terrorism and war.

Violence is also structural and occurs through unjust leadership and institutions that manipulate and/or strip away identity for the purpose of per-

sonal or corporate gain. These actions result in a sense of fear, helplessness, and hopelessness in the victims of such violence, causing trauma responses that “overwhelm an individual’s coping responses, making it difficult for him or her to function effectively in society” (Pouliny 2010). This deteriorating process is further complicated by collective trauma, which includes a more complex set of trauma-related variables. That being the case, it is generally understood to occur when a large number of individuals who have traumatic symptoms impact a community or society in a way that makes it difficult for people to effectively work together and maintain social stability.

These individual and collective traumatic reactions to current as well as historical traumatic events require a range of antidotes, including psychosocial trauma awareness and recovery procedures, which engage the emotional as well as the physical needs of victims—and ultimately those of the offenders in these conflicts. It is not only necessary to address the symptoms of trauma but their causes as well. Although the causes of trauma can be multilayered and complex, there is often a political component steeped in religious and cultural misunderstanding and manipulation (Lindorfer and Druey 2009). To comprehensively address this range of complex issues is problematic, but necessary when violence has been so disruptive and destructive. The goal is to prevent further violence that radically alters people lives.

The theory of change that underlies this prevention process is that if traumatic events, responses, and causes can be named and successfully addressed and traumatic symptoms and revenge scenarios not passed on to the next and subsequent generations, then these issues will not fuel further violence—where members of the same ethnic, religious, or gender group once again become victims or take on a new role as perpetrators of violence in defense of their core identities (Yoder 2005; Hart 2008). In a similar manner, people’s sense of dignity and need for safety and control are addressed within this theoretical construct and related set of transformative actions, and therefore, symptoms of dignity

violations, like those of trauma, will not be transmitted to future generations, potentially spurring cycles of violence.

The theories and concepts further elucidated by political psychiatrist Vamik Volkan, who has shaped societal level understandings of large-group identity and trauma, help give insight into what happens during these times of high stress and trauma related to complex violent conflicts. Volkan (2004) hypothesizes that "...the more a large group is under stress, the more individual differences in thinking and feeling disappear in response to the trauma." In other words, there is less space or willingness to express diverse or more nuanced perspectives of the "other." He ties this directly to leadership manipulation of large-group identity where leaders use accompanying rituals to maintain or gain power. It is through this manipulation says Volkan "that an atmosphere ripe for unspeakable, seemingly inhumane acts of violence" is established and the potential for a trans-generational cycle of violence begins.

Awareness of these complex identity and psychosocial trauma issues prior to and during negotiation processes provides negotiators critical insight into the important drivers of the conflict and how these drivers emerge and are acknowledged. The way(s) in which this happens depends in large part on the ability of the negotiators to recognize and acknowledge the salience of their own identity as well as the identity of the other negotiator(s) and those they represent. This awareness must be accomplished in an atmosphere of safety, acknowledgment, understanding, and trust, and as difficult as it is to practice this awareness, it needs to be integrated into a negotiation process if it is to be truly transformative.

Accepting Identity

Identity as a powerful force for individuals and groups has previously been examined. Hicks (2011) speaks to the importance of *accepting* identity of people as central to honoring their dignity, approaching them, "...as being neither inferior nor superior to you...[and] giving others the freedom to express their authentic selves

without being negatively judged." In regard to negotiating with others, it is essential to begin a process of engagement that indicates an acceptance of all who are part of this process and those they represent. The importance of accepting the identity of others and using the power of dignity in transforming disagreement in negotiation is done as a counterbalance to the shaming, humiliating, and identity-destroying practices that may have been significant parts of the cause of conflict in the first place (Linder 2008). Certainly, the concept, let alone the practice, of accepting another's identity, honoring their dignity, and not violating it through explicit or implicit shaming processes has to be studied in depth in the pre-negotiation stage so that these understandings can be effectively applied during complex negotiation processes.

As part of being a self-reflective negotiator, who pays close attention to the high relevance of identity while engaged in complex negotiations, a shift begins to take place in the negotiator's behavior patterns. He or she potentially becomes more aware of his or her own thoughts and feelings, as well as those of others. This awareness helps inform and change the negotiator's identity and allows him or her to work on choosing new ways of thinking, acting, and interacting that might lead to more healthy and successful negotiations (Shaperio 2006). What also occurs in self-examination before and during a negotiation is a movement from the (over) importance of *Me*, which is often distrustful of others, to the much stronger and universal *I* orientation which "knows that its significance and worth [of self and others] are non negotiable" (Hicks 2011). This is understood to mean that the identity and dignity of the negotiating partner(s) should never be compromised.

Knowing one's *I* as an individual negotiating with others (or as a third party asked to facilitate or mediate the negotiation) provides insight to the meaning and power of *We* in discussing complex issues. This interdependency has the potential to provide a basis for a better process and set of outcomes. Through this mental shift and practice negotiators are empowered to "construct their identities in ways that improve their negotiation process..." (Shaperio 2006). This shift in

consciousness may positively influence identity restructuring in others toward a *We-ness* model of negotiating, where a more creative and satisfying agreement is the result (Aquilari and Galluccio 2008; Galluccio 2011).

Safety

Acceptance of identity as part of modeling dignity also adds to a sense of safety in negotiation. Like identity, safety is a human need that indicates that there is a secure space and place to discuss important, complex, and emergent issues as they inevitably implant themselves into the negotiation process. Negotiators and their teams need to experience physical, emotional, and intellectual security (Redekop 2002), in order to help release anger and/or biases that could prevent them from employing their best negotiating skills. Safety in this sense also puts negotiators at ease since it helps them “feel free to speak without fear of retribution” (Hicks 2011). Creating a secure environment for a negotiation allows for the needed intellectual control negotiators require and provides them space for envisioning something *new*, utilizing the energy and creative power of a partnership approach to change.

Acknowledgment

Transformative negotiation may require a level of acknowledgment of injuries, pain, and losses between the negotiators. Acknowledgment is often part of restorative justice or reconciliation processes (Zehr 2002; Stauffer 2013), but its complimentary role in accepting identity, helping create safety, and honoring dignity needs to be considered as a central factor in the change process of transformational negotiation. Though not a therapy session, processes that use the values and skills of this type of negotiation pay close attention to past harms and injuries suffered by those at the table and/or the people they represent. Therefore, acknowledgment may be therapeutic, providing some of the openness and energy needed to generate change.

Acknowledgment of physical and moral injury of persons at the table or of one side to another may serve the relationship and the process well, since “acknowledgement through hearing one another’s stories validates experience and feelings and represents the first step toward restoration” of relationships (Chapman 2001). Being at the table with this knowledge of pain and suffering but not acknowledging it in some manner can hinder trust-building and imaginative ideas that allow for transformational change to take place. Again, vulnerability, implying courage, is a factor—courage to take the important risks for change to happen. This value set and process approach that informs how and when to acknowledge the pain and injuries of others does not mean negotiators enter blindly into the encounter or are somehow too *soft* in their approach. Just the opposite, they have done a full assessment of the issues and their counterparts and have prepared themselves through self-reflection to be flexible, patient, and capable practitioners.

Understanding

Transformative negotiation, with the concept and practice of dignity at its core, requires a level of understanding that incorporates the belief that what others say matters (Hicks 2011; Monk and Windslade 2013). Listening to understand requires a commitment to respecting what has been said, honoring that it is being said in a sincere manner and that it matters to the individual saying it—with the assumption that the person represents others who hold *near similar* feelings and understandings of the situation. Attempts to listen deeply in this way, while regularly testing one’s assumptions, imply a commitment to cultural sensitivity and an attempt to ascertain as well as possible the interests of others through this filter. Furthermore, listening to understand is an essential tool to help negotiators engage the complex web of factors that impact what others are saying (Docherty 2010).

Analysis done for negotiations regarding cultural issues will pay close attention to low- and high-context culture. This level of cultural

sensitivity allows for further understanding of the parties participating in the negotiation process. As Rosenberg (2004) points out in her discourse on low-context cultures, “the verbal communication is most often direct, and there is very little concern or need for nonverbal cues in order for people to understand each other.” Negotiators from these contexts are independent and “say what they mean and mean what they say.” Rosenberg contrasts this with persons from high-context cultures who are much more interdependent, coming from traditional societies, “in which the concepts of shame and honor are much more important...” (ibid).

To adjust to and recognize these differences between high- or low-context cultures is critical to the effective communication and deeper awareness of what is being negotiated and what culturally-informed means are being used to address the issues on the table. In order to understand the cultural dynamics at play in a negotiation, full attention also needs to be paid to the fact that many countries or regions where negotiators come from are neither high- nor low-context cultures in full; therefore, deep listening for understanding is required to determine what aspects of culture are more or less crucial to the other side. Negotiators from either high- or low-context cultures may be comfortable in both, having grown up in one and been educated in another. Finally, they remain accountable to the people and culture they represent and at the same time are required to understand the nuances of culture (Augsburger 1992) and its impact on the negotiation process and outcome.

Trust-Building

A sense of “trustworthiness” is essential for a negotiation to be transformative. As negotiators recognize their own value and worth, they begin to open to the possibility of the same in others. It is this *dignity nexus* of value and worth in members of the negotiating parties that provides a sense of common humanity and purpose and allows for the possibility of meaningful and workable agreements to emerge. Not that this is an easy process or even possible in all cases, but

when a bridge between parties is built on the premise of one’s own and the other’s worthiness and value, there is a greater potential for transformational thinking and acting to take place.

As Gardner (2012) notes in his understanding of building healthy communities, it is less about structures and more about “building relationships.” In the same way, transformative negotiation is less concerned with building structures or developing highly detailed negotiation frameworks and more about building relationships of trust (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). The underlying belief is that the sustainability of the process toward a constructive end is built on the premise of honoring the efficacy and power of these relationships. Trustworthiness through trust-building mechanisms such as listening and showing respect for others is rooted in a set of values and practices that require humility, patience, and a sense of a “shared responsibility for a new future” (Corcoran 2012) or at minimum a shared responsibility to engage in a process toward that future. In this way negotiators move from trying to persuade others or coerce them, using brinkmanship methods of change, to *using* interdependency as the value and mechanism of change.

Making room in the negotiation process for storytelling specifically related to the aforementioned issues of pain, humiliation, and suffering may also help solidify relational trust. High sensitivity and an ability to hear and properly process these stories are essential, while their appropriateness to enhance the process has to be weighed along with their potential negative consequences (Docherty 2005). To know when or when not to allow or encourage the telling of painful narratives is also not easy to determine, but to leave out the possibility of this type of exchange may disallow deeper trust to be established and therefore eliminate another important element toward change in the negotiation process.

The “trust” in trust-building is regularly understood to be the *glue* that deeply informs and holds the relationship together and “enables individuals to perform more efficiently and effectively” (Lewicki 2006). Trust also helps determine the level and depth of engagement in the negotiation. In other words, when negotiators sense a lack of trust, they are more cautious as to how vulnerable

they will be and how much risk-taking they are willing to engage in. Therefore, building trust in a negotiation requires a psychological and, in cases where religion is a central identifier of negotiators and the people they represent, a spiritual awareness of self and others (Redekop 2002). Also, for trust to be established, close attention should be paid to the conditions that surround the process and a readiness to engage new and often complicating variables introduced into the negotiation as it unfolds. These multiple issues and complexities necessitate an awareness of what is required to build trust. At minimum, the following three factors should be considered as first steps in the process:

1. Self-reflection which implies finding the time and space to ask the self-probing “who am I” questions and *why* am I doing or being asked to do the negotiation and critically asking, “Am I the right person for this task—and if so, what do I bring to it in terms of awareness of the situation, communication, listening skills, and values needed to undergird my commitment and involvement?”
2. Beginning at the level of “self,” the negotiator’s abilities and limitations are assessed, providing further reason for developing a “multiskilled” team approach to the negotiation. Lead negotiators require coleaders who understand the importance of dignity and its multiple elements of identity, safety, acknowledgment, and understanding for trust-building to happen.
3. The importance of the integrity or moral and ethical honesty of each negotiator on this team (and it being a whole and undivided team based on these factors) contributes to building trust within the team and potentially among all at the negotiation table. Without this integrity that produces honest and ethical actions, there is no basis for the development of agreements.

Hospitality in Negotiation

So far, we have explored the importance of respecting dignity and acknowledging the identity and potentially the current as well as historical trauma in transformative negotiation processes. In practice, this means being highly attentive to deep listening, safety, acknowledgment, understanding,

and trust-building. However, another important element in transformative negotiation is hospitality.

Creating physically and psychologically secure spaces to hold negotiations provides the participating parties a venue to not only discuss issues that concern them, but allows them to *begin* a process of engagement that reflects and honors their common humanity. The transformation that this secure space provides is best exemplified and only made possible through those who welcome and host the negotiators and create the venue for their process. Hospitality in this sense is neither absolute nor conditional (Bulley 2009), but it is essential to help establish the level of human engagement required for processes of change to take place. Those who provide this space have made an ethical decision to be involved in these processes and are committing themselves to it as critical to the negotiation process.

There are many examples of type of hospitality. A case that exemplifies this form of welcome and creates the kind of space necessary for change is found in the negotiations the Society of Friends lead in helping transform the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict between the majority black population and white landowners. The Society of Friends were both negotiators and host and worked with other groups to provide secure and welcoming environments for the negotiations to take place (see box).

When the Society of Friends, known as Quakers, deal with complex conflicts, their chief concern is being in “human solidarity with all parties.” They engage all sides of the conflict in discussion about how to find a way out of the violence. Their witness to others is premised on “equality, justice, peace, simplicity, and truth,” and they work to engage parties separately with a care and respect that promotes peace and morally challenges the parties in conflict to engage this peace. They then act as a “bridge” between the parties and since both sides trust them, their information and encouragement to peace are respected.

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Quakers carried out this peacebuilding role in the complex conflict between whites and blacks in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in the late 1970s. Along with the Catholic Church and members of Moral Rearmament (now Initiatives of Change), who played a significant role in creating spaces for individuals to make decisions that protected life and eventually helped transform the conflict. Central to their work was the art and practice of listening, according to Kraybill (1994)

Listening was for the Quakers no mere prelude to serious talk. Listening was itself a genuine contribution to change—a means to support the dignity, credibility, and rationality of the individuals with whom they were interacting. And because the Quakers consulted widely each time they expanded their role, listening was also a manifestation of their political values. Rather than give advice, the Quakers sought advice about what they should do and at all times presented themselves as quiet servants of the needs of the parties. Theirs was the politics of transformative listening.

The transformative listening of the Quakers during the conflict in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe is central to other groups values and actions who believe (and know) that empathic listening opens up persons, provides them with an opportunity to hear their own deep thoughts, or for some to reconnect with their moral or spiritual selves. “Effective, empathic listening by another provides us the opportunity to clarify our thoughts and emotions, to feel cared for and empowered to take the next step, or to begin or continue the healing process” (Hoover 1997).

Barry Hart, “Transformative Spaces for Change,” *No Enemy to Conquer*, by Michael Henderson, 152-158. © 2009. Reprinted by permission of Baylor University Press.

Hospitality, as Pavlich (2004) notes, “provides a ritualized lore for ways of being with others... [and if this gesture by the host is successful], open the way for effective discourse, enabling

frank discussion of past events...” to take place. Hospitality in this sense creates safety and space for parties to engage each other deeply around issues important to them and does it by providing a physical place and emotional/psychological space away from hostile environments where deep listening takes place, identity threat is minimized, and honoring dignity can be practiced. Transformative negotiation, framed by this type of hospitality, provides conditions for moving from fear, anger, and hatred to healthy tolerance where a certain level of trust becomes possible.

The Power of Dignity in Negotiation

Power is generally understood as the capacity to produce effects on others or influence their behavior. Along with influencing people, power can also direct the course of events that include various actors and systems. Redekop (2002) identifies two types of power, “positive power that makes things happen and a negative power to disrupt.” Dignity in negotiation, with its important elements of accepting the identity of others, safety, acknowledgment, and so forth, reflects the former kind of power, since, when practiced, it links the inherent value and worth of the members in the negotiating parties. This connection allows for a mutual influencing of other’s behavior and a means to help balance power in often complex and difficult negotiation processes—where imbalances of power are often the norm and circumstances that influence power dynamics are regularly changing. This more robust and holistic form of *dignity* power occurs when parties enter into a state of interdependency aided by dignity’s integrative influence.

The operationalization of dignity by first party negotiators who understand its power to help create interdependency, open and deepen communication, as well as build deeper relationships among the negotiating parties provides a platform for these negotiators to reimagine how they and their constituents might peacefully engage and live with the *other*. Transformations hinge on negotiations that provide both the negotiators and those they represent the ability to see *other* through new lenses and begin to understand

interdependence as essential to human existence—or at minimum see it as the best way to construct agreements that hold meaning and are workable. Dignity rightly understood and practiced provides generative energy to *make things happen* in contrast to negative or coercive power that regularly disrupts negotiation processes.

To fully practice the power of dignity to help transform conflicts, it is essential to engage in a negotiation style similar to the type of leadership approach that values “leading from the light” (Palmer 2000), where a *partnership* approach is taken that according to Dr. Martin Luther King “does not seek to defeat or humiliate the opponent, but to [as much as possible] win friendship and understanding” (King 1986). Like other advocates, mediators, and *negotiators*, Dr. King engaged his opponents through a standard of honoring their humanity and recognizing that humanity itself is not fully experienced without the other. Negotiators practicing this form of partnership or integrative power create an atmosphere where they are re-imagining their conflict and where they discover together agreements that are meaningful and sustainable. That this is not possible in all cases is clear, but what is clear is that not attempting this approach both demeans both parties and greatly lessens the possibility of meaningful change.

Implications for Process and Training

How do negotiators practically and effectively integrate dignity principles and actions into negotiation procedures? What is required of the negotiators and their teams or of facilitators and mediators who as third parties are brought into the negotiation process, to practice dignity, especially when the other side is unaware of dignity and its power to transform? How do low and high power groups discover and/or engage in a different kind of power found in dignity? Who is responsible for setting these things in motion?

To begin to address these and related questions and put into action the dignity model of transformative negotiation, it is important to build on the idea of training negotiators in new and more comprehensive ways. This includes greater analytical

skill, understanding of theories of change, and further insight into more culturally and adaptive ways of negotiating complex situations (Docherty 2010). Training of this kind would be for those already skilled in certain methods of negotiation technique, but also others—those political, religious, military, and civil society leaders who are regularly called upon to negotiate difficult issues under trying circumstances.

Training these multiple actors implies doing transformative, interest-based, negotiation from a multidiscipline, multi-sectorial perspective. In other words, where possible, there needs to be trained negotiators at the table (at minimum on the team or readily accessible) from different sectors of society, who bring their perspectives and expertise to the negotiation process. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to comprehensively outline what these trainings might include. What follows is a general set of values, concepts, and skills that should be considered for these trainings—adapted to the context and culture of those participating in them.

1. Prepare reflective negotiators and team member through *Mindfulness* Training that includes breathing and centering techniques that sharpen thinking (and feeling) patterns in preparation for the negotiation and provide cognitive and emotional agility during it (Galluccio 2011; See also Galluccio and Safran’s chapter to this book). Learn about the power of deep listening and communication based on this premise and cultural sensitivity.
2. Deepen analytical skills that address the Who, What, and How of conflicts and the multiple reasons conflicts develop. Train to understand conflict background and history and current situations on the ground. Gain a comprehensive understanding of how to do conflict mapping in order to identify all relevant groups engaged or impacted by the conflict.
3. Study other essential tools such as those that help illuminate the differences between positions, interests, and needs and the tool of *Force Field Analysis* that is used to identify the difference forces that may either aid or hinder the goals of transforming the conflict (Fisher et al. 2007).

4. Train to understand tools for building trust such as Appreciative Inquiry that uses appreciative questions to build recognition and trust in negotiation, where parties can "... create an internal atmosphere conducive to transformations through changing cognitive representations of the problem, engaging in new learning, and altering attitudes and behaviors of disputants" (Putnam 2004).
5. Develop theories and skills related to facilitating narratives of the conflict—in order to uncover the numerous understandings "people attribute to their own experience" (Price 2007). Through deep listening in a respectful and non-blaming environment, *space* is created by the negotiators (or mediators brought into negotiations) where an opportunity to construct a joint narrative begins to emerge. Training for this requires a comprehensive understanding of narrative mediation (Monk and Windslade 2013).
6. Learn more about the multiple sources of power in negotiation situations such as knowledge and personal power related to persuasion, integrity, patience and tenacity. Also the importance of the power of moral authority and legitimate power related to reputation and performance as well as the power of relationship (*Sources of Power* 2014).
7. Understand why peacemaker Adam Curle avoids the word *power* and "focuses on a balanced relationship between the parties and on the resources they bring to bear on the particular issue(s) in contention. In a balanced relationship, neither party is able to impose its will on the other." This does not mean they have equal power, but it does mean that, "neither side is likely to be successful in acting on the issue without the support or at least acquiescence of the other." (Dugan 2003).
8. Learn the importance of dignity as the type of power that helps balances relationships through honoring the value and worth of all persons—then study how to *operationalize* dignity as an essential tool of transformative negotiation.
9. Develop an understanding of the importance of assessment and feedback loops during the negotiation process—to allow for flexibility and adaptation of negotiation styles and procedures.
10. Become aware of developing final agreements that include the relevance of psychosocial trauma informed processes of recovery in post-conflict/post-disaster situations. Agreements that recognize the recent as well as historical traumatic impact on individuals and communities on both sides of the conflict and design mechanisms to deal with these issues that may help to "prevent" (Fisher 1990) future conflict.

To nurture or support the development of these values, concepts, and skills in negotiators requires regular personal reflection and trainings that promote the reimagining self and others as representatives of people who want safety, stability, and a sense of hope in their lives. It is a reimagining that starts with the premise that these things have their roots in what Mary Clark (1993) calls the special needs of the human species, *social bonding* and *sacred meaning*, which can only be fulfilled in a stable social context. Trainings that promote meeting these particular needs and the multiple others related to food, shelter, health care, identity, recognition, and respect and provide the space and time to reflect on and comprehend their importance in a comprehensive negotiation process expand the possibilities for transformative change to take place.

Experienced negotiators are mindful of many of these concepts. They also recognize the complexities and regularly emerging issues involved in and surrounding negotiations procedures and know that preparation for negotiating these difficult conflicts is essential and that flexibility to negotiate well is greater when their *toolbox* is full. Therefore, a greater number of trainings that support the use of a range of quality tools and related concepts are required to enhance their training experience. Furthermore, these trainings should consider the pairing of well-practiced negotiators (and team members where appropriate) with individuals just entering the field of

negotiation. This allows from the outset of the training a mentor-mentee relationship, where both are challenged by the expertise and worldview of the other and where balancing power and practicing dignity can take place.

Conclusion

Transformative negotiation is multidimensional in terms of what is required to reach meaningful and sustainable outcome agreements. Its use in complex situations, where every changing circumstances and influencing factors are the norm, necessitates a comprehensive understanding of the conflict and those negotiating it. Also, negotiators and their teams need both self- and *other* awareness and deep understanding of the fact that negotiations operate within a wider system, and although the power of dignity can help lead to transformative negotiated outcomes, the success of agreements is also connected to a web of additional forces. Therefore, negotiators have to factor in a range of issues that include local political and religious actors and regional and international political and economic influence. Further insight is needed regarding the importance of engaging relevant local civil society actors as negotiating partners.

It is also of critical importance to sensitize negotiators to pay close attention to the context and culture(s) of the negotiation parties and those they represent. This includes negotiators' own culture and related sensitivities. Negotiators and their team members should also focus on the future, but not at the expense of avoiding the pain, anger, and fear of the current or historical past. Sensitivity to these psychological factors is central to the negotiation process, since it is important to know when and when not to address these issues. In the end, transformative negotiation, using the power of dignity to help build relationships based on the value and worth of others, leads to and emphasizes the use of interdependent negotiation theory and practice, which provides the best opportunity for the development of successful and long-lasting negotiated agreements.

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Part III

**Conflict Management and International
Negotiation**

Louis Kriesberg

Introduction

Negotiations are too often analyzed in terms of single episodes, which conclude with an agreement or fail to do so. Usually, however, negotiation episodes between large collectivities are linked in a sequence over several years in which a conflict is transformed. In this chapter, I examine negotiations within the context of a changing relationship, considering how a series of negotiation episodes, often including agreements that are realized, are part of constructive conflict transformations.

The focus on isolated episodes of negotiations that conclude with an agreement, or fail to do so, is in some degree a consequence of thinking in terms of conflict resolution. That term was adopted in the late 1950s, with some recognition of its misleading implications (Kriesberg 2007). Members of the group at the University of Michigan who gave prominence to the term were aware of the reality that many conflicts are never “resolved.” The conflict’s destructive intensity may be reduced and constrained, but the conflict is not ended.

In recent decades, the term conflict transformation has come into increasing usage. Usually this

refers to destructively waged conflicts changing so that they are conducted in mutually acceptable ways (Kriesberg 2008). The term conflict transformation indicates that conflicts are not static and change over time. It also suggests that they may be done in a better or a worse manner; they may be variously destructive and also variously constructive (Kriesberg and Dayton 2012).

In this chapter, after discussing the concept of conflict transformation, I examine and illustrate three major paths a series of negotiation episodes may take. Then structural matters that help account for the different courses that conflicts take are discussed. These include the context of the conflicts, the asymmetry of the relations, the qualities of the non-contentious aspects of the relationship, and past methods of waging the conflict. Finally, various conflict resolution negotiation strategies that affect reaching agreements and constructive conflict transformations are examined. The strategies include mediation, negotiation styles, representative-constituency relations, reframing of conflict, and the sequencing of agreements and their implementation.

Conflicts vary along many dimensions, and therefore, they can change along many dimensions. Some of these changes can be transformational, usually meaning the changes are major ones and the changes are regarded as improving the relations between the adversaries. Transformational conflict changes, then, are usually viewed as greatly reducing the destructiveness of a

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relationship and increasing its constructiveness. So it is often indicated by reductions in deaths, hostility, and suffering resulting in the way the adversaries contend with each other. Many other kinds of changes in the relationship of adversaries may occur, which conceptually may be independent of the transformational constructive one. For example, adversaries may move toward greater integration and interdependence or toward more autonomy and separation from each other.

Examples of Negotiation Sequences

Three kinds of negotiation sequences related to conflict transformations can be distinguished. In one kind, episodes of extended negotiations over several years fail to yield a substantial transformation in the relations between adversaries. Negotiation sequences often have yielded constructive transformations of two varieties. In one variety the transformation is limited, and it yields more congenial management of the conflict. In the other kind, the transformation is profound, resolving the major issues in contention between the adversaries. I briefly identify some examples of each kind of consequence.

Failed Transformations

Three major conflicts, identified below, have persisted for many years, in varying degrees of hostility and with varying levels of negotiations, but without enduring transformation, as yet.

US–North Korean Negotiations, 1971–2009

In 1950, the civil war in the Korean peninsula changed into a large-scale international war between the Republic of South Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), joined by the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The war ended in a stalemate close along the earlier dividing line between the two Koreas. Two years of tough negotiations yielded a cease-fire in 1953, but no peace treaty.

Finally, in conjunction with President Richard M. Nixon's opening of diplomatic relations with China in 1971, secret, direct conversations between the leadership of South and North Korea began (Oberdorfer and Carlin 2014). They agreed to take measures to avoid military incidents between them and to oppose external interference in their domestic affairs. Public meetings and exchanges followed, which were beneficial to the authoritarian leaders, Kim Il Sung of DPRK and Park Chung Hee of ROK. However, no substantial negotiations to improve relations between the two Koreas were held.

With the expanding of relations between the PRC and the United States, there were a few exploratory conversations in the 1970s and 1980s about improving relations between North Korea and the United States. I focus on the negotiations between the United States and North Korea beginning in the 1990s, relating to the development of nuclear weapons in North Korea. The US government had become deeply concerned about this program and sought United Nations approval for strong economic sanctions (Sigal 1998). By June 1994, US plans to attack North Korea's nuclear facilities were being prepared. This was averted by former President Jimmy Carter's visit to North Korea when he persuaded Kim Il Sung to dismantle its graphite nuclear reactors under certain conditions. The US and North Korean governments then conducted negotiations leading to the 1994 Agreed Framework, according to which North Korea would roll back its nuclear arms program and the United States would gradually normalize relations, help replace the graphite reactors with two light water nuclear reactors, and supply heavy fuel oil on an interim basis.

Implementation of the agreement, however, did not occur on schedule and each side became suspicious of the other. In 1998 North Korea launched a medium-range missile over Japanese territory, which further undermined the agreement. Nevertheless, Clinton took steps that resulted in agreements that resolved some issues in contention. Benefits were promised, critically offering to improve relations. That would follow from agreements about supervising nuclear activities and ending destabilizing missile

development programs (Albright 2003: pp. 459–470) (Cumings, Abrahamian et al. 2004: pp. 52–54). In addition, Kim Dae-jung, president of North Korea, had already begun his sunshine policy, trying to warm relations with North Korea. In June 2000 he was welcomed in Pyongyang by the North Korean president, Kim Jong-il, which was followed by family visits across the previously closed border. In October 2000, Vice Marshall Jo Myong Rok, the second highest military figure in North Korea, was sent to Washington conveying from Kim Jong-il's an invitation for Clinton to come to Pyongyang. He also conveyed constructive proposals relating to the missile programs.

The progress toward improving relations between the United States and North Korea was abruptly broken off when George W. Bush became president. In Bush's first State of the Union address, in January 2002, he spoke of an Axis of Evil, referring to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Nevertheless, some negotiations did occur, but agreements were not reached. Sanctions against North Korea remained, and North Korea continued to develop its nuclear weapons capabilities. The United States did not offer any benefits to North Korea for ending its nuclear programs. As was said by neocons in the Bush administration, "We don't reward bad behavior" (Oberdorfer and Carlin 2014: p. 377). Negotiations thus largely consisted of the United States stating requirements that North Korea should meet, while North Korea continued its nuclear weapons program, including testing missiles.

Israeli–Palestinian Oslo Peace Process, 1992–2001

Starting in December 1992, officials of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) met secretly, near Oslo, initially with Israeli academics. Officials negotiated a Declaration of Principles (DOP), which was signed in Washington, DC, in September 1993 (Quandt 2005; Watkins and Lundberg 1998). This signified a major change: mutual recognition. The DOP spelled out a framework for an interim period not to exceed five years in which progress

toward peace would move step by step to build mutual confidence.

Clinton set out to assist the Israeli and PLO leadership in implementing what came to be called the Oslo peace process. Initial moves seemed auspicious. In September 1995, Israeli–Palestinian negotiations led by Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman of the PLO Arafat produced the Interim Accord that established the Palestinian Authority (PA). It set forth how and when the redeployment of Israeli military forces and the transfer of Israeli control in the West Bank and Gaza to the PA would be implemented.

The peace process, however, was opposed by some Palestinians and by some Israeli Jews, and a few extremists took violent actions to stop the progress. Most significantly, on the Israeli side, on November 4, 1995, Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by Yigal Amir, an Israeli law student and right-wing extremist who opposed the Rabin-led peace accords with the Palestinians. Shimon Peres, who succeeded Rabin as prime minister, undertook to fulfill the policies Rabin had begun. He also sought to demonstrate his toughness in dealing with terror attacks. But this did not go smoothly and terror attacks increased.

In the May 1996 Israeli elections, Netanyahu and the Likud Party defeated Peres and the Labor Party. The new Likud-led coalition government greatly slowed the peace process by failing to implement the agreement the Israeli government had reached to withdraw Israeli security forces from Hebron. By the fall of 1998, Clinton was sufficiently frustrated by the many months of deadlocked negotiations to try a summit conference. The conference was held near Wye River, Maryland, mediated by Clinton and others in his administration. Netanyahu and his Defense Minister Ariel Sharon were there for Israel and Arafat for the PA. With difficulty, a new agreement was salvaged by October 23. It was to implement the modified Interim Agreement of September 28, 1995. However, no substantive progress was actually made. The failures of interim measures contributed to reasoning in the United States and in Israel that a shift to comprehensive final status negotiations might be more productive.

Ehud Barak won a landslide victory in the Israeli elections in May 1999, based on the promise to move to comprehensive peace negotiations. To the consternation of the Palestinians, however, Barak brusquely announced that implementation of the Wye agreement would become part of those negotiations (Sher 2006). This tough negotiating policy is generally not how to overcome mistrust from one's negotiating counterpart. Nevertheless, Barak won Clinton's agreement and ultimately Arafat's acquiescence to a summit meeting (Albright 2003: 484). The meeting began on July 11, 2000 at Camp David. Israel made significant concessions, contingent on Palestinian concessions, but no agreement was found and after two weeks Camp David II ended. There were some continued negotiations, but violence erupted following the visit to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif area, on September 28, 2000 by Ariel Sharon, who was accompanied by Israeli police. The police shot at protesters and large-scale protests the next day produced a rapid escalation of violence. A violent Intifada erupted and the Israeli tried to suppress it with violence.

On December 9, 2000, Barak announced his resignation as prime minister and, in accord with electoral rules, remained in office until he faced elections in February. Some negotiations even continued into January 2001, but no agreements were reached. Barak was overwhelmingly defeated by Ariel Sharon and the Likud Party in the February 6, 2001 elections. The Oslo peace process was over.

US–Iranian conflict 1993–2014

US–Iranian relations were highly antagonistic after the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution and the Iranian seizure of the US Embassy in 1979, fueled by memories of the 1953 US actions to oust Iran's prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh. When Bill Clinton became president in 1993, several specific issues were the focus of US hostility toward Iran. These issues included Iran's aid to Lebanon's Hezbollah, which had attacked Americans in the 1980s, and its apparent pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. In 1995, the US government increased actions against Iran, including banning all trade and investment

with Iran (Crist 2012). Then in December Congress passed legislation incorporating \$20 million for CIA operations against Iran. Covert and overt exchanges of retaliatory actions were underway between the US and the Iranian governments.

A spike in the tension occurred in June 1996, when the US Air Force facility in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, was destroyed by a truck bomb. Some evidence implicated a group with close links to Iran's Revolutionary Guards, but the intelligence was unclear about the involvement of Iran's senior leadership. Clinton considered a massive military retaliation but recognized that could escalate destructively quickly (Clarke 2004: pp. 119–121). Instead, a measured response was made, coupled with communications with the adversary. The White House warned Iran not to commit further attacks. In addition, American installations in the Gulf region were hardened and US warplanes were deployed to an air base in the Saudi desert. Iran never acknowledged its role in Khobar, but terror attacks were stopped and the organization thought to have perpetrated the Khobar bombing was dismantled.

Clinton was reelected in November 1996 and a rethinking of Iranian relations appeared possible (Albright 2003: p. 319). American–Iranian relations actually began to be transformed following the Iranian presidential elections, in August 1997, which a reformist Islamic cleric, Sayyid Mohammad Khatami, won. He soon indicated in a CNN interview that he sought a new relationship with the United States and wanted to bring down the “wall of mistrust” with the American people (Talwar 2001). Official US efforts to engage the Islamic Republic followed. Clinton sent several public messages conveying his interest in improving people-to-people relations and expressing his appreciation for Iranian culture (Crist 2012: pp. 409–411). Clinton wanted direct diplomatic relations with Tehran and made efforts to that end. For example, in October 1997, the administration sent a message by way of the Swiss Embassy in Tehran, inviting Iranian officials to meet with high-level US officials. But Iran did not respond positively. In May 1998 Vice President Al Gore asked Crown

Prince Abdullah to arrange meetings between American and Iranian government officials. Again the Iranians deferred and asked for people-to-people dialogue before official talks started. Iranian officials, however, did interact directly with US officials in multilateral settings. The most active discussions were at the UN, pertaining to Afghanistan and the Taliban, since Shiite Iran had its own differences with the Sunni Taliban controlling Afghanistan.

In March 2000, the US government undertook a broader effort to begin direct talks. Albright publicly expressed understanding Iranian resentment about past American conduct, acknowledging that in 1953, the United States played a significant role in the overthrow of Iran's popular prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh. Albright also announced several actions including the beginning of a process to return millions of dollars in frozen Iranian assets, which had been held since 1980 after Iranian militants seized the US Embassy. The actions included lifting an import ban on several Iranian luxury goods such as pistachios and caviar and relaxing entry restrictions for Iranian scholars and athletes to visit the United States.

These American efforts failed to produce direct negotiations with Iranian officials and negotiations to resolve the differences between the two countries. Perhaps this was because Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and more hard-line elements in Iran opposed such talks (Riedel 2010). Or perhaps the intensity of hostility toward Iran in many American circles undermined the credibility of Clinton's actions. Perhaps bolder conciliatory gestures continued longer would have overcome Iranian hard-line resistance.

In any case, Clinton's term in office ended and President George W. Bush pursued a different approach toward Iran. He quickly characterized Iran as a member of the Axis of Evil along with Iraq and North Korea. Bush increased the severity of the US sanctions and demands made of the Iranian government. But this proved to be counterproductive. During this period, the Iranian government greatly enhanced its nuclear development program.

When Obama took over the White House in January 2009, he made it clear that the United States wanted a serious dialogue with Iran (Parsi 2012; Mathews 2014). That position produced international support, which enabled him to obtain broad international sanctions against Iran. The multilateral sanctions hurt the Iranian economy much more severely than had the unilateral US sanctions. Then, at the next Iranian elections, in June 2013, Hassan Rouhani ran as a moderate and won a majority against five other presidential candidates. Rouhani, a cleric and member of the ruling circle, was close to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Serious negotiations quickly ensued.

In November 2013, Iran and the P5+1 group (the five permanent members of the Security Council, the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany) announced that they had negotiated a 6-month interim agreement. Iran agreed to stop several elements of its nuclear program, eliminate its stockpile 20 % enriched uranium, and permit a very extensive inspection system. In exchange, the P5+1 agreed to lift about \$7 billion worth of sanctions. At the time this is written, the results of the negotiations to reach a long-term agreement are not known. If a mutually agreed upon agreement is reached, it may set the tone and conditions for a relationship that is transformed from an intense conflict to a managed conflict.

Transformations to Managed Conflict

Some conflict transformations are relatively limited, changing a hostile contentious relationship into one with mutually accepted ways to manage their conflict.

US–Soviet Arms Control Negotiations, 1963–1975

After the end of World War II, negotiations among the victors, Soviet Union and the United States, United Kingdom, and France, about many issues ensued. The Soviets and the three Western powers staked out opposing positions about disarmament and waged propaganda campaigns

against each other (Myrdal 1982). After the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear weapons, there was a shift to negotiations about arms control. The idea of stopping nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere gained expert and public support, particularly because of the health hazards of nuclear fallout. Following the widespread fears generated by the Cuban Missile Crisis, negotiations quickly succeeded in formulating a treaty to ban nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, signed in 1963 by the USSR, the United States, and the United Kingdom (Kriesberg 1992). Other cooperative agreements were negotiated in this little thaw.

As the technology for long-distance missiles with nuclear warheads improved, so did the dangers of the mutually assured destruction (MAD). Unofficial meetings, including US and Soviet atomic scientists, were held and various technical issues in monitoring arms control agreements and other matters were discussed, which assisted official negotiations (Pentz and Slovo 1981; Rotblat 1972). President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, in trying to end the US involvement in the war in Vietnam, thought that isolating North Vietnam from China and the Soviet Union would make North Vietnam willing to settle on terms the United States could accept and claim victory. So they opened relations with China and sought to move closer to each, as they contended against each other.

During the 1970s, several treaties were signed by the United States and the USSR, sometimes with other signatories, marking what was called *détente*. The treaties included bans or limits on seabed weapons, antiballistic missiles, strategic nuclear weapons, biological weapons, and testing of nuclear weapons. In addition, there were trade agreements and cultural exchange agreements. This Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the resulting Helsinki Accords, completed in 1975, made particularly profound contributions to the transformation of American–Soviet relations (Thomas 2001). Among other elements in the Helsinki Accords, two are especially important. The westward shift in borders and the division of Germany were recognized and not to be changed by unilateral

actions, providing important reassurance to the Soviet and Eastern European countries. The other element was the recognition of basic human rights of expression and movement, which prompted the formation of civil society organizations in many countries of Eastern Europe and in the USSR. This case of transformed conflict management was to contribute to the fundamental ending of the Cold War, as discussed later in this chapter.

Israel–Egypt, 1973–1979

The 1967 war between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, ended with the Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights; the West Bank and East Jerusalem, annexed by Jordan; and the Sinai up to the Suez Canal which was Egyptian. In September 1970, Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt, died and Anwar al-Sadat succeeded him as president. Sadat lessened Egypt's ties with the USSR, believing that improving relations with the United States would better serve Egypt's domestic and international goals (Kriesberg and Klein 1987). He sought to open negotiations with Israel to regain some of the Sinai and reopen the Suez Canal. When the Israeli government did not respond to enter negotiations, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel on October 6, 1973. Egyptian military forces crossed the Suez Canal and advanced into the Sinai Peninsula, driving back the Israeli forces, which had been surprised by the attacks. However, the Israeli forces regained the initiative and soon advanced, almost encircling the major portion of the Egyptian forces. At that point, the United States and the USSR interceded in the UN to end the fighting on October 25, 1973. Subsequently, a cease-fire agreement between Egypt and Israel was negotiated and was signed formally on November 11, 1973, being the first agreement between Israel and any Arab country since the 1949 armistice agreements.

In December 1973, the United States and the USSR organized a Peace Conference in Geneva, inviting Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. However, the conference ended on January 9, 1974 because Syria refused to participate and also because the PLO was not invited. US

Secretary of State Kissinger undertook to mediate between Israel and each of the opposing Arab states. I focus here on Israeli–Egyptian relations as Kissinger took his step-by-step path. The first agreement, signed by Israel and Egypt on January 18, 1974, entailed the separation of the entangled Egyptian and Israeli military forces. Israel also agreed to pull back its forces from areas west of the Suez Canal where the security zones for Egypt, UN, and Israel were created.

Although Israel gave over 12–13 miles of the eastern bank of the canal, it still occupied the rest of Sinai. Kissinger undertook another Egyptian–Israeli mediation and the second Sinai disengagement agreement was signed in Geneva on September 4, 1975. This agreement led Israel to withdraw from another 12–26 miles and a new buffer zone for the UN was created at the vacated area. These agreements had mutual benefits and were well implemented on schedule.

When Jimmy Carter took office as president in January 1977, he gave considerable attention to the Arab–Israeli conflict and decided to seek a comprehensive solution to the conflict. There were a variety of exploratory meetings, but a broad peace conference was not coming together. Sadat believed that such a conference could not succeed and decided to make a grand gesture and create a psychological breakthrough. He expressed his readiness to go to Israeli-controlled Jerusalem. Menachem Begin, prime minister of Israel and leader of the Likud Party, invited him to speak to the Israeli Knesset. On November 19, 1977, Sadat flew to Israel and spoke to the Knesset the next day.

Direct Egyptian–Israeli negotiations that followed, however, soon became stalemated. Carter then invited Israeli and Egyptian leaders to negotiations at Camp David. The two parties did not conduct direct negotiations. Rather, Carter and the mediation team shuttled between the two sides, with a draft agreement that was repeatedly modified in response to criticisms from each side. In this process, a single negotiating text is presented and each side is asked to accept the plan as a whole (Fisher 1981). After thirteen days, agreement was reached on two framework accords, which were signed on September 17, 1978, at the White House.

One was *A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel*, which led directly to the 1979 Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty. The other accord, *A Framework for Peace in the Middle East*, was concerned with the Palestinian territories, but this was rejected by the PLO and the other Arab governments. Indeed, Egypt was ostracized by the Arab world for breaking Arab unity. Nevertheless, the terms of the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty were speedily implemented and sustained. The result has been stabilized security arrangements, but otherwise a cold peace.

Fundamental Transformation of Relations

Some highly conflicting relations can and are fundamentally transformed, with mutual recognition of the benefits of the change. Such transformations are often aided by long negotiation sequences. Three such profound transformations are noted here: the ending of Apartheid in South Africa, of enmity between France and Germany, and of the Cold War between the United States and the USSR.

Ending Apartheid, 1984–1994

The imposition of apartheid policies in South Africa in 1948 after the election victory of the National Party immediately faced resistance. The African National Congress (ANC) struggle against apartheid began nonviolently, but following deadly violence against demonstrators, Nelson Mandela and some other ANC leaders announced they would resort to armed struggle. In 1964, they were tried, found guilty, and sentenced to life imprisonment for this decision. At the trial, Mandela made it clear that the armed struggle would not commit acts of terrorism or wage guerrilla warfare, but would conduct sabotage (Mandela 1994). Their goal was a negotiated end of Apartheid and all South African adults having a vote. Strikes and other nonviolent actions were conducted within South Africa and the country was subjected to various international sanctions.

In 1984, unofficial meetings were held between ANC leaders and groups of leading Afrikaners in

Lusaka, Zambia. Soon, changes in Afrikaner policies occurred: in 1985 the prohibition of marriages between whites and others was repealed and in 1986 the law requiring blacks to carry identifying pass books was repealed and the Dutch Reformed Church resolved that forced racial separation could not be considered a biblical imperative. In August 1989 Frederik Willem de Klerk was elected president of South Africa and in February 1990 Nelson Mandela was unconditionally released from prison.

Official negotiations began with a meeting between the ANC and the South African government in May 1990, resulting in a commitment to remove practical obstacles to negotiation including the release of political prisoners. Comprehensive negotiations began with a multiparty meeting, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). Nineteen organizations participated in the first meetings, in December 1991; some Afrikaners and some black African organizations chose not to participate. It lasted a few days, and working groups were appointed to deal with specific issues. In May 1992, CODESA resumed meetings, but in June a massacre by mainly Zulu hostel dwellers killed 46 residents of Boipatong. Mandela accused de Klerk's government of complicity in the attack and withdrew the ANC from the negotiations, ending CODESA II. The ANC moved to street actions, but that was met by further violence.

After CODESA II, collapsed, negotiations continued bilaterally between the ANC and the NP. The key negotiators were Cyril Ramaphosa of the ANC and Roelf Meyer of the NP.

In the major disagreement, de Klerk's government sought a two-phase transition with an appointed transitional government with a rotating presidency. The ANC insisted on a single transition stage to majority rule. The breakthrough arrangement was for a coalition government for the 5 years following a democratic election and many guarantees and concessions to all sides. On September 26, 1992, the government and the ANC agreed on a *Record of Understanding*, which dealt with a constitutional assembly, an interim government, and political prisoners. It also restarted the negotiation process in the

Multiparty Negotiating Forum (MPNF), which had a broader range of participants than had CODESA. The two main negotiating parties, the ANC and the NP, agreed to reach bilateral agreement on issues before taking them to the other parties in the forum. Some difficulties continued. On April 10, 1993, Chris Hani, a senior ANC leader, was assassinated by a white right-winger. As discussed later, this was handled so that progress strengthened. More substantially threatening to the process of transformation, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the mainly Zulu Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), withdrew from the MPNF and remained out of the negotiations.

Despite all the obstacles, elections were held on schedule. On May 2, 1994, the ANC won a large electoral victory and on May 9 the newly elected parliament chose Mandela to be the first president of postapartheid South Africa.

Germany, France, and the European Union, 1951–1963

After generations of intense enmity between France and Germany, after the horrors of World War II, a remarkable transformation in their relationship occurred. A major contributor to that transformation was the negotiated agreements and institutions that led to the actual European Union. The major initial institution in that movement was the 1951 treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It was ingeniously designed to balance the disparate concerns of the participating countries and to foster transnational ties that would bind coal and steel managers, coal and steel workers, and coal and steel consumers together across national borders (Haas 1958). National concerns differed. Thus, on the one hand, France and its Western allies wanted West Germany to rebuild its coal and steel industries for its well-being and to strengthen the West against the Soviet Union. On the other hand, they feared a too-strong, independent West Germany. West German leaders wanted Germany to be treated as an equal, normal friend of the West.

The ECSC answered these somewhat contradictory needs by creating a supranational institution consisting of six countries: France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and

Luxembourg. The ECSC structure consisted of a High Authority, an Assembly, a Council of Ministers, and a Court of Justice. Significantly it also had a Consultative Committee, equally divided between employers, workers, consumers, and dealers in the coal and steel sectors. Members of the Consultative Committee were selected by trade unions, industry associations, and other civic organizations. This fostered transnational bonds and provided access for workers and consumers at the transnational level that they lacked at the national level, creating a vested interest in supra-national structures (Kriesberg 1960).

Despite the achievement of the ECSC, the next attempt to bolster European identity and new European institutions failed. The idea of a European Defense Community (EDC) was originally proposed in 1950 and a treaty to establish it was signed in May 1952. However, issues about German rearmament, lines of command, and inclusion of the United Kingdom resulted in the failure of the French National Assembly to ratify the treaty. The external conditions and the design of the institution did not suffice to overcome nationalist sentiments.

In 1956 the Suez war between the United Kingdom, France, and Israel on one side and Egypt on the other produced gas shortages in Europe. This spurred the next steps in building unified Europe. In 1957 the Treaties of Rome established two, similar communities creating a common market (European Economic Community) and promoting atomic energy cooperation (Euratom). The membership and functions of European institutions gradually grew. In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht was signed by representatives from the 12 member states of the European Communities and the European Union was established. The economic integration of Europe was tight and the German–French relationship was very close.

USA–Soviet Union, End of Cold War, 1983–1989

Important changes in the Cold War began in 1983 (Garthoff 1994; Oberdorfer 1998). At first, tensions spiked between Soviet and US leaders. On March 8, 1983, in a highly publicized speech,

Reagan called the Soviet Union an evil empire. Later in March, he announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), commonly called “Star Wars” and viewed by Soviet leaders as a grab for military dominance. In September 1983, a Korean Airlines 747 passenger plane strayed over Soviet territory. Believing the plane to be on a US intelligence mission, it was shot down by Soviet fighter planes, killing 269 people. Indeed, a US reconnaissance aircraft had been in the area about an hour before the airliner appeared there (Gates 1996; Suri 2002). A major crisis resulted, exacerbated by other US actions. For example, in November 1983, US ground-launched cruise missiles began arriving in Britain and Pershing II missiles in West Germany. Some Soviet officials became convinced that the United States was about to launch a nuclear attack.

Reagan was briefed by CIA Director William Casey that the Soviets feared that the United States might launch a surprise attack. Reagan grasped the dangerous implications of such a belief. Some analysts mark this as the turning point in Reagan’s thinking. Reagan wrote in his memoirs that recognizing Soviet fears made him “even more anxious to get a top Soviet leader in a room alone and try to convince him we had no designs on the Soviet Union and the Russians had nothing to fear from us” (Reagan 1990: p. 589).

The event producing the most profound turn in the Cold War was the Politburo’s selection of Mikhail Gorbachev to be the new Soviet leader, following Chernenko’s death in March 1985. Gorbachev was relatively young, energetic, and ambitious to make major changes, which were desired by many Soviet leaders because they recognized the stagnation and backwardness of the Soviet system.

Gorbachev initially tried to correct economic problems by new technologies and more discipline, but by late 1988, Gorbachev’s economic reforms were clearly failing and he increasingly argued to his associates that it was necessary to reduce military spending and that would require more conciliatory policies toward the West. Reagan’s conciliatory gestures after 1983 helped give them reason to believe that such a Soviet course would be reciprocated.

Gorbachev and his associates had become familiar with the ideas that were being developed by peace researchers in West Germany, Denmark, England, and elsewhere in Western Europe (Evangelista 1999). They recognized how security could be more assured by adopting military defense strategies that were not offensive rather than ones that were likely to be perceived as threatening. It included restructuring military forces so that they clearly were for defensive purposes, which the Soviets did undertake.

Arms reduction agreements were signed and the Soviet Union told the Communist leaders of the East European countries that they must win the support of their own people and not be propped up by Soviet military forces. Popular demands rose, and concessions were made, but they were too late. Very quickly all the Communist governments in Eastern Europe were gone. In November 1989, the East German government did not prevent the opening of the Berlin Wall. The Cold War was over and American–Russian relations were fundamentally transformed.

Variations in Structural Conditions

Many conditions greatly affect how and to what degree negotiations contribute to constructive conflict transformation. I will discuss four conditions that appear to have been important in the cases described above: the context of the conflict, the intensity of the prior struggle, the symmetry of the relationship, and the magnitude of mutual benefits from the relationship.

Context of the Conflict

Conflicts are interlocked in many ways: over time, with smaller ones nested in larger ones, and overlapping with still other conflicts. Changes in the intensity of salience of one may fuel or diminish the intensity of other connected conflicts. Thus, during the Cold War, changes in its salience and intensity of antagonism affected relations between Germany and France, between the United States and North Korea, and between Egypt and Israel. Its ebbing could provide space

within which parties in other relationships might try improving their relations.

Methods of Waging the Conflict

Some conflicts are waged with great violence and dehumanization, but others are waged constructively, as was notably the largely nonviolent, non-racist struggle waged by the ANC, despite the violence of the government. Generally, great human rights abuses and terrorizing attacks on noncombatants are obstacles to constructive transformations. They often generate desires for revenge and further destructive escalations. Even so, at some time, efforts at constructive transformation are tried. Creativity, sensibility, and perseverance are helpful for such undertakings, as indicated in the South African and the French–German cases. Nevertheless, there are times that a spike in violence or the threat of great violence proves to be a spur to transformative undertakings. This was the case in different phases of the Cold War.

Symmetry Dimension of the Relationship

Variations in symmetry in large-scale conflicts are often viewed in terms of balance in coercive strength. However, the degree of symmetry should also take into account many other dimensions, including moral claims, demography, and availability of allies. Symmetry also can vary in regard to the particular issues in contention in a conflict. Thus, a matter of high importance to one side and of less importance to the other side means that the former side will be willing to expend much more of its resources on that issue than does the latter side.

Generally, in an asymmetric relationship, when the less weighty side rises in the balance, a transformative effort is likely to occur. The negotiations relating to nuclear weapons are illustrative in the case of US relations with the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Iran, in which negotiations began in earnest when the country without nuclear weapons capacity gained weapons or approached having them. The rising

capacities of blacks relative to whites in South Africa are also illustrative. The stability of considerable asymmetry in Palestinian–Israeli, US–North Korean, and US–Iranian relations also help account for the failures in the transformation of their relations.

Non-contentious Aspects of the Relationship

Contending parties in a conflict often also share some identities, interests, and concerns. Recognizing and giving such common matters, in so far as they are available, more prominence is often part of transforming a conflict. Illustratively, for the French and Germans, the shared identity as Europeans was attractive after the horrors of World War II. Furthermore, the attractiveness of increased economic well-being through economic cooperation was prominent in building European institutions and overcoming extremist nationalism between the French and Germans. This was also important in the South African case. It also was evident in the final transformation of the Cold War.

Variations in Strategies

Structural conditions raise obstacles against and provide paths for conflict transformation. Appropriate strategies for constructive transformation must be found for each case with its mix of changing conditions. A variety of negotiation strategies were used in the negotiation sequences noted earlier, some with mixed results and others consistently related to the occurrence of conflict transformation. The strategies include mediation, negotiation framing, mutual recognition of concerns, implementation of agreements, multilevel engagement, and managing spoiling actions.

Mediation

The participation of a mediator can be helpful in moving a destructively contentious relationship toward constructive transformation. This was the

case in the Israeli–Egyptian Sinai negotiations, but it cannot be regarded as successful in the Oslo peace process. Greater involvement of significant mediators might have been useful to bring about more transformation movement in the cases of the US–Iranian and US–North Korean cases. The absence of an official major mediator did not prevent the fundamental transformations ending the Cold War and apartheid, but in these cases there were significant track two, nonofficial diplomacy.

Negotiation Framing

How negotiators frame the issues about which they are negotiating is certainly crucial. Posing particular difficulties, in some cases, the different sides do not agree about the issue, greatly hampering reaching agreements that are transformative. For example, consider the differing conceptions that the Americans and North Koreans had relating to the Agreed Framework. From the North Korean perspective, the main goal was normalization of political and economic relations, but the Americans generally viewed the Framework as a nonproliferation tool (Carlin and Lewis 2008).

The framing that emphasizes future mutual benefits are likely to be more effective in constructive transformations than ones that are one-sided and focusing on the past (Zartman and Kremenyuk 2005). This is evident in the case of the negotiations relating to the ECSC and other European Community treaties.

Mutual Recognition of Concerns

Conduct that demonstrates awareness of the other side's concerns is important in progressing along the path of constructive conflict transformation. To ignore, misconstrue, or deny and deprecate the other side's concerns is likely to be experienced by the other side as disrespectful, insulting, and even humiliating. The failure of leaders to recognize how the members of the other side think and feel about their situation is sometimes due to leaders' pandering to their own

constituency, presuming it demonstrates strong in-group solidarity.

Transformation is fostered by leaders on each side acting in ways that help their counterpart leaders maintain their constituency support. This was the case, at least at critical times, in the transformation of white–black relations in South Africa. There was a lack of such conduct, however, in the Oslo peace process, which contributed to its failure; the leaders on each side pursued policies that made a mutual accommodation between them more rather than less difficult.

Implementation of Agreements

The faithful mutual implementation of an agreement obviously increases the likelihood of further agreements. This was true for the interim agreements between Egypt and Israel. Interestingly, this was important in the US–Soviet agreements during the Cold War. A great deal of attention was given to verify that the terms of an agreement were not violated. In addition, joint committees were sometimes instituted in treaty to resolve disagreements about how to interpret a provision of the treaty.

A basic fault in the Oslo peace process was that agreements were not implemented in timely and full fashion. On the Israeli side, Jewish settlements were expanding mostly close to Jerusalem but also in many parts of the occupied territories and Palestinians collectively were not treated as peers. On the other side, the PA leadership did not counter the inflammatory language in schools and the press about Israeli Jews and did not foster an open democratic political system and equitably develop the Palestinian economy.

Failing to implement one element of an agreement may be the source of misunderstanding when it was simply applied as leverage to get the other side to implement a different element it had agreed to do. A failure to implement an element may then mistakenly be regarded as a rejection of the agreement, not as a bargaining ploy. This sometimes was the case in the US–North Korean negotiations.

Multilevel Engagement

In-depth support is important if conflict transformation is to be sustained and increased. Too often, the negotiations are conducted secretly and without preparing each side's constituencies for a fundamental change in the relationship. At particular times in the course of negotiations, for example, in exploratory overtures, confidential conversations may be useful. Lacking broad engagement, a transformation to a managed conflict may occur, but it then may remain a "cold peace," as was the case for the Egyptian–Israeli relationship after the 1979 Peace Treaty was signed. The transformation of the US–Soviet conflict into the managed one during the 1970s is another example of this. Furthermore, failure of the US–Iranian and US–North Korean negotiations to result in conflict transformation is in part attributable to the lack of widespread public readiness for it within any of the countries involved.

On the other hand, the negotiations to end Apartheid in South Africa incorporated arrangements that would maximize broad participation. Initially, this was tried with CODESA, and later, with somewhat more success, negotiations were also conducted in the Multiparty Negotiating Forum (MPNF). In addition, the National Peace Accord was signed by 27 government, political, and trade union leaders in September 1991 (Borer et al. 2006). It established a national network of structures that included codes of conduct for political parties and organizations and for the conduct of security forces; it included a national peace committee, a national peace secretariat, regional and local dispute resolution committees, a commission of inquiry regarding the prevention of public violence and intimidation, socioeconomic reconstruction and development, and a police board. These structures also provided settings for persons from opposing sides to get to know each other and to work together at the national, regional, and local levels.

Managing Spoiler Attacks

Some members of each side may try to disrupt and even halt movements for constructive conflict transformation. They may do so because they

believe that too much is being conceded to the enemy, they are simply satisfied with the status quo, or they seek a larger role in the emerging new relationship. Spoiling attacks may be perpetrated by fringe groups or by factions of major institutions. Such attacks often happened during the Oslo peace process, notably with the assassination of Rabin and bombings of Israeli noncombatants.

How such attacks are dealt with by those leaders working to transform a hostile relationship is critical. If the targeted side's leaders push ahead in the transforming direction, the movement can be strengthened. This was the case in South Africa in April 1993, when an ANC leader, Chris Hani, was assassinated by an immigrant from Poland, a member of the right-wing Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. The assassin was captured after an Afrikaner woman telephoned the police, giving his license plate number. Mandela and de Klerk quickly acted together to isolate the event. Mandela went on national television, reporting what had happened and fervently asserting, "Now is the time for all South Africans to stand together against those who, from whatever quarter, wish to destroy what Chris Hani gave his life for—the freedom of all of us" (Mandela 1994: p. 530). The ANC organized protest demonstrations to allow for nonviolent expressions of anger and the government arrested a member of the Conservative Party in connection with the murder. The negotiations continued.

Another constructive way of responding to possible spoiling attacks occurred in South Africa and also pertains to ways to engage many societal levels in constructive conflict transformation. As noted earlier, in 1990, political violence erupted as the transition toward nonracial democracy began. Some deaths arose from the use of lethal force by security forces in public order policing, but much violence was among black groups, particularly between two ethnic groups, the Xhosa and the Zulu, and two political organizations, the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). A "third force," consisting of right-wing white elements, was initially linked to the government security forces and supported violence perpetrated by some of the IFP.

No single person or organization could stop the violence or even possessed the legitimacy to

convene a conference that might end it. Fortunately, the South African Council of Churches and the Consultative Business Movement, acting together, were able to call such a conference, which led to the National Peace Accord cited earlier. The NPA together with other actors were able to maintain the momentum for the transformation marked by the election of Mandela as president of South Africa.

Conclusions

For a series of negotiation episodes to contribute to a conflict's transformation, it requires the convergence of many structural conditions and well-conducted appropriate negotiation strategies. Even when destructive relations are fundamentally transformed, the course is never entirely smooth. Disruptions are likely and they can prevent advances for long periods. Yet there are reasons to think long term and persevere. Turning to non-negotiated coercive impositions can result in mutually destructive results.

There are many possible ways a transformation movement may be disrupted, including developments within one adversary camp or changes in the external context of the contentious relationship. Such disruptions, however, can be overcome with determined will, good judgments and skills, and perseverance.

Negotiations can take many different forms and no one form fits all circumstances. Creativity and good judgment is needed to choose the most suitable ones for a constructive transformation to be achieved. Often in the course of a long sequence of negotiation episodes, the form shifts over time. It is critical to try to forge agreements that create vested interests for further advances that rally supporters mutually.

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Dean G. Pruitt

Introduction

This chapter presents a step-by-step account of the development of readiness theory, which concerns how a disputant decides to enter negotiation aimed at settling an intractable conflict. (Negotiation is assumed to include mediation.) A cumulative case study method was used, involving sequential examination of the peace processes that ended at least temporarily three conflicts between dominant and subordinate ethnic groups. The negotiations that resulted from these peace processes were (in the order examined) the 1993 Oslo talks which established the Palestinian Authority (see Pruitt 1997), the 1998 Northern Ireland mediation which produced the Good Friday Agreement (see Pruitt 2007), and the 1993 Multiparty Negotiating Forum which led to one-person-one-vote elections in South Africa (see Pruitt 2012).

The method involved constructing a chronology for each case based on all available books and articles and, for Northern Ireland, three interviews. A theory was employed as a screening device to help identify the most important events in each case, and hypotheses about the most likely antecedents of each event were developed by means of

process analysis (see George and Bennett 2005). In the Oslo case study, the screening device was Zartman's well-supported ripeness theory (Zartman 1989, 2000). That study led to the construction of basic readiness theory, which was used as a screening device and further developed in the Northern Ireland and South African cases. Readiness theory, as it emerged at the end of this progression, is an augmented restatement of ripeness theory in terms customarily used by psychologists (the author is a psychologist).

Basic Ripeness Theory

Ripeness theory concerns the thought processes of decision makers who forsake a "unilateral" approach (continued hostilities) and embrace a "bilateral" approach (negotiation, with or without the help of a mediator). The basic theory specifies two conditions that are necessary, though not sufficient, for negotiation to take place:

1. A mutually hurting stalemate. Both sides realize they are in a costly deadlock which cannot be escaped by escalation. A hurting stalemate is especially motivating if accompanied by an "impending, past, or recently avoided catastrophe" (Zartman 2000, p. 228).
2. A mutually perceived way out. Both sides foresee that "a negotiated solution is possible" (Zartman 2000, p.228)—that a mutually

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acceptable formula can be found. “Parties do not have to be able to identify a specific solution, but they must have the sense that a negotiated solution is possible and that the other party shares that sense and the willingness to search for a solution” (Zartman and de Soto 2010, p. 6).

Ripeness and readiness theories do not apply to mandated negotiation or to negotiation that is aimed at impressing people or buying time rather than reaching agreement.

The Oslo Peace Process

Using ripeness theory as a guide to what to look for, the author examined the literature on the Oslo peace process for signs of interest in negotiation, perceptions of stalemate, perceived cost of the conflict, perceived risk of future catastrophe or memory of one in the past, perceptions that the other party is seeking a solution or that a negotiated solution is possible, and any reasonable antecedents of these processes.

The Case¹

The Oslo talks were between Israelis and representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a patriotic Palestinian terrorist group whose target was Israel. In the period before the talks, both sides were experiencing a stalemate. Israel could not reach the PLO, which was far away in Tunis, and “the PLO had been politically and economically weakened by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and by Arab retaliation for the PLO’s support of Iraq during the Gulf Crisis, curtailing its capacity to continue an effective campaign against Israel” (Pruitt 1997, p. 243).

In addition, Israel had experienced heavy costs in its effort to stem the Intifada, a revolt by

young Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. These efforts had tied down the army for years and given Israel an international black eye. Though Intifada activism had recently diminished, there was a strong possibility of its revival. Yitzhak Rabin, who became prime minister in 1992, had run on a platform of negotiating a settlement with the Palestinians, so his political reputation was also at stake. “Both sides were aware of an impending catastrophe in the rise of militant Islam. The growing Hamas movement threatened to unseat the PLO as leader of the Palestinians, and Rabin also feared this development and foresaw the possibility that a fundamentalist Palestinian leadership would make common cause against Israel with a militant Iran or a revitalized Iraq” (Pruitt 1997, p. 243). Israeli memory of a recent near catastrophe—Iraqi missile attacks during the 1991 Gulf War—strengthened this concern. Indeed he felt that an agreement with the Palestinians would reduce the overall threat to Israel from the Arab world. The PLO sought legitimacy and authority from Israel in order to restore their finances and to counter Hamas, and Israel sought the PLO’s help in combating Hamas and the Intifada and diminishing the threat from the broader Arab world.

Rabin initially relied on some previously organized negotiations with moderate Palestinian leaders which were taking place in Washington, but the PLO would not let these leaders make concessions. At the same time, Yossi Beilin, Israel’s deputy foreign minister, was trying to organize secret exploratory talks with the PLO, helped by the Norwegian government which offered to host and finance these talks. The Norwegians arranged a meeting between Yair Hirschfeld, an Israeli professor who was close to Beilin, and Abu Ala, a senior PLO official, which resulted in a series of talks that took place near Oslo in total secrecy. Secrecy was essential because hawks on both sides opposed communication with the other side. Had the talks been publicized, they probably would have been stopped and those involved could have been disciplined by constituents. If the talks had not been stopped, additional parties might have insisted on joining them, adding other priorities that would

¹This summary is based on Abbas (1995), Corbin (1994), Lundberg (1996), Makovsky (1996), Peres (1995), Pruitt (1997), Pruitt et al. (1997), Savir (1998), Schiff (2012), and Wanis-St. John (2011). The author is indebted to Amira Schiff and Anthony Wanis-St. John, who commented on an earlier version of this summary.

have made agreement difficult to achieve.² The talks were chaired by Terje Larsen, a Norwegian social scientist, who helped the parties in many ways but seldom intervened in the discussions.

There were 12 secret sessions beginning in January 1993. The first five of these can be considered exploratory prenegotiation because Hirschfeld had no authority to make binding proposals. Optimism about finding a way out grew rapidly during these initial meetings. Both sides made early concessions, causing each to see that the other was serious about wanting to end the conflict. At one point, the Israelis checked whether Abu Ala was a valid spokesman of the PLO by asking him to arrange for the Palestinian delegation to rejoin the previously organized negotiations which they had walked out of, and he passed that test. By the end of the fifth meeting the delegates had developed a fairly detailed framework or formula—an outline of an agreement that included such features as a democratically elected Palestinian authority with jurisdiction over Gaza and some part of the West Bank and eventual negotiations to resolve remaining issues such as the status of Jerusalem and the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their ancestral homes (Abbas 1995).

Learning about these optimistic developments, Israel turned the talks into true negotiations by sending an Israeli diplomat in May and another in June. According to Schiff (2012), Israeli optimism about the success of these negotiations was uneven across the government, with Beilin and others in the foreign ministry more optimistic than Rabin, who still hoped for a breakthrough in the Washington talks. Rabin's full support for the Oslo negotiations came only in August after definitive failure of the Washington talks and independent evidence of Arafat's readiness to make peace, which was delivered by a trusted intermediary (Haim Ramon) who had talked with a close associate of Arafat (Ahmad Tibi). Sessions six to twelve had their ups and downs but culminated in September 1993 with mutual recognition between the two parties and a

signed declaration of principles that fleshed out the prior framework.³ After the Oslo agreement was signed, subsequent negotiations worked out the concrete details and the Palestinian Authority was established.

According to Wanis-St. John (2011), "The atmosphere in the Oslo channel was one of intense contention over the substance combined with equally intense relationship building and trust" (p. 95). The participants came to see each other as fellow human beings, more similar than different from themselves; and "a warm, friendly, humorous atmosphere developed along with a common understanding of the issues and a uniform vocabulary" (Pruitt, Bercovitch, and Zartman 1997, p. 181).

Analysis

The case just described shows strong support for ripeness theory, but it also suggests the value of restating and amending that theory. Though the theory concerns leader-thought processes, it is not stated in standard psychological terms. It looks at the dyad (e.g., Israel and the PLO) collectively rather than the two sides separately, and it talks about necessary states rather than causal variables.

The value of looking at the two sides separately can be seen in the Oslo case, with Israel most concerned about the cost and risk of holding down the Intifada and the PLO most concerned about the danger of being supplanted by Hamas. Also if we wished to probe more deeply into the causes of these concerns or to bring psychological or political perspectives into the analysis, we would necessarily have to focus on the individual sides. That reasoning led to the development of a new term *readiness*, which describes the states of mind on each side when ripeness occurs.

There are four reasons for regarding ripeness, readiness, and their antecedents as variables. One is implicit in ripeness theory itself when it asserts that a past, impending, or recently avoided catastrophe *augments* the effect of a hurting stalemate.

²For a broader discussion of secrecy in negotiation and prenegotiation, see Pruitt (2008, 2011).

³Both documents can be found in Abbas (1995).

The second is that viewing ripeness and its antecedents as variables allows tracking the rise and fall of these conditions, as when we noted that optimism grew rapidly during the first five Oslo meetings. The third is that viewing these conditions as variables allows us to compare the parties within and between cases. The fourth is that the use of variables allows construction of a compensatory model in which more of one variable can substitute (compensate) for less of another. For example, it can be argued that a party that is more fearful of a future catastrophe will require less optimism about the success of negotiation before entering it (Pruitt 2005).

Basic Readiness Theory⁴

Readiness is a characteristic of a single disputant that encourages movement toward or participation in negotiation. The greater a party's readiness, the more likely it will be to propose negotiation or to agree to negotiation if proposed. Readiness also encourages participation in exploratory prenegotiation, but less readiness is needed than for entering full-fledged negotiation. Readiness, along with many other variables, encourages concession making.

Readiness has two antecedents that parallel those in ripeness theory: motivation to end the conflict or simply "motivation" and optimism about the outcome of negotiation or simply "optimism." In both negotiation and prenegotiation, optimism must increase over time or the party is likely to drop out.

Motivation has four antecedents:

- A perception that the conflict is not being won or (and this is more motivating) that it is being lost.
- The perceived cost of the conflict.
- The perceived risk of continuing the conflict. This includes the risk of further alienating the

other party, spiraling escalation, or exhausting one's resources.

- Third-party pressure to end the conflict, which can come from mediators, allies, or other powerful parties.

These antecedents are assumed to be independent and compensatory, which implies that any one of them may be by far the most important motivator. For example, pressure from a crucial ally was the main issue for Robert Mugabe when he attended the negotiations that led to the founding of Zimbabwe (Stedman 1991). This pressure was so strong that it outweighed his perception that there was no stalemate—that his troops were winning the conflict. The cost of continuing the conflict in lives lost seems to have been the main issue for both sides at the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh War (Mooradian and Druckman 1999). In the Oslo case just described, the perceived risk of continuing the conflict seems to have been paramount.

There was little if any third-party pressure in the Oslo case. This antecedent was included in readiness theory because of its importance in the Zimbabwe negotiation just mentioned. Third parties may press a disputant either to end the conflict or to enter negotiation.

Optimism is a sense that it will be possible to locate a mutually acceptable agreement in negotiation. Early on, optimism often derives from what Kelman (1997) calls "working trust," a belief that the other side is also motivated to settle and will work hard and make concessions. However, for optimism to be sustained, one must eventually see the outlines of a possible agreement, a framework or formula that will bridge the two parties' opposing positions. Frameworks are often developed during negotiation, but in the Oslo case this occurred during the first five prenegotiation sessions.⁵ The optimism generated by

⁴Basic readiness theory is presented in Pruitt (1997, 2005).

⁵The final agreement at Oslo can also be considered a framework or formula, more detailed than that developed in the first five sessions but still vague on many issues that were worked out in subsequent negotiations. This suggests that Zartman and Berman's (1982) formula-detail sequence may be repeated more than once in a series of negotiations, with the details that end one negotiation serving as a formula to be further developed in the next.

these sessions was an important source of Israel's decision to send official negotiators to the sixth and subsequent sessions (Corbin 1994; Makovsky 1996; Savir 1998).

Optimism also depends on a perception that the opposing negotiator is a valid spokesperson, an individual whose concessions can actually commit his or her party. During the Oslo prenegotiation period, Israel tested Abu Ala's influence back home and he passed that test, showing that he was a valid spokesperson. This contributed to Israeli optimism in negotiating with him.

Readiness theory is especially applicable to intractable conflicts because these conflicts involve severely fractured relationships between the disputants. Research (Merry and Silbey 1984; Mikolic et al. 1997; Sarat 1976) suggests that in more moderate conflicts, negotiation is a preferred tactic rather than one that is used after more aggressive tactics have failed. Possible reasons for this include a desire to avoid antagonizing the adversary and a view of the adversary as part of one's moral community, both of which are likely to disappear in intractable conflict.

The Northern Ireland Peace Process

The Case⁶

Northern Ireland is a province of Great Britain. Two-thirds of its population are unionists, mainly Protestant descendents of Scottish immigrants, who regard themselves as "British"; and one-third are nationalists, mainly Catholic descendents of the original inhabitants, who regard themselves as "Irish." Until recently, the nationalists were second-class citizens, dominated politically and economically by the unionists and resenting their lower status.

These groups have been at odds for centuries, but the conflict became especially heated in 1968 when nonviolent demonstrations were launched against unionist discrimination. Some of these

demonstrations were dispersed violently by the unionist-dominated police, which led to months of disorder. That caused the British government to send in troops and eventually to dismiss the provincial government and establish direct rule.

During this period, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), a nationalist paramilitary organization, was revived and began killing policemen, British soldiers, and government officials. The IRA's goal was to end British rule and unite Northern Ireland with the mainly nationalist Irish Republic in the southern part of the island. Unionist paramilitary groups formed in response and began killing nationalist civilians, which provoked further violence by the IRA. In the end, 3,700 people died out of a population of 1 1/2 million.

The peace process began with a 1987 statement by Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, and (though he denied it) a leader of the IRA. He said "there is no military solution" and "I would be prepared to consider an alternative, unarmed struggle to achieve Irish independence" (Hennessey 2000, p. 39). What he sought at that time was a broad alliance of nationalists on the island and in the USA to achieve the IRA's goals through political pressure. In 1990, Peter Brooke, the British Secretary of State (governor) for Northern Ireland, made a similar statement, "It is difficult to envisage a military defeat [of the IRA]" (Taylor 1997, p. 365).

Adams' statement attracted the attention of John Hume, leader of the nonviolent Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), the dominant nationalist political party; and the two men met secretly over the next 5 years. At these meetings, Hume argued, with eventual success, that IRA violence was counterproductive, unionist consent would be needed to achieve a united Ireland, and negotiation was essential. He also began talking with the prime minister of the Irish Republic, who in turn had periodic meetings with the British prime minister. Thus, a secret four-part communication chain was set up, with Adams at one end and the British government, representing their own views and those of the unionists, at the other. Parts of this chain were not hidden from the public, for example, the meetings between the

⁶This summary is based on English (2003), Hennessey (2000), Mitchell (1999), Moloney (2002), O'Clery (1997), Pruitt (2007), and Taylor (1997).

two prime ministers. What was secret is that the two ends of the chain were in contact through intermediaries.

A less important secret communication channel also operated during part of this period, involving an officer of British Intelligence and Martin McGuinness, second in command in Sinn Fein and also an IRA leader. These men mainly communicated through a long-term intermediary, Brendan Duddy (O Dochartaigh 2011). That channel broke down when it was exposed in the press, but the four-part channel continued and bore fruit.

The communications in these channels led the parties to recognize each other's peaceful intentions. Both sides made several concessions, which produced a mutually acceptable framework, enunciated in a joint statement by the prime ministers of Britain and the Irish Republic. Sinn Fein dropped its demands for immediate withdrawal of British troops and an immediate North-South union, accepting the inevitability of an intermediate solution. Britain agreed that Northern Ireland could eventually join the Irish Republic if there were a favorable majority vote in both parts of the island. The two sides agreed to a revival of the Northern Ireland provincial government with proportional representation and the establishment of a North-South council. Britain talked separately with the dominant unionist political group, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), which reluctantly agreed to the British concessions. Fierce guerilla activity continued throughout this preliminary period even though the talks were moving toward formal negotiation.

In 1994, the IRA leadership became convinced that negotiation was imminent and declared a ceasefire, encouraging a comparable response by the unionist paramilitaries. However, the British insisted that the IRA begin disarming before Sinn Fein could enter negotiation, and they organized overt talks involving most of the other political groups on the island. This led the IRA to resume its military campaign. Fortunately, a new British government was elected in 1997 and the disarmament precondition was dropped. The IRA renewed its ceasefire, and Sinn Fein was invited into the negotiations.

The negotiations were hard fought and often acrimonious. They were chaired by George Mitchell, a former US Senate majority leader; and the British and Irish governments mediated vigorously between the nationalists and unionists. The end result was a complex treaty—the Good Friday Agreement—which filled the gaps in the earlier framework. This treaty was signed in 1998 and ratified by referenda in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.

Support for and Contribution to Readiness Theory

Three of readiness theory's antecedents of motivation are prominent in this case. By 1990, both Adams, for Sinn Fein, and Brooke, for the British government, had stated publicly that they could not defeat each other militarily. These statements can be viewed as expressing genuine sentiments rather than strategic calculations because admitting that one cannot win is unusual and counterproductive in severe conflict. While perceived costs are not mentioned in the literature on this case, it is clear that there was heavy loss of life on both sides, and occupying Northern Ireland was a financial drain on Britain. Pressure from allies and other strong third parties is also apparent. Sinn Fein experienced pressure from the SDLP, the Irish Republic, and many Irish Americans—all prospective allies. Britain was pressed by the Irish Republic and the unionists by Britain.

As in the Oslo case, exploratory communication through secret channels appears to have been the locus for building the optimism that allowed the parties to enter formal negotiation. However, this communication was not face-to-face as at Oslo but was accomplished through intermediaries. Hence, readiness theory needed to be somewhat restated to say that optimism about the success of negotiation may result from communication between the parties, whether direct face-to-face or indirect through an intermediary or intermediaries. Communication through intermediaries may explain why the prenegotiation period was so long in Northern Ireland.

Why did the parties communicate through intermediaries rather than face-to-face? One reason may lie in the British, and especially the unionist, hostility toward the IRA which resulted from the many murders perpetrated by that organization. Even in the final negotiations, the unionists were unwilling to talk directly with the leaders of Sinn Fein on the grounds that they were murderers. When disputants are too hostile to talk with each other or the social distance between them is too great for them to understand each other, intermediaries are essential. Each party talks with a trusted and understanding person who interfaces with the adversary or another intermediary. Sometimes a single intermediary can face successfully in both directions, but often a chain of two (as in Northern Ireland and between Rabin and Arafat in the Middle East) or more is needed to interface successfully (Pruitt 1994, 2003).

Again in the preliminary period, we find both sides making substantial concessions. Concession making should increase optimism in both the conceiver and the recipient since it reduces the distance between the two parties' demands. It also should encourage working trust and the development of a common framework, both of which can produce enough optimism to allow formal negotiation to begin. All of this appears to have happened in the Northern Ireland peace process.

The South African Peace Process

The Case⁷

The South African conflict was launched by nonwhites⁸ to do away with apartheid, a legal system that kept them at the bottom of society. Only 9 %

⁷This summary is based on Clark and Worger (2004), Lieberfeld (1999, 2007), Mandela (1994), Pruitt (2012), Sisk (1995), Waldmeir (1998), Welsh (2009), and Zartman (1995). The author is indebted to Daniel Lieberfeld, who commented extensively on an earlier version of this summary.

⁸The nonwhites consisted of black Africans (79 % of the total population), coloreds (9 %), and Asians (3 %).

of the population was white, yet whites controlled the government and most means of production. Nonwhites were mostly employed as cheap labor and forced to live in bleak "townships" close to the white-occupied cities. These townships, which eventually housed millions of people, were the site of several, mainly nonviolent uprisings which were opposed by the army and police. During the massive final uprising in 1984–1988, more than 3,000 nonwhites lost their lives and 30,000 were imprisoned. That uprising was accompanied by many strikes, which were organized by the newly founded Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The uprising died down in 1988 but showed signs of rebuilding in 1989.

The government's apartheid policies and heavy repression of the demonstrators produced a backlash of condemnation and pressure from the outer world. By 1986, a full-scale program of Western sanctions was in place. South Africans were excluded from international gatherings, the West stopped buying South African products, and foreign investment dried up.

The most prominent non-white political group was the African National Congress (ANC), which was banned in the early 1960s because it had begun guerilla activity. (The targets of this activity were mainly structures rather than people.) Some of its leaders, including Nelson Mandela, were imprisoned at that time, while others went into exile in Lusaka, Zambia. Though not directly involved in the township uprisings, the ANC in exile provided verbal support and launched guerilla attacks that inspired the demonstrators. The United Democratic Front (UDF), which organized the final township revolt, "openly identified with the ANC and its imprisoned and exiled leadership" (Sisk 1995, p. 64).

Alarmed by the extent of the uprising and the impact of the sanctions, whites began visiting the ANC in Lusaka in 1985. The first visitors were businessmen, who developed a very positive impression of the ANC leadership which they communicated to the world. Other white groups followed and voiced similar impressions. The ANC leaders saw these visits as a sign that support for apartheid was weakening and

negotiations might ensue. To prepare for those negotiations and to be sure they were chosen to represent the nonwhites, they persuaded a British mining executive to organize and chair some secret exploratory meetings. These took place between 1987 and 1990 mostly at the Mells Park estate in England. They were attended by Thabo Mbeki and other ANC officers and an increasingly prominent group of South African whites.

These meetings greatly resembled the first five Oslo meetings described earlier. The chair was minimally intrusive. There was much interpersonal bonding, and most of the issues later covered in the formal negotiations were discussed. A lot of time was spent reassuring the whites that majority rule would not hurt their community. Despite progress in these talks, the ANC continued to encourage the township revolts—the “people’s war”—and to send guerillas into South Africa.

Another set of secret talks began in 1987 between Mandela, still a prisoner, and several high government officials. Mandela proposed these talks for the following reasons: “It was clear to me that a military victory was a distant if not impossible dream (and the effort would cost) thousands if not millions of lives.... If we did not start a dialogue soon, both sides would be plunged into a dark night of oppression, violence, and war.... They must have known this as well” (Mandela 1994, p. 525). The latter statement of optimism was based on a courtesy visit by the minister of justice when Mandela was in the hospital. Mandela’s aim in these talks was to foster negotiation between the government and the ANC leadership. He spent much time explaining the ANC and reassuring the officials that white rights would not be trampled under majority rule.

All of these visits and talks contributed to a growing positive impression among the white elite. The ANC leaders were increasingly seen as intelligent and reasonable men who mainly sought a truly democratic government. These views were reinforced by the Organization of African Unity’s 1989 Harare Declaration, a conciliatory document that was mainly written by ANC leaders.

By late 1989, a mutually acceptable framework for a final agreement had been developed.

Apartheid would be liquidated, a new constitution would be developed giving all South Africans equal voting rights, the ANC and other dissident groups would be legalized and allowed full political participation, all political prisoners would be released including Mandela, a court-enforceable declaration of rights for individuals and minorities would be enacted, and the state of emergency that gave broad powers to the police would be lifted.⁹

On February 2, 1990, South Africa’s president, F. W. de Klerk, publicly endorsed that framework, calling for negotiation of “a new democratic constitution (producing) universal franchise.”¹⁰ The ANC and its fighters returned to South Africa, political prisoners were released, apartheid was dismantled, and negotiation took place between the ANC and the dominant white political party. The result was a fully democratic government and a declaration of human rights that protected the white minority. That government persists to this day and the international sanctions are gone.

Support for Readiness Theory

Mandela’s (1994) statement about why he sought exploratory talks with the South African government is clear evidence for both components of readiness (and ripeness) theory. He mentioned (a) his fear that continued conflict would produce no victory and heavy loss of life (antecedents of motivation to end the conflict) and (b) his belief that the government “must have known this as well” (an indication of optimism about the outcome of negotiation). In the late 1980s, motivation to end the conflict also grew rapidly among highly placed whites, including many leaders of the governing National Party (NP). Though they had largely defeated the most recent revolt, it was not clear that they could do so again with the non-

⁹This framework is revealed by the common threads in the Harare Declaration and de Klerk’s February 2, 1990, speech which is discussed in the next paragraph.

¹⁰This speech can be read at www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/index.php?option=com_displaydc&recordID=spe19900202.026.021.000.

whites so well organized; and they ran substantial risk of a bloodbath that would claim many white lives. Thus, Sisk (1995) remarks, “Each successive period of resistance—1952, 1960, 1976-77, 1984-88—was more intense and widespread, and the regime’s efforts to contain revolution through repression were less and less successful.... How long before another round of violence and repression would begin? And if it began, how long would it last and how many lives would be lost? And the next time, would the state have the capacity to contain it? These thoughts were foremost in the minds of the NP leaders” (pp. 61, 64–65). Third-party pressure, in the form of the crippling sanctions, was another important source of motivation to end the conflict.

In addition, the many unofficial meetings with leaders of the ANC had encouraged optimism that an agreement was possible at an acceptable price. Thus, Welsh (2009) writes about these meetings, “These encounters...strengthen(ed) support for the principle of negotiating with the ANC, now increasingly accepted as inevitable among sections of the Afrikaner¹¹ elite” (p. 354). The Harare declaration, with its endorsement of negotiation and failure to mention the people’s war, must have produced added optimism. However, as Welsh (2009) also notes, “Grassroots white opinion...remained generally hostile” (p. 354). The crisis and its solution were mainly in the minds of people at the top of white society, and not all of them. Before negotiation became a government policy, an old president (P. W. Botha) had to be replaced and the new president (De Klerk) briefed on the depth of the crisis and the exploratory talks.

We see for the third time that much of the optimism about the outcome of negotiation resulted from secret exploratory communication between the two sides in which first working trust and then a mutually acceptable framework developed. This communication was face-to-face, and the Mells Park talks closely resembled the Oslo talks in that rebel leaders met with citizens who were

close to the government, and warm interpersonal relationships developed. At Mells Park as in Oslo, third-party assistance was in the form of good offices. The British mining executive organized and chaired the meetings but was not an active mediator.

Contributions to Readiness Theory

Some of the contributions discussed in this section were developed while writing up the South African case (Pruitt 2012). Others emerged from a later comparison of the three cases (Pruitt *in press*).

Additional Motives Leading to Negotiation

The South African case reveals that motives other than escaping a conflict can help precipitate a decision to move into preliminary communication. Thus, the leaders of the ANC in exile sought communication with whites when they concluded that the government might soon propose negotiation. They wanted to gain information about the issues and to be sure they were chosen as the negotiation partner. Surely they were experiencing some desire to end the conflict, as their top leaders knew that they could not win and many of their followers were facing severe costs. But these additional motives appear to have been the main reason they pressed for preliminary talks when they did. In addition, looking back at the Oslo case, we can see an extraneous motive underlying the Israeli government’s decision to enter actual negotiation: Rabin’s campaign promise to end the conflict.

Unequal Motivation

By 1990, the white establishment was much more motivated to end the conflict than was the bulk of the non-white leadership. The government had imprisoned tens of thousands of demonstrators, yet there were still some strikes, boycotts, and nonpayment of township rents (Clark and Worger 2004), and heavier action was beginning again. When whites looked ahead,

¹¹ There are two white groups in South Africa: the Afrikaners, who were politically dominant and ran the NP, and the English speakers.

they foresaw that the next revolt could overwhelm their security forces, causing their society to fall from comfortable affluence to abject misery, a very great distance. Furthermore, powerful Western sanctions had all but stopped economic growth. Thoughtful nonwhites were also apprehensive about the conflict—Mandela more so than most—and they were willing to negotiate. But ending the conflict was not so highly prized. The nonwhites held the moral high ground with the outside world and their tactics were slowly eroding the hated apartheid regime. Also they did not have so far to fall. Most of them were already on the bottom.

This unequal motivation means that by 1990, the ANC had far more bargaining power than the government, despite its disadvantage in firepower and wealth. That explains why De Klerk proposed negotiation and made such far-reaching concessions—releasing the political prisoners, legitimizing the ANC and its allies, repealing apartheid, and giving nonwhites full political rights—in exchange for nothing but informal promises. In legitimizing the opposition, he relinquished the government’s right to kill and imprison demonstrators as it had in the past. That allowed the ANC to field massive demonstrations in 1992 at a time when the negotiations had broken down, eliciting further large concessions from the government. Other writers about the South African peace process also have noted this discrepancy in size of concessions (Welsh 2009; Zartman 1995).

Perceived Urgency

In explaining the concessions made in his 1990 speech, De Klerk told a later audience, “We did not wait until the position of power dominance turned against us before we decided to negotiate a peaceful settlement” (Sisk 1995, p. 84). That suggests the importance of the *perceived urgency* of ending a conflict,¹² which is distinct from the strength of motivation to end that conflict, though

it shares some of the same antecedents. A party may be highly motivated to end a conflict, for example, if a costly conflict cannot be won, and yet feel that settlement can wait for a more propitious time. Conversely, a party may see that an opportunity to end a conflict is departing but not be sufficiently motivated to act on that knowledge. Perceived urgency rises when the situation is going downhill—one is losing a conflict, one’s capacity to achieve one’s goals is diminishing, or there are increasing threats to one’s welfare. It also rises when powerful outsiders are urging quick action or when a deadline approaches beyond which one will be penalized or lose an important opportunity. De Klerk’s statement suggests that in early 1990, he saw that the government’s bargaining power was steadily eroding, which meant that it was important to move to negotiation as soon as possible. That helps explain why he proposed negotiation at that time. Other factors affected the timing of his initiative, for example, he was due to speak to Parliament at its opening session on February 2; but perceived urgency appears to have been important.

If the government proposed negotiation because it was losing bargaining power, why did not the ANC reject that proposal because they were gaining bargaining power? There are three possible answers. One is that the Soviet Union, a major source of financial support, put pressure on them to enter negotiation (Welsh 2009). Second, it seems likely that the ANC would have lost much of its moral high ground with the Western world if it had turned down an offer of negotiation on such generous terms. A third possibility is that the ANC’s main aspiration was to gain political equality for nonwhites; hence, the goals of the negotiation proposed by De Klerk were quite attractive. Evidence of this aspiration can be seen in the August 1989 Harare Declaration, which was “drafted under the careful supervision of Tambo and...approved by the ANC’s National Working Committee” (Welsh 2009, p. 378). The declaration said, “We would...encourage

¹²Urgency plays a central role in Haass’ (1990) theory of ripeness. He writes that, “The most important (element of ripeness) is that parties must conclude that in the absence

of an agreement, *time does not work in their favor*” (p. 27—italics added).

the people of South Africa...to get together to negotiate an end to the apartheid system and agree...to transform their country into a non-racial democracy.”¹³ This declaration was in the spirit of the much earlier (1955) Freedom Charter, which the ANC had always endorsed as its guiding principle.

Detailed Frameworks

In all three cases, the frameworks developed during the prenegotiation period were much more detailed than is usually found in that phase. In other words, the parties were unusually close to a substantive agreement before they decided to enter negotiation. This can probably be explained by the fact that the conflicts to be settled were so severe and long lasting—at the upper end of the scale of intractability. In intractable conflict, both sides commonly become convinced that the conflict is insoluble, that the parties are so far apart that agreement cannot be reached. Furthermore, there are likely to be many chauvinistic hawks on both sides who want to continue the conflict. Hence, a leader who seeks to start negotiation needs more evidence than usual that it will be successful.

Positive Interdependence

The Mells Park talks were similar to the Oslo talks in that they involved direct communication and warm interpersonal relations; also agreement was reached with little intervention by the third party. That is surprising given the extremely hostile prior relationship between the parties. A possible explanation is that, in both cases, the parties were positively interdependent. Each side became dependent on the other to deliver important benefits that could not be achieved in any other way. The South African government (correctly) saw the ANC as able to stop the non-white revolt and end the sanctions. (The organizers of the revolt, the UDF and COSATU,

looked up to the ANC as their legitimate leaders; and the ANC was widely respected in the countries sponsoring the sanctions.) Conversely, the ANC leaders saw the government as the only feasible route to a new political order that would include nonwhites as equal players, which had been their main goal for decades. They knew that they could not beat the whites militarily, so they had to rely on white cooperation. In the Oslo case, the Israeli government (incorrectly) saw the PLO as able to prevent the development of a second Intifada and stem the rise of Hamas as a political force. The PLO saw the government as their only route to the legitimacy and authority that would reverse their downward political slide.¹⁴

There was no positive interdependence in the Northern Ireland case. That is because Sinn Fein had no benefits—nothing rewarding—to offer the British and the unionists; all they could do was to persuade the IRA to stop its attacks. It is true that Sinn Fein became positively dependent on the British when they realized that they could not beat them or assemble a winning alliance. Only with British cooperation could the nationalists be brought into equal political status with the unionists. But the situation was not one of positive *interdependence*. That may help explain the lack of direct contact between the two sides during the prenegotiation period and the need for intermediaries to transmit information and put pressure on both sides.

The broader theoretical point is that positive interdependence, where the parties need each other's cooperation in order to achieve success, encourages positive feelings, direct contact, and voluntary cooperation. This reduces, though may not eliminate, the need for third-party assistance to reach a settlement. Negative interdependence, where each party's efforts to succeed harm the other's interests, encourages the opposite, even when a settlement of their differences would be

¹³This declaration can be accessed at www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=3856.

¹⁴The PLO's positive dependence on the Israeli government ended once the negotiations were finished, which may help explain (along with the PLO's inadequacy at protecting Israel from the Intifada and Hamas) the subsequent downward spiral of relations between the PLO and the Israeli government.

mutually beneficial. And if, as in Northern Ireland, one party is negatively dependent and the other positively dependent, the negative wins out because negative feelings are usually reciprocated, and it takes two parties to converse and cooperate.

Evidence regarding positive and negative interdependence can be seen in three psychological experiments. In a laboratory study employing several decompositions of the same prisoner's dilemma game, the author (Pruitt 1967) found that two people cooperated when they were positively interdependent and failed to cooperate when they were negatively interdependent, even though mutual cooperation provided the best outcomes in both conditions. In an earlier experiment, Deutsch (1973) found that positive ("promotive"), in contrast to negative ("contrient"), interdependence produced "more effective communication...more friendliness (and) helpfulness...(and) more coordination of effort" (p. 26). Sherif (Sherif et al. 1961) in his classical boys' camp studies got similar results.

In both the Oslo and South African cases, there was some negative interdependence, in the sense that each had to rely on the other to avoid future attacks. There was also some hostility because of prior attacks. But these elements were minor compared to the large positive interdependence that developed. The distinction between positive and negative interdependence poses a challenge for third parties: how to persuade disputants who are only aware of their negative interdependence that they are also positively interdependent and that the positive outweighs the negative.

Multiple Communication Channels

In all three cases, there were at least two secret communication channels between the parties: in South Africa, the Mells Park and Mandela talks; in Northern Ireland, the Adams and McGuinness chains; and in the Middle East, the Oslo talks and the chain through Ramon and Tibi. Rabin consulted the latter channel to check whether Abu Ala was making authorized concessions and hence whether he was a valid representative of the PLO. Whether intended or not, the dual channels in the other two cases may have had a similar function.

Belief that the opposing negotiator is a valid representative is a third source of optimism. Indeed it is a *sine qua non* because doubts about the counterpart's credentials invalidate the other two sources of optimism—working trust and the existence of a mutually acceptable framework. Such doubts are inevitable when communicating through intermediaries, so multiple channels should often be found in those cases. Such doubts are also likely when dealing with insurgent groups because their governing structures are often opaque.

Decline of the Soviet Union

The decline of the Soviet Union and its withdrawal from foreign adventures in the late 1980s was an important contributor to the South African peace process by reducing government fears that a politically powerful ANC would increase Soviet influence in southern Africa. In Welsh's (2009) words, "The collapse of communism created an opportunity for a much more adventurous approach than had previously been conceivable" (p. 348). The decline of the Soviet Union may also have contributed to the Soviet decision to urge the ANC to enter the proposed negotiation and to the Soviet withdrawal of support from the PLO, which was part of the PLO's reason for seeking negotiation. Readiness theory does not discuss the removal of obstacles to negotiation, but that must surely be an important part of a finished theory of the antecedents of negotiation.

Conclusions

This section will summarize and comment on readiness theory as it emerged from the three case studies and then will evaluate the method that was used to develop the theory and the knowledge status of the theory.

The Theory

Readiness theory is designed to understand the antecedents of a party's decision to propose or enter negotiation to settle an intractable conflict. The theory also applies to entry into exploratory

prenegotiation, though less readiness is needed there. In addition, readiness and its components, along with dozens of other antecedents (see Druckman 1994), encourage concession making.

There are two main antecedents of readiness: motivation to end the conflict or simply “motivation” and optimism about the outcome of negotiation or simply “optimism.” Motivation has four possible antecedents: a perception that the conflict is not being won, perceived cost and risk of the conflict, and third-party pressure to end it. All of these antecedents were found in one or another of our cases along with a few other motives that were specific to a case. Motivation need not be equal on the two sides of a conflict. If unequal, the more motivated party is likely to make larger concessions.

In all three cases, optimism grew during a prenegotiation stage involving secret exploratory communication. In two cases, this was direct, face-to-face communication featuring considerable solidarity and trust, while in the third case, the communication was through a chain of two intermediaries. In all three cases, there also was a second communication channel which probably added to the optimism by confirming the validity of what was said in the first channel.

Despite this evidence, we hesitate to argue that optimism is always built through exploratory communication. There are other sources of optimism such as concessions and knowledge that the conflict is deadlocked or that the other party is experiencing severe costs or risks. But prenegotiation communication is surely a frequent source of optimism.

Another tenet of readiness theory is that fighting can continue during secret exploratory communication, but a ceasefire is prerequisite for formal negotiation. (A ceasefire was declared before negotiation in two of our cases and there was no fighting during either period in the third.) The main reason fighting continues is that disputants are reluctant to give up a unilateral approach unless they can be fairly sure that a bilateral approach is viable. This suggests that many intractable conflicts will only be solved if secret exploratory communication takes place.

Three new additions to readiness theory are put forward: (1) The distinction between positive

and negative interdependence. (2) The distinction between the strength of motivation to end a conflict and the urgency of achieving that goal. Urgency affects the time at which negotiation will begin, a neglected topic in the literature. (3) The hypothesis that a detailed framework is likely to be developed during prenegotiation rather than negotiation when the potential costs of forsaking a unilateral approach are high.

In readiness theory, all concepts are variables, including readiness, motivation, optimism, and perceived risk. There are several implications of building a theory that way. One is that most variables are compensatory: the more you have of one, the less you need of another. This implies that in most realms of inquiry, there are no necessary conditions. If some of the variables that predict negotiation are high, others may be low or even set at zero as in the following examples: in the Oslo case, there was little or no third-party pressure; in the London negotiations that produced the country of Zimbabwe, one of the most important players (Mugabe) thought he was winning the war (Stedman 1991); the Tamil Tigers entered the 2002–2003 negotiations with the Sri Lankan government with zero optimism about the outcome (Schiff 2014). Saying that most variables are compensatory does not mean that all of them are equally important; some may be much more potent than others. Also some of them may interact with others. For example, the cost of a conflict may loom larger in one’s thinking the less chance there is of victory.

A second implication, indeed an advantage, of using variables in building a theory is that it calls attention to stages in the development of conditions. For example, in intractable conflict, there is likely to be little optimism about negotiating a settlement—both sides see the situation as zero-sum. Unless there is unusually high motivation to end the conflict, negotiation cannot start until optimism grows. We have observed two stages in such growth: the development of working trust and the development of a mutually agreed framework. We might have missed this orderly progression had we not treated optimism as a variable.

A third implication and also an advantage of building a theory with variables is that it allows

comparisons between parties, both within and between cases. For example, there is ample reason to believe that at the end of the 1980s, motivation to end the conflict was stronger among most South African government leaders than among most ANC leaders. That explains why the government made much larger concessions than the ANC.

The Method

An in-depth, cumulative case study method was employed in this research. In-depth case studies are useful because they reveal the fine details of what is being studied and hence may uncover phenomena and cause-and-effect relationships that would otherwise be overlooked. The cumulative element means that the same scholar does all the case studies rather than different scholars for each case, which is beneficial because it facilitates searching in one case for phenomena observed in another. Thus, finding that optimism was produced by exploratory communication in Oslo led us to look for this phenomenon in the other two cases, where we found it. Cumulation can also go in the opposite direction, from later to earlier cases, if the analyst keeps his or her earlier source material.

Theoretical assumptions and their associated concepts always guide case studies, helping to separate the wheat from the chaff (George and Bennett 2005). We were explicit about the main assumptions and concepts used in constructing our case studies. We were initially guided by ripeness theory and thereafter by readiness theory. Other analysts, starting with different assumptions about which variables are important, are likely to develop different interpretations of these cases. For example, a specialist in political process would probably identify the various actors on each side of the conflict and examine how they behaved and interacted to produce decisions about the conflict.

At an early point in this research, a colleague in psychology suggested that the sample be broadened to include negative cases that did not

lead to negotiation. That would have been appropriate if comparison between cases had been our main method for inferring cause and effect, as in most psychological research. But the suggestion was rejected since our main method involved process tracing in which social science theory, common sense, and judgments by reliable observers were used to develop hypotheses about the antecedents of important events (see George and Bennett (2005)). Since our aim was to understand what led to negotiation, we did not want to waste time on cases that did not have that outcome.

Status of the Findings

None of the hypotheses presented in this article has been adequately tested, since they are based on only a few cases. But that is not a real problem because our aim is not to persuade but to provoke—not to present a convincing body of theory but rather a plausible set of hypotheses that may be useful for understanding other cases or tested with larger data sets. Some of these hypotheses, tentative as they are, may also be helpful additions to practitioner tool bags. For example, in our cases, two communication channels were needed for the full development of optimism about the outcome of negotiation. Knowing this, a mediator might encourage the creation of a second channel when a party has doubts about the credibility of messages coming over the existing channel.

At this point, there is no way of knowing how far to generalize the hypotheses presented here. Do they apply only to the cases from which they were derived or can they be extended to other cases? And if so, what kinds of cases? This is the eternal problem of external validity—of the boundaries beyond which an effect is not found and the variables that determine the location of these boundaries. One hypothesis about boundaries was already mentioned when it was suggested that warm face-to-face meetings of the kind seen in Oslo and South Africa but not in Northern Ireland occur when there is positive interdependence. Other hypotheses about boundary conditions can be derived from some of our

explanations of the observed effects; for example, exploratory communication is likely to be secret when there are high costs of abandoning a unilateral approach.

The field of conflict studies is mainly in a theory-generating phase, and much more research is needed before most generalizations are set in stone.

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Why Is Mediation So Hard? The Case of Syria

11

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Introduction

Over the past 60 years, mediation has become an accepted, almost commonplace response to addressing violent interstate or intrastate conflict, particularly after the end of the Cold War when many civil and regional disputes landed on the negotiation table.¹ Along with the rise in the practice of mediation, there has been an increase in the literature, capturing lessons learned and prescribing best practice for acting as a facilitator or mediator, often in civil wars and other internal conflicts.² However, studies that show there is often a renewal of violence within 5 years of a negotiated agreement suggest that there is still much to be learned about effective mediation (Call 2012; Fortna 2004; Hartzell 2009; Walter 2004).

One of the difficulties of mediating conflict arises from the constantly shifting landscapes in

which mediation takes place. This chapter will examine two phases of third-party-assisted peacemaking in the Syrian conflict because they highlight three serious challenges to mediation. One challenge relates to the international environment and the external forces that support or undermine a nascent peace process. Another challenge arises from the nature of current conflicts and the complications associated with problems of legitimacy, state capacity, perception, and the internationalization of civil/regional conflicts. These two challenges are not new to students and observers of mediation. The third challenge has been studied less thoroughly and relates to the supply side of the equation, i.e., the number, quality, and coherence of institutions willing to undertake a mediation effort. This last challenge is generally exogenous to the conflict itself, but can have a profound impact on the trajectory and outcome of any peace process. This chapter will analyze these three challenges and examine how they affected the attempts to bring parties to the Syrian conflict to the negotiating table from March 2012 through December 2013.³ It concludes with the argument that addressing the supply challenge through the effective coordination of different mediating bodies delivers a key component of a mediation effort. However, as the Syrian case points out, this coordination—even if

¹ One dataset estimates that between the end of World War II and 1995, there have been over 1,900 international mediation attempts (Bercovitch 1999).

² The literature ranges from the scholarly (see for instance the many books by I. William Zartman, Jacob Bercovitch, and others) to practitioner oriented (i.e., the publications by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the European Centre for Policy Development Management).

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³ These three mediation challenges are elaborated upon in Crocker et al. 2015.

it brings together the most powerful nations—does not guarantee a successful outcome to the process.

Challenges to Mediation⁴

Many analytical studies of mediation have focused on the how, why, whether, and when of mediation. In so doing, these studies examine substantive factors (the nature and dynamics of the conflict), agency factors (the parties and their relationships, the identity and characteristics of the third party), and procedural factors (the design of the mediation process, its timing, and how the mediator and parties go forward with the process) (Mandell and Tomlin 1991). These are critical elements of any mediation, but other less-recognized factors that affect the demand for and supply of mediation are also important to the success or failure of mediation efforts. On the demand side, the countries and societies in conflict as well as neighboring countries and others with interest in the outcome form the major component of the equation. We suggest that the context, especially the type of conflict, is a strong influence on this demand. The third-party institutions and individuals involved in peacemaking form the supply side of the equation. Most discussion about the supply side focuses on whether or not there will be an outside effort to resolve the issues. But it is equally critical to look at issues of mediator readiness—to examine whether the mediation effort is properly staffed and sustained so that the supply side can meet the demand. Both supply and demand are further influenced by the international environment surrounding the mediation effort. This environment may serve to support or to block the process. Focusing on these contextual issues about supply, demand, and the environment can help us understand better the dynamics of mediation.

Context on the Demand Side: A Typology of Conflicts Before the end of the Cold War, most mediation efforts targeted interstate conflicts (see Crocker 1999; Solomon 1999, for two examples).

Mediation in today's world, however, has to engage with many different types of conflict that occur within the borders of a given state as well between states. Each type of conflict brings its own obstacles and opportunities, making it difficult for mediators to apply lessons from one conflict type to another. While every conflict is different, most can be assigned to one of four different varieties: conflicts over legitimacy, conflicts arising from weak states, existential conflicts, and interstate conflicts.

- *Conflicts over Legitimacy.* This is an emergent—or more accurately, reemergent—type of conflict, and its future shape and scope are only dimly visible today. Writing in 2005, Zbigniew Brzezinski foresaw that “the central challenge of our time is posed not by global terrorism, but rather by the intensifying turbulence caused by the phenomenon of *global political awakening*” (Brzezinski 2005, p. 40). This scenario foresaw that the world's somnolent would rise into political awareness and demand change in the relation between rulers and the ruled. While these conflicts focus on legitimacy issues within a state or society, they also carry the risk of spillover and regional contagion, including for third-party institutions that try to help smooth the transition or support the government in place. Unless handled skillfully, this type of conflict risks drawing them in on behalf of contending sides, creating a fresh layer of polarization.
- *Conflicts Arising from Weak States.* A second, more familiar category of conflict results from state fragility or failure leading to political collapse, a vacuum of authority, and humanitarian crisis. Such scenarios emerged with a vengeance after the Cold War ended and bipolarity came to a sudden end. Numerous factors contribute to the weak state phenomenon such as the spread of criminal networks that undermine legitimate state authority, trade in arms and looted commodities, economic stagnation, the politics of greed and corruption that hollow out state institutions, the manipulation of sectarian and ethnic diversity by political entrepreneurs, and simply chronically bad political leadership. As a result, state weakness takes many forms and can descend into

⁴This section draws on Crocker et al. 2015.

conflict along several pathways, some of which are more threatening to international order and the interests of major powers than others (Patrick 2011). A major share of such conflicts are recurrent cases where peace agreements break down (e.g., the DRC and Sudan) and intractable cases where peace efforts fail to get at the underlying sources of violent strife (e.g., the Naxalite conflict in India, Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand, or the Tuareg rebellions affecting Mali and Niger).

- *Existential Conflicts.* A third category of conflicts revolve around the perception of existential threats—in other words, threats to the existence or viability of one group due to the actions or attitudes of another group or groups. Because of the perceived zero-sum nature of the dispute, these conflicts often become intractable. A substantial portion of the most intractable cases derives from the circumstances and decisions made when things fell apart after major wars and imperial decline. Kashmir, Cyprus, the Balkan wars, the Korean peninsula, the Armenian-Azerbaijan dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, and even the Israeli-Palestinian case all contain a variant of this group of what could be called imperial legacy conflicts. Such cases are impacted in the political rivalries of successor or neighboring states, captive to forces larger than the immediate territorial confines of the contested land (Bose 2007). While regional organizations may be the most likely candidates to try to mediate these conflicts, they are also likely to mirror such divisions which more often than not make mediating these conflicts difficult.
- *Interstate Conflict.* A fourth type of case is armed confrontation and outright conflict between great powers and/or rival regional powers or interstate conflicts that result from the expansion of internal conflicts. While various schools of thought come to distinctly different conclusions about the emerging international system and the relationships among its most powerful states, the possibility remains that major state rivalry, structural tests of strength, or sheer miscalculation could trigger outbreaks of interstate war as disputes

escalate or spill across borders. The internationalization of conflict—especially regional interstate conflict growing out of regional disputes (India-Pakistan) or cross-border warfare (Democratic Republic of Congo-Rwanda, Syria-Lebanon)—may also be the consequence of the first three categories.

It is not the case that current conflicts are more complex than conflicts of yesteryear, but there have been changes that increase the destabilizing potential of current conflicts. These include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the capacity for mass mobilization, modern communications such as the Internet and social media, and the identity-based, zero-sum nature of current conflicts which erase shared interests among diverse communities and spread easily across borders. While a number of studies have shown a decrease in conflict and conflict-related fatalities, those conflicts that remain are hardened in ways that make them difficult for the conflict parties to resolve and resistant to outside engagement (on the decrease in violence, see Human Security Report Project 2011; Hewitt et al. 2012; Themnér and Wallensteen 2013; on intractability see Crocker et al. 2004; Bar-Tal 2001). The context of these intractable conflicts complicates a mediation process. In addition, current mediators may have to deal with several different types of conflict simultaneously. For instance, mediators engaged in peacemaking in Mali are working in a conflict environment which overlaps several categories—Mali is a weak state embroiled in a conflict over legitimacy and identity, with serious international spillover effects.

Understanding the Context of the Supply Side: Not Enough Mediators or Not Enough Readiness An important post-Cold War trend has been the broadening of the conflict management field to include many different players (Crocker et al. 2003). While governments/states and intergovernmental organizations remain centrally important in conflict and conflict management, they increasingly have to share their roles with a growing list of others, both within their own societies and within the so-called international community. Conflict has become

more distributed, but conflict management has become distributed as well. However, effective mediation in this distributed environment is not easy. For a number of years, there has been a growing awareness of the problems posed by too many mediators—opportunities for forum shopping by the conflict parties, lack of coordination among mediating institutions, difficulties in establishing leadership and creating momentum in a mediation process, and opportunities for preventing or resolving disputes lost because of differing agendas among the institutions sponsoring the mediation efforts.

Equally serious is the possibility that no one with the requisite tools and resources steps up to the plate and takes full responsibility for a mediation process. This might happen when significant powers prefer to “outsource” mediation to international or regional organizations without giving them the authority, backing, or resources to be effective. The paralysis also affects intergovernmental organizations, such as the UN and the OSCE, when they are hampered by membership debates over the best course of action—including whether or not to engage at all. Prolonged engagement is also a challenge to NGOs, which may be reluctant to start a process that they cannot sustain or withdraw from an ongoing process because they lack the resources to continue.

Mediator readiness is not just a numbers game. There are three levels of readiness—strategic, institutional, and personal readiness. Strategic readiness occurs at the political, social, economic, or strategic level surrounding the conflict and refers to the alignment of the strategic interests of the key third parties with the mediation process. Institutional readiness occurs within the institution that is sponsoring the mediation. Personal readiness refers to the personal characteristics, preparation, and accomplishments of the mediator. That the mediator is the right person for the job is of course essential. However, equally important are the support of the mediator’s institution, the robustness of the mandate, and the leverage that the mediator can bring to the effort, either through his or her own resources or through borrowing leverage from powerful backers (Crocker et al. 2003).

Impact of the International Environment The international environment provides an important backdrop to any effort to resolve conflict, whether it is an interstate or intrastate conflict. The principal challenge that the current international environment poses for mediation is its changing nature. The state of the world has been called many names—the post-Cold War era, the post 9/11 era, a G-zero world (in which no country dominates the global agenda), the age of terrorism, the rise of the rest, and the Pacific century (Bremmer and Gordon 2011). These labels do not fully describe the world we live in. They do, however, point to a common denominator—the global order is breaking apart, national sovereignty is changing, boundary lines are more fluid, new norms are forming, and old norms are weakening. A systemic transformation is occurring. Some regions are on the rise, some are in decline, and some are simply in open revolt.

A new order has not yet materialized. In fact, with the emergence of new actors representing different institutions and using new approaches and methodologies, there is a diffusion of agency, authority, and action that will make a new global order unlikely to materialize soon. While rapid changes in the international environment can sometimes provide unexpected opportunities for conflict management engagement, they more often are destabilizing—it is hard to put together coalitions, develop cohesive pressure to urge parties to rethink their positions, and offer real alternatives. In these circumstances, mediators sometimes expend more energy on developing outside support for a process than they do on the process itself. When the international system itself is in transition, international interest in any particular conflict goes down.

Mediation Efforts in the Syrian Civil War: Changing Challenges and Mixed Successes

In order to examine how the different characteristics of conflict, the uncertainty in the readiness and influence of mediators, and the impact of international politics affected mediation efforts in

the Syrian Civil War, this chapter looks at two phases of the mediation process. The first is from the beginning of the uprisings in Syria (roughly March 2011) through former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's appointment in February 2012 as Joint Special Envoy for the United Nations and the Arab League and his subsequent resignation (August 2012). The second period (August 2012 to December 2013) covers the lead-up to January 2014 Geneva negotiations between the Syrian government and the rebel groups. Annan's mediation effort came at an early phase in the conflict, a fact which should have boded well for his chance of success (Regan and Stam 2000; Bercovitch and DeRouen 2005). However, despite extensive negotiations with the parties and the international community, Annan's six-point peace plan (SPPP) ultimately failed to gain any traction, and Annan resigned in frustration in August 2012. Lakhdar Brahimi, former Algerian foreign minister and special advisor to the UN Secretary-General since 2004, took over as Joint Special Envoy in the same month. A year and a half later, his efforts resulted in peace talks between the Syrian government and rebel groups. Examining these two mediation periods allows us to examine how the challenges associated with the nature of the conflict, capacity of the mediators, and impact of the international environment helped to cause one mediation effort to fail to get off the ground (the Annan plan) and helped the other to at least lead to direct face-to-face meetings of the conflict parties (Geneva II).

A Summary of the Syrian Conflict

The conflict in Syria has deep roots in history, but the current phase dates back to March 2011 when activists, echoing other popular uprisings across the Arab world, called for a "Day of Rage" against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. The popular protests met with a strong repressive reaction from the government. Fighting grew over the year, although it remained relatively one-sided, as most violence was committed by the government or pro-Assad paramilitaries through this period.

International reaction to the violence was relatively swift. On August 18, 2011, the United States, Britain, France, and Germany and the European Union demanded Assad's resignation. Two months later, the United States withdrew its ambassador from Syria over security concerns. In November, the Arab League voted to suspend Syria's membership, approved sanctions against Syria, and in December deployed an observer mission to the country. Joining with the UN, it appointed Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General, as joint envoy to the Syrian conflict. It also supported the draft UN Resolution on Syria, calling on all parties to cease violence. The UN draft resolution was months in the making and the result of painstaking, behind-the-scene negotiations. Though the draft resolution did not call for immediate sanctions, it laid out some clear markers for Assad's embattled regime to change its ways with harsh measures to follow if it did not. In all, nine countries voted for it. Brazil, India, Lebanon, and South Africa abstained. The Americans, French, and the British thought they had finally secured the support of Russia and China in the careful wording of the resolution. However, Russia and China vetoed the resolution (United Nations Security Council 2012b).

In the wake of the failure of the UN resolution, an ad hoc body came into being, organized by the French government. Some 60 countries, under the mantle of the Friends of Syria, attended a meeting of foreign ministers and representatives of international organizations in Tunis in late February 2012 in a bid to raise the pressure on Syria's al-Assad's regime. The Tunis communiqué called on the Syria government "to cease all violence" and to allow free and unimpeded access by the UN and humanitarian agencies (Group of Friends of the Syrian People 2012). It also demanded that the regime "permit humanitarian agencies to deliver vital relief goods and services to civilians affected by the violence." In addition to enforcing current sanctions, the Friends agreed to introduce new ones, including travel bans, asset freezes, ceasing oil purchases, reducing diplomatic ties by closing embassies, and preventing the shipment of arms. The Syrian National Council (SNC) also got the nod to serve

as “a legitimate representative of Syrians seeking peaceful democratic change (Group of Friends of the Syrian People 2012).”

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was appointed special envoy for Syria by the UN and Arab League on the eve of the Tunis meeting. In mid-March, Annan tabled a six-point peace plan (SPPP) calling for a ceasefire, the start of a political process, military disengagement, humanitarian relief to civilians, release of political prisoners, and restoration of civil rights. When it appeared initially that the Syrian government might cooperate with Annan, an unarmed UN monitoring mission was inserted on the ground.

These efforts to pressure Assad and build up Syria’s opposition, however, were not strong enough to stop the killing. A last ditch effort to back the Annan effort came in the “Geneva I” communiqué adopted June 30, 2012. Signatories identified themselves as the Action Group for Syria and included top UN-Arab League and EU officials as well as the foreign ministers of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar. A final resolution laid out a full-fledged program of transition elements, but its main thrust was to condemn “the continued and escalating killing, destruction and human rights abuse” and to call for launching “a Syrian-led political process leading to a transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people ...” (Action Group for Syria 2012). However, the convincing threat or show of force necessary to persuade the conflict parties that the international community was serious was lacking. In July the stakes of an international intervention became higher as the government of Syria threatened to unleash chemical and biological weapons if the country was invaded. (This was the government’s first acknowledgement that it possessed weapons of mass destruction.) In the face of these circumstances in August 2012, Kofi Annan announced his resignation as UN-Arab League envoy to Syria, citing official noncooperation, mounting opposition military action, and the lack of consensus in the UN Security Council (Martin 2012). Lakhdar Brahimi, another seasoned UN

mediator, took over the position shortly after Annan resigned.

The year following Annan’s resignation and Brahimi’s assumption of envoy responsibilities saw a continuation of violence with a terrifying escalation. In April 2013, the White House reported that US intelligence indicated Assad had twice used chemical weapons in his country’s civil war, but said the evidence was not sufficient to justify US involvement in the conflict. The situation in Syria deteriorated into a full-fledged civil war. By June 2013, it was reported that almost 100,000 people had died in the conflict (Price et al. 2013; Solomon 2013). By this time, the war had also been internationalized: violence had spilled over into sectarian clashes in Lebanon, and Hezbollah had begun combat operations in support of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). Similarly, Syria’s turmoil had begun to affect stability next door in Iraq, fueling sectarian struggles there which, in turn, affected the balance of forces in eastern Syria. These events were capped by chilling reports of the August sarin gas attack in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta, killing as many as 1,400 people.

This was a wholly different environment for any would-be mediators than a year earlier. All the belligerent parties had paid a substantial price in blood and treasure at this point, and the conflict had become more severe, as fighting took on a dark sectarian tone between August 2012 (when Annan resigned) and the Ghouta gas attack in August 2013. It was in this time period that Hezbollah entered the fray and groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) multiplied and began portraying the conflict as a zero-sum religious war. Ghouta was perhaps the climax of this trend: it appears to have been the single biggest loss of life during the war so far and was symptomatic of the changing nature of the conflict. Simply put, by the summer of 2013, the war was far bloodier, it involved a larger, more diverse range of actors, many of which had (and have) incompatible interests, and the belligerents were increasingly seeing the conflict in zero-sum terms. This meant that the conflict

	Difficulties	Opportunities
Annan Peace Plan (SPPP) February – August 2012	<p>Lack of support for the single mediator</p> <p>Weak Syrian state may have reduced incentives to negotiate, increased incentives to fight</p>	<p>Conflict still relatively low-intensity</p> <p>No competition among mediators</p> <p>Relative cohesion among Western camp (Friends of Syria)</p>
Toward Geneva II August 2012- December 2013	<p>Increased number of participants in the war</p> <p>Increased sectarianism/existential element to war</p> <p>Heightened polarization among states on periphery of conflict</p>	<p>Heightened interest among major powers to promote negotiation and UN-led mediation</p>

Fig. 11.1 Difficulties and opportunities in the two Syrian mediation efforts

agenda had expanded (both thematically and geographically) while the range of potentially acceptable bargains that a mediator might be able to identify had shrunk.

In an attempt to restart a peace process, a number of governments agreed in principle to holding another conference in Geneva with the express goal of fashioning some sort of peace settlement. This was the genesis of what came to be called the Geneva II conference. Unlike the SPPP, the drive for a Geneva II conference produced the first face-to-face talks among the Syrian parties. While the SPPP suffered from the lack of serious engagement in support of the mediation, the Geneva II process benefited from serious efforts by the United States and Russia to attempt to manage the violence in Syria in the wake of US-Russian coordination in addressing the challenge of Syria’s chemical weapons. While the Geneva II process produced little tangible result, they did bring the conflict parties together for talks, a significant step in a negotiating process. The chart in Fig. 11.1 summarizes the difficulties and

opportunities present in the two mediation efforts as of December 2013.⁵

Challenges from the Conflict Characteristics: The Demand Side

The Syrian Civil War has attributes of all four conflict types that can make mediation difficult. It is a conflict arising from legitimacy disputes, state weakness, existential threats, and complicating international involvement.

Legitimacy At its foundation, the Syrian Civil War was a product of 100 years of exclusivist rule and contested political legitimacy as well as the influence of the Arab Spring. Bashar al-Assad

⁵It is important to note here that the second process also failed and came to an end with Brahimi’s resignation in May 2014, which occurred for many of the same reasons that led to Annan’s resignation. However, this analysis reflects the state of play at the time of writing and confines its focus to the period of February 2012—December 2013. The authors feel that their conclusions remain relevant despite shifts in the Syrian conflict and the international response to it

inherited the Syrian presidency from his father Hafez al-Assad, who ruled Syria from 1970 until his death in 2000. From 1963 to when the senior Assad took power in Damascus, Syria was ruled by the Ba'ath Party. Before Ba'ath rule there were a series of regimes, all of which ruled on behalf of an urban landowning elite at the expense of the country's poorer Sunni majority. Despite some populist overtures early in Hafez al-Assad's presidency, the pattern of Syria's rulers governing with the support of a narrow coalition continued since 1970.

Another legitimacy-related factor affected the mediation environment, as a result of international pressure to oust al-Assad. By the summer of 2012, four authoritarian Arab regimes had fallen to popular uprisings during the previous 18 months. Among Western news outlets there was a sense that Assad's demise was inevitable and a natural continuation of the broader Arab Spring phenomenon (for examples, see Fletcher 2011; Hoagland 2011; Rifkind 2012; Taheri 2012). More importantly, a number of regional governments and the United States signaled that they considered the Assad regime not valid and ultimately doomed. As early as July 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the Assad government had "lost legitimacy" and that the United States was seeking "a democratic transition" in Syria, while a White House official bluntly claimed "the Assad ship is sinking" (Ignatius 2011). President Obama followed up a month later, on August 18, 2011, in a press statement that declared "the time has come for President Assad to step aside."

Key NATO allies took a similar position, and former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, speaking in August 2012 at the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Tehran, declared "Our solidarity with the struggle of Syrians against an oppressive regime that has lost its legitimacy is an ethical duty and a political and strategic necessity" (Hider and Coghlan 2012). The conflict, rather than a typical insurgency, had become a brutal, multi-sided struggle over patches of turf at the expense of their inhabitants and a complex battle over competing claims of legitimacy. However, by underscoring the lack of legitimacy of the Syrian government, the international com-

munity effectively delegitimized it as a negotiating side, complicating both Annan's and Brahimi's efforts to bring the parties together.

State Weakness In 2011, Syria displayed many of the hallmarks of a weak and failing state. While the state security apparatus was exceptionally strong, and political opposition was highly regulated (to the point where there was no effective opposition in Syria), this apparent control was built on a weak foundation. Since the beginning of Ba'ath Party rule in 1963, the Syrian economy had been dominated by the government, in a system that has been characterized as "state capitalism" or "etatism" (Perthes 1997; Hinnebusch 2001). This meant that the public sector accounted for the vast majority of capital formation in the economy and provided the lion's share of jobs. Given its political backing, it often succumbed to inefficient practices (such as marking up the price of manufactured goods and putting the cost on the consumer) and wholesale corruption, with a handful of politically connected families owning vast swaths of the economy (Shadid 2011). While the large public sector and heavily subsidized consumer staples meant that relatively few Syrians lived in poverty before the war, the corruption, nepotism, and inefficiency of the Syrian economy also offered very few opportunities for upward economic mobility.

Existential Threats The Syrian conflict also assumed an existential quality on both a personal and a group basis. On the personal side, there was compelling evidence that Assad's very existence was threatened. The Arab Spring has not been kind to rulers it has deposed. Hosni Mubarak was tried for corruption and abuse of power and was literally displayed before Egypt in a cage. Nevertheless, he fared better than Muammar Gaddafi, who died an ignoble death in the streets of Sirte. If al-Assad believed his only option was to stand and fight, then his conclusion was understandable.

On a group basis, perceived existential threats also loomed large. For example, the massacre of as many as 190 civilians in Latakia in August

2013 by rebel forces was accompanied by graffiti calling for death to Syria's Alawites. Rebels also deliberately destroyed an Alawite shrine and allegedly executed an Alawite *imam* (Human Rights Watch 2013b). Some Alawites explained their support for the Assad regime as a function of the fact that they believe Syria's opposition forces, if given the opportunity "will kill me for simply being an Alawite" (Hersh 2013). More moderate elements of Syria's opposition may also have succumbed to extreme, absolutist views that put the possibility of a negotiated peace further out of reach.⁶ The Syrian government's use of sarin gas in Ghouta also reinforced the sense among Syria's opposition that they were in a life-and-death struggle (Habboush 2013; Bayoumy 2013).

Interstate Dimensions Finally, there were significant interstate rivalries that drove the violence in Syria. These rivalries—notably between Iran and Saudi Arabia—predated the civil war. The Iranian-Saudi rivalry has numerous roots, including religious (Shi'ite-Sunni) and political (republican-monarchist) differences, as well as the desire of both countries to ensure their long-term security by supporting friendly regimes in the Middle East (Fürtig 2002). However, once the die was cast in 2012, the war in Syria created an opportunity for Saudi Arabia to weaken Iran by unseating a regime allied to Tehran and posed a major challenge to Iran which had supported the Assad government for years. Consequentially, both countries (along with others) funneled money, weapons, and fighters into Syria. These rivals posed the risk of becoming spoilers who could block a mediation effort from beginning in

the first place and would likely add their own issues to an already complex negotiating agenda.

Syria also shares a neighborhood with a host of fragile countries, which further exacerbates the conflict. Lebanon's politics had been dominated by sectarian conflict for years, reducing the legitimacy and effectiveness of many government institutions. Political parties, with membership along religious lines, moved into that vacuum, and they often had their own armed organizations to provide security, rather than exclusively relying on the national police or armed forces. Syria's de facto military occupation and control of Lebanese politics ended in 2005 after nearly 30 years, but Syrian influence continued, and the Syrian Civil War began to spill directly into Lebanon (McDonnell 2013a, b). Compounding the difficulties in Syria was another neighboring civil war, along the same sectarian lines as Syria's, began gestating in Iraq beginning in mid-2012. While around 110 Iraqi civilians were killed per month by political violence in 2011 and 2012, this number jumped to more than 250 per month for the first half of 2013, according to government of Iraq statistics (O'Hanlon and Livingston 2013). The porous Syrian-Iraq border made it relatively easy for Sunni, Shi'ite, and Kurdish fighters to pass back and forth between the two countries, particularly when national attention was focused on the deteriorating situation in Iraq's heartland.

Challenges Posed By the Characteristics of the Mediation: The Supply Side

In addition to challenges brought about because of the nature of the conflict, the Syrian mediation also experienced the challenge of profound disagreements between the two most powerful external actors. In the first year and a half of the Syrian Civil War, the United States stuck to the strategy of getting a firm UN Security Council resolution that would open the door for more muscular action, and Russia continued to block that approach. In these circumstances, Annan's mediation effort was certain to run into a brick

⁶In an infamous video recorded in May 2013, a commander from the Farouk Brigade carved the heart and liver from a dead pro-Assad fighter, and then declared to the camera, "I swear to God, soldiers of Bashar [al-Assad], you dogs—we will eat your heart and livers!...Oh my heroes of Baba Amr [Homs], you slaughter the Alawites and take their hearts out to eat them!" (Human Rights Watch 2013a).

wall. While Annan was highly respected, he could not bridge by himself the animosity and distrust that separated the two (or more) Syrian sides and a divided international community.

Before discussing why the first phase of mediation failed, it is important to recognize that there were at least some reasons to believe that mediation efforts had a chance of succeeding. First, as noted earlier, Annan's timing was good. In March 2012, when Annan took the job of special envoy, approximately 8,000 people had been killed in the uprising (UN News Service 2012; Russel and Bhatti 2012). While not an insignificant number, mediation attempts in violent conflicts are more likely to succeed the lower the casualty rates are (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006). There is also some evidence that diplomatic interventions in civil wars tend to help shorten the conflicts if the intervention happens relatively early on—after the phase where both parties are confident they can win, but before attitudes have hardened too much (Regan and Aydin 2006).

Second, the violence was still largely one-sided, and at that point the Syrian opposition had not been infiltrated by radical Islamists. In essence, the conflict was, similar to the other Arab Spring uprisings. While it was much more violent than Tunisia or Egypt, the basic issue was the perception among a broad part of Syrian society that the government was illegitimate and needed to either reform itself or step down. While it was a serious crisis, it was not yet a full-fledged, existential war, and the interests and identities of the two principal sides did not appear to be fundamentally incompatible.

Finally, and most importantly, Kofi Annan was a veteran, high-status mediator with the standing to actively mediate between the Assad regime and the opposition. The Annan effort appeared to exhibit many of the attributes and characteristics that make for a successful mediator, including institutional backing and resources, ample experience, a global profile, and broad legitimacy (conferred by both the Arab League and from his stature as a former UN SG) (Crocker et al. 2003; Bercovitch and Gartner 2006). In principle, Annan also had the backing of the Security Council. United Nations Security Council

Resolution 2042, passed in April 2012, called for a ceasefire in Syria and for the implementation of Annan's six-point peace plan.

However, while Annan had some leverage over the parties and their international backers, he had few hard power resources at his disposal. Annan's plan called for the government of Syria to withdraw its troops from—and stop the use of heavy weapons in—major population centers, and for a similar halt in violence from the armed opposition, without any way to enforce respect for these objectives and to demand a ceasefire. To the parties, the situation remained similar to a prisoner's dilemma.⁷ If both sides were confident that they could win advantages by continuing to fight (i.e., not to cooperate and to eschew negotiation), they would continue to do so. Options to coerce the Syrian government into abiding by the Annan plan via a Security Council-sponsored threat of action under Chapter VII (use of force or severe sanctions) were out of the question in light of Russia's persistent and firm opposition (Dejevsky 2011). Russia justified its continued support for Damascus by drawing on international legal principle and the presumed legitimacy of the Assad government and insisted that the conflict be settled by Syria's warring factions. In July 2012, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed, "we will accept any decision by the Syrian people on who will govern Syria, as long as it comes from the Syrians themselves" (RIA Novosti 2012b). China quietly deferred to the Russian lead.⁸

⁷During the spring of 2012, there were reasons for both the Assad government and the opposition to believe that momentum was on their side: the Syrian government still had a clear advantage in terms of armed force, while the opposition had the Libyan example, which offered the hope of an armed intervention by one or more outside actors. This created a situation where negotiating was not necessarily the most attractive option, since each side could hold out hope that by continuing to fight, the scales would tip in their favor. So while the government or the opposition may have tentatively agreed to participate in a mediation process, each side still had an incentive to defect from the mediation process and continue to fight.

⁸Russia's refusal to help tip the scales in favor of the Syrian opposition was compounded by the opposition's own hard-line position in summer 2012. As the Annan plan floundered, the Syrian National Council (SNC) made

European diplomacy was largely absent, according to some, because of lowest common denominator policymaking and free-riding by some of the organization's members. As Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja put it, EU members "use the EU when it suits them," but otherwise set their foreign policies independently (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2012).⁹ The one critical exception to the lack of European movement on the issue was France's spearheading of the "Friends of Syria Group" initiative.

it clear that "no dialogue with the ruling regime is possible. We can only discuss how to move on to a different political system" (Agence France-Presse 2012a). Instead, the SNC endorsed the Arab League's plan which called for Assad to relinquish power to a transitional government (RIA Novosti 2012a; United Nations Security Council 2012a). The SNC also refused to entertain the notion of Assad stepping down in return for immunity from prosecution, since "he has his hands stained with the blood of Syrians" (Interfax 2012). In June 2012, the National Coalition also called for "a resolution under Chapter VII, which allows for the use of all legitimate means, coercive means, embargo on arms, as well as the use of force to oblige the regime to comply" (Agence France-Presse 2012d). The SNC was also vocal in rejecting the Action Group's June 30 Geneva communiqué, including its reiteration of support for Kofi Annan's SPPP. Since the Geneva communiqué did not explicitly exclude Assad or members of the Ba'ath regime from participating in the proposed transitional process or any postwar government, the SNC criticized it as ambiguous, while Haitham al-Maleh, a prominent regime critic, described the agreement as a "farce" (Karam 2012). Finally, the SNC rejected any possibility of a regime figure leading the transitional government (Agence France-Presse 2012c).

⁹Former Belgian PM and European Parliamentarian Guy Verhofstadt was particularly pointed in his criticism of EU policy in 2011, when he remarked that EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Catherine Ashton, would rely on the opinions of all 27 EU foreign ministers, rather than decisively leading on policy matters (De Redactie 2011). In the face of these criticisms, it is important to note that EU diplomacy and policy was at least consistent. This policy rested on two planks: first, economic sanctions on Syria and, second, the repeated insistence that all parties halt the violence in Syria and begin fashioning a negotiated transition to a new government. What the EU could (or would) offer to bring about a cessation in violence was never broached. A common refrain from the EU throughout 2012 was that the EU has been ready to provide support to any peace initiative, once it begins (Ashton 2012). However, throughout this period there was no peace process for the EU to support or facilitate.

The Friends of Syria initiative was a regionally inspired, collective response to the deadlock in the UN Security Council over Syria. It was initiated by France following the February 2012 veto by Russia and China of Chapter VII action on Syria. It also reflected the birth of a nascent collective conflict management initiative to increase collective pressure on al-Assad and work around UN while it was deadlocked.

The Friends of Syria, which could have easily confused the process by introducing too many mediators, instead helped attenuate some of the challenge posed by the fractious international context. First, it provided a focal point around which Western and Arab governments could coordinate their policies. Second, it acted as a forum where Western and Arab governments could directly work with their counterparts in the Syrian opposition. Importantly, this was reflected in efforts by Western governments to convince the opposition to attend the Geneva II conference.

Positive as it was, the Friends of Syria initiative did not succeed in unifying the opposition and reducing the number of factions and players involved in the conflict. In November 2012, moderate Islamist rebels initially rejected the Friends of Syria's recognition of the National Coalition as foreign meddling in Syrian affairs and asked for a larger role for Islamist groups in the National Coalition (Agence France-Presse 2012b; Atassi 2012). A year later, Islamist rebels formed an alliance known as the Islamic Front, which worked independently of the National Coalition (Atassi 2013; Surk and Hadid 2013). Again, the Islamist groups criticized the National Coalition as a foreign-sponsored entity that did not represent the will and interest of the majority of Syrians (Atassi 2013). Thus, while the Friends of Syria project helped to unify a number of national governments behind the Syrian National Coalition, and thus reduce the risk of Western and Arab governments working at cross purposes, the very act of endorsing one opposition group as the official and legitimate representative of the Syrian people gave other Syrian groups the opportunity to paint themselves as more authentically Syrian than the National Coalition.

In sum, the Friends of Syria may have strengthened some elements of the Islamist wing of the rebellion, but it also strengthened the mediation process by bringing some cohesiveness to the Western and moderate Syrian camp. The determination of key actors to support the mediation process received a much stronger boost by the Syrian war's intensification and by the cooperation between the United States and the Russians on dealing with Syria's chemical weapons. As Antony Blinken, President Obama's Deputy National Security Advisor, explained, the extremist trend in Syria has "begun to concentrate the minds of critical actors outside Syria" (Groll 2013). While the United States and Russia may not have agreed on a positive vision of what the future of Syria should look like or on how to get to that goal, they shared a common interest in preventing Syria from fragmenting into pieces or becoming a fully failed state ruled by local warlords and religious extremists. Neither country would benefit from a repeat of what happened in Afghanistan in the 1990s. This realization allowed Washington and Moscow to agree to explore the possibility of a mediated round of negotiations, and both implicitly accepted the fact that the Assad government would be part of that process.¹⁰ With this change,

¹⁰This same logic helped drive US Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to broker the deal with the Syrian government to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and destroy its chemical weapons arsenal under the supervision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). While the Ghouta attacks forced the White House to react, given President Obama's earlier vows that the use of chemical weapons would constitute a "red line" that would prompt American action, the Ghouta attack also brought greater coherence to the international environment by focusing the United States and Russia on a common point of concern.

The tripartite deal to have Syria eliminate its chemical weapons was a compromise that worked for three principal reasons. First, there were only four parties involved: the Syrian government, the US, Russia, and the OPCW. The fractious international environment that was making mediating an end to the war difficult simply did not apply for the chemical weapons issue. The Syrian opposition, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, Hezbollah, and the like could all be bypassed and did not need to be consulted. This meant, secondly, that the dynamics of the

several roadblocks that had hampered the Annan mediation were removed.

Challenges from the International Environment: The Context

Some of the factors that contributed to the challenge of mediating a solution to the Syrian Civil War have been constant throughout the course of the conflict. The post-Cold War world was marked by the lack of a single (or small group) country that can dominate and unilaterally shape international politics. While the United States remained the world's predominant military, economic, and political power, it could not dictate political outcomes on its own (Hampson and Heinbecker 2013). There was much political "room" for others—including non-state actors—to help shape world politics. In the Syrian case, this meant that the Syrian Civil War was neither a straightforward ethnic Civil War nor a simple proxy war between ideological adversaries. It was both of those things and more and involved a broad array of diverse actors, ranging from the US to tribal militias.

This fractious international environment made mediation success in Syria elusive for two chief reasons. While there was a large discrepancy in the material, economic, and political power among the countries that backed various Syrian factions, some countries were more committed to their interests in the conflict than others and were able to shape disproportionately the course of the war. For instance, French and American reluctance to engage militarily created opportunities for Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Saudi and Qatari

conflict—namely, the sectarian nature and Assad's lack of legitimacy—did not matter. Instead, there was a severe disagreement between the United States and Syria about whether Syria would be allowed to use chemical weapons. This was not an existential disagreement, but a political one. This opened up the range of mutually acceptable potential solutions. Finally, there was no lack of mediators in this case. Since both Russia and the United States had a clear interest in containing the violence in Syria and trying to manage it down to some acceptable level, both had clear motives to do something about Syria's chemical weapons.

donors prioritized short-term battlefield success over longer-term considerations when selecting groups to arm and finance. On the other side of the conflict, Russia and Iran leveraged their not inconsiderable resources to benefit the Assad regime and SAA to the greatest extent possible. For Russia, this meant directly shipping arms and ammunition to the Syrian government. Iran (with a largely cooperative Iraq on its western border) extended lines of credit to Damascus, sent arms, ammunition, and oil, and even deployed the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in Syria (Weiss 2013; George 2013; BBC 2013). Western hesitation to intervene militarily in the conflict even after Assad crossed a so-called red line when he used chemical weapons also allowed Russia to expand its influence as a leading sponsor of the second round of negotiations in Geneva because Russia was widely seen as the only country that had real influence and leverage on the Assad regime.

The second challenge brought about by the weakness of the governments in the immediate region was the number of non-state actors involved in the war. Since 2012, Syria's opposition went from an informal alliance of locally based, ad hoc guerillas and SAA defectors who seemed to share the general goal of ousting the Ba'ath government, to a broad, heterogeneous swath of secular nationalist guerillas. The alliance was joined by groups motivated by a radical and politicized version of Sunni Islam, with the goals of dismantling the Syrian state and reorganizing its society along very narrow, exclusionary, religious lines. These groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, and Liwa/Jaysh al-Islam, did not subscribe to liberal notions of statehood and international law. Instead, they tended to see the world in terms of believers and nonbelievers and had little use for notions such as legal sovereignty, territorial boundaries, or secular nationhood.

In addition, pro-regime non-state actors threw their weight behind the Syrian government. While the SAA was conducting the majority of combat operations on behalf of Damascus, the regime's dirty work was increasingly up to *shabiha*, loyalist paramilitaries that fight on

behalf of the government, but often do so according to their own doctrines and on their own schedule. Syria's Alawites formed pro-government militias (*Jaysh al-Sha'bi*), and the country's Druze population reluctantly leaned toward supporting the government (Jasser 2013; Filkins 2013). Hezbollah also entered the fray. A long-time client of the Syrian government, Hezbollah claimed the conflict in Syria was not just about preserving the Assad regime, but also was a fight against *takfiris* who threaten to rip the Muslim world apart (BBC Monitoring Middle East 2013; Blanford 2013).

Overall, these challenges from the demand side, the supply side, and the international environment made for a very difficult environment for mediators. On the demand side, defining the parties was the first challenge. The government of Syria was widely denounced as illegitimate, and yet was an essential party to the negotiations. Rebel fragmentation exacerbated the problem of achieving a clear and authoritative spokesman for the opposition at a future peace conference. As the conflict intensified, attitudes hardened. What began as a popular uprising against an exclusionary dictatorship quickly took on sectarian tones. The government's indiscriminate killing of civilians fed into the Islamist narrative of a pitched fight between good and evil. Negotiating some sort of settlement simply became more difficult in this environment, especially in light of the reality that the opposition comprised diverse and fragmented factions, some of whom had begun fighting each other. Whereas while the Syrian government violated the ceasefire during Kofi Annan's mediation effort likely due to the belief that they could press their military advantage to get additional concessions from the opposition, by 2013 both regime and rebel violence seemed increasingly driven by the belief that the two sides' interests and goals were fundamentally incompatible. This effectively eliminated the bargaining space (i.e., the set of mutually acceptable peace deals) between the two sides, and left little room for a mediation process.

On the supply side, the interests of the key international actors converged briefly only in late 2013. The Annan phase occurred at a point in the

conflict when violence was growing but was still somewhat limited. While the violence was largely one-sided in this first phase of the war, there was no prospect of a mutually hurting stalemate to incentivize the government and the opposition to sit down with a mediator (Zartman 2001). This period was marked by a fragmented international environment and a lack of external coherence behind the international, UN-sponsored mediation effort. The Geneva II phase of the conflict saw greater compatibility and at least nominal convergence in the positions of outside actors (namely, the United States and Russia), which helped to fix the supply-side “readiness” problem. The chemical weapons episode in 2013 created a degree of tactical convergence between Washington and Moscow as did the arrival of a new US Secretary of State, John Kerry, who threw his full diplomatic energy into resuscitating talks and building relations with Moscow and Tehran on the nuclear issue.

With regard to the international environment, the internationalization of the conflict brought more parties into the fray and raised the level of violence. A mediator not only had to work with the Syrian government and the Syrian National Coalition but also had to manage the United States, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Russia, Turkey, and others. Some of these countries—namely, Saudi Arabia and Iran—had hostile relations and made concerted efforts to keep each other out of the Geneva II process. Since these countries had the ability to encourage and restrain the belligerent parties, they also had the potential to act as spoilers and derail negotiations. In sum, by December 2013, the nature and regional ramifications of the conflict in Syria made the challenge of mediation more complex, even as it appeared to motivate the external powers to take the possibilities of diplomacy more seriously.

Meeting the Challenges: “Messy Multilateralism” or More Coordinated Action

As the Syrian case shows, in a world of fractured governance and diffused authority, it is apparent that responding to conflict will require a diverse

portfolio of instruments and actors to deal with security challenges. In such conflicts, however, mediation success may well be elusive because of the complex interplay of “demand side” factors in a conflict that contribute to its intractability even when it has reached a very bloody, hurting stalemate and there is little prospect that either side can win through military means alone. On the “supply side” of the equation, each mediating actor (or set of actors) and institution has its own strengths and weaknesses, but no single actor or set of institutions has a decided comparative advantage (or legitimacy) over the others in today’s world. This poses its own challenge to effective conflict management. Further, the issues represented in current conflicts range from regional rivalries to the spread of nuclear materials and weapons, from transnational organized crime and terrorism to cyber security, and conflicts of the more traditional variety that occur within and between states. All of these elements are at play in Syria. By their nature, many of these challenges are best met by collective effort. In the signature phrase of Richard Haass of the US Council on Foreign Relations, it is a world of “messy multilateralism” (Haass 2010). But “messy” also means that there will not be a speedy resolution to a conflict even when mediators are able to assemble a quorum and get warring parties and their various backers to sit down at the table.

Nevertheless, there may be greater order in that “messiness” than at first appears to be the case. The UN still plays an essential role and is establishing a rich playbook for collaborating with regional organizations as we see in Syria. In addition, regional states and security organizations at times offer an effective alternative to UN engagement, as they increasingly assert their role as legitimizers and gatekeepers of international action (Bellamy and Williams 2011). And there are also examples of improvised forms of collaboration that bring together a variety of countries and institutions to support mediation efforts as in the case of the Friends of Syria (Crocker et al. 2011a, b).

As the Syria case powerfully demonstrates, even veteran professionals such as Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi cannot make water run uphill. If the warring sides are stuck in a stalemate that hurts

the people but not the military leadership cadres, and if the latter enjoy firm support from their respective external patrons, processes such as Geneva I and II cannot produce a negotiated end to the bloodshed. If the sides cannot agree on an agenda or a sequence for discussing its contents, even this widely endorsed and UN-Arab League-backed process loses its purpose. If one side insists on discussing “terrorism” and the other side demands discussion of “regime transition,” the mediator is well advised to bring the process to an end or place it on hold, as Brahimi suggested during his UN consultations in mid-March of 2014. There are situations such as Syria in early 2014 that demand ripening before serious international mediation is worthwhile. Elsewhere, we have written about cases of intractable conflict that appear to be captives of larger divisions in the regional or global political environment (Crocker et al. 2005). Any sustained deterioration in relations between Russia and the Western nations only aggravates Syria’s captivity.

In conclusion, mediators will need to be increasingly sensitive to the nature of the emerging security environment where conflicts have multiple dimensions, and conflict management options are distributed and decentralized. Mediators need to work through teams and coalitions, throwing diplomatic energy into developing coordinated and layered responses and working closely with regional and local actors that have the knowledge, legitimacy, and capacity to act in constructive ways. Mediating in this environment is a team effort requiring new rules of engagement and cooperation among a diverse group of participants whose fields of action and core objectives differ. Diplomats and other negotiators will need the best possible situational awareness, the ability to conduct fluid and adaptable networking, and a readiness to accept the limits of tactical cooperation when genuine strategic coherence is beyond reach. Opportunities for solo operators will be more limited. But some aspects of mediation tradecraft are timeless. The ability of mediators to shape events will depend upon clear and stable mandates and a willingness to cooperate with others from whom leverage must be borrowed. Unity of action will continue to be essential in order to bring balanced influ-

ence to bear on warring sides. As the case of Syria richly illustrates, these characteristics do not come easily. Both the supply and demand curves in the mediation equation have to intersect if there is to be a successful negotiated outcome. In Syria, that intersection point was elusive.

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Introduction

The need to find a means to governing relations around the world for the prevention of war and conflict is a relatively new idea in human history. It started out in earnest as the concert of great powers seeking to impose their worldview on the other countries in Europe and elsewhere. Various justified as civilising missions, setting rules for the best in ‘barbaric’ countries and preventing warfare, it was an attempt for hegemonic diplomacy to affirm its influence. Over the last 200 years, this notion has gone through several transformations in search of alternatives to the concert of great powers at its origin. The rise of lawyers in the late nineteenth century and attempts to formulate a set of rules preventing conflict were in many ways an assault on old-style diplomacy, as documented by Mazover (2012). Lawyers have certainly since further expanded their range, influence and not least their income-earning capacity in many areas of national and international relations, as new areas

of interaction and new technologies opened additional fields of activities and need for rules.

With industrialisation rose the need for measuring, acquiring and processing data and for international standards to communicate beyond national boundaries. Science was seen as the way, par excellence, to pursue the quest for knowledge—and peace—across national boundaries and to build up organisational structures, so as to document and use data and information and create knowledge by wider appropriation for the benefit of society. In the wake of their development, many learned societies and technical organisations were founded: some still extant and others the precursors of post-WWII organisations, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN inter alia. As Mazover (2012, p. 102) recounts, ‘The revolutionary social impact of standardization was nowhere more evident than in the case of the telegraph. The International Telegraph Union—the world’s first public international union—was created very early, in 1865, in order to overcome the delays that had been caused by the need to print out telegraph messages on one side of the border and walk them across to the other side. In similar fashion, the Universal Postal Union was formed in 1874, and within a decade commentators were presenting these institutions as the seeds of a future world government’.

Since, international contacts, collaboration and negotiations have significantly diversified and expanded beyond interstate relations. This expansion of structured international contacts has taken

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place since the late nineteenth century through the growing numbers of professional associations, organisations for technical cooperation in various fields, international university and research cooperation and learned societies, labour movements and, of late, social movements and other civil society organisations. International tourism as a mass phenomenon after the initial recovery from World War II, cheap air travel starting in the last two decades, exchange programmes in research and the education sectors and the rise of electronic media are adding to the web of international contacts. Large-scale migrations have happened in waves between different regions, often for economic or environmental reasons or in response to persecution and war. Displacements within countries for a variety of reasons represent yet another—extreme—layer of interconnectedness that may, or may not, have international spillover effects (Lennard and Morris 2012; Birkeland et al. 2012). Moreover, in recent years we have moved politically in rapid succession from a bipolar to a unipolar and now towards a multipolar world, bringing about new demands and opportunities for governance.

Global Interdependence

The extraordinary growth of international trade in goods and services, particularly financial and insurance services and the unprecedented acceleration of material flows are creating not only traditional relations between individuals, countries and continents, but a high degree of interdependence. These material flows are visible in the continuing high deforestation estimated by the FAO at approximately 13 million ha/year, by the decimation of marine fauna through fishing on a global scale (Watson et al. 2012), the acceleration of mineral extraction (e.g. Jernelöv 2012) and air, soil and water pollution reaching global proportions beyond what even Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* (Carson et al. 1962) anticipated (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005).

At the same time, energy consumption continues to increase, despite discourses of efficiency, and there is a growing recognition that fossil fuel consumption in particular has to shrink by 80 % in

the next two to three decades (all the while accommodating perhaps as many as two and a half billion additional fellow humans), together with a realisation of the need to rebuild vulnerable and degraded marine and land ecosystems. Despite a timid beginning in climate action, the ongoing change is starting to make impacts on the costs of maintaining the type of economic models preferred in recent decades (see Anthoff et al. 2009; Narita et al. 2010; Brown et al. 2013). The already global threats to common goods, such as climate, biodiversity, air, water and others make international cooperation for their protection and restoration *the* imperative for the current and next generations.

Yet the perceptions and interpretation of these megatrends vary greatly between countries and cultures (e.g. Nisbett 2005). People find it very hard to connect the information about global trends and relating their multiple causes to their own behaviour or need for change. The discrepancy between abstract acceptance of climate change and willingness to take concrete mitigation measures is a case in point (Stoll-Kleemann et al. 2001; Marshall 2009). Uncertainties are increasing in the complex systems we live in. There is more frequent systems breakdown or largely unexpected consequences of earlier decisions, something we should not be surprised about, but should rather seek coherence on, traversing the edge of chaos (Fullan 2001).

As Kahn (1966) pointedly remarked, the accumulation of small decisions, each optimised for a specific context, may lead to outcomes that the actors themselves would not want to bring about, if given the chance to vote for or against it. This 'tyranny of small decisions' is typical for certain dysfunctionalities arising in complex systems when there is no directly visible relation between the individual action and the megatrend arising from accumulation, nor other unintended consequences.

Inequalities and the Need for Diversity

People tend to compare themselves with their peers and with others in their immediate surroundings. As Gladwell (2013) illustrates, e.g. in the

case of gifted youth in elite universities, these tend to work really well mostly for the top 10 % of fiercely competitive (and often uncooperative) students. Those performing very well, but not at the pinnacle, may experience themselves as failures to the point of quitting the science subject they originally chose. These same students in another very good university with more cooperative working modes are likely to be high performers. That much is suggested by national performance overviews cited by Gladwell (2013). The unexpected message from these wider comparisons is that while elite universities use a disproportionate level of resources, the larger number of very good performers from other universities deliver more research papers and earn more over their professional lifetime. Thus, the fixation on elite organisations obscures this basic lesson.

An in-depth scientific treatment of this challenge to conventional thinking about framework conditions for happy, healthy and successful societies is compiled by Wilkinson and Pickett (2010). This contributed to laying the foundations for the fluid case illustrations of broader trends offered by Gladwell (2013). Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) look at a large number of indicators compiled over many years from reputable sources. They range from teenage pregnancies to life expectancy, from education investment to criminal offences. The authors do not mince their words in drawing the conclusion that more equal societies are better for citizens, including privileged ones. Indeed, the evidence is overwhelming that once income enables a decent living, an increase in income does not normally enhance happiness, life expectancy, health or other measures of success. Indicator by indicator they demonstrate that economic inequity translates into a large number of social ills, which concentrate in the USA, the UK and Portugal, the three most unequal societies in the study. Interestingly, the data are presented at national or state level, and the social outcomes illustrate that people compare mostly across their country or state or lower geographic level, not as much between countries. So it is income spread between the rich and the poor and other measures of inequality in their respective country which translate into undesir-

able outcomes, not only for the poor, but also for many of the more privileged citizens.

We thus start seeing that the widespread perceptual and conceptual flaws briefly touched upon above trick them into making wrongful decisions and detract from their wellbeing. They make it difficult for individuals to grasp why it is not only essential to care for local conditions but also be alert to interactions and large-scale trends in the wider systems where interdependence has reached such proportions, as is the case today.

Further economically grounded evidence is analysed by Stiglitz (2012). He investigates how financial elites, particularly in the USA, have gained a grip on politics and are capturing an ever-increasing part of national wealth through deregulation, privatisation and the smashing of unions, while 90 % of the population is worse off than 30 years ago. He demolishes the oft-cited 'trickle-down effect', as there is nothing to show for it in empirical observation, though the arguments keep being used to maintain the status quo. The talent and potential that goes to waste this way has been labelled 'The End of the American Dream'.

As attempts at technocratic responses to these intricate challenges abound at the hands of public administrations, but also in companies, they put more and more people out of balance with themselves and others (Stiglitz 2012), while doing too little or nothing to reduce inequalities in society. Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) show that the higher the economic inequality in a country, the higher the percentage of citizens suffering from depression or otherwise subjected to psychopharmacological medication to counter the alienation that entails. A quarter of the population in the UK suffers from the conditions, more than 25 % in the USA, while fewer than 10 % are affected so far in Germany, Japan, Sweden and Italy. We are thus authorised to suspect some form of relationship between economic inequality and this worrying level of mental disorders, even if it were not due to simple causality.

Lietaer et al. (2012), borrowing concepts from ecological systems, add an additional layer of interpretation. They note that economic and

financial monocultures are non-viable in times of change. Systems stability at its simplest is the balance between efficiency and diversity. Reducing diversity increases efficiency. However, push the reduction too far and the system becomes unstable and unable to cope with changing circumstances. Thus, one is well advised to consciously sacrifice some efficiency to maintain sufficient diversity to enable adaptations to evolving circumstances.

One is tempted to add, as well, that efficiency applied in the wrong direction precipitates negative outcomes. In other words, it is better to do the right thing a little less badly than the wrong thing highly efficiently.

Are We Prepared to Think the Unthinkable?

This begs the question whether we are sufficiently prepared for dealing adequately with the multiple levels of local, national and international relations, interdependencies and the many instances involving negotiations, often even more of necessity than by choice. Do we have enough safeguards in place not to fall prey to preconceived ideas and stereotypes, such that we can address the complexities alluded to above? Do we engage in processes that allow accounting for the diversity and be prepared for the unthinkable?

From the cursory evidence discussed so far, it is difficult to answer this question with a simple yes or no. We certainly require some elements to help prepare us. On the other hand, the rapid specialisation of scientific and technological inquiry and insufficient social processes to transform scientific insights into knowledge available in society at large is a formidable obstacle to grasp the structure and dynamics of the larger systems, whether they are ecosystems or different types of social systems. While there are attempts to piece together global knowledge about systems, much of the research is highly focused to dig deeper into a specific area. In a somewhat simplistic manner, one may draw a parallel to working on a monograph—compiling

and analysing everything about a specific topic, species, locality and style, so as to produce vertically integrated knowledge about the object of the monograph. This is a powerful way of learning everything we ever wanted to know about the study object. As a principal approach to learning, it tends to blind us to the connection to other issues and to leave us poorly prepared to understand the specialty within a wider systemic view. This is what helps bring about ‘the tyranny of small decisions’.

Navigating complexities and competently dealing with international relations of different kinds require more attention to the connectivity and interdependence of issues, thus more horizontal integration at least in addition, if not in place of monographic knowledge. It is out of connectivity and interdependence that the unexpected and improbable arise, the ‘black swans’ as Taleb (2008) calls them.

Moreover, the many deeply held beliefs we carry within ourselves, whether they are explicit in the form of religious convictions or unconsciously absorbed from the value systems embedded in how we were brought up, affect in many more ways than we are aware of the lenses through which we experience the world around us (Schein 2004). This is particularly so for experiencing the ‘otherness’ in international relations across political and cultural boundaries or among opposing interest groups. It has been argued in this conjunction that ‘the sacred’ and certain taboos of traditional belief systems, even when not explicitly targeting environmental protection, have often had such effects. Examples are the sacred groves preventing the last forests to be cut down or time and space limitations of resource extraction, which have amounted in practice to biodiversity and environmental protection (Collet 1992). More generally, Norenzayan (2012) argues that the major religions have made human civilisations, through enabling altruistic and cooperative behaviour towards strangers. When growing size led the typical kinship and reciprocal support fail to generate necessary cooperation, religious beliefs associated with watchful omnipresent oversight by a powerful god

emerged in complement as the enforcer of morality and good behaviour. Believers mistrust atheists, because they do not feel subjected to surveillance of a supranatural being and may therefore be lacking in cooperative behaviour. He notes, however, that Scandinavian societies seem to be among the few who have managed to replace religious beliefs by secular institutions that ensure fairness, such as courts, police and mechanisms to enforce contracts.

This is the context, in which we want to explore ways to hone ever higher levels of cooperation as a preferred mode to engage with the complexity and interdependence of our natural and social environment. We would indeed argue that unprecedented levels of cooperation are nowadays required to steer our societies into transitions of social organisation and into systems of living compatible with the regenerative capacity of our blue planet and which counteract growing inequality, itself as much an obstacle to decent futures as ecological overshoot.

Turning to the first of the questions forming the framework of this book, we will not venture into quantifying ratios between cooperation and competition needed in the efforts to navigate complexity and international interdependence, even less so, when focusing on a problem solving or transformational approach. But it is fair to say that both approaches are necessary in the sense that competition between a range of organisations is a prerequisite for generating different perspectives and competences that allow to cope with evolving conditions, particularly in times of change (see also Ferguson 2011). The very existence of diverse actors and organisations is a prerequisite for complex systems to function, particularly when conditions change.

On the other hand, the interdependence at different, including global, levels militates strongly for heightened levels of cooperation. We will explore how to better free the creativity in different individuals, groups and cultures so as to prepare for the unthinkable and escape the ‘command and control’ fallacy so often associated with technocratic approaches and overconfidence in technological fixes (Jasanoff 2007).

Listening to One Another and Engaging in Conversations that Matter

In the following, we will concentrate on the sub-sovereign level of international cooperation and its negotiation aspects. We use ‘international’ here loosely in relation to all transborder and intercultural issues, including those within the EU. Many of these can be seen as in dynamic tension with the complex international negotiation processes that take place in the realm of the UN and other international organisations. Even when not directly feeding into these international negotiation frameworks can those multidimensional strands of international cooperation be relevant. This can be the case upstream in terms of developing mindsets that negotiations need to take into account or, perhaps more so, in terms of the social tissue—favourable or not—to take up and help implement the results of international negotiations.

Our working hypothesis, developed as the core element of this chapter, is that greater focus on people and enabling meaningful conversations about issues that matter are powerful enhancers of international negotiations themselves. This builds on the previous compilation of research on the role of emotions in international negotiations (Aquilar and Galluccio 2011) and specifically the need for a ‘New Deal’ between science and society (Nauen 2011).

These methods, alongside those many other forms of cooperation, have the potential to bring about the necessary transitions to be able to cope with the ongoing change processes from local to global levels and their break points (or tipping points as others have called them) to indicate non-linear change in complex systems and how small things can make a big difference (Gladwell 2000).

Bringing down the macro-trends outlined above to an institutional and individual level, we premise that due to complexity our way of governance of organisations and of society has arrived at a point of crystallisation. Different perspectives and positions are not really heard or taken into account; procedures often determine the outcome of consultations or negotiations, for

example, by attracting certain interest groups more than others. At the same time, we live at a moment of high diversity, among others, due to the quadrupling of humanity in the last 100 years. The processes of democratisation—efforts at greater transparency, demands for accountability, and legitimacy through the many—have enabled people with diverse backgrounds to access higher education and jobs with leadership functions in organisations and society at large. However, the administrative, conventional learning and information processes influencing our opinion forming and decision-making have not kept up with the necessary adaptations, in order to plug into the huge potential of this evolved citizenship, particularly those in countries with highly skewed wealth distribution.

Over recent decades new working methods and new leadership attitudes have been developed, which are the enablers for the new processes needed, which harness the complexity and diversity of citizenship today. These new working methods have started to find their way into consultative and negotiation processes of governments, governmental organisations, civil society organisations and businesses.

In order to move from coexisting and competing intelligence, we argue for the need to move to co-intelligence, true collaboration and eventually cocreation. Here we offer a brief description of what these new working formats are, their preconditions and their potential impacts on a new societal culture still to be born. All of these are highly relevant to negotiations taking place at different, including international, levels.

Going Slower to Go Faster

Over recent centuries, citizens in Western cultures have become more individualistic in their thinking and approach to the world. People have become more focused on their cognitive capacities and often less connected to the whole including themselves as a living system and to other living systems such as organisations and geographic and political entities. The complexity of things has produced precious expertise in all

areas of our society and also a wide range of interests and concerns in all segments of the population. This now leaves us with the challenge of how to intelligently connect, combine and bring these strands of expertise and experience into an inclusive framework that can truly benefit the whole of society (Senge et al. 2005).

Research for new management concepts increasingly finds that the interior state of leaders has an important influence on how organisations or even whole countries are managed. Scharmer's often used quote from CEO O'Brien 'The success of an intervention depends on the interior condition of the intervener' led him to look more deeply at the influence of consciousness and places from which leaders operate (Scharmer and Käufer 2013). Scharmer coined the term 'presencing', which blends the words 'presence' and 'sensing' and works through 'seeing from our deepest source' (Scharmer 2009). In addition to research, several leadership and conversational practices have been developed over recent decades, which call people through conversational practices into those 'deeper sources'. These various new approaches which help design dialogues—strategic meetings inside organisations or with stakeholders—have been developed independently from each other and have been combined into a broader approach called 'the Art of Hosting Conversations that Matter'. After years of application of these approaches, we have evidence that these new forms of interactions in organisations are answers to the more complex organisational challenges of our times (Vith 2013). A team of researchers found that applying these approaches showed results of substantial increase in social capital as well as higher dynamics of adaptive capacity of the observed systems (Bruce et al. 2013).

One of the core principles of the Art of Hosting Conversations that Matter is the Fourfold Practice. This principle refers to the different practices necessary for this new format of leadership:

1. Being Present (Hosting one's self)
2. Practising Conversations (participate actively and authentically)
3. Hosting Conversations (the varied set of different approaches to design conversations for different purposes and contexts)

4. Cocreate with a Community of Practitioners.

The Fourfold Practice and what it entails can be detailed as follows.

1. *Hosting Self and Being Present Determine the Outcome of Conversations: 'Inner Leadership'*

'Hosting one's self'—'emotional intelligence' and 'spiritual intelligence'—is a concept acquiring increasing currency in the literature about management and organisational development. Likewise, change processes in education and business in today's complex environments require more than technical knowledge. The growing global sustainability challenge that society is facing and the complexity this entails call for facilitators and leaders that are adept at engaging diverse groups in a collaborative manner to see the larger picture beyond individual or narrow group perspectives. Such engagement has the potential to support complex planning and decision-making. These collaborative engagement processes include people learning from each other and with one another. They are a cornerstone in organisational learning theory (Baan et al. 2011).

Emotional intelligence, the ability to put oneself in the shoes of others—and thus form relationships—is critical, particularly in negotiation situations. Trust in others (trust in the process meaning confidence that others make genuine and constructive contributions) requires foremost trust in oneself. Organisations and societies with a high level of emotional intelligence and even spiritual intelligence are more flexible and adept at coping with change and at surviving crises.

The convergence in the definition and understanding of underlying principles in different areas of empirical study should be taken as a measure of robustness and pertinence for their usefulness in negotiation processes which share many of the human and social features addressed in the research.

2. *Practice Conversations, Participate: Participate in the Conversation as a Whole Person*

Practising conversational leadership includes the inner leadership, the first of the Fourfold Practice and further analysed by Scharmer. It

will diminish the social divide between self and other, as it will enable the creation of relationships and reduce prefixed opinions, unexamined assumptions about 'the other'. Members of different parts and age groups of society, with diverse backgrounds, roles and functions, will be able to show up as 'themselves' and also listen with a fresh mind. Therefore, other cultures and contexts will appear less as frightening and something to refuse but rather provoke a curious listening to get to know the person behind the person. This is the prerequisite for any further action.

3. *Hosting Conversations: Approaches, Methods and Principles for Meeting and Conversation Formats*

3.1 *Conditions for Successful Conversations.*

The Art of Hosting meaningful conversations and other change processes can facilitate—'host'—complex transformation in society by using approaches that explicitly suspend these divides. It starts with creating the conditions for such conversations. This involves inviting into meeting rooms and hosting conversations differently from the conventional urges, e.g. for securing territory, for securing from the unknown or protecting from the judgmentally perceived 'other'. The setting is chosen to suspend or overcome the separation from self in a societal and organisational context. It organises people in meeting formats, which allows them to create a common space or territory together, everyone starting from where they are, without any constraints, without any loss of identity and allowing them to stand tall in their full authenticity.

3.1.1. *A Neutral and Hospitable Place as a Prerequisite for Conversations that Matter*

The use of a neutral place—which is neither the place owned by one of the parties nor by government, but has a more private character—is helpful in resolving conflictual situations and in creating a shared purpose for the several

parties coming in from diverse backgrounds. It helps participants to show up as whole persons, independent from a role they are playing in society, or an organisation. Isaacs (1999) calls the phenomenon of creating a safe space for conversation ‘container building’. It is the art of the hosts to create this container for transformation and provide people with psychological safety in a dialogue. How important it is to hold a suitable space and to create a safe environment is visible in the huge success of the 1,000 Tables of Israel, when some 10.000 citizens from all backgrounds, religions and nationalities met in 30 cities at 1,000 hosted tables to enter into real dialogue in September 2011 (Gershon 2011). The prerequisite was to enter as one people, able to express their suffering without blaming others who might be part of the societal group that might have caused the suffering. The creation of a neutral and safe space was an important prerequisite and proved itself, even in areas of conflict.

This configuration helps to meet one of the main principles of World Café (see below), creating a hospitable place (Brown and Isaacs 2005). The experiment in Israel illustrates that even a public space can become a neutral space, if hosted well, in this case through the effort and support of 1,000 facilitators, one for each of the tables.

The ‘neutral’, safe space mediating between public and private can be a physical space, i.e. a space neither in the public sphere nor the private sphere. It can also be declared as neutral through the

intervention of hosts not representing any of the concerned parties in an official way. In the case in Israel, this was organised through civil society (Danny Gal, *pers. comm.*, 9 March 2014).

3.1.2. *Harvesting the Results of Strategic Conversations and Conversations that Matter*

The purpose of harvesting is to support the individual and collective meaning making. The harvest of a meaningful conversation can take many forms. It can be tangible (documentation, newsletters, audio or video) or intangible (new insights, a change of perspective or mindset, a shared clarity, new relationships and contacts). Both forms of harvesting are valuable and needed, as they can enhance our collective intelligence and wisdom.

Ultimately, the harvest of such collective processes can support wise decisions and wise action. The Art of Hosting and Harvesting Meaningful Conversations are techniques and states of mind to bring sometimes disparate perspectives and positions into a shared framework. In this way, they offer a gateway to the simplicity ‘on the other side of complexity’, even if the direction of the conversation goes through chaotic phases (Nissen and Corrigan 2013).

3.2. *Conversation Formats Enabling Trust and Relationship Building and the Use of the Full Potential of Diverse Groups in Complex Contexts*

An experienced Art of Hosting practitioner describes the art of choosing the right meeting formats in the following way: ‘I like to use The Circle to help people to arrive well, World Café to deepen important issues, then move into

Open Space where people roll up their sleeves around projects they want to be thinking about together' (in Meisterheim et al. 2011, p. 33).

Designing meetings requires knowing the context well and to have met with enough stakeholders to be able to determine what can be the right rhythm for moving through space and time allocation of the meeting in an organic way. Working with emergence—e.g. of new unexpected insights—means to go slower first in order to be able to go faster later.

Relationships and trust need to be built in at the beginning of the process, when new stakeholders participate or when disruptive situations need to be settled and healed before stakeholders can construct something together.

3.2.1 *The Circle*, where everybody can consciously perceive everybody else, is always a good choice to begin hearing on a more personal and human level the stories of who is in the room. No meeting should start without hearing who is in the room. This provides essential grounding for the conversation. Every voice is heard, particularly before addressing divisive issues (Baldwin and Linnea 2012). A meeting or conference is also best ended in a circle conversation to create collective ownership of results obtained.

3.2.2 *The World Café* format is a good choice to give everyone a voice, as the conversations take place in intimate groups of four to five people. One person acts as the table host who keeps track of the flow of the conversation at that table, while the other discussants are invited to change tables at intervals. The weaving of the conversations through changing tables in a systematic, but self-organised, way allows almost everybody to

listen and talk to everybody else. It is a highly suitable format to see patterns emerge in an organic manner. The World Café format is ideally suited, when the goal is the focused use of dialogic inquiry to foster collaborative learning, knowledge sharing and collective insight around real life challenges and key strategic questions. Brown and Isaacs (2005) suggests seven design principles:

- Set the context.
- Create a hospitable space.
- Explore questions that matter.
- Encourage everyone's contribution.
- Cross-pollinate and connect diverse people and ideas.
- Listen together for patterns, insights and deeper questions.
- Harvest and share collective discoveries.

These principles are also useful for other conversation settings and have come to influence several practices developed and used by the Art of Hosting movement.

3.2.3. *Open Space Technology* serves to develop an agenda for getting work done. It offers an approach to self-organised leadership with strong goal orientation, including a way for hosting meetings, conferences, corporate-style retreats, symposia and any type of summit events. It is easily scalable to large groups of several thousands of people and works well when there is a sense of urgency to act (Owen 1992). It is often used at a stage, when trust has already been established and stories have been shared.

3.2.4. *The Pro-Action Café* is an excellent method to combine the individual drive behind a vested interest and making efficient use of a diverse audience or stakeholder

population in a short period of time. As the name suggests, it uses the intimacy of small group conversations World Café style, but instead of concluding with better-shared understanding of the challenge at hand, it adds an action-oriented cycle to support the challenge or project of the table host and should ideally lead to some operational outcomes. The Pro-Action Café has been developed by a group of practitioners in Brussels, notably by Rainer v. Leoprechting and Ria Baeck (*pers. comm.*, 2012).

3.2.5 *Appreciative Inquiry* is a method for studying and possibly changing social systems (groups, organisations and communities). It advocates collective inquiry into the best of existing experiences ('what is') in order to tease out the 'ingredients' required for future success (imagine 'what could be'). The inquiry is followed by a collective design of a desired future state that is compelling for the participants. It thus does not require the use of external incentives, coercion or persuasion for planned change to occur, as it is driven by the internal values discovered and structured by the stakeholders in the process. This appreciative approach, in contrast to the usual problem solving approach, is used often in combination with other meeting formats or as a way to encourage an underlying attitude to convening and hosting conversation focused on learning and constructive engagement (Cooperrider et al. 2008).

3.2.6. *Dynamic Facilitation* and *Wisdom Councils* are used for engagement processes both in businesses as well as government structures,

where a smaller group of randomly chosen representatives creates a microcosm of the larger entity and comes up with a solution for the larger whole (Rough 2002). This process is supported by a facilitator trained in dynamic facilitation. This ensures that all participants are heard and that their ideas and solutions are written down. Dynamic facilitation goes with the flow and takes the conversation to a deeper level to make the quest and background visible behind what is being discussed. For instance, the success of Wisdom Councils in Vorarlberg, Austria, has inspired a growing number of local governments and administrations in Austria, Switzerland, and Germany to start exploring this work (Zubizaretta 2014). Dynamic facilitation can also be used for the internal coordination of hosting teams or core groups.

3.3. Time Is of the Essence

From that neutral and newly created space can the truly shared purpose—of even a complex group—be slowly and sustainably cocreated, everyone contributing their piece to the collective weaving. The 'Hosting' of conversations is artfully conducted and designed, so that real weaving can take place. Sometimes healing of relationships happens before anything else can start. Sometimes this is the goal of a conversation, e.g. in cases where only war and conflict had been in the foreground. A good example of an intangible harvest as the most important outcome was given by the conversations of the 1,000 tables in Israel in 2011 mentioned above.

Starting within that space of neutral recognition and acceptance, many things become possible, including wise actions for future engagement, which can include

even lawmaking for all those concerned, in a sustainable way with representatives of all concerned in the room. Once the foundation for good dialogue and recognition has been laid, it will soon become clear that value statement, purpose statements right up to lawmaking, will appear sooner or later on the agenda. If people stay true to the process, those otherwise difficult actions will emerge from the group or from the process. Such processes can be designed to last for hours, days or weeks or go on for years. They need to be accompanied by neutral and authentic process hosts who are unbiased and recognised by the key members of the group.

These processes can look quite slow in the beginning and suddenly gain momentum. In the end, groups with very diverse members can go faster together and do not go back for cumbersome validation processes, as an intelligent field has been created from which the solutions will emerge (Scharmer 2009)

4. *Cocreate, Practice Community: How to Cocreate the World We All Want to Live In?*

Having created welcoming and enabling conditions as a starting point, relationships can be set up. By entering relationships, common understanding can be developed as a basis for cocreation and ultimately wise action.

Participants and actors in the process are respected, recognised and acknowledged for who they truly are. They are accepted. Judgement and assumptions are suspended for the sake of creating a safe space for engaging in a neutral zone of equals, especially when people come from diverse backgrounds and contexts.

Now we touch upon the fourth dimension of the Fourfold Practice, the learning community. Once the conversations have happened, the results for collective meaning making are harvested and spread, and the wiser action may emerge from the centre witnessed by all. The World Café founders speak about the ‘magic in the middle’. A group that has

become subject to creating a shared purpose, also in acting for the higher good, will know how and where to listen for the ‘new’ to emerge. This can happen at the level of a local, regional or even national community, if spaces for free and self-organised conversations are allowed, supported and recognised.

Wenger and Leave (1991) coined the term ‘community of practice’, which has become a concept allowing the intentional set-up of communities for bringing awareness to implicit knowledge of groups of practitioners of any practice that eventually enables them to cocreate new knowledge and innovation and can initiate and accompany new behaviour and culture change. Self-organising communities of practice are the enablers to learn and practise all of the four practices, in Wenger’s (2010) understanding: learning governance, learning stewardship and emergence, creating learning partnerships and finally learning citizenship.

Cultivating collective intelligence is a dimension of leadership work today for dealing with a complex world and creating the new frameworks we will need now and for the future (Pór 2008).

The Three Divides and the Reconnection

We have so far spoken about the ways, methods and conditions for conversations that take systemic complexity and diversity into account. Now we want to take a look at what happens when such new conversations take place at the different levels.

In the process of social evolution and urbanisation, many have lost a meaningful connection to Earth, to our planet. Through the industrialisation of agriculture, people have lost the very concrete contact to Earth as a source of food and, indeed, the support system of human life. At the same time, humans still have collective memories that the land and the territory are important for feeding themselves and their people. On the other hand, humans behave



Fig. 12.1 Fourfold practice (as originally proposed by Hein, Nissen and Moeller and cited in Corrigan (2012))

‘territorially’ in many other ways, where it is less useful, and not even needed. Scharmer (2013) also speaks of three divides: the ecological divide, the separation of self from nature; the social divide, the separation of self from other; and the spiritual divide, the separation of self from self.

The process to reconnect the individual to the collective can take place at several levels. It will always include a shift of attitudes in four areas (see also Fig. 12.1):

1. At the individual level: shift from downloading of habitual thought to empathic and generative listening—being present, practising inner leadership
2. At the level of an individual’s behaviour in groups that enables and requires connecting and forming relationships: a shift from debating about to enquiring with others and to co-creating with others—practising conversational leadership
3. At the level of organisations and institutions: a shift from organised control structured around hierarchy towards organising around differentiation, networked organisation of stakeholder groups, and to organising around issues that emerge in the interest of the larger good (putting functionalities first)—participatory leadership, practising the Art of Hosting Conversations

4. At the level of global systems, governments, larger wholes and indeed the entire planet: a shift from national state-centric command and control, from a subset of unrestrained competing ‘free market’ behaviour, towards networked behaviour mediated also through ‘social markets’ and to a cocreated economic ecosystem honing a moral purpose and a place for diversity (Scharmer 2013), practising co-creation and creating conditions for communities of practice

In order to practise conversations and conversational leadership, *listening* is a prerequisite. Listening to one’s self and recognising the legitimacy and usefulness of expressing different voices and views require a certain composure and inner leadership. The success of an intervention depends on the interior condition of the intervener (Scharmer 2009).

Figure 12.2 is an attempt to show how the levels of listening work, and thus the connection to self, other, group and Earth, the four practices of the Art of Hosting Conversations described above.

Helping to close the social divide between self and other, as Otto Scharmer puts it, means inviting the concerned parties to sit around the table using the appropriate moderation methods for tapping into the valuable potential of varied opinions and interests. Moving away from polarisation to inclusion involves conversation, convening and acting. Through true appreciation of each individual participant in the process, polarisation vanishes, as evidenced by the growing success and demand for conversation hosts. The authors can attest to this across the EU institutions and beyond.

A person is being perceived as who she or he is. Everyone concerned is invited to make it a sustainable process, which does not get ‘sold out’ or ‘hijacked’ along the way, but where inclusion and empowerment of all parties are ensured from the beginning.

Diversity and complexity are all around us and represent a challenge in the quest to make sense of the world and of specific situations. They ask for a simple process and connection as humans using collective intelligence to overcome

Fig. 12.2 Integration of the fourfold practice and the principles from ‘The Matrix of Social Evolution’ developed by Scharmer as cited in Scharmer (2013) and in Hillbrand (n.d)



contrasts and conflicts which otherwise tend to deprive the parties of freedom to move or lock them into wasteful stalemate. A well-hosted conversation process provides a framework for acknowledging diversity, complexity and even conflict, without trivialising, and allows for developing some shared understanding. Active participation in this ‘sense making’ enables the parties to regain a capacity to act, including when they agree to disagree as it instils a sense of ownership and (limited) predictability.

The challenge is then to move from collective intelligence enabled through the setting and active participation to collective wisdom and wise action.

A good example of where the need to cultivate good containers for conversations and wise actions was used after a conflict—with the view to prevent further conflict—can be seen in Côte d’Ivoire: This is a story of a sincere and heartfelt call from concerned citizens and elders in Côte d’Ivoire, West Africa, to bring more peace to their country after the civil war in 2011. It is an exploration into the wise blending of personal and collective practice of peace and basic wis-

dom for citizens of Côte d’Ivoire. It has begun to unfold during 2012 and 2013 and will continue into the coming years (Amani et al. (n.d); more information at <http://storymap.artofhosting.org/tag/art-of-hosting-what-matters/>).

Developments in the EU Commission point in that same direction, meaning entering into conversations with stakeholders of all kinds; citizens; representatives at national, regional or local level; and other institutions: A growing number of services, projects and processes demand support for consultative and engaging events and processes, which require the use of participatory methods and enable more listening to stakeholders and citizens in general. This growing demand mostly results from recognition of making better use of diversity or trying to cope with complexity. Many participatory examples of European, local and regional levels can be found as taken up the report of Social Innovation (European Commission, Bureau of European Policy Advisers, 2011, updated 2014).

These examples are largely supported by a community of practitioners from among the large number of officials trained in participatory

leadership methods, a specially trained internal consultancy unit, and from external process experts. The same is observed in many municipalities and civic initiatives across the EU. This resonates with the statement in an influential report to the President of the EU Commission that policy needs to be developed *with* citizens, not *for* citizens (European Commission, Bureau of European Policy Advisers, 2011). In 2013 and 2014, a series of citizen dialogues have taken place in all EU Member States. The generalised application of this recognition will require much additional work, including within the higher echelons of decision-making in EU Member States but also at the level of civil society engagement in democratic processes across all Member States of the EU.

Conclusions

We have described some aspects of the social evolution and how our society, organisations and governments at different levels respond to it. Many of the aforementioned examples are manifestations of a transition period. Many conversations and dialogues are already happening in a more inclusive manner, using an abundance of diversity and complexity in a constructive way for collecting robust information and forming opinions. But little seems to go beyond the collection of facts and awareness raising at this point. The greatest limitations are that these processes have not yet reached the civic decision-making levels on a large scale.

As this chapter suggests, conflict prevention using the Art of Hosting Conversations operates at many different levels, from local conversations to national discussions, and even at supranational level, such as what has been happening across the EU institutions. However, we are waiting to see how fast structures and governance rules will be altered to really take into account the full potential of participatory processes, when it comes to negotiation mandates and procedures in different formal settings.

We do not expect a tipping point to be reached in the very near future, but believe that massive spread of practising the Art of Hosting Conversations approaches outlined above would

open up additional options for shaping our collective futures. These are direly needed to accelerate changes in favour of more sustainable modes of living and being designed by citizens. That would also mobilise a much higher share of human potential, which is currently stifled through spreading skewed wealth distribution.

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Part IV

Emotions Regulation in Negotiation

Improving Negotiation Effectiveness with Skills of Emotional Competence

13

Carolyn Saarni

Improving Negotiation Effectiveness with Skills of Emotional Competence

For the last dozen years or so, the significance of emotional experience and expression in negotiation processes has garnered increasing attention by theoreticians and researchers alike. Whether the negotiations are occurring in business, in politics, in labor organizations, in legal settings, and even in therapeutic sessions in which married partners seek to resolve their conflicts or dissolve their unions, the emotions felt and expressed by the negotiators are now acknowledged as crucial to effectiveness and outcome. What I propose in this essay is to meld skills of emotional competence (e.g., Saarni 1999) with social exchange theory within a systemic-relational context. Some definitional content and my own theoretical assumptions follow.

Emotional Competence

The construct emotional competence was first introduced by the sociologist Steve Gordon (1989), and I subsequently deconstructed this

superordinate construct into its constituent skills that develop interdependently and are also very much tied to the emotionally evocative context (Saarni 1999). Emotional competence can be succinctly defined: It is the demonstration of self-efficacy in emotion-eliciting social transactions, but this brief definition belies its complexity. Self-efficacy essentially means that one possesses the capacity and confidence in one's abilities to reach one's goals (Bandura 1989), and goals in emotion-laden situations refer to the motivating aspects of the situation facing the individual in which various emotions are evoked (Lazarus 1991). Competence is judged relative to: (1) the cultural standards that are indicative of appropriate developmental mastery and maturity and (2) the functional adaptiveness of the individual's response (Campos et al. 1994) in a particular cultural and relational context. We experience emotions when we have a stake in the outcome of our encounter with the environment, and to make matters even more complicated, our appraisal of the environment may vary across several levels of conscious awareness. This means that we may respond emotionally to the environmental encounter in ways that are not deliberate, not rational, and without a conscious sense of volition. Indeed, most emotion processes operate without consciousness (Clore et al. 2005), although once we are experiencing the emotion itself, we are generally aware of our feeling state and tend to attribute it to something

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in the environmental encounter (but not always accurately). Table 13.1 presents the eight skills of emotional competence, and they may influence the negotiation process as well as the negotiators themselves.

Because of the unconsciousness of many processes in emotion generation, on occasion we will behave in ways, when examined in retrospect, that were not especially emotionally competent and did not serve our healthy self-interests adaptively in the *long run*. How should we understand such a contrary outcome? Using the concepts of declarative and procedural knowledge helps to explain how this might come about. Declarative knowledge refers to explicit concepts of *what* one knows, and procedural knowledge refers to *how* one tacitly applies what one knows. To illustrate, we can have explicit (declarative) knowledge of words that represent different emotions, but in a given instance, we may not be immediately aware of how we actually appraise an emotion-eliciting situation and respond to it with, for example, surprise versus happiness, fear versus anger, or sadness versus anxiety, among many other possible emotional reactions. That appraisal process, the subsequent regulation of the emotions themselves, and how one copes with the emotion-evoking situation are largely reflective of well-rehearsed procedural knowledge, which functions much like the application of nonconscious event scripts. In short, we do not always act in an emotionally competent manner if the situation facing us exceeds our resilience, our knowledge, and/or our coping capacity, and we may not even be aware of it until a later point in time.

From the standpoint of effective negotiation, emotional competence skills serve the negotiator, and such skills also influence the dynamic transactions that are part of the communication and interpersonal influence between negotiators (Saarni 2011). It is in this way that emotional competence and the *relational context* are inseparable. Now I elaborate on some of the theoretical assumptions of emotional competence and what we know about its development (further details are available in Saarni 1999, 2011 and Saarni et al. 2006). For a more extensive explanation of skills of emotional

Table 13.1 Skills of emotional competence

1. Awareness of one's emotional state, including the possibility that one is experiencing multiple emotions and, at even more mature levels, awareness that one might also not be consciously aware of one's feelings due to nonconscious dynamics or selective inattention
2. Skills in discerning and understanding others' emotions, based on situational and expressive cues that have some degree of consensus as to their emotional meaning
3. Skill in using the vocabulary of emotion and expression in terms commonly available in one's subculture and at more mature levels to acquire cultural scripts that link emotion with social roles
4. Capacity for empathic and sympathetic involvement in others' emotional experiences
5. Skill in realizing that inner emotional state need not correspond to outer expression, both in oneself and in others, and at more mature levels the ability to understand that one's emotional-expressive behavior may impact on another and take this into account in one's self-presentation strategies
6. Skill in modulating emotional reactions by using strategies that modify the intensity, duration, or aversiveness of such emotional responses as well as skill in coping adaptively with distressing circumstances
7. Awareness that the structure or nature of relationships is in part defined by how emotion is communicated, for example, by the degree of emotional immediacy or genuineness of expressive display and by the degree of reciprocity or symmetry within the relationship; e.g., mature intimacy is in part defined by mutual or reciprocal sharing of genuine emotions, whereas a parent-child relationship may have asymmetric sharing of genuine emotions
8. Capacity for emotional self-efficacy: the individual views herself or himself as feeling, overall, the way he or she wants to feel. That is, emotional self-efficacy means that one accepts one's emotional experience, whether unique and eccentric or culturally conventional, and this acceptance is in alignment with the individual's beliefs about what constitutes desirable emotional "balance." In essence, one is living in accord with one's personal theory of emotion when one demonstrates emotional self-efficacy that is integrated with one's moral sense

Note. Adapted from Saarni (2000), pp. 77–78). Copyright 2000 by Jossey-Bass. Reprinted by permission of the author

competence applied to the negotiation context and of a general overview of the difference between the two constructs of emotional competence and emotional intelligence, please refer to Saarni (2011).

Reciprocal Influence Between Emotions and Relational Contexts

When we think about how humans develop emotionally, it is through the relationships that we have with others. Granted, we are also biologically wired to be emotional, but the meanings, the language, and the appraisals we make of emotion-evocative situations have all been filtered, so to speak, through our relationships with others. Even when we are alone and face an emotion-evocative situation, our appraisal of it is still made meaningful through our prior immersion in relationships. Leach and Tiedens (2004) have summed up very well the perspective that I take here: “Emotions are one channel through which the individual knows the social world, and the social world is what allows people to know emotion” (p. 2).

Of course, this social world is saturated with cultural beliefs, artifacts, and practices, and if we extend Leach and Tiedens’s thinking, then emotional experience, considered both within the individual and collectively across groups of people, reciprocally influences the cultural context. As we can see in the globalization of information via the Internet, cultural beliefs do indeed change, albeit more evident in superficialities and nuance than in deeply held values. The emotions that are evoked in people may lead them to question culturally approved practices and beliefs, and thus the dynamic fluidity of a society is manifested in this reciprocal influence of emotions and cultural beliefs and practices. Faure (2002) wisely predicted that growing exchanges between nations (via media, trade, etc.) would result in both cultural transcendence as well as a heightened sensitivity to cultural distinctiveness; indeed, a celebration of cultural and ethnic differences may be what we see ensuing in our current international climate. In sum, emotions are dynamic psychophysiological processes that occur “in” the individual, but they cannot be understood without taking into account the individual’s transaction with an environment (especially a social environment). Thus, emotional experience, by definition, is a *bioecological-relational* experience as well. We are, after all, organisms who inhabit a dynamic habitat (Saarni 2008).

Systemic Approach and Emotional Competence

A systems approach to functioning—whether we are addressing physiology, ecology, or social-psychological processes—implies that there is some degree of self-regulation through feedback, that individual entities are dynamically embedded in complex wholes, and that the whole is an organization that is more than its constituent parts. Constructs such as emotional competence, self-efficacy, emotional intelligence, personal integrity, and culture represent abstractions that can be applied to characterize complex phenomena, such as how effective was a given negotiation process between negotiators from differing cultures who may have radically different perspectives on how to strategically negotiate.

For international negotiators to come together in productive meetings, both are better served if they are knowledgeable about the emotion folk theories or ethnopsychologies of their counterpart’s culture. Given the globalization of information, we are also seeing “hybrid” cultures emerging in diverse societies in which both collectivist and individualist values and beliefs are endorsed (e.g., compare urban Beijing or Shanghai with rural western Sichuan Province). Faure (2002) embraced cultural factors as active elements in the negotiation process that competent negotiators should make use of, understand, and develop as “integrative cultural blends” (p. 413) and as bridges to improve the outcome of negotiations that encompass two or more distinctive societies.

In addition to one’s developmental-relational history and the cultural context in which one lives, another very significant contributor to emotional competence, and which also profoundly influences the interpersonal negotiation *system*, is one’s moral disposition or personal integrity. I have been influenced in this regard by the philosopher Wilson (1993) and by various psychologists (Colby and Damon 1992; Walker and Hennig 1997), who have convincingly argued that personal integrity comes with a life lived in accord with one’s moral sense or disposition. Colby and Damon, in their case-oriented research on moral action and moral ideals, studied individuals who were characterized by their commitment to truth-seeking, open-mindedness,

compassion, flexibility, and a sensitivity to “doing the right thing” in their daily lives. Personal integrity was deeply valued by these individuals. Walker and Hennig (1997), in their review of moral development as part of personality, also argued that moral commitment and personal identity are inextricable from one’s social-emotional experience.

I believe that those individuals, whose lives reflect integrity, compassion, and open-mindedness, are simultaneously characterized by mature emotional competence. They can readily access the skills listed in Table 13.1 and deploy them in both ordinary and challenging situations. I recognize that an ethical perspective, much less an emphasis on ethics, does not consistently or explicitly show up in negotiation research and theory (but see Rivers and Lytle 2007, and Cohen 2010, for exceptions); however, I argue that concern with the ethical nature of the outcomes and of the processes of negotiation (e.g., collaborative versus aggressive approaches) as well as the personal integrity of the negotiators themselves is implicit in much of the literature on negotiation. To quote Gibson (2004): “In short, contemporary negotiation scholarship would be remiss to not deal with three ethical elements: the [negotiator’s] personal moral stance; issues which arise from treating negotiation as mutual problem solving, such as trust, disclosure, or beneficence; and the wider ethical considerations of justice, rights, equality, or welfare” (p. 750).

In summary, taking a systemic approach to negotiation means that one must be aware of how feedback within an unfolding episode of negotiation will include myriad significant influences, not the least of which are the qualities of the negotiators themselves. Their emotional competence skills, personal integrity, relational history, and cultural contexts are among the potent contributors to how that feedback loops back and forth in time to influence the eventual outcomes.

Social Exchange Theory, Emotional Competence, and Cooperative Processes

Social exchange theory (e.g., Blau 1964; Emerson 1976) has a common sense or intuitive appeal: individuals are invested in promoting and attain-

ing their own goals and yet can only do so if they interact with another. In short, self-interest is inextricably and somewhat paradoxically linked with interdependence. Friendships, buyers and sellers, management and labor unions, marriages, and so forth can be viewed through the lens of social exchange theory. Lawler and Thye (1999) provided a thoughtful review of how emotions affect social exchange, for, indeed, the actors engaged in the social transactions characterized by exchange are very much emoting individuals. Lawler and Thye suggested that emotions influence social exchange in three ways: The *context* in which the social exchange occurs, the *processes* involved in social exchange, and the eventual *outcomes* (or consequences) of social exchange. More specifically, in their analysis emotions influence exchange context through cultural norms about how emotions “should” be displayed or managed and by social position that conveys power or ascendance over others. Emotions influence exchange processes by the dynamic feedback that experiencing emotions provides to the actor as well as to one’s counterpart. Both internal sensory as well as cognitive feedback are involved here as in experiencing one’s flushing face when one has made a faux pas. Likewise, awareness of one’s own emotions and of the other’s emotional experience impacts how one subsequently acts; e.g., does one apologize for one’s gaffe or maybe compliment the other so as to mollify? Lastly, the outcomes and consequences of social exchange are intimately tied to emotional experience that derives from attributions of credit for the outcome (leading to feeling pride and satisfaction) or blame (leading to anger or shame). Joint interactions that result in productive and gratifying outcomes for both parties also tend to solidify the relationship between the parties, providing the foundation for future satisfying exchanges. Thus, cooperative exchanges (read negotiation here) are more helpful in building future alliances. More recently Elfenbein et al. (2010) undertook a study in which they analyzed participants in a round-robin simulation for their accuracy in posing emotional expressions (encoding) as well as accuracy in understanding others’ facial expressions (decoding). They discovered that emotion encoding and decoding had a moderately positive correlation

with a medium to large effect size. Although their study did not examine this dual-sided accuracy with regard to negotiation effectiveness, it is congruent with the Elfenbein et al. (2007) earlier study and suggests that self-awareness of one's own emotions may well go hand in hand with perceiving accurately what one's counterpart is emotionally experiencing nurturing cooperation processes (see also the complementary theoretical work on mindfulness and emotion management in Galluccio & Safran's chapter in this book; Kopelman et al. 2012). In a correlational study Cohen (2010) examined the role of empathy, perspective-taking, and guilt proneness in students who then rated various questionable negotiation and bargaining strategies. Cohen found that higher empathy was associated with negative attitudes toward lying and bribing, whereas greater perspective-taking did not. Guilt proneness was associated with a negative judgment of both making false promises and lying, but unexpectedly, empathy was not related to disapproval of false promises, which are, in fact, not factual lies until some future point when the promise proves to be empty. Complementing spoken language and its emotion-laden messages is research undertaken by Griessmair and Koeszegi (2009) on negotiation exchanges via email. Using complex content and scaling analyses, these authors found that "factual" statements do indeed convey considerable emotional intent and connotational richness. Both lexical and syntactic choices were analyzed, and systematic variation could be found in how integrative (mutual gain) versus distributive (individual gain) content interacted with low versus high dominance assertion. Over time, successful negotiations were also found to evolve differently than failed negotiations. The former moved toward content characterized by personal and cooperative overtures, while the failed negotiations contained content that was more negative and interpersonally distant.

A thoughtful review chapter on emotion displays in negotiation by Thompson et al. (2004) concluded that negotiators often have to deal with exchanges that entail finding common positions of agreement and yet also compete to maximize one's own gains. As a result, positive

displays are important for fostering cooperation and developing agreement between negotiators, but "poker face" or neutral displays may be more useful in distributive zero-sum exchanges.

Conclusions

The skills of emotional competence can be cultivated through education, exposure, humble recognition of and learning from mistakes (i.e., from emotional incompetence), and careful looking-and-learning from expert negotiators (video-taped records). It is my belief that the thoughtful individual can improve their negotiation effectiveness, if they make the effort to become well prepared with facts and cultural knowledge, adopt a stance of respect, and educate themselves about the basic emotional competence skills, meta-communicative awareness and emotional self-efficacy in conjunction with personal integrity. In so doing, negotiators will likely be far more effective in creating mutually shared value in the negotiation process and simultaneously managing the tension that is inevitable in also trying to maximize one's own outcome (i.e., claiming value). However, we need empirical research that teases apart these components of the person, of the process, and of the situational context facing the negotiators. Lastly, I want to acknowledge that negotiators often have to contend with poorly developed emotional competence skills of their constituencies or those whose interests and positions they are expected to represent. They face two kinds of pressures as they negotiate: external pressure from the counterpart and internal pressure placed on them by their superiors or constituencies (Galluccio 2011). An emotionally competent negotiator should be aware of this dichotomy and be able to detect diplomatically delicate issues, which if not adequately addressed, could bring the negotiation process toward dangerous paths and deteriorate working relationships.

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David R. Caruso

International Negotiation and Emotional Intelligence

Introduction

Emotions are a source of information or data. They can signal our intent to others and they can help us to assemble other forms of data, logical information, for instance, and help us decide, plan, and think more intelligently and successfully (Caruso and Salovey 2004).

Although there are many differences in emotional expressions and causes from person to person and from culture to culture, there also exist some universal components of emotions (Ekman 1992). For example, emotions have the same basic or universal cause from person to person, or culture to culture. The universal, or underlying cause, of happiness is gaining something of value. However, what you value and what I value can be unique to us as individuals. Thus, if you tell me that you are happy because you found a 1-cent piece on the sidewalk I might be perplexed. This would not bring me happiness. But what if you told me that the 1-cent coin you found was a lucky coin that your grandmother gave to you when you

were little and living with her and your grandfather? This 1-cent piece, whose value is just 1-cent in terms of commercial value, it possesses great value to you, certainly >1 cent.

It may be of great importance to understand these individual and cultural differences in emotion in order to successfully negotiate differences and resolve conflicts between people and groups. The ability to feel what others feel, to recognize their emotional reactions, and to understand why they feel as they do and the ability to manage complex feelings and emotions are all part of the theory of emotional intelligence (EI). These abilities can be used to better understand the emotional components of negotiation and to describe an emotionally intelligent negotiation approach.

In this chapter, I first describe what emotional intelligence is, and is not. Next, I provide more information on emotions and then review each of the four EI abilities and relate them to negotiation. Lastly, I propose a structured approach to emotionally intelligent negotiation.

What Is Emotional Intelligence?

Emotional intelligence means many things, and ever since a landmark article by that name was published in 1990 (Salovey and Mayer 1990), it has grown to refer to a wide variety of behaviors, traits, characteristics, and skills. Emotional intelligence is often referred to as “EQ” for

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emotional quotient, and EQ is used as a shorthand to refer to almost any aspect of human personality other than analytical intelligence or IQ (Gibbs 1995). The problem with such a creative approach to the use of language is that when a term is used to mean so many things, it begins to lose its value in describing important aspects of a person. And while traits such as assertiveness and optimism, which are included in some definitions of EQ, are important in their own right, such traits have been studied for decades by those conducting basic research on human personality.

The emotional intelligence described in this chapter is an intelligence, an ability that has to do with using emotions to help you think and the ability to think about emotions. As with any form of intelligence, it is actually related to standard intelligence or IQ and is not its opposite. This approach to emotional intelligence was first defined in that 1990 article by two psychologists, John D. (Jack) Mayer and Peter Salovey. Mayer and Salovey later revised their initial model and proposed a “four-branch model” of emotional intelligence in 1997. This four-branch model forms the basis of this chapter and we’ll look at these four branches in some detail.

This ability model of emotional intelligence is less well known than other approaches labeled emotional intelligence. These other approaches are often referred to as “EQ” for emotional quotient. In these approaches, IQ and EQ are often thought of as opposing one another and that if you are high in IQ, you are probably low in EQ. EQ is a shorthand way of referring to almost any positive trait or quality, ranging from “character” to assertiveness, optimism, initiative, leadership, or noncognitive skills. Such approaches have intuitive appeal to them, especially to a lay audience. The problem with such approaches is that they almost are always a relabeling of either traditional personality traits or traditional leadership competency models (Brackett and Mayer 2003). Therefore, I feel that it is better to study the original theories and research on personality or competency models rather than relying on “EQ” models and research. Therefore, in this chapter, our focus will be entirely on the ability model of EI which in my view is something different and a new approach to intelligence and negotiation.

What Are Emotions?

As noted above, emotions are signals. They are the result of some change in the environment, whether the world around you or the inner world—that is, your thoughts. Emotions have somewhat unique internal feelings associated with them and often have their own, unique expression. They prepare us for action and they help organize our thinking. Such an approach to emotions comes from those who posit that basic emotions exist and can be differentiated from one another. However, other researchers believe that basic emotions and universal emotions do not exist, that instead, they are creations of our unique cultures (see, e.g., Barrett and Russell 1999).

For our approach to emotional intelligence, the basic or universal approach to emotions is the better fit, and such an approach does recognize cultural differences in emotions, especially regarding emotional expression rules, called display rules. We’ll examine the culturally unique aspects of emotions later in this chapter.

The Ability Model of EI

Intelligence has been defined by many people in many different ways but the various definitions could be summarized as the ability to learn. Efforts to measure intelligence began in the early 1900s with the most successful effort coming from the work of Binet and colleague Simon who were commissioned to find a means to identify school children who needed extra assistance (see Matarazzo 1972). Since that time, other attempts to define and measure intelligence have been made. Efforts at defining a social intelligence, for example, were given up on after tests designed to measure social intelligence were found to correlate strongly with general intelligence measures. In other words, social intelligence was viewed as almost identical to the general ability to learn.

The challenge for any new intelligence is to pass the “Goldilocks Test.” A new intelligence cannot correlate too low with general intelligence because that would mean that it probably isn’t a standard form of intelligence. A new intelligence

cannot correlate too high with general intelligence because then it's just the same as general intelligence and adds nothing to our understanding of human abilities. The new intelligence and general intelligence need to correlate "just right." Emotional intelligence, defined and measured as a cognitive ability or standard intelligence, may meet the Goldilocks Test (see Mayer et al. 1999; Mayer et al. 2008).

The ability model of Mayer and Salovey (Salovey and Mayer 1990; Mayer and Salovey 1997) was first proposed in 1990 and their model was refined in 1997. It was next operationalized via a set of objectively scored assessments (Mayer et al. 1999). The definition and assessment of EI included four related abilities: the ability to accurately perceive emotions, the ability to use emotions to assist thinking, the ability to understand the causes of emotions, and the ability to manage emotions. We look at each of these in turn and reflect upon their importance in negotiations.

Perceiving Emotions

What Is Perceiving Emotions?

There is value in self-awareness and introspection but only if they are accurate. The first ability ensures that there is accurate emotional self-awareness as well as awareness of emotions in others and in the environment around us. "Reading people" is a complex skill but provides us with data about how a person is reacting to information we are presenting, how receptive they are, how entrenched in their beliefs, or how angry they might be with regard to a sense of injustice. There are cues to reading people's emotions from their words, their tone of voice, and the match or lack thereof between the two. Body language and posture also send powerful signals, although the interpretation of these can be culture specific and must be handled with great care.

What Role Does the Ability Play in Negotiations?

"How is it going?" we ask others or wonder about a situation we find ourselves in. The ability to accurately perceive emotions provides us with a

valuable source of information or data. Being aware of our own emotions allows us to better monitor our internal mood states which influence our decisions. This awareness also warns us about our level of engagement and how open we are to listen to both parties.

It is also important to create an environment for a negotiation where parties feel supported, respected, and heard. How we arrange the furniture and how we position ourselves and the various parties all send messages of respect or lack of interest.

The basic, or universal, emotions models and theories state that basic emotions have unique expressions and that these expressions are universal across cultures. However, such a statement may not make sense to negotiators who work across diverse cultures. Basic emotions theories also note that there are major differences across cultures in *display rules*, that is, the rules different cultures have about the emotions you consciously show in public. The emotionally intelligent negotiator must be extremely aware of emotional displays, the uncensored, initial expressions that are automatic. In that half a second, we can observe how people really feel before they assume a mask. It is this mask that is based on culture and which makes emotion perception such a difficult task in cross-cultural negotiations.

Using Emotions

What Is Using Emotions?

Emotions are known to derail us and to disrupt our thinking. We use phrases such as "blinded by rage" to indicate that emotions are not to be trusted. Yet, there is another side to emotions which is that emotions can facilitate thinking and help us make good decisions. For example, if our task is to generate a large number of creative ideas, it helps to be in a pleasant, high-energy mood. However, if you need to edit a document and do a careful read of a document, such cognitive activity is facilitated by being in an unpleasant, low-energy mood. The ability to match mood to task can also be used in order to

make meaningful emotional connections with other people. This ability allows you to form an emotional connection with another person even though your actual, concrete experiences may differ radically. The basis for such a connection is a shared emotional experience and shared feelings. As the other person relates a powerful experience to you, you can re-create the same, underlying feelings and therefore feel what the other person feels.

What Role Does the Ability Play in Negotiations?

Careful, analytical problem solving is facilitated by a low-key mood. There will be times when a negotiation will be facilitated by such a mood. The key is to consider each step and each stage of the negotiation process as requiring different types of thinking and, therefore, different moods and emotions. Careful attention to the various phases of a negotiation and the matching of the right mood could greatly enhance the effectiveness of the process.

More than that, though, is the possibility that enabling an emotional connection between parties can provide them with new perspectives on the “other.” Feeling the pain of the other parties could, potentially, enhance the understanding of the people involved in a negotiation process. Of course, emotional empathy does have a price, which is the price of feeling the pain others relate and experience. And for a professional negotiator, emotional empathy can lead to burnout and high levels of stress. The answer to this problem is not necessarily to feel less, if that is even possible, but to manage better. We look at the ability to manage emotions later.

Understanding Emotions

What Is Understanding Emotions?

Emotions have basic or universal causes. As we noted at the opening of this chapter, we are happy because we gain something of value. We are sad because we lose something of value. And we are angry when an important goal is blocked or when there is a perceived injustice. The fundamental,

underlying causes of emotions belie strikingly varied specific causes of basic emotions. While EI is viewed as a set of abilities crossing multiple cultures and, indeed, almost culturally universal, there are striking individual and cultural differences in specific causes of emotions. At the individual level, what we perceive as an injustice varies greatly. A colleague, for example, finds upsetting when a meeting begins or ends late. Another colleague habitually runs late and thinks nothing of it. Cultural differences in values are tremendous and are well beyond the scope of this present chapter.

Emotions also follow a set of rules. They have known causes and follow a certain trajectory. In normal personality, we are usually not suddenly enraged. The expression, “a slow boil,” suggests that we may start out irritated or frustrated. If the source of our frustration is not addressed, it grows into annoyance. If our demands and requests are still ignored, annoyance over time grows to anger, and then if our core values are violated in a negotiation, this anger becomes rage. It usually does not “just happen”.

What Role Does the Ability Play in Negotiations?

Empathy has an emotional and a cognitive component. The second ability is the ability to feel what others feel—emotional empathy—whereas Understand Emotions is about understanding why people have the emotions they have—cognitive empathy. An understanding of the emotional triggers of people in negotiations is critical. It is equally important in successful negotiations to conduct what we call an “emotional what-if analysis,” which is an analysis of how people might react to various events. Using one’s understanding of universal emotional rules and combining it with knowledge you gain about culture-specific or individual-specific causes of emotions allow the negotiator to navigate better through potential obstacles. It is important to follow through on hypothetical actions, to consider how someone might react to various alternatives, strategies, and offers. While not as complex as a master playing chess, the emotionally intelligent negotiator should look forward more than one or two steps and consider various options’ emotional costs.

Managing Emotions

What Is Managing Emotions?

Perhaps the most important of the four abilities, Manage Emotions likely plays an important role in successful negotiations as well as in the lives of negotiators themselves. One of the premises of emotional intelligence is that emotions contain data and are a source of information. At the same time, emotions can be unwelcomed and unwanted and many of us suppress the experience of emotions in our attempt to be rational actors. The problem with emotional suppression as our main strategy is that we spend cognitive resources and have little room left to process information. We also fail to consider the emotional data available to us and we make decisions that might be considered “too logical.”

Managing emotions involves managing emotions in yourself as well as in others. Techniques which some people believe work to manage stress, for example, may not be effective. Drinking alcohol can provide very short-term relief but it is not an effective stress management strategy.

What Role Does the Ability Play in Negotiations?

Managing emotions helps us cope. More than that, however, is the fact that emotions can be painful and they can cause stress. If we possess strong emotion management skills, we may be less susceptible to the effects of stress, both acute and long term. And if we can effectively manage emotions of others, we can guide them to remain calm enough to consider various options and strategies during the process of negotiation.

We can also consider the well-being of the professional negotiator. Dealing with life and death issues, or with more limited, local issues, can be stressful. But stress and our reaction to it is a function of two factors. One factor is the objective amount of stress in the environment. For example, a birthday is a source of stress, albeit at a low level. A major life event, such as the birth of a child, no matter how joyous it may be, is also a stressor. In addition, these stressors are additive, so a birthday and a birth add up and put strain on our emotional resources. The second factor in our experience of stress is our ability to manage emotions. A person on the lower end of the emotion management abil-

ity spectrum will experience stress during the weekend of the birthday and birth, whereas someone with stronger emotion management ability will not be stressed.

The Emotionally Intelligent Negotiator

What an Emotionally Intelligent Negotiator May Do

We must admit that our formal knowledge of negotiation is limited. Yet, we also believe that the principles of EI apply fairly broadly and that they can assist a negotiator in a number of ways. EI as a model is not designed to replace standard negotiation techniques; it is meant to supplement them. The emotionally intelligent negotiator is likely to:

- Accurately attend to her own emotions
- Accurately detect the emotions of various parties
- Utilize different emotions to facilitate aspects of the negotiation
- Understand the underlying motivations and causes for deep-seated resentments, anxieties, and hopes for the negotiation process
- Manage her own emotions to allow her to maintain focus and leverage emotional insight in constructive ways rather than being swamped by emotions
- Manage the complex emotions of the various parties, allowing them to experience and express their feelings in ways that can be heard by others

Table 14.1 summarizes some of the possible applications of emotional intelligence to negotiations using the examples of hypothetical people who are either less or more skilled in emotional intelligence.

Cultural Aspects of the Emotionally Intelligent Negotiator

Emotional intelligence is generally not culturally specific. That’s the good news. The principles outlined in this chapter apply quite broadly.

Table 14.1 Emotional intelligence abilities and negotiation

		Level of emotional intelligence	
		Low	High
Emotional intelligence ability	Perceive	May incorrectly identify others' emotions	Accurate self- and other-awareness of emotions
	Use	Lacks emotional empathy and can fail to use emotions in helpful ways	Connects emotionally with others and matches the mood to the task
	Understand	Emotional reactions can surprise, poor at communicating emotions	Excellent emotion vocabulary enhances communications and can conduct accurate affective forecasting
	Manage	May get overwhelmed and fail to calm others down	Stays focused and calm and is able to keep others calm as well

The bad news is that there exist a few differences in EI across cultures that can be quite problematic if not carefully attended to. Let's examine the cultural universals first.

Whether you believe that there are basic or universal emotions or not, it does appear that a smiling face is usually recognized as expressing happiness in most cultures. Anger is usually represented by firmly compressing the lips and sometimes with a snarl or baring of the teeth. Thus, the negotiator should be able to detect how the parties in the negotiation are feeling. Emotions, for the most part, have the same underlying causes. As noted before, we are happy because we have gained something of value and we are angry when our goals are blocked or values compromised.

But emotional expressions and emotional causes have unique aspects to them across cultures. One of the most significant differences is in emotion expression, especially the area known as display rules. Display rules are culturally determined schemas for the conscious expression of emotions. For example, in certain parts of the United States, one can express significant displeasure and even anger at another with a phony smile (lips curl up but the eyes do not have the telltale crinkle) and in a sweet voice say "bless your little heart." While traveling in Japan, my actions are often greeted with the same phony smile and accompanied by my host nodding his head and saying "hai" (yes). Of course, such a display suggests that the host is not happy with my actions but a strong cultural display rule takes over.

Emotions have the same basic cause, but at the same time, there are significant cultural as well as individual differences in specific causes. Take the example of anger. While I am often late to a meeting and do not care very much if someone else is late to a meeting I have called, one of my colleagues has a different value system. He always starts and ends his meetings on time and is annoyed by those who show up late, and without explanation. Promptness is something he values greatly. Here, culture can refer to societies and large groups, but it is important to also understand such individual differences among people.

There are many culturally specific behaviors as well, but these are well beyond the scope of this chapter. We are dealing with emotions and, for the most part, with emotional universals. We certainly recognize that various gestures and nonverbal signals can be interpreted very differently as a function of one's culture.

An Emotionally Intelligent Approach to Negotiation

Emotional intelligence, and particularly the ability model of emotional intelligence described in this chapter, has direct connections to the practice of international negotiations. You can examine each of the four abilities one by one and apply them to the practice of successful negotiation, but we now put these abilities together to create a structured and integrated format for international negotiations which we

call an emotional intelligence blueprint. The blueprint (Caruso and Salovey 2004) is a rather simple device to assist people in addressing complex interpersonal emotion-based problems but its application can be quite complex.

It all starts with a simple question, “how are you feeling?” and with a related question, “how are the various parties involved in the negotiation feeling?” The question is easy, and the answer can be hard. The answer is hard because when you ask someone the question they may not be aware of their feelings, and if they are, they may hesitate to tell you. You need to use all the powers of observation available to you, perhaps channeling your inner Sherlock Holmes as you collect data. Tone of voice, body posture, and observing people’s behavior provide clues to their underlying feelings.

Once you have accurate data in hand, you must allow these emotions and feelings to influence your thinking, and as you do, as you take on the emotions, especially of others, you develop a connection with them and you generate emotional empathy. Emotional empathy provides an unspoken connection between people and creates what colleague John D. Mayer calls an “emotional theater of the mind.” Imagine seeing the world through the eyes of someone else. How do they perceive the world, and what is their perspective? Such perspective is yet another data point to leverage in the process of negotiation.

Before these emotions wash over you and sweep you out to sea, your more rational and logical skills come to the fore. What is the cause of these feelings, and what is their source? You can then engage in “affective forecasting,” conducting emotional what-if analyses as you play an internal chess game, trying to determine how people will react to various alternative suggestions and negotiation strategies.

These other steps are precursors to the most important step in the process, that of managing emotions. Emotion management includes managing your own emotions first, staying calm and focused, and avoiding burnout so that you are at your peak. Once you can focus, you can attend to the emotional climate of the negotiation, calm down each party, and, at times, motivate and

inspire them to continue to engage with one another and to stay open to new ideas and ways of viewing the situation and one another.

It is unlikely that any one person can constantly engage in these tasks all of the time. Team approaches to negotiation, having a negotiation partner, taking frequent breaks, and, above all, going into the situation with an emotionally intelligent blueprint, can all increase the odds of achieving a successful negotiation.

EI and Cooperation and Competition in Negotiation

An emotionally intelligent approach to international negotiations does not mean that “everyone wins” or that all parties are happy at the end. That’s not the intent of such an approach. However, it is likely that by understanding what drives the various parties, what motivates them, what makes them happy, and what angers them, the skillful negotiator will manage the process to enhance cooperation. Conflict is unavoidable and is part of the process, but the overlay of these EI principles into the negotiation process can help to achieve a result where the conflicts are better understood and do not become insurmountable.

Intra- and Interpersonal Applications of EI to International Negotiations

Some negotiators believe that the work itself has resulted in them becoming psychologically hardy or resilient. Some of them might report that years at the negotiation table have given them the ability to cope with strong emotions. That is possible, but we have a competing hypothesis: people who possess strong EI skills and become negotiators are more likely to stay in the field over the years because they are not as burnt out as other who enter the fray and flail around. This is not to say that the skills underlying EI cannot be learned, simply that the stress involved in this profession is great and that EI skills are critical in terms of intrapersonal applications. Among the four emotional intelligence skills, managing

emotions is obviously the most important in terms of intrapersonal aspects of international negotiation. The stress of such negotiations can be overwhelming and survival in this demanding field likely requires well-developed emotion management skills.

Anecdotally, we find that people high on Understand Emotions, those with keen insight of why people feel the way they feel and have a sophisticated emotion vocabulary, indeed have deeper and more accurate information about the well-being of others. These people have a good deal of cognitive empathy, a key component of interpersonal relationships.

Training EI Skills for International Negotiators

Emotional intelligence skills can be developed, or compensatory strategies taught, to international negotiators. Sometimes, mere awareness can assist negotiators to make better decisions. People make decisions based on how they feel, and often, emotions can help in the decision-making process (Damasio 1994). However, it is critical to determine whether the feeling you have is integral to the decision you face or incidental. Consider, for example, a recent study on feelings and decision making (Yip and Côté 2013). People low on EI, when made to feel anxious, were less willing to take a risk than people high on EI. Why? When you feel anxious you want to reduce your anxiety and so take the safe path. The Yip and Cote study went one additional step, and in another study, the experimenters told research participants who were made to feel anxious before taking a risk-taking survey that sometimes people's feelings, unrelated to the current task, can actually impact your decisions. The result of this brief "training" intervention was that both low and high EI participants showed no impact of incidental or unrelated anxiety on decision making.

Studies like these, and others, suggest that considering one's feelings and analyzing the sources of their feelings can assist international negotiators make better, or at least more-informed, decisions. There are few outcome studies of training interventions, and so, much of

the training which occurs in the emotional intelligence domain may or may not be effective, and so, considerable caution is warranted when discussing training for negotiators. Teaching negotiators to use the Emotion Blueprint can also assist them in being more attuned to the emotions of all participants in the negotiation process.

Conclusions

Simply put, emotions contain data. While they may derail conversations and inject unexpected difficulties into a negotiation, they are a source of information and inspiration. They exist and they are flowing throughout every interaction you have. You can choose to ignore them of course, but doing so does not mean they stop existing and cease having an influence on the negotiation.

The international negotiator has a complex role to play, and overlaying this emotional intelligence approach may seem to make a difficult job nearly impossible. However, we believe that by taking an intelligent approach to emotions, by utilizing the four abilities of emotional intelligence to harness the power of emotions, you will achieve even greater success in this worthwhile endeavor.

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From Conflict to Peace Through Emotional Regulation and Cooperation

15

Felicity de Zulueta

Introduction

When approaching the subject of conflict resolution within the context of international negotiations, what strikes one immediately is how much more has been written about the reasons for making wars rather than ending them, let alone preventing them. Conflicts are all around us in the news reports from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Africa, many of which follow recent wars that were waged in order to ensure ‘democracy’ and ‘security in the face of terrorism’. However, in 2005, the Oxford Research Group, experts in the field conflict resolution and violence prevention, predicted that the ‘war on terror’ and the conflict in Iraq would achieve the opposite of its stated aim and increase the power base of the Wahhabi Jihad movement, which it unfortunately has (Rogers 2011). But then war is big business for some states: in 2010, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI 2011), the world military expenditure was estimated to have reached \$1.63 trillion which represents an increase of 50 % since 2001. This corresponded to \$236 for each person in the world. In 2011 the USA’s military spending accounted for just under half of the world’s total.

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There is therefore a vested interest in trying to convince people and their leaders that fighting wars and killing or oppressing others is part of ‘human nature’, a belief which is however not based on current scientific evidence but more on the religious beliefs and values of those who feel they make sense of the way they experience and perceive the world (de Zulueta 2006a). Indeed, even though Darwin’s concept of ‘survival of the fittest’ is repeatedly used to scientifically justify man’s violence, unregulated capitalism and inequality, there has been little interest in his findings relating to the value of our social instincts. Not only did he rank them as highly beneficial to animals, including man, but he emphasised that the most important of these are ‘love and the distinct emotion of *sympathy*’, which we now refer to as *empathy*. He concluded his study of the social instincts by stating that ‘they have in all probability been acquired through natural selection’. Darwin had a particular interest in ‘*sympathy*’ which ‘impels man to aid his fellows’ and which he recognised as being influenced by ‘the praise or blame of his fellows’ (Darwin 1871, pp. 610–611). Few refer to this aspect of Darwin’s work, although it was in fact setting the scene for the current scientific interest in attachment and human development, having recognised that the social instincts contribute to our survival through natural selection.

Referring to the two opposing views regarding human nature, Montagu wrote, ‘they represent not only two ways of looking at human beings—important enough in itself—but also two ways of

being human. And that has implications for us as individuals, as societies and as survivors' (1976, p. 11). It also has important implications for negotiators who, in their strivings to resolve conflicts and find equitable solutions, are promoting an aspect of humanity that has been much neglected as we face increasing violence and destruction in so many parts of the world as well as the all too likely devastation caused by man-made climate change.

In 1999 Fisk stated, 'Negotiation and mediation permeate virtually every dimension of contemporary international conflict resolution. It is especially important then, to consider ways that new approaches to negotiation and media can inform practice'. And, what we are now witnessing is an increasing interest in what the field of neuropsychology and biological sciences is beginning to reveal in terms of how the human mind responds to its surroundings and how these responses influence not only the way we act and think but even the way we perceive the world. Whilst the contribution of our genetic inheritance remains important, what happens to us during our early development is turning out to have an important implications in terms of how we think and behave. Anais Nin summed it up when she said 'we see things as we are'. This raises the most important and relevant question of our times which is now preoccupying many researchers in the field of neuroscience and biology: what are we then? The last 20 years have seen a huge amount of research into brain imaging showing us how the human brain 'appears' to work in different contexts and these findings are being taught and applied in many fields such as in business management and law schools in the USA (Birke 2011; Schore and McIntosh 2011). Despite the fact that some of this science involving brain scans is still rife with errors (Button et al. 2013), many of its findings, usually backed up by other research evidence from the field of neuropsychology and neurobiology, are beginning to be seen to be applicable to the field of conflict resolution (Lack and Bogacz 2012).

The briefest foray into the literature on conflict resolution and international negotiations soon makes us aware of the complexity of the issues

negotiators have to work with in order to facilitate a constructive dialogue that can lead to a satisfactory solution for the different parties involved. A new approach based on recent neuropsychological research on the human brain has appeared on the scene which claims to be able to provide a way of facilitating the process of negotiations leading to more positive resolutions. It may also be less costly both financially and emotionally. If these claims are validated, this approach might also enable international organisations, such as the United Nations, for example, ensure that their negotiations are run in a manner that is more in keeping with the spirit of its founders whose aim was to achieve peace and security.

In this paper, I will attempt to outline the bare bones of the process of conflict resolution and some of the emotional and cognitive problems that international negotiators tend to encounter which can often result in an unsatisfactory outcome. In order to understand some of the potential obstacles to a successful negotiation, I will summarise interesting research in the field of multilingualism, before outlining relevant findings in the study of the neuro-development of the human brain and the formation of the *self* and its contribution to 'what we are', both in 'normal' conditions and following psychological traumatisations. This evidence will lead us to consider different ways in which these new findings could be used to inform the way international negotiations are run in the future so as to achieve a more constructive outcome for all concerned. I will end by considering the possible benefit some preparatory training might give negotiators and also 'neutrals' or facilitators involved in these processes.

Current Recommended New Approaches to Conflict Resolution

Conflicts occur when people or other parties perceive, that as consequence of a disagreement, there is a threat to their needs, interests or concerns. As participants in conflicts tend to respond on the basis of how they perceive a situation, some experts in the field of conflict

resolution suggest that any negotiation aimed at resolving a conflict, could do well by first clarifying the nature of the disagreement: the true disagreement and the ‘perceived’ disagreement may be quite different from one another and thereby influence the level of perceived threat. In so doing, the participants can begin to acknowledge the possibility that perceptions may vary between individuals: this can be of major importance in informing how the next stage of the process is conducted.

Most of us are aware, at least in theory, that people perceive a situation on the basis of their values, their cultural beliefs, the information they have, their past experience, their gender and other variables. However, many of these attributes have important psychological dimensions which, until recently, have been generally ignored. For example, currently tensions are building up between China and Japan: in the eyes of the Westerners, the bigger threat comes from China but, from the Chinese perspective, Japan can still be perceived as very threatening in the light of its past military occupation during the Second World War. Any attempt to defuse this situation may need to take this into account.

The field of conflict resolution has come up recently with a wide range of ‘appropriate dispute resolution’ or ‘ADR’ processes which have essentially been seen as either ‘competitive and adversarial’ or ‘interest based and cooperative’.

The first can be described as a ‘tug of war’ of position, each side trying to influence the other party to reach a compromise closer to its starting position. Parties will often use power and frequently escalate into one side perceiving the other side as being ‘stubborn or in bad faith’ which then often escalates into seeing the other as being a ‘threat’ that needs to be controlled. This adversarial approach is in fact the default position for most American and British lawyers and negotiators.

However, an alternative ‘cooperative’ approach is gaining ground in the USA despite the fact that it is much more counter-intuitive. One of its approaches is called the ‘win-win’ approach, and it is about changing the negotiation process from an adversarial attack and a defensive

process to one based on cooperation, moving from a power struggle to one that says, ‘I want to win and I want you to win too’ (Goldfien and Robbennolt 2007).

One of the prescribed ways to achieve this is to begin by eliciting the underlying needs of each negotiating representative rather than searching for solutions: in some cases the different needs may end up being complementary but, even if they are not, the act of simply acknowledging the needs of each party means acknowledging and valuing those needs rather than denying them: such an approach provides the appropriate background for potential future cooperation. But perhaps, one of its main benefits is that it also means *attacking the problems rather than the people* involved, a far less threatening approach and therefore less likely to antagonise the negotiators.

This cooperative approach also allows for a more creative response as it involves turning problems into *possibilities* or looking at them as *challenges*. The usual adversarial approach would be to try and find the most ‘perfect solution’ for each party concerned: this brings with it judgmental values, rigid beliefs, having to be seen to be right, blame and, as a result, a sense of low self-esteem in the participants. Instead, looking for *possibilities* leads to a ‘process of discovery’ which allows for exploration, enthusiasm, taking a risk, playing with ideas and experimentation and results in a higher level of self-esteem in the negotiators.

It is clear from the descriptions given above, that for the ‘cooperative’ approach to be successfully implemented people must be able to both understand and make the other feel that he or she *is understood at a cognitive and emotional level*, a process that is referred to as *empathy* and which, as we will see, involves two different approaches. Thus, if we go back to the negotiator, he or she is trying to get as clear a picture as possible of the other side’s views and feelings by being an *active listener*, i.e. asking questions and checking back that he or she has heard and understood the relevant details so as to finally be able to summarise and feedback correctly what the speaker has said. This involves a *cognitive level of empathy*, the capacity to put oneself in

the mind of the other. However, *empathy* also involves making the ‘other’ *feel* that his or her feelings are being acknowledged and shared (even if they are not openly spoken about because it might be culturally inappropriate to do so). These two aspects of empathy, the emotional and the cognitive, involve, as we will see, the *limbic system*, a collection of structures in the brain that deal with emotions, memory, behaviour, motivation and olfaction as well as the *supraorbital frontal hemisphere* of the brain.

For the cooperative process to be sustained, this empathic attitude needs to be maintained by the negotiator, without resorting to retaliation, even when under verbal attack, so as to allow the speaker feel that he or she is being sympathetically acknowledged. It is not easy for a negotiator, having to represent the needs of his or her side, to both understand and empathise whilst at the same time not agreeing with the other side if their needs are different.

Finally, once the heat has been taken out of the situation, the negotiator who has been listening becomes the one who speaks and conveys his/her side’s needs and difficulties by showing the appropriate assertiveness. This give and take process between negotiators is gradually directed towards looking at these difficulties and differences as positive possibilities and creative challenges. In this way the power of cooperation continues to be sustained with the aim of achieving a ‘win-win’ outcome.

Just from this simplified description of a possible negotiating scenario, we can see how difficult and yet important it is for the participants to be able to stay calm and not to be carried away by feelings of fear, anger or humiliation.

For most of us, feelings and emotions are more or less the same thing, but for a neuroscientist, a *feeling* is defined as the conscious awareness of an *emotion*, and the *emotion* is the physical awareness of what’s happening in the cells and tissues of the body. For example, the emotions underlying ‘fear’ trigger a reaction in our body that makes our heart thump and our palms sweat, sensations we quickly recognise as those of feeling frightened. These same emotions relating to fear also cause our brains to focus on self-protection

and survival by turning off our capacity to empathise with the other. Unfortunately, this also leads to a reduced capacity to think clearly and creatively. It is for this reason that it is so important for negotiators to be able to *regulate their emotions* as will become clearer when we look at the neuropsychology of the brain under stress (Thayer et al. 2009).

Last, but not least, the demands faced by negotiators in international negotiations can become even more challenging and complex when they involve participants who speak different languages and who come from different cultures. In many parts of Africa, the Middle East and Asia, for example, the need to preserve one’s honour and that of one’s community is terribly important and, if this is neglected or threatened, it can lead to further conflict. For example, in some Asian cultures—such as China—it is of paramount importance not to be seen to ‘lose face’. This term is a complex one which can be simplistically summarised as being made to suffer public disgrace or humiliation with profound implications at the level of the *self*, i.e. of how an individual sees himself or herself in the eyes of the others.

Potential Linguistic and Cultural Issues in International Negotiations

As someone who was brought up in five languages during my childhood, I am very aware of how a language can embody both a culture and one’s personal identity. Borges (1970) acknowledged the power of language a tradition, as a way of grasping reality. Balint (1968) believed that for those who can speak a second language, emotionally charged communications cannot be expressed equally in different languages. He described each word as surrounded by a cluster of associations which is different in every language and different in varying human relations using the same language.

My professional interest in languages began when I was working on a locked ward of a psychiatric hospital where I met a 19-year-old Englishman who was diagnosed as suffering from a recurring history bipolar disorder. He was studying languages and had learnt Spanish after puberty.

One day, whilst still severely disturbed and suffering from hallucinations and thought disorder, we were talking in my office when he playfully picked up my phone and began to talk to me in Spanish, knowing that I spoke the language. When he spoke to me in this language he appeared quite coherent and showed no evidence of the thought disorder I had witnessed a few minutes before. He looked puzzled and repeated the call twice and then remarked, still in Spanish: "Isn't it strange but when I speak to you in Spanish my mind is quite clear and when I talk to you in English I become all confused" (de Zulueta 1984). I could not but agree!

On reviewing the literature, I discovered that the same phenomenon had been observed with other psychotic bilinguals who learnt their second language after puberty, a remarkable finding which highlights the importance of language in influencing the way our brain functions (de Zulueta 1984; de Zulueta et al. 2001).

When looking at studies on bilinguals who were not psychotic, I found that for some, to speak or write in a second language was a way of distancing themselves from painful emotions. This was the case for the author Samuel Beckett who took to writing in French and living in France in order to escape the apparently suffocating influence of his mother (Casement 1982). It also applies to many traumatised patients who choose to use their second language in therapy so as to avoid disturbing memories and feelings related to their childhood, for example (de Zulueta 1984, 1995).

Krapf (1955) described a young German patient who, when she spoke in her mother tongue, was frightened of being poisoned or destroyed. She lived with her husband in the same building as her parents. Since her marriage, she had not been interested in sexual intercourse, had given up domestic work and was eating less and less. Her German-speaking mother brought her to treatment and her father paid for it.

The analysis began in German and was a nightmare: the patient was late, silent and critical. Once, however, she complained that her husband did not talk in Spanish, the language she had spoken to the servants and her playmates. At this point...the analyst switched to Spanish. From

then on progress was evident. The patient left her analysis weighing 10 kg more and at the beginning of a joyously welcomed pregnancy.

Ervin (1964) carried out a study on proficient English-French bilinguals in Canada using the Thematic Apperception Test and found that there was a shift in content depending on the language used. For example, the need for achievement was greater in women when they spoke in English rather than French. There was also more verbal aggression in French stories and more physical aggression in English stories. Ervin suggested that these differences resulted from differences in perception and recall of experiences depending on the language used. She concludes that they behaved as if 'they had two different personalities, at least, as far as their personality involved verbal behaviour'.

A study on 'dominant' bilinguals (who do not speak their second language fluently) showed that they felt ill at ease when speaking in their second language and that they were also more likely to perceive their listeners less favourably and to see themselves as less intelligent, less confident and less friendly in that language. These dominant bilinguals felt more relaxed in their mother tongue (Segalowitz 1976). The use of interpreters with these 'dominant' bilinguals in therapy showed that they felt better understood when they used their interpreter (Kline et al. 1980).

The reasons for these differences in perception in bilinguals and the different mental states relative to the language used seen in psychotic patients have been found to be linked to differences in brain organisation and function depending on which language is used, at what age it was learnt and in what cultural context it was learnt (de Zulueta 1984, 1995; de Zulueta et al. 2001).

Writing about Western culture, Foulkes, a group analyst wrote:

In a community which stresses individual property and competition, a configuration has arisen which created the individual person as if existing in isolation... Yet one of the surest observations one can make is that what the individual is preconditioned to the core by the community even before he is born and imprinted vitally by the group that brings him up. This concerns even the

genetic inheritance and still more his psychology, insofar as this developed in the interaction between him, objects and persons. (Foulkes and Anthony 1957, p. 23)

What the examples above show us is that we have to pay more than lip service to the idea that language embodies both a culture and individual identity. Language can be seen as the agent of transmission of cultural attributes and values as it embodies, through its form and content, the communication patterns and relationship models that are intrinsic to the community from which it is derived. Metaphorically it could be said that language is to culture what DNA is to genetics. Deutscher gives a wealth of examples as to how language influences not only our perception of things and people but also our thinking. He shows that ‘the way language carves up the world into concepts has not just been determined for us by nature, and that what we find “natural” depends largely on the conventions we have been brought up on’. He also shows ‘that the linguistic conventions of our society can affect aspects of our thought that go beyond language’ such as ‘spatial coordinates and their consequences for memory patterns and orientation, grammatical gender and its impact on associations, the concept of colour which can increase our sensitivity to colour distinctions’ (2010, p. 234).

We need to be aware of these findings in our understanding of people who speak different languages: the need for some people to maintain their own sense of identity by speaking their primary language or mother tongue may be particularly relevant in the context of international negotiations, particularly if they don’t speak it well or if the language used in the negotiations is that of a historical oppressor. Some individuals, on the other hand, may choose to speak a second language for the reasons I mentioned earlier. Skilled cross-cultural simultaneous interpreters should therefore be made available so that negotiators can choose to speak the language they feel most comfortable with in that particular setting and even allow them to ‘switch’ language if it helps them to keep their emotions under control as some bilingual patients do when in treatment (Krapf 1955). This may prevent a lot of avoidable

difficulties for, as can be seen by the following example, even within our own multi-ethnic communities linguistic misunderstandings can lead to serious and potentially harmful results:

Dr Byng Hall, a colleague of mine, (personal communication), was asked to see a Nigerian woman whose children were no longer attending school. On this home visit, he took with him a Nigerian woman who would act as an interpreter. The family included a mother who lived in a council flat and appeared to be socially isolated. She was an illegal immigrant of many years standing who could not risk returning to her family lest she were unable to return to the UK. Her husband and his second wife lived nearby. The mother appeared to be psychotic because she had paranoid delusions and had recently taken her children out of school and refused to let them return despite having had to appear in court. She had also broken all relations with her doctors thus endangering the life of one of her daughter’s who suffered from a blood dyscrasia.

Though this mother spoke good English, my colleague decided to use another acculturated Nigerian as both a ‘foster parent’ and an interpreter to act as a bridge between the mother’s culture and the British one. He briefed her carefully telling her what he wanted her to do, and together, they made their first domiciliary visit. At first the mother reacted angrily. She said that she felt frightened of losing her children to social services. But then, Dr Byng Hall described how his interpreter “took off” both non-verbally and verbally, speaking in the Nigerian dialect of the family. She touched and caressed the mother and spoke freely of her own difficulties in adapting to this country. He noticed the mother relax before him and, by the end of the first session, she was smiling warmly. A second meeting with the ‘foster mother’ sufficed to get the children back to school and for the family to re-establish normal social contacts. Dr Byng Hall also learnt why the mother had broken off all contact with society when her English doctor diagnosed one of her children as suffering from ‘chicken pox’: she saw this as a final attack and part of an English conspiracy against her since her son had not been anywhere near a chicken! (de Zulueta 1995).

The Key to Emotional Regulation and the Cooperative Approach

So far we have learnt that to maximise our intellectual capacity, we need to be able to regulate our emotions. Unfortunately, as Darwin hypothesised, this is not a given but an acquired

ability determined by the way our brains have been moulded in our first 2–3 years of life.

We owe it to Bowlby (1988) to have made us aware of the importance of our early attachment relations in determining how we feel and think. He had noticed the effects that separation and loss had on children in the context of a post-war Britain. But, it was Harlow's work (1974) on the effects of maternal deprivation in primates that finally led Bowlby to 'discover' the hitherto unrecognised and yet fundamental motivational system that drives human development which he called the *attachment system*. He concluded that human infants are genetically predisposed to want access to their attachment figure—particularly when they are in need or frightened—and that this behaviour is normally reciprocated by their parents (Bowlby 1988). His work has led to an enormous amount of research, particularly in the field of emotions.

We now know that the psychobiological substrate of human attachment behaviour involves a large part of the right cerebral hemisphere and, in particular, the orbitofrontal cortex which is involved in regulating our emotional responses and our capacity to *empathise* with others. It also regulates our levels of arousal and, via the autonomic nervous system (ANS), our visceral functions and our response to danger (Schore 1996).

Empathy and the Mirror Neurones

Having outlined earlier the importance of empathy and emotional regulation when attempting to resolve conflicts by using a 'cooperative win-win' approach, the orbitofrontal cortex is therefore of obvious importance to the conduct of international negotiations. However, for it to be able to function effectively, it needs to have had the right kind of early stimulation.

When human infants are born, unlike other mammals, they do not have the ability to regulate their arousal and emotional reactions nor can they gratify their needs or maintain psychological or physiological homeostasis. It is through the development of their attachment to their caregiver(s) that a complex process of psychobiological attunement or *empathy* takes place between them: the

sensitive caregiver responds to the infant's signals through holding, caressing, feeding, smiling and by giving meaning to the infant's different experiences. This normally results in the infant's early physiological and *emotional systems* being regulated by his or her primary caregiver, functions she/he gradually acquires throughout early development whilst countless other brain activities are moulded and stimulated into action. During this extraordinary process, the baby's brain, which at birth has 50 trillion synapses or connections between its neurones, has by the age of three 1,000 trillion such synapses. As a result, with a sensitive caregiver, the infant gradually acquires the capacity to *regulate his or her emotions* and *empathise* with others.

This process begins a few hours after birth as newborn infants are seen to mimic facial expressions and later they can remember and imitate a gesture performed by an adult the previous day. They will also cry in response to the cry of another and, at 18 months, they will offer to help another child or adult in distress if they can (Schore 2001, 2003).

These behaviours arise as a result of specialised neurones called 'mirror neurones' which were discovered in the primate infant's brain by Rizzolatti, Gallese and others (Gallese 2006; Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004; Rizzolatti 2005). These neurones respond to the parent's facial expressions and movements resulting in the infant imitating his or her parents and other people's facial and body movements. So, if the mother smiles, the infant smiles and, in so doing, he or she feels what the parent is feeling: this *embodied simulation* leads to the sharing of emotions or *emotional empathy*.

'Internal representations of the body states associated with the actions, emotions, and sensations are evoked in the observer as if he/she would be doing a similar action or experiencing a similar emotion or sensation' (Gallese 2006, p. 18). To illustrate embodied simulation, we can imagine seeing someone about to have their hand smashed by a falling rock: without any conscious thought, we find ourselves removing our hand, and, if the stranger's hand is hit, we also feel their pain.

Gallese hypothesises that this capacity for *embodied simulation* also enables infants to intuitively sense the intention of others as early as

about 15–24 months. But the capacity to attribute thoughts, desires and intentions to others, to predict or explain their actions and to posit their intentions which is called *theory of mind* does not develop until around the age of four and requires, in Gallese's view, the activation of much larger areas of the brain.

It is important to note at this point that the area of the brain involved in the perception of emotional pain, such as experiencing social exclusion, is the same area involved in the perception of physical pain (Eisenberger et al. 2003; Panksepp 2003).

From the beginning of their life, human infants become alert to the physical and emotional availability of their caregivers: the latter may be either sensitive and responsive to the child's attachment needs or rejecting, frightening and unpredictable. These repeated experiences are synthesised by the *mirror neurones* in the infant's brain to become what Bowlby (1988) called 'internal working models' or internal representations of how the attachment figure is likely to respond to the child's attachment behaviour. These findings have become the focus of research in the field of attachment using the Strange Situation in infants (Ainsworth et al. 1978; Main and Hesse 1992). These researchers found that one year old infants responded in different ways to separation from their caregivers depending on how secure their attachment was to that caregiver and this in turn determined how, both in childhood and adulthood, these individuals expect to be responded to when in need of support and help.

The development of the individual's sense of identity or *self* is closely intertwined with the way his or her parents responded to him or her so, for example, a *securely attached* person will expect to be responded to when in need. As a result, these securely attached children feel confident and are capable of empathy and forming good attachments which protect them from traumatising in potentially traumatic situations (Schoore 2001).

So what happens to those infants whose parents are unable to give them the sensitive and containing early infant care described above? These infants develop insecure attachments based

on the different strategies they have developed to maintain proximity to their caregiver in order to survive. Three types of insecure attachment behaviours have been recognised using the Strange Situation (Ainsworth et al. 1978; Main and Hesse 1992). The percentages given here relate to a middle-class sample.

1. The least damaged are the 12 % of children of inconsistent caregivers who learn early in infancy to make more of a fuss to get the attention they need: they develop a clingy angry or 'anxious ambivalent' attachment.
2. Unfortunately, about 25 % of infants are born to rejecting caregivers who will not respond to them when they are in need. These infants learn to appear indifferent to their caregiver and thereby avoid being rejected by them but their elevated heart rate betrays their separation anxiety (Sroufe and Waters 1977). These infants subsequently develop conduct disorders and tend to deny the importance of attachments (Sroufe 2005). They learn to avoid intimate emotional interactions, hence the term 'avoidant attachment', and they develop a 'stiff upper lip' attitude to life which can be very helpful in certain situations such as in the army. However, despite appearing strong and in control, their sense of *self* is a vulnerable one, easily punctured when humiliated which results in these men or women becoming aggressive or violent (Blanchard and Main 1979).
3. Main and Hesse recognised that a third category made up of 15 % infants had no particular strategy to maintain their attachment to their caregiver. They have had an early life marked by terror due either to the emotional unavailability of their caregivers or to having experienced physical or sexual abuse (Main and Hesse 1992). These 1-year-old infants displayed unpredictable response in relation to their caregiver sometimes freezing in trancelike states. The emotionally neglectful parents are often women who suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and who find themselves reliving terrifying experiences relating to their traumatising which may have been induced by the infant.

This behaviour leaves the child in a state of total terror as the parent cannot empathise or regulate her emotions.

For example, in the Traumatic Stress Service at the Maudsley Hospital, several African refugee women who had been raped in their home countries tried to care for their babies who were the product of this rape. Unfortunately, they found themselves reacting to their infant's eyes: 'He has the eyes of the abuser!' they cried. In the arms of a terrified mother reliving the nightmares of her traumatic past, their infant experiences terror as well as the desperate yearning to be comforted by a mother who is too distressed to respond.

The brain of these traumatised infants is damaged to such an extent that they cannot regulate their emotions or empathise and put themselves in the minds of others. They suffer from what is now referred to as 'developmental trauma' (van der Kolk 2005) and have long-standing problems with intimate relationships and with authority figures. They will often resort to violence towards others or to themselves when they feel insecure or threatened in order to protect their very vulnerable sense of *self*. Many of these individuals survive by 'forgetting' the horrific experiences that led them to *freeze* and thereby escape mentally from their terrifying parent. These frozen memories and accompanying *internal working models* of themselves in relation to a terrifying or unavailable parent can remain well hidden to themselves and to others through the process of splitting of the self or dissociation (van der Kolk 2005; de Zulueta 2006a). Whilst some of the women end up in hospital because they feel suicidal, many of the men end up in prison because of their violent behaviour. However, many of these individuals can also be successful in certain settings where they achieve positions of power: dominating others can become their way of surviving at the expense of the 'other' or they can resort to drugs or other addictive habits to replace their underlying need for comfort. This vulnerability and accompanying violence is clearly illustrated on the domestic front by men who control their wives by any means, including murder, if they feel threatened by the loss of their partner.

It is important to note that infants and children do develop different types of attachments depending on their father's or mother's attachment security and they can be more or less resilient depending on their genetic make-up or the level of empathic support they have had from other relatives or members of the community.

The Effects of Traumatism on Individuals or Communities

International negotiations may sometimes involve individuals who, if not traumatised themselves, may represent heavily traumatised populations or leaders. The diagnosis of PTSD only came about after the Vietnam War when thousands of veterans wandered about the US shunned by the general population for representing a war they had lost. They accumulated in psychiatric services and the doctors treating them realised that they all shared certain common symptoms. According to the American Psychiatric Association's new diagnostic criteria (DSM.5 2013) to qualify for the diagnosis of PTSD, an individual must suffer from a certain number of symptoms and must have been exposed to actual or threatened death, to serious injury, or to sexual violence including sexual abuse or trafficking, exposure to war as combatant or civilian, threatened or physical assault, being taken hostage or kidnapped, a terrorist attack, torture, incarceration as a prisoner of war or a natural disaster. Looking at the risk factors, the most important, according to the NICE guidelines (2005, p. 94), is the lack of social support: this finding is congruent with the latest research regarding the pathophysiology of PTSD that defines it very much as an attachment disorder (Schore 2001, 2003; Henry 1997). In 1997, Yehuda (1997) found that only victims of an RTA whose response led to a lower than normal release of cortisol developed PTSD. She suggested that PTSD may reflect a 'biologic sensitisation disorder' rather than a post-traumatic stress disorder. Wang (1997) attributes this sensitisation to changes in the attachment system, i.e. suppression of cortisol levels observed by many in insecurely attached children.

An understanding of attachment disorders can therefore help to diagnose, understand and treat patients suffering from simple and complex PTSD (de Zulueta 2006a, b). From such a perspective, PTSD is not an arbitrary constellation of symptoms but the manifestation of a disrupted attachment system, the effects of which can be transmitted down the generations as will be outlined later on in this paper. For this reason such a diagnosis can have very serious implications in terms of the individual, the family and the affected community (Henry 1997; Wang 1997; de Zulueta 2006a, 2007).

The symptoms that traumatised people suffer from reflect similar damage to their *attachment system* as that seen in children with a *disorganised attachment* or developmental trauma which is usually referred to as complex post-traumatic stress disorder or PTSD in adults (Herman 1992a, b). These adults and adolescents are also unable to regulate their emotions and to empathise with the others. Their inability to attune to the emotions of others or to put themselves in the mind of others will often result in difficulties in forming stable relationships and in trusting others. When under severe stress, this distrust can develop into paranoid ideas or even delusions.

These individuals when suffering from PTSD will often find themselves experiencing sensory flashbacks of their traumatic experiences, often triggered by feelings of helplessness or by memories, verbal or physical reminders. They usually suffer from nightmares which interfere with their sleep and they can find themselves re-enacting their traumatic experiences in broad daylight. Van der Kolk gives a vivid illustration of this phenomenon:

One night in 1968, a Vietnam Vet lit a cigarette which led to his 'buddy' next to him being killed by a Vietcong bullet. From 1969 to 1986 when he ended up in this psychiatrist's clinic, on the anniversary of his friend's death, this man would commit 'armed robbery' by putting his finger in his pocket and carry out 'an armed hold-up' in order to provoke gunfire from the police. His compulsive and unconscious re-enactment came to an end when he understood its meaning through the process of psychotherapy (1989, p. 391).

All these flashbacks and reliving experiences are felt to be as terrifying and arousing as they were at the time of the trauma, so much so that the individual feels he or she is stuck in the past with little or no sense of a future. Being in a state of quasi-permanent fear and arousal due to their overactive *sympathetic system* also makes these people feel very irritable, angry and even violent. They are on permanent alert for danger and have an exaggerated startle response which can be a give-away sign in the presence of loud noises. Their difficulties in concentrating and sleeping add to their memory problems. In many cases, these men and women have often lost relatives and friends and have not been able to grieve them in a culturally appropriate way which may result in them suffering from depression.

In order to control their emotions and arousal and to also improve their sleep, trauma survivors will tend to use alcohol or drugs. Some survivors also discover that by resorting to violence they get a 'high' which gives them momentary relief from their pain: this is due to the release of endogenous opiates and is quite common in veterans and mercenaries (Pitman et al. 1990).

But perhaps, what is most unbearable for those have been made to feel helpless and incapacitated by trauma is their profound sense of shame: shame at what happened to them, shame at what they have now become and shame at what they feel and cannot control. Any criticism, any threat and any humiliation can be experienced as an attack on their sense of *self* to which there is often only one possible solution: an act of violence to the self or to the other or both in some circumstances, such as through a suicide bombing.

The victim thus becomes the perpetrator and, in this way, the traumatic experience is re-created but the roles are changed. The victim does unto the 'other' what was done unto him/her thereby setting up the cycle of violence. Gilligan, who worked on the origins and prevention of violence, wrote:

The basic cause of violent behaviour is the wish to ward off or eliminate the feeling of shame or humiliation—a feeling that is painful, and can be intolerable and overwhelming—and replace it with its opposite, the feeling of pride (2001, p. 29).

In the re-enactment of a past violent experience, the 'other' (who might be the partner or the 'enemy') is not seen as a human being with feelings and a personality. He or she can become the re-reincarnation of a past tormentor or, to those who have been made to feel they don't exist in the mind of the other, attacking and killing may become a way of existing: as one of the prisoner's Gilligan worked with in therapy said 'better be bad than not be at all' (1996). When most of these young men were asked why they had assaulted or killed someone, they replied 'Because he disrespected me' (Gilligan 2001).

In Middle Eastern and Eastern societies as well as most African societies shame plays a hugely important role in the formation of the individual's sense of identity: you are what others make you feel you are. To suffer a personal humiliation can be experienced as an attack on the self or even as psychic death. Their concern with 'honour' or 'saving face' is a concept many Westerners find difficult to understand because in their more individualistic culture, their sense of self is not built up through shaming by rejection, a powerful method of making people toe the line which is used both at home and in the community. A popular Zulu proverb *Umntu ngumntu ngabantu*, which means 'a person is a person because of other people', sums this up very well (de Zulueta 2006a, pp. 366–367).

It was originally believed that anyone could develop PTSD but we now know that some individuals are more vulnerable than others, those whose attachment systems have already been damaged by earlier attachment failures or whose mothers suffered from the symptoms of psychological trauma.

One example of this is provided by a study on Israeli soldiers who developed PTSD. The individuals most likely to develop this condition were those whose parents had been through the Holocaust (Yehuda 1997). We now know that mothers suffering from PTSD transmit to their offspring the vulnerability to PTSD through *epigenetic transmission*. This was shown in a study on 1-year-old infants whose mothers suffered from PTSD following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack in New York. These babies

were found to have a low level of cortisol, like their traumatised mothers, which makes them vulnerable to developing PTSD in later life (Yehuda et al. 2005). This epigenetic finding makes it all the more important to focus on the prevention and resolution of conflicts as it shows how traumas of the past can affect successive generations (Yehuda and Bierer 2009).

The damage inflicted to the attachment system is expressed emotionally and behaviourally as we have described above. However, as I pointed out earlier, at the root of many of the symptoms suffered by traumatised people is the loss of the capacity to attune or empathise with the other and to put oneself in the mind of the other. As a result, those who suffer from PTSD or 'wounds of the mind' live in a very isolated world where trust in humanity has been broken: the attachment system that binds us to one another through subtle multiple interactions bound by faith in the other has been torn apart leaving the individual exposed and vulnerable. To such a person survival is easily dictated by the principle 'if you are not on my side, you are against me', an understandable attitude but also a likely recipe for conflict, particularly if your opponents shares the same kind of conflict engendered psychopathology (Henry 1997).

This takes us to looking at whole communities affected by violent conflicts. What happens when men, women and children have been exposed to killing in all its forms and to terror and humiliation at the hands of the 'other' or the enemy? These devastating experiences can become incorporated into the history and culture of this community, forming a sociocultural matrix in which traumatised people can find solace in the validation of their suffering, an emotional refuge and even, in some cases, a new meaning in their lives by making their survival and/or the elimination of the 'other' their 'raison d'être'. This can empower them and thereby reduce the impact of their mental and emotional wounds. However, these trauma-induced solutions to the experience of communal violence are usually achieved at some cost. The past traumatic experiences can become so much a part of the community's identity that their memory has to be

preserved at all costs: for example, in Northern Ireland, though the conflict between the Protestants and Catholics has officially ended, even so as Miall states, ‘conflict remains and continues, as each marching season re-invokes the old atmosphere of division and fear’ (Miall 2004). For example, one of these is the march by the Protestant Orange Institution celebrating the battle of the Boyne (1690) when the Protestant king William of Orange beat his Catholic rival King James, a victory which ultimately helped ensure the continuation of Protestant ascendancy in Northern Ireland. This march goes through areas where Catholics now live reminding them yearly of the battle that their side lost and all the suffering that followed.

Traumatised communities can behave like emotionally wounded individuals: their sense of shame and helplessness can be re-enacted either through repeated victimisation experiences in the face of an unjust world or, if empowered by socio-historical events, they can turn the tables and become the tormentors of their past oppressors, finding empowerment in the act of humiliating and hurting those who now represent their victimhood. They can finally feel vindicated in the full expression of their rage, born from helplessness and shame. The ‘other’ is not a human being but the embodiment of what they once were, victims dehumanised for their colour or creed. The template of violence is set for re-enactment but it is a play without an external script: the script is an internal one transmitted from one victim-perpetrator to another victim-perpetrator down the generations and through their culture.

This is what seems to have happened in what was Yugoslavia when the Serbians re-created the concentration camps they had been tortured in by the Croats, under the auspices of the Nazis, with the difference in this case that they were the ones who had the power to hurt their unfortunate Muslim victims. As the writer Glenny shows us:

These Serbians were settled in Croatian territory for historical reasons having originally been the vanguard forces in Kosovo defending the Christian Habsburg territory from the Ottomans. In the wake of a failed attack against the Ottomans, they had to flee and were allowed to settle in Croatian territory and populate the Krajina area which became the boundary between the powers of Islam and the Church as well as that between the Roman Catholic

faith and the Orthodox Christian faith. It was in this “most active and disruptive historical fault line in Europe” that the war erupted between Tito’s partisans and the Croatian fascists, the Ustasas and here again where the more recent war took place (Glenny 1992).

The children here “are schooled in weaponry at an early age, learning how to handle and control first shotguns and later handguns before they reach their teens... A person’s standing will be enhanced and confirmed by his or her ability to wield a gun...” (Glenny 1992, pp. 6–7).

In such traumatised communities, the ‘other’ can be seen as a threat and not as another human being with the similar feelings and needs as oneself. Having been on the receiving end of a dehumanisation process which deprived them of a sense of being human in the eyes of their oppressors, they may replicate this in their violence over the ‘other’ if and when conditions require it or allow it. Any threat to such a community’s existence will easily trigger off feelings of fear and the threat of annihilation. All ‘others’ will be judged by who they stand for: ‘If you are not with us, you are against us’. The stage is set potentially for another round of violence.

Traumatised Israeli communities, when fearful of being attacked or of losing land they consider belongs to them, on religious grounds, may re-enact similar scenarios with the Palestinians: the latter can easily become the Nazis of their parents’ nightmares, a nightmare that led to the creation of Israel for and by the survivors of the Holocaust.

These are some of the possible trauma-related scenarios that may be brought to international negotiators; in such cases, an understanding of the potential vulnerability of those who may be attending or being represented needs to be kept in mind. In such cases it may help to use a cooperative approach if at all possible and to remember that what a traumatised individual cannot bear is to feel helpless or humiliated.

Facilitating Emotional Regulation in International Negotiations

We are left with how to integrate these psychological findings into the negotiation process?




Diagram 15.1 *Green zone, safety; yellow zone, danger; red zone, life threat.* Adapted from Wheatley-Crosbie (2006) with permission

The Diagram 15.1 sums up in a simplified way humans are driven to feel and act by their autonomic nervous system which operates mainly via the limbic system: the latter consists of the sympathetic system (SS) and the parasympathetic system (PS). The PS relies on two different pathways: the new *vagus nerve* referred to as *the 'smart' vagus* and the *old reptilian vagus*.


The Social Engagement System (Green Zone—Safety): The ‘smart’ *vagus* is particularly important to us as it provides humans with the only link between our highly developed hemispheric functioning in the orbitofrontal cortex and our much more primitive autonomic nervous system: it thereby gives humans the possibility of regulating their emotions and is therefore the part of the brain we would like to be able to recruit in the context of any negotiations using a cooperative approach (Schore 1996). It also sets the scene for cooperation because it mobilises the *social engagement system* which enables people to *empathise at an emotional level*, by making eye contact, by modulating their voice and by regulating their emotions whilst, at the same time, producing an optimal level of general cerebral arousal: in such a state we are neither

over or *hyperaroused* as a result of feeling frightened and in ‘fight-flight’ mode or ‘frozen’ with terror or *hypoaroused*. The level of optimal arousal, brought on by the *social engagement system*, also enables the cerebral hemispheres to be fully functional thereby allowing the negotiators to deploy their intellectual and cognitive skills to their full potential (Thayer et al. 2009). This means that not only can they empathise at an emotional and cognitive level but they can also think more creatively in relation to the challenges and possibilities they are faced with.

For example, during social engagement, interaction and conversation can rapidly shift from strong affect and animation one moment, to calm listening and reflection the next. This “smart” branch of the parasympathetic nervous system regulates the sympathetic and “freeze” (dorsal vagal parasympathetic) responses to trauma and allows human beings to fine-tune their arousal to the needs of the situation. This sophisticated “braking” mechanism of the Social Engagement System facilitates the regulation of overall arousal (Ogden and Minton 2000).

The Diagram 15.2 can be used to illustrate what is happening to traumatised individuals

Diagram 15.2 Adapted from Ogden and Minton (2000) with permission the window of tolerance



when exposed to internal or external triggers (Ogden and Minton 2000). It illustrates the importance of regulating emotions during negotiations to the extent that they are contained within the limits of the *window of tolerance*.

In emergencies, when a traumatised individual suddenly finds himself or herself reliving a past traumatic event, certain interventions can be very helpful: one of the simplest for people who may suffer from trauma-induced symptoms is to activate the orbitofrontal cortex by olfactory stimulation using natural oils such as lavender oil or by using small tea bags with strong smelling herbs or spices to put under their nose whenever they feel they are likely to dissociate, i.e. to move into hyperarousal or hypoarousal as illustrated above. I have used this simple intervention when interviewing Peruvian peasant torture survivors with great success and I found that it also made them laugh which is always helpful in potentially tense encounters.

What is of particular importance for international negotiators is that the *social engagement* system can be switched on through stimulation of the 'smart' *vagus* using specific techniques that will be discussed in our suggested training programme below. In this way it differs from the fear-driven *sympathetic system* (SS) and the freeze response of the *parasympathetic system*, both of which are controlled by the reptilian *vagus*, which remains out of our conscious control and can have serious implications when activated.

The sympathetic system (SS) is activated when individuals feel threatened in any way leading to high arousal, irritability, anger and rage with the concurrent loss of the capacity to empathise and to

think clearly. Defensive and aggressive positions can be adopted and, in the process, old traumatic situations can be re-enacted by those who have been traumatised and who often have accompanying paranoid ideas to justify their positions. If the *social engagement system* is not reactivated quickly, the frightened individual may then come to perceive the situation as physically or psychologically life-threatening which activates the *reptilian vagus nerve*, and the parasympathetic system (PS) takes over leading to a low state of arousal, emotional numbing, a feeling of not being there due to dissociation, slowing down of the thinking process, postural collapse and, in some individuals, a feeling of being victimised.

These findings emphasise the importance of regulating emotions in order to conduct a successful negotiation based on a cooperative approach. The stimuli of pain or fear are fast acting and likely to increase the adversarial behaviour in proportion to the vulnerability of the individual's sense of self. Social triggers, such as being treated unfairly or being excluded or humiliated, are as powerful as physical ones. On the other hand, being listened to and validated, feeling respected and valued as well as being treated fairly are experiences that stimulate cooperative behaviour and reciprocity which naturally entails trust.

Whilst this approach may appear unrealistic and naive to some hard-headed lawyers and negotiators who believe that our behaviour is driven by rational self interest, recent research using the 'trust game' proves them wrong (McCabe et al. 2003). With large sums or small sums, participants almost always behave with more trustworthiness

than established economic theories predict. This game is a research tool in experimental economics. It goes like this: two players—who only meet through a computer screen and have no other contact—are paid \$10 each for attending and are then informed that any amount one player gives to the other will be tripled in value when it reaches the receiver. The latter can then choose to give or not to give some or all of his/her total \$40 back to the donor. The interesting finding is that even though neither player is under any obligation to be trustworthy since no one knows what they do and the receiver could just walk off with his/her \$40, 95 % of players in the USA send some money back to the donor. The amount they send has been found to depend on how much they trust the other to cooperate with them and thereby making the money increase for both of them (Zak 2012, pp. 8–9).

The levels of trust have been found to vary depending on how much oxytocin is circulating in the body. Oxytocin is a hormone that is essential to the *social engagement system* making our anxiety drop as it releases dopamine and serotonin, two neurotransmitters that bring about the feeling of pleasure. Oxytocin generates the empathy that inspires trust causing the release of more oxytocin. ‘However stress, testosterone, trauma, genetic anomalies, even mental conditioning can inhibit these effects. But as long as we keep these influences from taking over, the system is self-reinforcing’ (Zak 2012, pp. 63–64).

Looking back at the different approaches to resolving conflicts, the cooperative approach appears to offer more scope for negotiation in that it aims at providing a contained and creative setting by focusing on preserving in the negotiators the capacity to empathise and think constructively. The question then is, how can negotiators switch on their *social engagement systems*? Such control is not really possible to achieve without some prior preparation.

Prenegotiation Training Programmes

It is worth remembering that Mandela spent many years preparing himself before bringing about the process of reversal, restitution and

reconciliation between blacks and whites in South Africa: as a boy, whilst living with his grandfather, he witnessed the traditional processes of conflict resolution and, when in prison, he sought to understand what motivated people, both prisoners and warders. He also learnt the language of the white Afrikaners, his oppressors.

It would be useful for international negotiators and their facilitators to learn how to optimise the working of the human mind towards a more cooperative negotiating approach which integrated some of the above neurobiological and neuropsychological findings, but most of them probably would not have the time to carry out a long training course. It therefore might be useful to provide different prenegotiating introductory courses for those who wish to develop their skills in this area. There could also be a module for the bilingual and multilingual negotiators to look at the bilingual research and help them decide what language they would prefer to use, assuming that a choice is provided. Moreover, talking about emotion regulation (see Chap. 16), some authors in the field have pointed out that learning to empathise with others could be used to manipulate the other’s autonomic system and that this could be very useful to those whose aim is to increase their power and control over the process for their own ends (Gilbert 2011). In my view, this is unlikely because the various interventions we have outlined to facilitate a cooperative process form part of a wider systemic process which—not only brings about both emotional and cognitive empathy—but it is also driven by a cooperative attitude in relation to the task at hand involving all negotiators, a process that is dissonant to the adversarial approach.

Some negotiators and facilitators may wish to develop their skills further and advice may be given in relation to what courses are available in their respective countries or a specific training may be developed as required. In addition to providing more in-depth methods to achieve emotional regulation, a training in ‘mindfulness’ would be of benefit to all negotiators, mainly because of the stress involved in negotiation work (for an extensive training programme for negotiators, see Chap. 16). It has been described

as the process of bringing one's complete attention to the present experience on a moment-to-moment basis and it involves 'paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, and non judgmentally' (Kabat-Zinn 1993, p. 4). It originated in Eastern meditation practices but despite its roots in Buddhism, mindfulness is often taught independently of religion and in a variety of ways to suit different personalities. A comprehensive 2013 meta-analysis of mindfulness-based therapy concluded that it was 'an effective treatment for a variety of psychological problems, and is especially effective for reducing anxiety, depression, and stress' (Khoury et al. 2013).

The Establishment of the Negotiators Boundaries

During or after these training experiences, it might be very useful to ascertain what language the different negotiators want to use during the negotiations and whether they want a neutral person to attend, acting as a facilitator to the cooperative process. This can be very helpful as the group tends to behave differently in the presence of a third party who can facilitate the cooperative process and intervene when it is threatened. Decisions may need to be taken to the degree of isolation the negotiating team want to maintain in relation to the outside world and to the media, all of which can impact on the process of negotiation. It is also important to ascertain whether the negotiators are independent or whether they are delegated by an authority figure or a government since most negotiators are not free agents but operate under instructions from their leaders (Aquilari and Galluccio 2008). If they are accountable to an outside authority, this could seriously disrupt the running of the negotiations since the outsiders are not party to the cooperative processes and may refuse to ratify the resolutions made by their representative. In order to minimise this possibility, it may be useful to arrange regular meetings to take place between the negotiator and the authorities he or she is accountable to in order to brief them as to

the progress of the negotiations and prepare the ground for a more cooperative and possibly a more sustainable resolution.

Conclusions

However, all these attempts to empower the international negotiators might not be sufficient for as Miall, a current conflict resolution expert states, often 'contemporary conflicts require more than the reframing of positions and the identification of 'win-win' outcomes. The very structure of parties and relationships may be embedded in a pattern of conflictual relationships that extend beyond the particular site of conflict,' as is the case in Syria today. He proposes a preparatory stage he calls *conflict transformation*, an ambitious 'process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict' (Miall 2004).

Whilst many a pessimist may think that the search for peace is idealistic and unrealistic in our current economic and political context, never has it been more important for humanity to find sustainable and peaceful resolutions to our conflicts to ensure our survival and that of the environment on which we depend. Despite their many failings, the creation of the United Nations and the post-war European Union is a reminder of humanity's wish for a fairer and more peaceful world. The recent interest in understanding how the human mind works and the application of this knowledge to seeking more cooperative ways to achieve conflict resolution and mediation can only be seen as a step in the right direction towards ensuring a fairer and happier future for our children and grandchildren.

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Mindfulness-Based Training for Negotiators: Fostering Resilience in the Face of Stress

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“Whatever you hold in your mind will tend to occur in your life. If you continue to believe as you have always believed, you will continue to act as you have always acted. If you continue to act as you have always acted, you will continue to receive what you have always received. If you want different results in your life or your work, all you have to do is change your mind.”

Unknown

Introduction

The most common approach to addressing international conflict within the domain of diplomacy is that of negotiation, an interpersonal and interactive process that appears to have a semblance of universality at a generic level (Raiffa 1982). Negotiation is typically defined as a discussion among parties, a more or less structured dialogue aimed at resolving incompatible goals (Kelman and Fisher 2003). In foreign policy, international negotiation processes may advance in tandem with the overwhelming weight of one party’s power and a suspicion (often a correct perception) of one side’s probable use of power: be it soft, hard, or smart. The *balance of power* may affect the negotiation process and outcomes for those directly involved and those to whom negotiators are answerable for their actions and achievements (international actors and constituencies from whom they receive their mandates and at the end of the day, their ability to act in

political, technical, bureaucratic, or other ways). We could say “international negotiation aims at disciplining, modulating and managing interdependence between acting subjects in a peaceful and skilful manner through shared communication, problem solving, and compromises” (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008: 8). Communication should be used as an interpersonal strategic compass in such a way as to establish bridges with the interlocutor in conveying to her/him our appreciation of reciprocal goals, reasons, motivations, behaviors, and our mutual standing going forward. From this interpersonal dimension, we can demonstrate how to solve problems, adjusting our common goals, while the negotiation proceeds toward acceptable compromises. This may be seen as an interpersonal process that nurtures and fosters (or harms and disheartens) working relationships, allowing (or not) negotiators to reach agreements that satisfy all involved according to their needs and interests, and not to the elusive ideal of a 50 %–50 % settlement (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). Nowadays international challenges seem even more complicated than formerly due to global uncertainty and ambiguity in international relations, to the continually shifting nature of conflicts and their tangible and intangible causes (Aquilar and Galluccio, 2011; Galluccio 2013). The role of individuals matters more than ever. We are in need of a sufficiently interdisciplinary, articulated perspective from

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which to examine negotiators' performances on a step-by-step basis and assess how they experience their own negotiation processes, from which new, more specifically tailored training can be developed. Such training should aim to strengthen the cognitive-emotional-behavioral resources and social abilities of negotiators, mediators, diplomats, and politicians in a structured way allowing for peaceful interpersonal relationships that may be assessed in realistic ways. "The world is growing multipolar and training capacity building for negotiators and mediators could represent powerful strategic processes to increase the number of "cooperators"...to better solve common and shared international problems" (Galluccio 2013: 315).

Three types of problems faced by actors on the international backstage can be classified as:

1. Individual problems, faced by one nation with its experience and problem solving national capacities (food supply, housing, infrastructure, transports, ICT supply, communication networks). Basically these issues are qualified as individual but can very easily turn into the subject for international relations if they need foreign aid, supplies, transfer of technology, and know-how.
2. Universal problems, which the international Community of Nations have to face, as for instance, health, well-being strategies, education, and vocational training. However, those problems could also be solved on an individual basis.
3. Global problems, wherein a solution may only be achieved through worldwide cooperation and coordinated action by the international community as a whole (Raiffa 2002).

The solution of problems which the nations have to solve could be addressed collectively through all kind of negotiation processes taking into account and trying to integrate different perspectives. For instance, anthropological and culturally derived variables are invisible elements underlying modern social dynamics. These variables often influence the way people perceive and assess information and consequently think, feel, and act. Such social interactions are, by their nature, not static, but dynamic and are thus

inevitably distant from the desirable "ordered world" researchers would like to investigate. Hence, this chapter tries to illuminate cognitive, metacognitive emotional, motivational, communication, and negotiation processes involved in human beings and hence in international negotiations. Then, it proposes useful metacommunicative processes that could prevent misunderstandings and foster sustainable working alliances and perhaps facilitate balanced resolutions based on mutual needs and interests.

Human Consciousness

Cognitive theory treats all mental contents, such as perceptions, memories, thoughts, fantasies, dreams, and emotions, as *information*. Mind (and brain) activity consists of *organizing* elementary, multiple, and unconscious information. Human consciousness refers to awareness of our own mental processes. This awareness can shift from tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge by introspective techniques through which an individual processes information about his or her own mental experience. This establishes a background of experience humans accumulate during their lives. Relevant research supports the idea that self-knowledge, emotional knowledge, and consciousness functions are intersubjective in nature (Edelman 1989; Liotti 1994, 2001). Consciousness is a complex, compound, and dynamic process, intimately interlinked to the unconscious mind, and it actively influences behavior regulation (Liotti 2001). Moreover, different studies on metacognitive monitoring, theory of mind, working memory, and metarepresentation, to name but a few, have demonstrated the complex nature of consciousness (Liotti 1994, 2001, 2007; Di Maggio and Semerari (2003), Di Maggio, Semerari, Carcione, Nicolò, Procacci, (2007); Falcone et al. 2003). Nowadays, consciousness is studied by cognitive psychology through scientific empirical procedures. The transformation of nonconscious mental activities to conscious activities is necessary for appropriate communication because newly acquired abilities and skills can be communicated

through the use of language. Emotions and feelings, at least from a clinical point of view, are the main mental processes that must reach the state of consciousness in order to be regulated (Liotti 2005a). Damasio (1999, 2011), Damasio, (1994, 2003) Panksepp (1998, 2001, 2003), and Panksepp and Biven (2012) have been scientifically demonstrating that the transformation of emotions in feelings, subjective experiences (such as physiological events unfolding as a neurovegetative cascade that are enveloped in the silence of the body) dare witnessing the construction of consciousness as part of the cerebral processes. Emotions are evolutionary processes found and regulated or organized by cognitive and metacognitive processes, which contribute to the perception of emotions in oneself and in the other (Aquilar 2011, 2012; Liotti 2007). The experience of emotions always takes place in an intersubjective context—the experience of interpersonal and interacting worlds of at least two people (Liotti 2001; Stolorow and Atwood 1992). Therefore, we can say that cognitive psychology studies the multiple ways in which the mental work of the construction of meanings is translated into an organization of the self and of the world (Guidano and Liotti 1983; Liotti 2001).

The study and application of emotion regulatory functions to training for negotiators and mediators could be invaluable in helping to identify and make sense of the network of meanings everyone tends to conceptualize and in understanding how much this could differ among individuals and groups (Galluccio 2007). It is necessary to increase awareness of how to look beyond the oral/verbal cues, identifying intrapersonal and interpersonal dynamics, and using this awareness as a strategic tool in training activities to increase negotiators and mediators' cognitive and emotional resources.

Interpersonal Motivational Systems and Emotional Regulation

Interpersonal Motivational Systems (IMSs) studies and research are derived from the ethological-evolutionist research applied to psy-

chotherapy. They are a complex of innate psychobiological rules, largely adaptable by personal development, which largely determine human beings' interactions (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Bowlby 1969; Eibl-Eibesfeldt 2001; Gilbert 1989, 2011; Liotti 1994, 2001; Liotti 2005a, b, 2007; Panksepp 1998; Panksepp and Biven 2012). We refer to the just mentioned references for the scientific and clinical validity of this model. In practical terms, it seems that within individuals, there are innate, well-defined neurobiological dynamic structures inclining subjects toward social interactions. The conceptualization of IMSs has important implications for shedding new light on interpersonal processes. It could allow us to efficiently investigate how negotiating working relationships of negotiators may be qualitatively improved by aiming for a strategic balance between acquired knowledge of the *self in interaction with the other* (interpersonal dimension) and the innate verbal and nonverbal communication cues (intrapersonal dimension) acting in the world they live in (the context). Each of the human motivational systems is neurobiologically inclined toward reaching specific goals or aims. This unique functionality is due to a "cooperation" of specific sequences of emotions along with various changing environmental contingencies (Aquilar 2011, 2012; Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Gilbert 1989, 2011; Liotti 2001, 2014; Liotti and Monticelli 2008; Panksepp 1998; Panksepp and Biven 2012). If we would like to try to better understand mental events, we must consider the interpersonal context in which they happen. It is an illusion to think that it is possible to study the individual mind in isolation. Every subjective experience can be properly understood only by taking into account the interpersonal context from which it comes and to which it refers (Liotti 1994). Different motivational systems' activation in human beings depends on both their innate nature and the concrete and variable interactions of individuals with the environment (Liotti 2001). There is a behavioral codetermination between innate and learned knowledge. Regarding social behavior as a whole, we see how each motivational system regulates fundamental aspects of

the relationship which become active when individuals interrelate within a social group in precise interactive sequences (communication) and circumstances (Gilbert 2011; Liotti, 2014).

The following are the Interpersonal Motivational Systems (see also Aquilar 2011; Aquilar and Galluccio 2008):

1. **Attachment System:** desire of proximity or closeness to trusted people requesting implicit or explicit help (Bowlby 1969). This system is hierarchically superior to the others, and all other systems are strongly influenced by its regulation or deregulation.
2. **Caregiving system:** desire to give or to offer proximity, contact, closeness, and help to those who appear weaker or in need.
3. **Procreative sexuality system:** desire to select, to see, and to maintain contact with a partner of the other sex for recreational, relational, and procreative exchanges (that is related not only to the conception and raising of children but also to any construction of common elements: home, a book, a working activity) (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008).
4. **Competition system:** desire to fight for access to limited resources, in order to define “ranks” within the group and/or in the society. It represents the desire for “certain rules” that “the right person to be the right place”. A purpose in order to gain advantage for oneself and for the whole group.
5. **Peer cooperation:** desire to put aside, temporarily, differences of rank in order to unite coordinate efforts, among persons, in order to reach a common objective/goal (which would otherwise not be attainable).

The other two motivational systems are that of play and affiliation. IMSs could represent a useful code of interpretation of human social behaviors. Moreover, applying this concept to understanding human behavior could help to decode the seemingly incompatible modalities of conflict (competition) and cooperation that lead to tailored negotiated solutions to problems (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). The conceptualization of the IMSs brings to the fore important implications for implementing the specific, tailored field of

training for negotiators and mediators (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008).

Cognitive Interpersonal Cycles

As we have extensively discussed (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Galluccio 2004, 2011), people have experience-based preconceptions which are useful for managing the *complexity of the world*. Individuals may develop predictions about interpersonal negotiation courses based on inner expectations and intentions. Consequently, they will be looking for verbal and nonverbal cues confirming their expectations (Di Maggio and Semerari 2003, Di Maggio, Semerari, Carcione, Nicolò, Procacci, 2007; Popolo et al. 2011; Semerari 2006). Humans have innate dispositions to build interpersonal negotiation schemata all along their development on the basis of repeated interactions with meaningful figures (called attachment figures) with whom they are related and with whom they have interacted since their childhood (Guidano and Liotti 1983). Bowlby (1969, 1988) called this schema Internal Working Models (IWMs) as they emerge during child development, codifying early interactions which are stored in implicit memory. These schemas are frames from which individuals predict, and on which they continuously assess, their interactions on the basis of their expectations. Adults have a set of representations (schemas) of interactions containing self-representation, other representations, and a representation of the relationship that binds them together, as well as the environmental context in which it takes place, and of activated interpersonal roles (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Di Maggio, Semerari, Carcione, Nicolò, Procacci, 2007; Semerari 1992, 2000; Dimaggio).

Safran’s seminal theory and research on the *cognitive interpersonal cycles* helped to bridge the gap between pure cognitive theory and theories that emphasize environmental determinants of emotional problems (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Safran 1984, 1998; Safran and Muran 2000; Safran and Segal 1990; Robins and Hayes 1995).

Interpersonal interactions may involve behaviors and verbal and nonverbal communication that may elicit in others responses that confirm expectations. An individual enters into interactions with other humans on the basis of his or her expectations regarding the nature of relationships and will relate to the other on a sort of *déjà vu* basis, waiting for certain *familiar* responses to provide guidance on how to manage this relationship. These expectations will provoke automatic or unconscious behaviors that are in line with the individual's inner mental states (thoughts, emotions, body cues, desires, etc.), thus influencing the interaction under way. These interpersonal cycles even if dissociated from conscious experience will come to the fore in nonverbal cues which are likely to trigger responses in the counterpart (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Di Maggio and Semerari 2003; Di Maggio, Semerari, Carcione, Nicolo', Procacci, 2007; Popolo et al. 2011; Semerari 2006; Semerari et al. 2002). These expected responses fortify the cognitive and emotional scaffolding of individuals that effects a dissociation of those aspects. One actor at the negotiation table anticipates that others will not take her concerns into consideration and will ultimately not respect her. Thus, a dysfunctional cognitive interpersonal cycle has been automatically activated. The cycle includes negative feelings for that individual that can lead, for example, to tenacious and aggressive actions that alienate others and become a self-fulfilling prophecy. For example, if the individual enters a *problematic state* prompted by a feeling of perpetually suffering injustice, he may dissociate the emotion of rage. But the rage even if not overtly expressed may be communicated through nonverbal cues (face, smile, gestures, tone of voice, etc.). These nonverbal signals may precipitate fear, or rage in others, which in itself will confirm the perceptual prophecy of *being subjected to unmotivated attacks* (this depends on the context and on the nature of the relationships because if we perceive an expression of fear on the other side, we, ourselves, may react with fear thinking "there is a threat in the environment" or we could offer protection). In brief, the answer that the counterpart gives to the first expression (rage against rage, for instance) confirms the

underlying assumption of the behavior of the subject in promoting in him automatic, unconscious answers that reinforce the dysfunctional cognitive cycle (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Di Maggio and Semerari 2003, 2007; Galluccio 2011).

Moreover, a negotiator may view the counterpart as unwilling to acknowledge his needs and interests because he does not care about him. A new dysfunctional cognitive interpersonal cycle has thus been automatically activated. The cycle includes negative feelings for the actor that can spark tenacious and aggressive actions that ultimately alienate the counterpart and elicit the originally feared responses confirming his negative expectations. Another negotiator foresees that the counterpart will not accept his demands (for instance, an addition to a text they are negotiating) and will be critical of him and thus could act in an excessively self-justifying fashion that is irritating to others, ultimately eliciting the criticisms that have been expected.

The perpetuation of dysfunctional cognitive cycles is due to counterparts' elicited responses which reinforce individual dysfunctional schemas. A negotiator who responds to aggressiveness with counter aggressiveness may confirm the counterpart's expectation that negotiation is a rotten mechanism where aggressiveness is a necessary condition for gaining respect. We can see from this self-perpetuation of cognitive cycles how emotional turbulence could result in large part from situational determinants. However, these cannot be separated from the role that the individual's cognitive and metacognitive processes may play, not only in interpreting situations but also in generating many of them (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Safran 1998; Safran and Muran 2000).

A Metacognitive Insight

The word *metacognition* (cognition of cognition) here refers to the whole set of knowledge and control processes carried out by individuals with awareness about their cognitive functioning

(Semerari 2000). Metaknowledge is the knowledge that an individual has of his own mental operations, while metacognitive knowledge is a more specific knowledge that he has about his own cognitive processes (Semerari 2000). Metacognition does not have to be identified as particular moments of *insight*, but rather as a permanent active function constantly used at more or less complex levels to regulate every day behaviors (Di Maggio and Semerari 2003). Metacognition studies metarepresentations linked to basic cognitive processes (like memory). Metacognitive contents refer to the knowledge and beliefs through which the subject interprets and estimates his mental states processes (knowledge of one's own mental states). The study of *metacognitive functions* helps us to understand cognitive activities related to control and regulation, through which a given subject, actively and with consciousness, *walk and act* in his interactive environment. The ability of an adult to *monitor* the contents of his conscious experience, in order to recognize them as mental states (emotions, feelings, thoughts, memories, opinions, expectations, fantasies), seems to be the implementation of a theory of mind that begins to develop in childhood (Di Maggio, Semerari, Carcione, Nicolo', Procacci, 2007; Liotti 2001). Theory of mind research studies the evolution of one's knowledge about one's own mind and the minds of others starting from the earliest years. It studies the ability to identify mental states and the ability to think about them. Metacognition studies other functions, such as regulation and monitoring of cognitive activities.

Metacognitive Contents and Functions

The metacognitive ability to assign intentions, desires, beliefs, and mental states to ourselves and to others and to mastering problematic conditions is deemed of primary importance for consciousness and is considered mentalizing skills for social adaptation (Di Maggio and Semerari 2007; Falcone et al. 2003). The ability to metarepresent one's own mental states plays an important role in consciousness and could even be seen as defining it (Sperber 2000). When attention is focused on mental contents, which

have other mental contents as object, we talk about *metacognitive contents* (Falcone et al. 2003). The focus is on ideas and beliefs through which the individual evaluates his own thoughts and feelings: What does a subject think about his own feelings and thoughts? Does he think, for instance, that compromising on a given issue implies weakness? Moreover, the role of positive or negative beliefs in one's own worries determination and amplification of anxiety disorders and depression has been noted (Wells 2000). Instead, when attention is focused on the operations through which metacognitive processes are defined, we talk about *metacognitive functions*. These functions are specifically aimed at solving cognitive tasks, ruling mental events, and forecasting and explaining other individuals' behaviors.

The *five metacognitive functions* as defined and explained by (DiMaggio and Semerari, 2003; Di Maggio, Semerari, Carcione, Nicolo', Procacci, 2007) are:

1. Identification
2. Decentering
3. Differentiation
4. Integration
5. Mastery

The metacognitive function called *identification* is defined as the ability to appropriately recognize one's own and others' emotions and identify links between cognition (thoughts) and emotions (I feel inadequate because I think I am not well prepared to face certain issues at the negotiating table) or between intrapersonal and interpersonal dimensions (I feel outraged because he is trying to patronize me) (see also Galluccio 2011). The inability to discriminate between the intrapersonal and interpersonal context compromises the emotion regulation. Consequently, strategic planning processes are negatively affected with a drastic reduction of problem solving abilities and a deterioration of mental skills in facing crisis situations. For example, if the identification function is partially invalidated, the subject will be unable to perceive other's emotions, instead making inferences about their thoughts and misunderstanding their mental states. Adaptive decision-making processes may be negatively influenced.

The metacognitive function called *decentering* is the ability to assess interactive sequences, being able to understand (and remember) someone else's point of view in the relational context (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). Decentering refers to acquired mental skills that allow individuals to see the perspective from which others relate to the world and to realize that their negotiating behavior may be "guided" by values, principles, and goals that could differ from ours and could also not be directly related to our interpersonal relationship dynamics (Galluccio 2011). A deficit in the decentering function fosters the inability to recognize the hypothetical and fallible nature of one's own representations, an inability to create alternative hypotheses, and a lack of awareness in imagining that what others think and feel could have nothing to do with us. An example of egocentric thought in a negotiation context could be "I feel that my counterpart is lying to me, but if I tell him this, he will deny it and will invent a false narrative; he will continue to lie to me. You know what? It is far better to trust my intuition."

The metacognitive function called *differentiation* is the ability to understand mental states as representations of reality, therefore potentially wrong and at best probabilistic (ability to distinguish between reality and wishful thinking) (see also Galluccio 2011). In the case of this mental function deficit, the individual has difficulty in recognizing the representational and subjective nature of his own and other people's mental states. The differentiation function allows us to recognize our mental states as reality's representation: *therefore, not coinciding with it*. It is the inability to recognize the subjectivity and the fallibility of our representations and the awareness of the limited power of thoughts and expectations to perceive reality. Another form of human expression of this deficit is the interpretation that thoughts influence reality directly. For instance, "the evening before a negotiation I have to focus on one or more subjects (contents) without distraction; otherwise, I have to start over again, or the negotiation will be a failure." To sum up, *differentiation/decentering* deficit makes the mind egocentric. Therefore, in order to effectively read another's mind, it is necessary to have the ability of *differentiation* and to exert that ability from a

decentered point of view, from which we can see not only our mental functioning characteristics but also those of our counterparts.

The metacognitive function called *integration* is the ability to reflect on emotional and mental states, to consciously organize them in an ordered sequence, and to structure a thought's hierarchy (by importance). This way, behaviors will have the consistency necessary for adaptation and the pursuit of goals "guided" by a defined coherent individual's identity (Galluccio 2011). A metacognitive deficit of the function of integration implies that the person perceives discontinuity and fragmentation in his personal narrative, with poor autobiographic self-knowledge. The narrative process is the way in which the elements and the mental activities have been combined in a *text* that allows the subject to think strategically and imagine actions to solve problems and plan the future. The conscious ability of individuals to put together and maintain various episodes and meanings of their own experience constitutes the *integration function*. It links the different narrative levels and articulates, in a coherent way, cognitive, somatic, and emotional elements to higher levels of metacognition. It allows individuals to describe their intrapersonal and interpersonal processes and to build up an internal and/or interactive dialogue that gives coherence and a sense of continuity to our experience and our self.

The metacognitive function called *mastery* is the ability to intentionally intervene on one's own thoughts, mental states, and emotional states, in order to solve tasks, or master problematic states, in a way to adequately face complex situations (see also Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). This could be seen as an improved cognitive and emotional awareness of oneself in the process of coping with distress in general and stressful interpersonal contexts, where reflective efforts are required to avoid feeling powerless and enabling people to actively contribute to ongoing interactions (see also Galluccio 2011). It includes using one's knowledge of others' mental states to regulate interpersonal problems (I tend to get angry when I am stressed, but it does not depend on others' behavior) and wisely accepting the limits one has in mastering oneself and influencing events.

Metacognitive Abilities and the Interpersonal Dimension

We can divide metacognitive abilities into three areas (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Di Maggio, Semerari, Carcione, Nicolo', Procacci, 2007; Falcone et al. 2003):

1. Self-thoughtful processes
2. Other's mind comprehension
3. Mastery functions

There are meaningful differences between these areas. For instance, some people may have good self-thoughtful ability while lacking comprehension of other's mental states; other people may lack self-thoughtful capability and yet manage a discrete capacity for understanding other's mental states; still others may show high thoughtful capacities but display a poor attitude to mastery, and so on. The correct functioning of metacognitive abilities creates awareness that psychological status is not a passive recording of reality, but is rather a reconstruction of it (although eventually an incorrect one). A quantity of research and clinical data shows that the interpersonal context has a critical role in regulating metacognitive functions. Experimental research has revealed that metacognitive abilities may be developed from childhood in the context of a safe and secure relationship (Allen et al. 2008; Fonagy and Target 1997). The role played by the identification of emotions is therefore crucial for regulating metacognitive functions (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Liotti, 2014; Liotti et al. 2005; Liotti and Monticelli 2008; Di Maggio and Semerari 2003; Falcone et al. 2003; Semerari et al. 2002). The link between the attachment system and emotional comprehension comes to the fore, and it could be related either to a higher or lower sensibility of the caregiver toward the emotional world of the child or to the modality of emotional expression in the family environment (Aquilar 2011; Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Liotti 2014; Liotti and Monticelli 2008). This is a founding element of our *metacognitive insight to international negotiation*. Following this model, a deficit of a metacognitive function could be understood in terms of

dysfunction of the activated IMS (or an activation of the wrong IMS), the consequential destabilization of the referral emotions, provoking specific deficits of metacognitive functions (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008).

Emotional Processes and International Negotiation in Context

Metacognitive functions introduced in the previous paragraph, as well as Interpersonal Motivational Systems discussed previously, may play a determining role in widening the understanding and relational abilities of negotiators and mediators. This could reduce the risks of negotiation failure due to psychological characteristics and relational dimension of actors, rather than to "unsolvable" political or economic problems. Greenberg and Safran (1987) have focused attention on the importance of self-reflective processes and especially on our emotional attitudes which drive our actions and behaviors. Emotions give us quick firsthand information (tacit process) on the nature of our attitude toward events, our aims with respect to the external world, and the style of our assessment. The ability to recognize and be aware of our emotional processes gives us a better coordination of aims and evaluations and allows us to form a perspective of our perspective. Emotions have an integrative function and could help to regulate the interactions among negotiators. The conscious or unconscious repression of emotions may favor interpersonal dysfunctional cycles, whereas nonverbal cues such as posture or mimicking could create an awkward subliminal communication that may negatively influence the negotiation process. This interpersonal process develops through a mutual monitoring of our internal state and the observation of our counterpart's nonverbal attitude. At this point, an open communication requesting nonjudgmental attitude fostering the dialogue could help to clear up misunderstandings and put the communication back on track. If we could help our counterpart to discriminate between his inner state of mind and

the cognitive process of meaning and beliefs underlying this interaction, we would enable a metacognitive process that aids the integration of the three components of problematic states: body sensations, emotions, and thoughts (Semerari 2000). Liotti (2001) formulates a hypothesis on the repressed (inhibited) emotions approach, through the IMS that is activated in a person at a particular moment and in a certain context. A behavior could be better understood by investigating the IMS in which it can be fit. The activation of an IMS brings with it nonverbal signals, which provoke on the other side the activation of a similar IMS or a complementary one (for instance, antagonistic vs antagonistic, attachment vs caregiver). In this way, a negotiator who could combine the observation of his inner state of mind with the behavior and nonverbal cues expressed by the other side could successfully formulate a hypothesis on the nature of the IMS activated on the other side at a given moment in that context and behave with awareness (see also Aquilar and Galluccio 2008).

The Role of the Communication and Metacommunication Process

Negotiation can also be seen as a metacommunication process among two or more actors that is communicating about the communication that is taking place. In practice, one participant to the interaction attempts to engage the other participant in a collaborative process of developing an awareness of interpersonal problematic interactions “here and now.” Through the process of metacommunication, one participant in the interaction attempts to engage the other participant in a collaborative process of developing an awareness of problematic interactions that both partners’ are unwittingly contributing to in the here and now (see also Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). As discussed by Safran and Muran (2000), this process of metacommunication can thus be thought of as a tool for promoting the process of metacognition at a point where the capacity for metacognition has collapsed. Our perspective on this issue has been heavily influenced by the

work of Jeremy Safran and colleagues. According to Safran and Muran (2000), this process of metacommunication could be a tool for promoting the process of metacognition. Metacommunication techniques are context based, as we need to make sense of the negotiation process through the development of working relationships and the improvement of human interactions. Assumption of responsibility, monitoring of interactions, and problem solving activities are facilitated through shared attention and a nonjudgmental attitude which nurtures cooperative behaviors and peer collaboration among actors. The fostering of metacognitive functions of identification and differentiation plays a central role as they allow us to share with the counterpart the awareness that interpretations are just representations of reality, potentially incorrect and at best only probable. Practical techniques and training should be based on the contextual environment because rather than embedded in an abstract strategy, they acquire meanings from the same contextual situation in which they are employed. Tensions and problems that can arise in the negotiation process should be addressed *now and here* (even if it seems that they have an analogy with past experiences). All perceptions should be noted as personal perceptions in the communication process. Remarkings the personal and subjective nature of one’s observation will help to establish a common playing ground. Our own contribution (positive or negative) to the interaction should be recognized and shared with the counterpart. In conveying feedback about behavior, actions, or interpersonal style, it is important to inform the counterpart of the effect it has on us. For example, it will be important to talk about how we feel about it in the *present time*, because tomorrow morning when we start a new round of negotiation, emotions and feelings could be different from yesterday (also in the meantime, the negotiators may have been changed). In this process, it is important to focus on specific and concrete elements rather than general or abstract elements that could contribute to the deterioration of the capacity for constructive negotiation. A concrete attitude and a respect for the observational and subjective positions could help to

establish a common discovery process enabling a breakthrough in the human change process. A next step is that of being aware of the sense of *relatedness* with the counterpart, which reflects an ongoing interplay between interpersonal and intrapersonal dimensions. The working relationship, however, should be strictly and discreetly monitored so that we are aware if our interventions are really eliciting the desired responses in the counterpart. It could be that despite all our good intentions and specific training, the counterpart perceives our intervention as manipulative, patronizing, and critical or accusatory. The attention should be focused on the way the counterpart builds up relationships and personal schemas.

The negotiation process should entail the full acknowledgment and acceptance of the relational and social context. Even the situation of feeling trapped is a situation that requires our active intervention: once we have accepted it, we can shift our energies from fighting to exploring and cooperating. In accepting the situation as it is in this *precise moment*, we can be liberated from “conflicting ghosts” and related negative emotions and so deploy our energy to accept all the various possibilities available in the contextual environment in that precise moment. Formulating interventions in a non-accusatory way is key to the negotiation process, but unconscious affective communication could influence the communication process. This means that emotions and feelings behind negotiators’ words inevitably influence their impact on the counterpart. A growing awareness of one’s own responsibility in the communication process may shift the feeling behind the words, so that an emotion of frustration may be replaced by a reflection of growing empathy for the counterparts’ needs and problems. It is important for the negotiator to approach each manifestation of a potential impasse with a *beginner’s mind* (Safran and Muran 2000). Negotiators may also lose hope in the possibility of moving forward after an *impasse*. However, periods of hopelessness and demoralization are part of the process of working through stalemates. Intrapersonal mastery demands the identification, expression, and modulation of emotions and feelings and prompt awareness of responses that

the counterpart evokes in the negotiator. The identification of feelings as well as that of mental states (related thoughts, memories, etc.) could be really useful for trying to smooth the negotiation process. Intrapersonal and interpersonal worlds should be investigated with tailored training techniques in order to yield a more coherent and comprehensive picture of the negotiation process through the experience of both negotiators and mediators.

Principles of Metacommunication in the Context of Negotiation

Every interaction in the negotiation process prepares the stage for the next interactions and step by step builds trust among actors, nurturing a cooperation that is directly proportional to the quality of interpersonal relationships. It is even better to learn how to cooperate within your own group and then with out-groups. Intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligence should be nurtured and protected in the environment of international negotiation. However, before working together, we need to identify issues and ways of working. The negotiator should mediate his own dispute (Watkins and Rosegrant 2001) and be ready to manage the interpersonal dialogue within the negotiation process (Galluccio 2011). Leading a negotiation process means also knowing how to communicate your ideas and needs and create an equal status among subjects. A persuasive communication may be a main tool at the negotiator’s disposal to get more chances to influence an adaptive decision-making process.

Metacognitive capacities can be thought of as cognitive-affective skills that can be cultivated through the use of training methods that can be derived from the type of structured mindfulness exercises initially popularized by Kabat-Zinn in his Stress Reduction Clinic at the University of Massachusetts Medical School and increasingly being employed by clinicians and researchers to treat a wide range of both psychology and physical problems (e.g., Baer 2003; Hoffman et al. 2010). While mindfulness training has traditionally been employed in Western medicine and psychology as

a treatment for patients, clinicians and researchers, such as Safran and colleagues at the New School for Social Research in New York (Safran and Muran 2000; Safran and Reading 2008) and Christopher Germer and colleagues at Harvard Medical School (Germer et al. 2013), have pioneered the use of mindfulness training to enhance the interpersonal skills and emotional intelligence of clinicians. In this chapter, we are suggesting that training methods of this type can be adapted for purposes of enhancing negotiators' skills by refining their capacity for metacognitive functioning and emotional intelligence in the context of difficult and stressful negotiations.

Below we list a number of different principles of metacommunication in the context of negotiation:

Principle 1. Attend to and Monitor Feelings on an Ongoing Basis

Difficult negotiations, or periods of impasse in negotiation can evoke a range of difficult feelings and associated thoughts: anger, indignation, feelings of inadequacy, hopelessness, etc. These feelings often take place without our awareness and shape our actions and communications on an ongoing basis. To the extent that the negotiator is unaware of feelings as they emerge, there is potential for these feelings to cloud judgment or lead to counterproductive negotiation strategies.

Principle 2. Learn to Use A Range of Different Affect Regulation Strategies

Learning to regulate one's emotional experience while negotiating is essential. The first step in the process of affect regulation is accepting the fact that the emergence of a range of different feelings is inevitable. The negotiator who believes that he can remain rational or objective throughout the negotiation process is deceiving himself and decreasing the likelihood that he will be able to regulate and use emerging feelings constructively when they emerge. Once one accepts the fact that intense emotional fluctuations are inevitable, one can begin to observe one's feelings as they emerge in a curious and nonjudgmental manner. One can then regulate feelings in a variety of ways, for example, temporarily suspending negotiations

until one has an opportunity to make sense of emerging feelings or discuss them with an ally or collaborator; continuing to observe one's feelings as they emerge, while remembering that all feelings are transient; and using breathing exercises to induce a calmer state of mind.

Principle 3. Establish a Sense of Collaboration

The implicit message should always be one of inviting the other negotiator to become a partner in the process of solving a mutual problem. During negotiation impasses, if one negotiator is feeling helpless and demoralized, there is a reasonable chance that the other may be having similar feelings. By framing the impasse as a shared experience, the negotiator begins the process of overcoming the impasse by acknowledging that the negotiation partners are "stuck together."

Principle 4. Ask About and Attempt to Empathize With the Other's Perspective

Make an effort to understand the other's perspective. During difficult negotiations, there is a tendency to demonize the other and see them in two-dimensional terms. To the extent that one can understand and genuinely empathize with the various needs and forces that lie behind the other's stance, one has more of an opportunity of thinking creatively about solutions that will be responsive to the needs of both sides.

Principle 5. Maintain an Attitude of Respect for the Other Side

The substance of the negotiation is only one component of what is being negotiated. A second dimension of negotiation revolves around the theme of interpersonal respect.

Principle 6. Accept Responsibility for One's Own Contribution to an Impasse

Negotiators should always accept responsibility for their own side's contributions to an issue that is being negotiated and to their own contributions to problems that emerge during the negotiation. Bear in mind that when negotiations take a negative turn, there are often ways in which negotiators, themselves, have unwittingly said or

done things that have had a negative impact. The task is thus one of continuous vigilance in clarifying and correcting such negative actions. In many cases, simply the process of acknowledging one's contribution to the impasse can be an important intervention. Recognizing and acknowledging one's own missteps can earn the other negotiator's trust and pave the way for constructive solutions moving forward.

Principle 7. Track the Other Negotiator's Response to All Interventions

The negotiator should carefully monitor the other negotiator's response to all interventions. It is vital to be acutely aware of signs that the other negotiator is beginning to feel mistrustful or that communication is beginning to break down. At such times, it can be useful to comment on one's perception that the other has withdrawn or hardened their stance and to explore what is going on.

Principle 8. Remember That the Situation Is in Constant Flux, and Watch for Openings That Emerge

It is important to remember that the situation is never static. While at one moment there may be no opening for headway, the next moment the field may shift and reveal a new direction worth exploring. It is thus important to track the emergent situation carefully in an ongoing fashion.

Empathic or active listening is a way of listening and responding to another person that improves mutual understanding and trust. The benefits include:

- Building trust and respect
- Reducing tension and regulating emotion
- Empowerment facilitating the emergence of new, potentially relevant information
- Creating a safe environment that is conducive to collaborative problem solving

Summarizing what you have to say is important. Questions and demands: Understand motivations, needs, and goals. "Why" questions are not helpful. "What" and "how" questions are more constructive. "Closed" questions should be used with caution.

Tailored Training for Negotiators

Negotiators need training in an adaptive decision-making process, not "sanctifying" procedures. It is important to learn how to employ tacit knowledge and cognitive and emotional resources to make sense of events in the present time and to modify rigid and noncontextual negotiating procedures (or to adapt them), especially in complex situations. Training based on participants' exchanges of experience and tacit knowledge can also be beneficial for improving adaptive decision-making processes so as to increase performance, not just in well-ordered situations but also in complex situations more likely to be dealt with in the real world of international negotiations.

How can we apply some of these principles to train negotiators to deal constructively with conflict resolution impasses? The answer lies in the nature of the skills that we are trying to teach. The relevant skills are not just conceptual skills or narrowly defined technical skills. They are also complex, multifaceted inner and interpersonal skills. In order to work their way out of impasses, negotiators require a basic capacity for self-acceptance (or at least an ability to work toward it), as well as the willingness and courage to learn from experience and to learn how their own unique personalities and personal issues affect their negotiation skills. To this end, it is necessary to willingly engage in an ongoing process of self-exploration and personal growth. Negotiators also require certain basic skills, including interpersonal sensitivity, perceptiveness, and tact, as well as the capacity for intersubjectivity (being able to appreciate the other's perspective and of being able to experience the other as a subject rather than as an object).

A second significant aspect of the negotiator's skills, like expertise in any field, is important intuitive or tacit quality to it. As Dreyfus and Dreyfus's (1986) research on expertise in a variety of different fields shows, unlike beginners, experts do not follow rules or pursue goals in a detached, explicit fashion. Instead, they appraise

the situation in a rapid, holistic, and partially automatic fashion. Important aspects of this skill are embodied and tacit. In fact, the explicit, detached following of rules or clear-cut goals can actually interfere with skillful performance. The cognitive sciences make a distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge that helps shed light on the difficulty here (see Binder 1999). Declarative knowledge is explicit in nature and can be taught in a didactic fashion, while procedural knowledge is implicit/intuitive and can only be acquired gradually through real-life experience. This real-life experience gives individuals the opportunity to apply declarative knowledge in a practical context and to reflect on the consequences. They can thus modify their declarative knowledge in response to environmental feedback, enabling the development of complex and implicit working models that can guide their actions in ambiguous situations. It permits skilled negotiators to develop complex pattern recognition abilities and the skill to integrate information from multiple sources (e.g., theory, personal affective reactions, as well as the other negotiator's responses at both verbal and nonverbal levels, the environment) in an unconscious fashion.

In addition, skilled negotiators, like experts across a range of different domains (e.g., musicians, architects, engineers, managers), develop the ability to *reflect in action* (Schon 1983). This reflection does not necessarily involve conscious mental processing. It is often experienced at a feeling or intuitive level. Nevertheless, it involves a reflective conversation that allows them to modify their understanding and actions in response to ongoing feedback. This type of procedural knowledge in combination with the ability to reflect in action allows experts to improvise in a fashion that is responsive to the needs of the particular moment.

We discuss now a number of principles relevant to training negotiators. They consist of (1) explicitly establishing a focus that favors the experiential and nonconceptual, (2) using structured mindfulness exercises to help negotiators develop the capacity to become observers of their own experience, and (3) using awareness-oriented role-plays for the purposes of

helping negotiators learn to bring metacognition or mindfulness skills to the negotiation table.

Explicitly Establishing an Experiential Focus

For many trainees, the process of establishing an experiential focus involves partially unlearning things they have already learned about negotiating. Often negotiator training programs emphasize the conceptual at the expense of the experiential (based on their real needs). Although this type of knowledge is essential, it can also serve a defensive function. It can help them to manage the anxiety that inevitably arises as a result of confronting the inherent ambiguity and chaos of lived experience. But it can also lead to premature formulations of the problem that prevent the possibility of new, creative solutions. A useful exercise for purposes of helping trainees begin to distinguish between the experiential and conceptual consists of having them work in pairs and take turns relaying whatever emerges in awareness for them. The other partner is instructed to label each awareness as consisting primarily of (1) feelings and physical sensations, (2) immediate perceptions of the outside world (e.g., "I hear the clock ticking," "I see you smiling"), or (3) thoughts, inferences, and fantasies. Although the distinction between these three realms is not always clear, the processes of systematically articulating one's own experience in the here and now and attempting to distinguish between them can help trainees learn to attend to their immediate experience and to distinguish between conceptual and experiential levels.

Mindfulness Training

In addition, it can be useful to spend some time talking about the concept of mindfulness and the role that it plays in the negotiation process. At first, trainees typically have difficulty distinguishing between their experience and their ideas about their experience. Thus, it can be useful to use structured mindfulness exercises at the

beginning of training in order to help them grasp this distinction and to develop an openness to their experience. Such exercises also help trainees sharpen their abilities to become participant-observers.

One simple exercise, borrowed from Jon Kabat-Zinn (1994), involves instructing trainees to eat a raisin in a normal fashion and then to eat a second raisin slowly and deliberately while paying careful attention to the entire experience: the taste of the raisin, the feeling of the raisin on the tongue, and so on. This helps them to gain a sense of the distinction between approaching an experience the way we usually do (i.e., mindlessly) and approaching it mindfully. A second exercise consists of instructing trainees to attend to their bodies for a few moments in an attempt to become aware of any physical sensations that emerge (e.g., itches, tension, restlessness, etc.). During this exercise, they can also be instructed to note when they find their mind wandering away from their physical sensations, in the form of thoughts or fantasies, and then to gently return their attention to their bodies. The first part of the exercise helps them learn to direct their attention and to investigate a specific aspect of their experience (i.e., physical sensations) mindfully. The second part helps them learn to note when their attention is wandering.

A third exercise consists of a more standard mindfulness training. Trainees are instructed to attend to their breath, focusing on their inhalations and exhalations. When they notice that they are no longer attending to their breath (as they inevitably will), they are instructed to note what they are attending to and to gently return their attention to their breath. The realization that one is no longer focusing on one's breath thus serves as a cue to identify the current focus of attention, thereby bringing into awareness that which has been out of awareness, either partially or fully. For example, I suddenly realize that I am no longer attending to my breath and note that I have been thinking about an appointment I have 2 h from now. I then gently return my attention to my breath. A few moments later I realize that my attention has wandered from my breath again and note that I have been absorbed in a memory of an

argument I had with my wife this morning and that my body is tensing up in anger. I gently return my attention to my breath, where it stays for another few moments. Then I notice that I have forgotten my breath once again and criticize myself for being so easily distracted. If I become absorbed in this self-criticism in a non-mindful fashion, a few moments may pass before I become fully aware of what I am doing to myself. When, however, I do observe this self-criticism directly, it begins to shift my experience of it. It may lighten its intensity. Or I may find myself struggling to push it away. If this is the case, this struggle becomes the focus of observation and investigation. And, as always, I continue to return my attention to my breath as an anchor point.

Trainees are instructed to observe the contents of their awareness without judgment and without letting themselves get caught up in any particular content of awareness. This involves a conscious effort to "let go" of whatever one's attention has become momentarily absorbed by. This letting go is not the same as suppressing or ignoring; rather, it is a spontaneous dissolving of the momentary focus of attention as a by-product of awareness. Trainees are instructed that the goal is not to eliminate thoughts or feelings, but rather to become more fully aware of them as they emerge on a moment-by-moment basis, without judging them or pushing them away. Gradually, over time, this type of mindfulness work helps trainees to become more aware of subtle feelings, thoughts, and fantasies emerging on the edge of awareness which can subsequently provide an important source of information about what is occurring in the relationship. One of the most valuable by-products of this kind of mindfulness work is a gradual development of a more tolerant and accepting stance toward a full range of internal experiences.

Awareness-Oriented Role-Plays

The use of awareness-oriented role-plays can be particularly valuable for grounding the training process at an experiential level and promoting self-awareness in trainees. Awareness-oriented

role-play consists of having negotiators recount negotiations that have been difficult with the assistance of a training group member who plays the role of the other negotiator or by playing both roles (alternating back and forth between the roles of the two negotiators themselves). The goal of this type of exercise is not so much to practice different ways of intervening as it is to facilitate the exploration of feelings, thoughts, and fantasies relevant to the case that is being focused on. It can also be an opportunity to experiment with different ways of intervening and exploring feelings that can block the negotiation process.

When trainees are playing the roles of negotiators, it can be useful to have them switch back and forth between two chairs in order to keep the roles distinct and to heighten their own sense of immersion in the particular role they are playing. Negotiators are encouraged to use whatever they remember from the case being discussed as a point of departure, but not to worry about exactly recapturing the event. The goal is to facilitate awareness, rather than to reconstruct a scenario in a precise fashion. At different points during the experiment, the negotiation trainer may encourage the trainee to respond “in role” (either as one negotiating partner or the other) in a fashion that feels emotionally plausible in the moment or to attempt to articulate what he or she feels in a given moment. By directing the negotiator’s attention inward at opportune moments during the awareness experiment, the trainer can help him to become aware of feelings that are unconsciously influencing the way he interacts with the interlocutor. Sometimes this awareness in itself can help individuals to shift out of an impasse.

In other situations, this awareness can provide the trainer with information that can be used for purposes of metacommunication. A useful variation on this type of awareness experiment is to focus on a particular impasse that a trainer has presented by having different members of the training group take turns playing the role of one negotiator or the other. This procedure has a number of advantages. First, it gets all of the training group members (not just the trainee who is presenting) actively involved in an experiential mode of learning. Second, it reduces the type of

one-upmanship that can take place when other group members offer feedback or suggestions about the case. By encouraging other group members to struggle experientially with the presenting negotiator’s dilemma, the trainer increases their empathy for the presenting negotiator’s dilemma and reduces the type of conceptually driven feedback that is often delivered from a one-up position. This increases the sense of mutuality in the group, as well as the degree of trust, and facilitates the type of genuine self-exploration that is particularly helpful when negotiators are caught in a difficult negotiation impasse. It also increases the possibility that any feedback that is delivered will be experientially grounded and hence useful to the negotiator. In addition, the process of watching colleagues’ role playing the dilemma can sometimes provide the negotiator with a new perspective on the impasse. Finally, by playing the role of the other side, negotiators can sometimes develop an empathic understanding that had previously eluded them.

Conclusions

It is important for a negotiator to understand his/her mental states and emotional responses, and those of the interlocutors. This can enhance the quality of framing and re-framing of compromise proposals. All the available information (technical and personal information) should be taken into account to increase the chances of improving the joint attention in working on acceptable compromises, nurturing persuasive processes, while safeguarding sustainable working relationships. This means working on respect for identities and on *trustworthiness* and *positive affect* among parties.

Human communication consists of verbal and nonverbal cues through which we intentionally or unintentionally communicate emotional states. The awareness of emotional communication is important to manage interpersonal negotiations and to understand how people recognize and use emotional experience in dealing with others. The training of these skills requires negotiators to be aware

of several aspects of relationship dynamics in negotiation (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Saarni 1999; Saarni 2011):

1. The interpersonal and intrapersonal consequences of their emotional communication within different kind of relationships (emotional skilled negotiators)
2. The importance of relationship quality (e.g., equilibrium) or alteration of it (e.g., by deepening or attenuating it)
3. The power or control within the relationship (domination, submission, conflict, cooperation in the negotiation context)
4. The relationship between emotional norms and social organizations, which could help to illuminate rigidity in thinking and emotional processes and decision-making (Thoits 2004)

The training of negotiators, in fostering cognitive and emotional resources, can be enhanced by providing mindfulness training to develop the metacognitive skills that enable them to step back from the immediacy of the moment and gain the perspective of a third position that allows them to perceive both perspectives at the same time. Training negotiators in the use of various affect regulation skills including mindfulness training, taking time out from the negotiation, etc. can help them to cultivate the type of emotional competence that facilitates skillful negotiation (as specified by Galluccio 2011):

- *Emotionally intelligent negotiations*: developing tailored training for negotiators and mediators and improving cognitive and emotional resources and social skills in fostering resilience
- *Sustainable negotiations*: promoting more cooperative, efficient, and ethical negotiation processes
- *Inclusive negotiations*: fostering a broad framework for all actors involved in different issues
- *Balanced negotiations*: negotiating within alliances a common approach to problem solving that should be careful without being paranoid

Emotional communication is an ability that can improve the quality and range of relationships. A particular negotiating transaction can prepare the

stage for emotional communication and the consequent counterpart's responses to it (Galluccio 2005d). The emotional experience is influenced by an individual's past, present, and *future* scenarios which persist in the mind. The cognitive, metacognitive, emotional, meta-emotional, and motivational processes of negotiators all play an important role in the adaptive decision-making process, and it would be beneficial if negotiation strategies could be tailored to encompass these psychological dynamics as well as technical and contextual elements (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Loewenstein and Lerner 2003). Awareness of emotional communication should be one of the core features of training programs for negotiators and mediators because any particular negotiating move initiates a script for the emotional communication and consequent responses of negotiation counterparts. Our far-reaching proposals for training negotiators and mediators (leaders, politicians) aim to challenge and improve their cognitive, affective, and behavioral skills (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). The role individuals play matters more than ever before in that human action is shaped by individuals and group movements rather than by abstract forces. Nowadays, it seems we are missing a sufficiently interdisciplinary, articulated perspective from which to examine negotiators' performance on a step-by-step project, or assess their own experience and witnessing of their negotiation processes, that can serve as the basis for new specifically tailored training for operators on the field.

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Part V

**Cognitive and Behavioural Approach
to Negotiation**

Mauro Galluccio and Aaron T. Beck

Occidental rationalism must go back into itself and overcome its own blindness in order to open up dialogically what it can learn from the traditions of other cultures. [...] Europe must [...] relativize itself far more radically vis-à-vis the others, the strangers, the misunderstood. [...] What we need is to practice a little more solidarity: without that, intelligent action will remain permanently foundationless and inconsequential.

Jürgen Habermas, *The Past and Future*, 1994, p. 96.

Introduction

The fall of the Berlin Wall exacerbated global tension and violence with an increase in the number of intrastate ethno-political conflicts on a regional and local scale (Galluccio 2011). These conflicts include, but are not exclusive to, violent clashes, within national boundaries (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009). This chapter explores a cognitive approach to conflict resolution proposing an integrative viewpoint and a more comprehensive and coherent means of conflict transformation. Cognitive psychologists and cognitive

psychotherapists hypothesize that thoughts and beliefs are connected to emotions, moods, physical experiences, and behaviors and that this connection must be explored in order to understand outward actions (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). A central idea in cognitive psychotherapy is that our *perception* of an event or experience powerfully affects our physiological, emotional, and behavioral responses to it (Beck 1988; Ellis 1994). For how people think, feel, and behave toward other individuals and groups is one aspect of their warring behavior (Beck 1999; Ellis 1992). International negotiation, mediation, and the skillful ability to *feel, manage, and prevent* potential disputes in their *embryonic* state are essential mechanisms in a rapidly changing and complex global environment. Our approach examines the cognitive root causes of violence in order to help social structures withstand conflict and so that we may promote tailored training programs that can transform a conflict (and relationships) shifting from the level of violence to the level of political resolution.

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New Reversal of Power from Top-Down to Bottom-Up

International conflicts have evolved from ongoing competition between national states to struggles that cross national borders. These conflicts arise from situations that transcend mere interstate international crises. Traditionally, the international arena has been ruled by hegemonic structures based mainly on coercion, determined in accordance with security and military power. Nevertheless, since the end of the Second World War, the international system has witnessed a deep and rapid change in the structures shaping international relations, which has profoundly affected the traditional balance of power. Henry Kissinger in 1975 defined the contemporary global situation in terms of “entering a new era, [as] old international patterns are crumbling” (Quoted in Nye 1990, p. 156). Further, these changes have been hastened by the technological revolution as well as the fall of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Today, states are more focused on new challenges rather than challengers (Nye 2011). Issues like economic growth, ecology, health epidemics, illicit trade, and terrorism, in addition to the explosion in technology, make the world increasingly interconnected. Consequently, military power is no longer the only factor in the balance of international affairs. New actors—such as international organizations, multinational companies, international governmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) but even transnational religious groups, oil companies, and terrorist organizations—have now entered the scene, creating a multilevel distribution of power. This new distribution of power (Nye 1990, 2011) is seen in the less tangible forms of culture, information, communication, and science, which may over time be considered increasingly effective sources and expressions of power. The 1990s witnessed the so-called information revolution which revolutionized the way knowledge is produced, exchanged, and disseminated. We have consequently been witnessing new structures of power which are less

top-down and more bottom-up (directly from the citizens).

On the basis of these considerations, Nye (2011, p. 23) puts forward the concept of *soft power*, “The ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.” As a matter of fact, it will be much easier for a state to achieve a particular aim if it manages to shape the behavior of others in its own image, in other words, according to its values and ideology. Therefore the costs of coercive power will increase in the face of environments changing from the inside out in pursuit of their goals. Such changes suggest that international relations may no longer be understood merely in terms of power, sovereignty, and security (Manners 2002). Where realism fails to adequately explain reality, new insights about the distinctive features of human beings, namely, their cultures and anthropological and psychological issues, begin to matter.

Cognitive Processes and Decision-Making

Individuals during their lifetimes develop beliefs about themselves, their world, and other people, which heavily influence their perception of events, including their encoding and recalling of information (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). Information processing, for instance, is seen as a key factor in the physiological, emotional, and behavioral aspects of the human experience (Beck 1995, 1999; Ellis 1995). Individuals process and filter information via personal “cognitive schemas” that store knowledge based on prior learning and experiences. Schemas are the mental structures through which we assign meanings to events and life experiences. While simple schemas are constructed for objects, people, events, and procedures, more complex schemas are involved in abstract thinking. In the clinical field, it is widely accepted that individuals with cognitive and emotional disorders suffer from maladaptive early schemas (Leahy 2007; Guidano and Liotti 1983; Young et al. 2003).

People's most central cognitive schemas are so fundamental that they often remain unarticulated, automatically accepted as reality. Beliefs about relationship interactions are learned early in life and internalized without question, existing as vague concepts of what "should be" or what is right (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Dattilio 1998, 2010). One's underlying beliefs influence one's perception, which is expressed by situation-specific automatic thoughts. These thoughts, in turn, influence one's emotions. As such, ideas and beliefs play a critical role in interpersonal negotiations, as they can seriously influence decision-making processes.

As extensively explained in Aquilar and Galluccio (2008), Aaron Beck made a fundamental discovery in the idea of automatic thoughts and their role in the maintenance of emotional disorders (Beck 1963, 1988, 1995, 1999). Automatic thoughts may be defined as stream of consciousness ideas, beliefs, or images that individuals have from moment to moment, often elicited by specific situations (see also Dattilio 1998, 2010) ("My partner is late, she does not respect me!"). The word "automatic" conveys the spontaneous quality of these thoughts, which are not the result of reasoning, but seem to spring up automatically, rapidly, and very briefly (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Beck 2011). These automatic thoughts, which reflect appraisal of a situation, rather than a more broadly objective view of a situation, trigger emotional and behavioral responses (Robins and Hayes 1995). If the appraisals are distorted, the person's responses will be maladaptive.

Cognitive distortions (thinking errors) are the links between beliefs and automatic thoughts. They may often have roots in people's early attachment relationships contributing to the development of relative Internal Working Models and consequential interpersonal patterns (Allen et al. 2008; Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). When new information or memories are cognitively processed, the information is often biased to fit a pre-existing belief (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). This bias then becomes accessible to consciousness in the form of distorted automatic thoughts or images. These automatic thoughts are central

to the way in which an individual interprets events and thus to what behavior is displayed, i.e., hostility. There is a number of specific types of cognitive distortions that tend to be present in the thoughts of individuals and which could also affect negotiators. Although these types of cognitive distortions are conceptually discrete, any given thought may reflect more than one type of distortion. Aquilar and Galluccio (2008), Beck (1988, 1999, 2002), Beck (2011), Beck and Pretzer (2005), and Dattilio (1998, 2010) list the following common cognitive distortions:

1. **Dichotomous thinking** (called also "all or nothing" or "polarized thinking"): Experiences are viewed in terms of two mutually exclusive categories where the gray zone does not exist. We can exemplify this cognitive distortion with the aphorism: "Who is not with me is against me." Defiance, not cooperation, is often the response. "The counterpart (and our) behaviors are appraised through the lens of this distortion as: right/wrong; correct/incorrect; victim/guilty; good/evil, etc." (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008, pp. 53).
2. **Tunnel vision**: People only see the negative or positive aspects of the situation when they are distressed (what fits their attitude or state of mind).
3. **Overgeneralization**: A single contingent experience is taken as being characteristic of life in general, going far beyond the contextual event.
4. **Selective abstraction**: Information is perceived out of context. The focus of attention is on one or some particular aspects of a complex situation, which are noticed or highlighted, to the exclusion of other relevant aspects and to the picture as a whole. This distortion may inhibit far reaching compromises and long-term cooperative behaviors.
5. **Disqualifying the positive**: Positive experiences are discounted because they may "collide" with personal negative views.
6. **Mind reading**: Even without evidence, people may assume that they know what others are thinking and how they, themselves, will respond to anticipated counteractions to this evidence-less-based reasoning.

7. **Fortune telling:** Treating expectations about future events as established reality without awareness that this “reality” is in fact a mix of perceptions, thoughts, images, hopes, desires, and emotions (mental states). The person becomes incapable of recognizing the hypothetical and fallible nature of his own expectations.
8. **Catastrophizing:** Anticipated negative events are viewed as unbearable disasters despite any substantial evidence and without considering other more likely perspectives. Even a minor factor in the event may be interpreted as a sign of imminent catastrophe.
9. **Maximization or minimization:** Decontextualizing some aspects of the situation, personal characteristics, or experiences from the actual significance, treating them as independent of their real meaning.
10. **Emotional reasoning:** The assumption that feeling particular emotions, such as rage or sadness, for instance, reflects the true nature of the situation.
11. **“Should” or “have to” statements:** Statements that provide justification for or control over behaviors. To the extent that ideas, emotions, and behaviors arise that actually sabotage an understanding of interpersonal differences or disagreements.
12. **Labeling:** Mistakes made in the past are generalized as traits that define oneself or others. People attach these fixed, rigid, and global labels without considering that the evidence might suggest a less uniform conclusion.
13. **Personalization:** The behavior of others is explained on the basis of personal responsibility. You believe others are behaving negatively (or positively) because of you, without considering other factors that may lead to more plausible conclusions.
14. **Arbitrary inference:** Drawing a conclusion, in the absence of supporting evidence. People may reframe their experiences so that an *in-the-moment* disappointment becomes a dominant memory. This is a common thinking error resulting in repeated mistakes in human information processing.

Such distortions play a central role in the cognitive-interpersonal reflexive cycle, which Beck has developed, proposing that thoughts do not simply “cause feelings and behavior” but that thoughts are rather part of a recursive cycle in which “thoughts influence emotions, feelings, and behavior and feelings and actions, in turn, influence thoughts” (Beck and Pretzer 2005). When such thinking errors are present, the individual is more likely to see an exaggerated version of events than is objectively warranted.

The cognitive model further identifies the components that may contribute to hatred and violence: cognitive egocentricity and hostility. *Cognitive egocentric monitoring* can be problematic when it becomes extreme, fostering the obsessive desire to control the behavior and intentions of others. This egocentric perspective can mire individuals in the role of victimizers, self-righteously defending themselves against what they perceive as the aggressive actions of others who threaten their values, personal identity, or very being. The emergence of cognitive errors in response to a perceived threat leads the individual to categorize others as positive “in-group” or negative “enemy.” Negative or “hostile” framing illuminates the angry or hateful behavior of individuals in response to certain events. Over time, individuals may come to totally misinterpret the behavior of others, constantly suspecting the other’s motives and thus significantly biasing their interpretations of events. Such biases arise directly from an individual’s beliefs, which can dictate erroneous conclusions about the actions of the perceived offender. Hostile framing can increase the individual’s likelihood of feeling wronged, which can then lead to anger (Beck 2002).

This “*hostility sequence*” encapsulates the above factors, describing the psychological process of individuals who react with hostility and anger in ways that may seem inappropriate. Individuals may be predisposed to certain beliefs, e.g., “if my wife contradicts me, it means she does not like or respect me,” which become a vulnerability. “When a person perceives that either he himself or a sacred value is threatened or abused, he reverts to categorical, dualistic

thinking. When this primal mode of thinking is triggered, he automatically prepares to attack—to defend his highly invested value” (Beck 1999, p. 22). If an external event occurs that triggers this vulnerability, it activates the belief, which then shapes the interpretation (or misinterpretation) of the event. This interpretation appears in the form of automatic thoughts [and] produces distress. If the injured party blames another party for having caused his distress, he feels angry and becomes aroused to punish her; the blame may be magnified as a result of cognitive distortions (Beck 1999). At the end of the day, we may all be at some point “prisoners of hate.”

Prisoners of Hate: The End Justifies the Means

September 1, 1939. Adolf Hitler’s Germany invades Poland. The Second World War breaks out in Europe, beginning one of the darkest chapters of human history. Countries from all over the globe fight each other in an unprecedented struggle for liberty or dominance, as the case may be. What is at stake is ideology and an obsessive search for vital space. Six years later, the total amount of losses in terms of human lives would exceed 55 million. The victorious powers would then stand off against each other for another fifty years, dividing the world into two blocks, separated by the *iron curtain*.

March 2, 1965. Operation Rolling Thunder starts off, sanctioning the US involvement in Vietnam in order to fight the Vietcong “rebels” who, with the support of the North Vietnamese Government and the Soviet Union, seek to take control of South Vietnam and reunite the country. The Vietnam War was born of wider Cold War policies and the related strategy of containment, aimed at defeating communism on a global scale. The conflict, which ended 10 years later with the withdrawal of US troops, resulted not only in massive loss of human lives but also in widespread protests in the USA and a fracturing of American society.

August 1969. The British army is sent to Northern Ireland in order to control the spreading

violence perpetuated by the B Specials, a Northern Irish reserve police force, against the Catholic population marching for civil rights. In January 1972, 14 civilians are killed by the fire of the British army itself. This episode marks one of the most violent moments in the history of Northern Ireland, with the name of Bloody Sunday. From that time, an increasingly polarized situation existed between two groups within the same society, namely, Catholics and Protestants. Their reciprocal intolerance would destroy civil and pacific coexistence in a brutal escalation of hate and violence.

June 26, 1991. Following the Slovenian declaration of independence, the Ten-Day War introduces a series of civil wars that will lead to the dissolution of Yugoslavia after a decade characterized by bloody episodes. At that point in time, the fall of the Berlin Wall was very recent history, and the Soviet Union, hitherto one of the two major world powers, had also started its implosion process and was about to collapse. By the time the last bullet was shot, about 250,000 people had been killed and several episodes of ethnic cleansing had occurred.

September 11, 2001. Two passenger planes crash into each of the World Trade Towers in Manhattan, causing the death of almost three thousand civilians, as well as the destruction of a prominent symbol of American (and Western) economic and financial power. Such an attack on the world’s greatest military power provoked the USA and its allies to adopt policies to defeat terrorist violence, particularly of the group known as al-Qaeda. At the turn of the century, a new way of viewing international conflicts had begun: the *war on terror* would become a central issue of contemporary international relations.¹

March 15, 2011. Public demonstrations are held in Syria, in the wake of the “Arab spring.” Protesting against Bashar Al-Assad’s regime,

¹As Tim Dunne points out, “September 11 2001 gave the George W. Bush presidency a mission. Terrorism became the enemy [...]. The war on terror became the ideology. To combat terrorism, Bush urged the American people and their allies to accept the need to fight on all fronts and to tolerate exceptional measures, including [...] restricting civil liberties” (Dunne 2003, p. 309).

rallies quickly turn into riots, until the breakout of civil war which continues after 3 years and is worsening by the day. To date, more than 140,000 people have been killed, the majority of them civilians, including men, women, and children. Moreover, Syrian refugees have now exceeded two million. While we are writing, the world is still trying to understand the meaning of the mass murders entailing the use of sarin gas against the civilian population.

Despite profound differences in the causes, reasons, and dynamics of each of these violent conflicts, there is a common factor connecting them. That is human nature. Since its very beginning, humanity has been caught between the two opposing forces of cooperation and conflict. Relevant questions have often been raised by scholars, researchers, and laymen: why do so many attempts at cooperation seem to be ultimately overwhelmed by conflict? Why conflict, why war? Why do humans always seem to default to this terrible love of war (Hillman 2004)? Are they just enacting innate features of human nature or do they have contingent reasons? Where does all this hatred, anger, hostility, and violence come from? What lies behind it? What are the cognitive bases of anger, hostility, and violence (Beck 1999; Aquilar and Galluccio 2008, 2011)?

Cooperation, Conflict, and Moral Disengagement

Cooperation and conflict dynamics have always existed as prominent biological motivational forces in human life. Indeed, an important merit of interpersonal exchanges is merely the bringing together of diverse individuals with the opportunity to share perspectives, needs, interests, and plans. The ultimate result of such exchanges is the exploration of ideas and ultimately transformation. We acquire and improve awareness in interpersonal exchanges. And it is consciousness of thoughts, feelings, and actions at the individual level that provides the meaning that leads to transformative action for both self and environment. In this light, we may say that it is through cooperation that human societies have been able

to improve in a more or less continuous evolutionary process. On the other hand, conflict seems to characterize the core of human social behavior. In the presence of conflict, cooperation is jeopardized and—in extreme cases—conflicts arise when contrasting sets of values threaten or seem to threaten one another.

What is at stake is a particular set of values and identities that define groups and individuals. When in conflict with others, it is felt that what is endangered is our freedom, our way of life, and our world view. Consequently, fighting cruel Nazis, shouldering a rifle to shoot a Serbian militant, perpetuating violence against a Unionist to avenge one's murdered relative in Northern Ireland, and expressing solidarity with "our guys" fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq all become justified acts of moral disengagement of those who feel that their rights have been violated. The moral disengagement is described by Bandura (1990, 1999, 2002, 2004) as the result of psychological mechanisms (highly influenced by interpersonal relationships, media, and communication processes). It "allows" individuals to act, tolerate, or support morally censurable behaviors, deactivating, often temporarily, some of the cognitive-emotional functions of the self-regulatory moral mechanisms by which moral agency is exercised (Aquilar and Galluccio 2009; Bandura 2002). The moral disengagement may center on the cognitive restructuring of inhumane conduct into a benign or worthy one by moral justification (Bandura 2002). In a diverse world, there are infinite perspectives concerning the use of violence, its tolerance, and justification. As a matter of fact, Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia, which shortly afterward led to the WWII, was "justified" by a claim of defending German citizens in that country, who were portrayed as vulnerable to persecution (Beck 2002). Historians and international relations theorists tend to agree that German policies in WWII were largely viewed as justified and were consequently supported by the German people in response to perceived injustice and humiliation after the severe mandates of the Versailles Treaty. The ethnic cleansing carried out by former president of Yugoslavia, Milosevic, was in turn "justified" by

accusing Kosovars of genocide against the Serbs. From this point of view, violence has been “justifiable” from both sides also in Northern Ireland; indeed the incursions of the Shankill Butchers—Protestant extremists who used to torture and murder random Catholics in Belfast—were “legitimized” by the terrorist acts perpetrated by the IRA, on the basis of an eye-for-an-eye view of retribution. Finally, more than once, al-Qaeda claimed that terrorist attacks against Western civilian populations were “justified” by American imperialistic foreign policies and the view that American culture in general is repugnant and immoral, therefore corrupting and dangerous (Beck 2002). One set of human disengagement practices operates on the construal of the behavior itself (Bandura 1990). “People do not ordinarily engage in harmful conduct until they have justified to themselves the morality of their actions. In this process of moral justification, detrimental conduct is made personally and socially acceptable by portraying it as serving socially worthy or moral purposes. People then can act on a moral imperative and preserve their view of themselves as moral agents while inflicting harm on others” (Bandura 1999, p. 194).

Cognitive Basis of Violence

Aquilar and Galluccio (2008) and Beck (1999, 2002) have talked extensively about the cognitive model applied to the field of international relations and international negotiations. For the cognitive model, the interaction between external circumstances, the intrinsic human capability for violence, and a specific triggering environment highlights the importance of *meaning* as a central factor in hostility and anger. The cognitive model postulates that an individual’s interpretation of an event informs how he or she will react in a given situation. All individuals have internal representations of themselves, others, and the world. Whether acting in a group or as individuals, people have built-in mental categories that identify good and bad and right and wrong (Beck 1999). When an individual believes that he or she, or the

group to which he or she belongs, is being threatened, the threat may translate into an assessment of the self and one’s own group as “good” and the group or individual of the other party as “bad.” The other may then transform “from *opponent* to *antagonist* to *enemy*” in the mind of the individual who identifies himself as a victim (Beck 2002). This enemy must consequently be punished or eliminated, in retaliation for perceived damage or possible future damaging action. In most cases, terrorists do not call themselves terrorists. Rather, “like aggressors and perpetrators throughout history, terrorists regarded themselves as the victims and the enemy as the victimizers” (Beck 2002, p. 210). In this light, where does the truth stand? Who is the victim? Who is the victimizer in a conflict of absolute values? “Dissecting” a good/evil relationship, we could analyze hate, anger, hostility, and violence, but things may become far more complicated than they at first appear. Cognition and emotions are intimately linked. The nuance and connection between these processes are thin and evanescent as their interaction is indefinite and mutually influencing.

Victims and Victimizers, Need for Expansion, and Vital Space

We all see reality from our own point of view which we accept as the true state of things. However, this naturally obscures the fact that in our world there are potentially infinite perspectives, many of which are quite different than our own. The origin of violence may lay in deeply embedded, unconscious mechanisms, which only a more accurate knowledge of the human mind may reveal. Regardless of which party assumes the role of the victim and which the victimizer, history is clear in showing how most conflicts arise from yearning, ambition, and sometimes need of expansion (Beck 1999, 2002). Aggression has always been perpetrated by a large military power to the detriment of a smaller one, be it *de facto* or perceived as such. As a matter of fact, when the hegemony of a

superpower is confronted with another of equal or superior force, aggression may not take place. In this case, the superpower retreats, preferring to focus on maintaining national security. The Cold War is a prime example of such a mechanism, given that it involved two massive superpowers threatening each other for almost half a century but never disrupting the fragile balance between them (although transposing the conflict to other parts of the world was a favorite strategic confrontation policy utilized by both superpowers). There were episodes of crisis and moments of higher or lower tension, but the equilibrium was never broken, until one of the two collapsed, forced to give up the strategy game. The Cold War showed how the balance of power between two or more superpowers may be seen as a balance of terror. It is just a matter of calculating the amount of risk, between potential losses and possible gains. When all parties estimate that the losses may be much higher than potential gains, a tacit agreement emerges fueled by the fear of ultimate loss.

Obviously, no superpower can justify its expansionist aims just as such and so presents them as the righting of some previous injustice or persecution. This position is nurtured by propaganda, inciting a society toward hatred of the victimized party. In the examples of conflicts that we have cited, aggression can be seen as the ultimate reason for the German invasion of the Czech Republic, as well as for the Balkan wars. Consideration must also be given to the external conditions that lead individuals or groups to respond with violence: groups may rebel in response to perceived coercion and oppression, may experience revulsion when they perceive others as immoral and violating their own sacred values, and may act as though they have been actually harmed, a belief to which they have fallen victim. Various terrorist groups seem to exhibit these responses and thus justify their actions (Beck 2002).

It is interesting how the aforementioned mechanism of victimization has been a recurrent theme throughout history, employed by leaders for their own imperialistic aims. One of the greatest

conquerors of all times, Julius Caesar seems as he exhibited this behavior. Indeed, the Roman general claimed that the German tribes were taking an expansionist stance in order to justify his own aggression and longing for glory and Roman expansion. In fact, as he states in his *Commentarii de Bello Gallico*:

“Men fond of war [as they were] [the Helvetii] were affected with great regret. They thought that considering the extent of their population, and their renown for warfare and bravery, they had but narrow limits, although they extended in length 240, and in breadth 180 [Roman] miles. [...] But even if he were willing to forget their former outrage, could he also lay aside the remembrance of the late wrongs, in that they had against his will attempted a route through the Province by force, in that they had molested the Aedui, the Ambarri, and the Allobroges? That as to their so insolently boasting of their victory, and as to their being astonished that they had so long committed their outrages with impunity, [both these things] tended to the same point; for the immortal gods are wont to allow those persons whom they wish to punish for their guilt sometimes a greater prosperity and longer impunity, in order that they may suffer the more severely from a reverse of circumstances. Although these things are so, yet, if hostages were to be given him by them in order that he may be assured these will do what they promise, and provided they will give satisfaction to the Aedui for the outrages which they had committed against them and their allies, and likewise to the Allobroges, he [Caesar] will make peace with them.”²

Nevertheless, at the earliest origins of a conflict, as these examples show, we may perceive an individual will to control “other territory.” Consequently, we could infer that aggression is always led by the will—or the need—to conquer and control a territory or a space and the goods in that territory. It could follow how, considering the forces lying behind conflict, there is always a tendency to impose oneself aggressively, led by a desire for *enlargement* and *domination*. This aggression may then be actualized in several different ways, as the actors and the interests at stake change.

²Gaius Julius Caesar, *Commentaries on the Gallic War*, translated by W.A. McDevitte and W.S. Bohn. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1869. Book 1, II, XIV.

Cold Versus Hot Violence

Pathways to aggressive or destructive behavior differ. Beck distinguishes between “cold, calculated violence” and “hot, reactive violence” (Beck 1999). The latter does not necessarily imply a rapid, violent response to an external event, but may signify the buildup of hatred in reaction to prolonged provocative events. This seems to have been the case with the escalating arms race that increased threat levels and led to a preemptive strike by Germany at the beginning of World War I. Hatred of the enemy plays a central role in hot violence, to the extent that perception becomes so exaggerated that the only option left is the enemy’s humiliation, destruction, or extermination. This process often begins with one group stereotyping an out-group, such that its members no longer have distinct identities, but rather form *one large mass*. As a second step, the members of the out-group are *dehumanized*, seen as less than human, which diminishes the perpetrators’ empathy with them, further lowering inhibition of the violent impulse (Aquilari and Galluccio 2008; Beck 1999). Finally, the offender *demonizes* opposition members, conflating theoretical conceptions evil behavior and actions that threaten the very existence of the so-called aggressors. When individuals subsequently carry out an act of violence toward out-group members, they are not attacking them as distinct, human beings but rather as the all-encompassing image of the enemy that they have projected onto their victims. Even in cases of domestic violence, where a husband knows his wife as a unique individual, the same process of dehumanization and demonization takes place before he actually strikes her. When distorted thinking overrides higher-level cognitive processes, the husband becomes fixated on the idea of the enemy, now embodied by his wife who is seen to undermine him, shame him, or challenge him through objectively harmless words and actions. This fixation prevents him from feeling empathy for her, which inhibits his revulsion at striking another human, and thus prompting an act of violence against her (Beck 1999).

Cold, calculated violence, on the other hand, is not characterized by this directive hatred and demonization of the other. Rather, this is violence rationally carried out to achieve a clear goal—whether a bank robbery or Hitler’s invasion of Poland. The danger of cold violence is that the ends are perceived as justifying the means, and criticism of both the ends and the means by outsiders is negated by the perpetrators’ conviction that they are acting in service of a greater goal (Beck 1999).

Group Violence

A common psychological trait of perpetrators of violence is represented by the rigidity of belief that they have suffered some injustice, reinforcing their self-image of righteousness. This happens in an inversely proportional manner: the more the image of the enemy takes form, the more the self-image is consolidated. A representation of “the other” is necessary in order to have a representation of “the self”: we need some entity to compare with and oppose to achieve a definite consciousness of the self. Our own identity takes shape through opposition to something “other”; we need “the other” in order to be ourselves. The cognitive approach is also applicable to violence perpetrated by groups. Beck and Pretzer (2005) have found that parallels can be found in the thinking of men who abuse their wives and that of groups engaged in the persecution of other members of society. In other words, the perceptions and cognitions that lead to violence are the same whether the violence is inflicted by an individual or a group. It should be noted, though, that societal-level analysis of this phenomenon requires an appropriately broad frame of reference (Aquilari and Galluccio 2008; Beck 1999, 2002; Beck and Pretzer 2005). Additionally, the support for and use of violence by a group are not simply the sum of the members’ cognitive distortions and core beliefs; rather, interaction with other group members may reinforce an individual’s conviction of having been wronged, and group belonging heightens the sense of in-group superiority.

Further, “group interactions that reinforce these views can lead to a much more extreme response than would be the case if each individual reached these conclusions separately” (Beck and Pretzer 2005, p. 74).

The phenomenon of group narcissism, for instance, in which the interests of the group are pursued to the exclusion of the interests of other groups, mirrors the egocentric worldview of the individual and provides a backdrop to other cognitive effects operating at the group level. Hostile framing also plays a role here, significantly contributing to negative perceptions of out-group members, prejudice, and stereotyping. “...the fixed negative representation is supported by selective memories of past wrongs, real or imaginary, and malevolent attributions” (Beck 1999, p. 8). The cognitive distortion of dichotomous thinking, conflated with the demonization of the enemy, leads to an enhancement of the group’s self-image. When beliefs are present that justify violence, individual and group-level inhibitions may be overcome for the group to carry out violence and to spew hatred (Beck and Pretzer 2005). Investigations into in-group superiority and out-group inferiority (see Chow et al. 2008), the role of moral disengagement social mechanism (Bandura 1990), as well as the role of morality, threat perceptions, and in-group belonging (Brambilla et al. 2013) can provide further insight into group-perpetrated violence.

The actions of terrorist groups and their supporters demonstrate the role of “good” self-perceptions, hatred toward the enemy, and cognitive distortions. Terrorists may believe that they have been wronged—the primary driver for anger—and “rightfully” call for revenge. “Oppressors” are re-categorized as enemies, and “retribution against the enemy in the form of mass murder of anonymous civilians may become an imperative,” simultaneously enhancing the group’s self-image (Beck 2002, p. 209). Terrorists further exhibit many of the same cognitive distortions as spousal abusers or participants in genocide, namely, overgeneralization, tunnel vision, and dichotomous thinking. Terrorist violence may primarily be classified as hot and reactive and is

driven by hatred of the image of the enemy. The stronger the cognitive distortions, the greater the negative bias toward the victim/enemy will be. The strength of these “primal beliefs” may cause the perpetrators to fixate on the enemy and to lose their inhibitions toward harming other humans, as the perceived legitimacy of their grievance justifies violent means of revenge. At the same time, leaders of terrorist groups also exhibit aspects of what Beck describes as cold, calculated violence, in which the desired outcome justifies the means. Indeed, feelings of hate may lie dormant within a conscience (either individual or collective) until some particular perceptual event may ignite and burst into violence, torture, murder, and even broad social destruction such as ethnic cleansing, genocide, and annihilation. In this light, far from being about innate, universal human predispositions, war, conflict, and cooperation are the result of complex cognitive, metacognitive, emotional, meta-emotional, and motivational processes (through which we “embellish” the information we receive and store through our perception) and our interdependence with the “reality” of the outside world. A core element of the cognitive model is the interdependence of thoughts, emotions, feelings, motivation, and behavior that make values and principles sacred to individuals, peoples, and communities.

Negotiating a De-radicalization of the Violence Process

De-radicalization of the violence process has a strategic meaning (Dechesne 2011). In this context, special attention must be paid to sacred values which Philip Tetlock describes as “those values that a moral community treats as possessing transcendental significance that precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any mingling with secular values” (Tetlock 2003, p. 320). In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for example, such sacred values are the “right to return” among Palestinians and the need to protect the whole “land of Israel” among Israeli settlers (Ginges et al. 2007). Despite economists’ theories that people will make rational choices, it

can be seen that people will protect sacred values in negotiations despite the absence of any prospect of success and will become outraged at the suggestion that sacred values be compromised for economic or material gain (Atran and Ginges 2012). Following Tetlock's "sacred values protection model," individuals will experience moral outrage at others in their community who have relinquished the sacred values and even feel contaminated if they themselves contemplate—however briefly—trading sacred values for material benefits (Tetlock 2003). Studies show that when groups are asked to give up sacred values in return for economic support, they become outraged and refuse to negotiate (Sheikh et al. 2012); if they are offered economically worthless moral concessions such as an apology, however, they are more willing to think about negotiating (Ginges et al. 2007). Some Iranians view Iran's right to nuclear power as a sacred value and thus oppose decommissioning the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for economic aid far more vehemently than a deal with moral incentives (such as a halt to US military aid to Israel) instead (Ginges et al. 2007). Sacred values must thus be carefully considered when analyzing conflict and peace processes. Did the individual hold certain sacred values at the beginning of the conflict, such that recruiters were able to recognize these values and re-order them within the radical worldview? Or did values deemed "merely" important become sacred over the course of the conflict? Understanding which values are sacred and how they evolved as such can be immensely important to the negotiating process of de-radicalization from violence. As the individual accepts disengagement from violence and the radical group, the process will become significantly more difficult if the sacred values clash with other values and/or identities endorsed by mainstream society. As explained in Aquilar and Galluccio (2008), the contribution of the cognitive model may cast the management of psychological consequences of war and terrorism as negative aspects of failed negotiations. The functions of the cognitive model as they have been evolving within the sphere of peace psychology fall into macro-categories (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008, pp. 108–109):

1. **Prevention**, with a strong focus on identification and overcoming of "dysfunctional" beliefs ("irrational" ideas) and cognitive distortions. This category includes social communication actions aiming at discouraging possible terrorist organizations' flankers and/or adepts.
2. **Managing**, with focus on interpersonal processes and metacognitive function. This category includes dissuasive actions directed to already active but dubious, flankers, or adepts.
3. **De-radicalization/reparation**, with direct psychotherapeutic help for the victims' survivors of war experiences and/or terrorism and victimizers. This category includes the psychological recovery of repented terrorists or flankers.

The inclusion of social-cognitive approaches in training and de-radicalization programs may provide practitioners with the opportunity to make significant inroads in reducing an individual's likelihood of inflicting violence on others (Bandura 1990, 2002, 2004). On an individual level, cognitive-behavioral counseling seeks to reframe an individual's interpretations of and responses to a perceived affront. Training programs can thus help individuals change their perceptions of threats and external events.

Relationship Transformation

As Beck indicated, when an in-group perceives an out-group to be the "Image of Evil," "retribution against the enemy in the form of humiliation, destruction, mass murder of anonymous civilians may become an imperative" (Beck 2002, p. 209). Bandura introduced an interactionist perspective to morality in which moral actions are the products of the reciprocal interplay of personal and social influences (Bandura 1986, 1990, 2002, 2004). For example, although physical violence may end many years before a truth commission is established, the negative emotions of fear, anger, anxiety, and hatred, as well as certain cognitive distortions (including overgeneralization, selective abstraction, maximization/minimization,

emotional reasoning, and labeling), are likely to persist for many years. A study conducted by Rimé et al. with survivors and perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide, for example, showed that the survivors still maintained negative stereotypes toward the imprisoned offenders and were more likely to view the latter group as homogeneous (a signifier of intergroup prejudice) many years after the end of the genocide but before participating in the Rwandan Gacaca (the truth and reconciliation process in Rwanda) (Rimé et al. 2012). Cárdenas et al. state that “from a psychosocial perspective, reconciliation implies (a) the construction of a common integrative narrative of past collective violence; (b) overcoming revenge and negative emotions like anger, fear and sadness, and changing the out-group image, increasing intergroup trust and forgiveness as well as positive collective emotions like hope; (c) increasing confidence in institutions; and (d) increasing values of tolerance and universal justice” (Cardenas et al. 2013, p. 63). Participation in collective events has implications for humans’ sociality, and a cycle of emotion may be created by participation in such events through emotion contagion. In other words, one individual expression of emotion may spark similar emotions in others and thus invite the reciprocation of these emotions from outside groups. Researchers decided to test whether the truth and reconciliation process in Rwanda led to certain psychosocial outcomes described above, namely, a reduction in negative emotions as well as a shift in the image of the out-group (Rimé et al. 2012). In two consecutive studies (Kanyangara et al. 2007; Rimé et al. 2012), the researchers investigated the impact that the Gacaca procedures had on both emotions and social variables among survivors and imprisoned offenders. They hypothesized that both groups would experience an increase in negative emotions following the commission (emotional variable) but also that participation in the Gacaca would decrease negative stereotypes of the out-group as well as increase perceived heterogeneity in the out-group. Following the study, the researchers’ hypotheses were correct. With the exception of anger (which was replaced by sadness), the other three emo-

tional variables that had been tested (sadness, fear, and anxiety) among both groups had increased, while negative stereotypes each group held of the other had decreased. Additionally, perceived out-group similarity had significantly decreased as well (Rimé et al. 2012). It can thus be seen that such truth and reconciliation processes through timely organized commissions and procedures could be strengthened in addressing socio-cognitive mechanisms that incite to the violence among both the perpetrators and the victims of genocide and contribute to transforming the lingering “image of the enemy” among the offenders (Beck 2002).

Conclusion: Toward a New Social Conscience?

According to a cognitive approach, some political leaders can be seen to think and act through the biased lens of cognitive distortions and dysfunctional cognitive and emotional processes. This may be due to inadequate early learning of interpersonal schemas, traumatic attachment relationships patterns, focused unduly on violence and oppression (and related emotional background). Even if this way of thinking could seem “irrational,” it has the capacity to gain, in some contexts, the approval of social or military groups (Ellis 1992; Beck 1999). Attachment theory may help to better explain, through individual and dramatic narratives, how some people might develop an incredible hatred and “talented planning” for vengeance at any cost, to improperly make up for past emotional suffering (Aquilar 2011; Aquilar and Galluccio 2008; Bowlby 1969, 1988; Holmes 2001). In this view, cooperation and conflict are complementary aspects of human nature: probably cooperation could not exist without conflict and vice versa, since they nourish each other. We have suggested how, in the dynamics of taking part in a group or community, members need to identify a common opponent (either concrete or abstract) for cooperation to take place. Clearly, this trend is exacerbated in a conflict situation, where a common opponent becomes a common enemy. At any rate, it is

always a matter of *me* versus *you* or *us* versus *them*, even within the same group.

Researchers and scholars in the field of conflict prevention and conflict resolution are increasingly aware of the need to use a multidisciplinary approach that incorporates economic, political, and sociopsychological elements (Aquilar 2011; Aquilar and Galluccio 2011; Galluccio 2011). With the increase of bitter ethno-political conflicts, there is a pressing need for well-trained professionals who are equipped to work in war zones and understand the local culture and situation. A crucial challenge is to prepare a new generation of practitioners and psychologists to participate in this important applied work. The goal is to better understand the processes involved in ethno-political warfare and to improve methods of prediction, intervention, prevention, and management, in order to meet human needs in context in countries ravaged by violent conflicts in post-conflict peace-building capacities. The cognitive model can serve to illuminate dysfunctional thinking in ethnic or national leaders: those in negotiation and mediation need to be aware of socio-cognitive mechanisms of the opposite sides and in themselves. Considerable skill is required to redirect the focus toward the question of what benefits each side would gain from an agreement.

We need to diffuse a sense of “We-ness,” the sense of belonging to a community in which we feel safe, in which our positions and our way of understanding the world are shared, the world where—nowadays more than ever—we all have to live together. The outside reality could be uniform, but it is subjected to potentially infinite interpretations. Such interpretations strictly depend—as we have seen—on our cognitive, metacognitive, emotional, meta-emotional, motivational processes. Studies in the field of neuroscience are suggesting that others may influence what we firmly believe in our own consciousness (Liotti 2001). Having that awareness may lead us to call stereotypes and prejudices into question. In this light, world peace is a process that is to be sought not only at high levels of the hierarchical pyramid but also at a more widespread social

level, through the rising of more appropriate or transformed human relations. Attention should not only be focused on the political nature and the ruling classes of states but also on the cultural, psychological, social, and ethical inclination of peoples. Indeed, a turning point in terms of universal and perpetual peace is not to be expected unless people are educated in building a common identity based on respect and acceptance of diversities as well as more direct democratic participation in the political life of the state. Albert Bandura in his seminal work (1986 1986, 1997, 2002, 2004) explained that man also has the capacity to self-regulate his motivation and actions through the mechanism of internal value systems and the process of evaluating the reactions to his behaviors. In order to spread and consolidate this process, it might be necessary to encourage the rising of a common social consciousness of the importance of cognitive and emotional resources and of social mechanisms active in human beings. This, through specialized tailored training, may ultimately result in the acquisition of complex sociopsychological knowledge and skills. In light of globalization, the information revolution and its exponential development, as well as the general financial/economic circumstances, the time may be right for a new social-cognitive consciousness to arise and spread worldwide. In this way, people may become critical of the “rightness” of their judgments, accepting the existence of potential cognitive and communicative biases at interpersonal and intercultural levels.

Shipwrecked in the middle of history, we cannot know where we are going, but we might just be in the eye of a huge storm, the dimensions of which we can only guess. The nature of this storm depends on whether we view history as an “eternal return” or rather as a dialectical tendency toward some kind of “different order” of human relations and the rising of a global ethical community. One day we may embrace the fact that we are far more interconnected with every human being, to the extent that we all are—at the end of the day—both executioners and victims in this world.

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Impediments and Strategies in Negotiating: A Cognitive Therapy Model

18

Robert L. Leahy

Negotiators differ in their goals, assumptions, strategies, knowledge, and beliefs about other participants in the exchange. Parties to a potential conflict often rely on emotions, shortsighted gains, resentments over humiliation, past narratives of “historic truths,” and the tendency to underestimate the potential retaliation of opposing parties while exaggerating their own view of their power to achieve their desired goals (Leahy 2011). Negotiators may pursue ultimately impossible or self-defeating goals without considering alternative and more accessible practical goals as they become locked into their perspective, demands, and the consequences of their decisions. They may utilize strategies that lead to the very outcomes that they are trying to avoid—for example, provocative and contemptuous approaches may result in open conflict which may have been viewed as undesirable. And, negotiators may selectively focus on biased information overlooking factors that might provide new opportunities for flexibility and less costly outcome. In short, negotiators are seldom rational. In this chapter, I will briefly describe the central elements of a cognitive model of misappraisals that may underlie problematic negotiation. In addition, I will outline several characteristics

of “egocentric” or “narcissistic” approaches to negotiation and indicate how these are often self-fulfilling prophecies. I will indicate how these “narcissistic” or egocentric biases precipitated a sequence of events leading to World War I and influenced the Treaty of Versailles and how these biases are operating in today’s impasse between the United States and Iran regarding nuclear proliferation. Finally, I will suggest some practical steps that might be initiated to overcome these impasses.

The Cognitive Model

The cognitive model of depression, anxiety, and anger was first advanced by Aaron Beck, stressing the role of conscious thinking in the elicitation and maintenance of negative moods (Beck 1976, 1979). According to the cognitive model, depression is characterized by biases or distortions in thinking that confirm a negative view of self, experience, and the future (the negative triad). Specifically, “automatic thoughts” are thoughts that occur spontaneously, appear to be true, and are associated with negative or dysfunctional moods and appraisals. Automatic thoughts are classified as labeling (the person is characterized as having an unchangeable trait), fortune-telling (predictions about the future without sufficient evidence), dichotomous thinking (all-or-nothing views of reality), personalizing (viewing events as overly caused by the self or directed against the

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self), discounting the positive (failing to consider positive information), overgeneralizing (seeing a pattern without sufficient recognition of variation), catastrophizing (viewing events as awful or intolerable), and shoulds (insisting that things must be a certain way). Underlying these automatic thoughts are a wide range of assumptions or conditional rules (“if-then” rules that are imperative). Examples include “If you disagree with me, then you must be my enemy”; “If we have different interests, then we can never reach an agreement”; and “If I don’t get my way, then I must feel humiliated.” Further, these automatic thoughts and assumptions are generated by core beliefs (or personal schemas) that reflect habitual biases of themes and issues (Leahy et al. 2005). For example, personal schemas might include viewing the self as helpless, incompetent, defective, unlovable, or superior. As a corollary to these views of self, others may be viewed as powerful, protective, persecuting, rejecting, judging, unreliable, or need gratifiers (Beck et al. 2004; Leahy 2003). The nature of schemas is that they direct attention, memory, and evaluation of information toward information that confirms the schema—that is, schemas have “confirmation bias.” Thus, we are naturally attentive to information that supports beliefs that we already hold. Moreover, schemas may also determine memory biases, such that information confirming a schema is more easily recalled and is given higher value when recalled.

A central assumption that I will advance is that international negotiators may reflect the schemas, assumptions, and automatic thoughts operative in their “national narrative.” This does not mean that the negotiator has a personality disorder, but rather that negotiation is carried out in the context of a narrative about self and others—in this case, about the negotiator’s nation and its perception of the other nation engaged in the process. I shall illustrate how automatic thoughts, assumptions (“shoulds” or imperatives and “if-then” beliefs), and core beliefs or schemas have affected past international conflicts, such as the series of events precipitating World War I, the Treaty of Versailles, the Marshall Plan, and the current conflict between the United States and Iran about nuclear arms.

A cognitive model of negotiation helps participants identify their automatic thought biases or distortions. These can include fortune-telling (predicting the future without sufficient evidence), personalizing (interpreting the behaviors of others as directed against the self), catastrophizing (viewing events as life-threatening or intolerable), labeling (viewing the other as having a fixed and inflexible trait), discounting the positives (not giving credit to any positive elements available), dichotomous thinking (seeing events in all-or-nothing terms), and overgeneralizing. In addition, the cognitive approach would include evaluation of assumptions or rules or shoulds that have an imperative quality: “They must comply.” Finally, core beliefs or schemas are central beliefs through which events are filtered. For example, the core belief “We are superior” filters events through this lens, selecting information that confirms the belief (about self and others) while rejecting information inconsistent with the belief.

The cognitive model utilizes a wide range of techniques to help negotiators examine the utility and validity of these cognitive biases, assumptions, and schemas (Leahy 2003). These techniques include the following: Identify the thought; rate the degree of belief in the thought; examine if the degree of belief changes and why it changes; link thoughts to emotions (e.g., anger, fear); categorize thoughts into “distortions” (e.g., mind reading, personalizing, fortune-telling); examine costs and benefits of thought; examine evidence for and against thought; take a devil’s advocate position toward thought; examine if these thoughts have been exaggerated in the past; ask if there is sufficient evidence to totally accept the thought; view events along a continuum (rather than dichotomously); examine what events could change in the future to modify the thought; consider alternative interpretations; examine the costs and benefits of alternative interpretations; consider using mutual problem solving with other parties; avoid getting committed to sunk costs; and brainstorm solutions with allied parties and with the “opposition.” In addition to utilizing these techniques on the self, the cognitive therapy negotiator can encourage the

opposition to utilize these techniques on their thoughts. By creating flexibility and constructive doubt, examining options, and collaborating on interpretations and possible courses of action, the negotiator can step away from fixed positions or emotional reasoning and consider more options. We shall examine how collaborative negotiation can be enhanced by the use of cognitive therapy techniques, how narcissistic or egocentric negotiators can increase their flexibility and modify their limited perspective, and how failures in these areas contributed to past impasses and current roadblocks in international negotiation.

A Cognitive Model for Enhancing Negotiation

As the foregoing discussion suggests, parties to a negotiation are vulnerable to cognitive biases, emotional heuristics, and egocentric perspectives. Indeed, given the adversarial nature of negotiation, it is difficult to imagine how one can completely escape from these biases. Accordingly, it is suggested here that before entering negotiation, the individual parties to the exchange can employ standard cognitive therapy assessment and techniques, as described here:

- What are the automatic thoughts and possible cognitive distortions that I may be employing?
- What rules, imperatives, or assumptions are guiding my thinking?
- What are my personal schemas and how will they impact this process?
- What are the personal schemas of the other participants?
- How does the other side view this? What are their automatic thoughts, imperatives, and schemas?
- What are the long-term and short-term consequences that I need to consider?

Let us examine each of these issues. First, “What are the automatic thoughts and possible cognitive distortions that I may be employing?” (Tables 18.1 and 18.2).

Consider the possible rules, imperatives, and “shoulds” that may be guiding your thinking in negotiation. What could be some more realistic,

Table 18.1 Cognitive distortions in negotiation

Automatic thought category	Example
Personalizing	They are doing this to humiliate us
Mind reading	They think we are inferior
Fortune-telling	They are going to overrun us
Overgeneralizing	This is a pattern that just keeps continuing
Catastrophic thinking	It would be awful if they got that
Discounting positives	None of those other positives matter now
Emotional reasoning	I feel threatened, so something terrible is going to happen
Labeling	They are evil
Dichotomous thinking	Either you are with us or against us

pragmatic, and flexible ways of looking at this? (Table 18.3).

The negotiator can continue his or her self-assessment by asking “What are my personal schemas and how will they impact this process?” It may be difficult for negotiators (or those who represent nations) to be honest with themselves about their personal schemas, but to ignore the biases that are directing important negotiations confers great vulnerability. Examples of personal schemas about the self are the following: superior entitled, omnipotent, persecuted, helpless, dependent, and demanding standards. The individual who believes that he or she (or his or her nation) is superior and entitled will have difficulty negotiating compromise, acknowledging any legitimacy to the rights of other parties, and is very likely to overestimate their capabilities to achieve their aims. The idealized view of self—which can include moral righteousness, superiority, entitlement, and especially the belief that “God” or “history” is on our side—can result in overextending commitments and underestimating risk. An example of this is the overidealized view that American political leaders advocated that led to the Vietnam War—overestimating the capabilities of American military power against a guerilla adversary, viewing the conflict as part of a righteous campaign against Communism, and failing to recognize the demoralization and unreliability of “allied” Vietnamese. Idealization of self,

Table 18.2 Challenging distortions

Automatic thought category	Alternative ways of thinking
Personalizing	Maybe what they are doing makes sense to them, and they would be pursuing this even if we were not around
Mind reading	Maybe I don't know what they are thinking and they may be viewing this in a manner quite different from how I am seeing it. Maybe they have different information
Fortune-telling	There are a wide range of possible outcomes. Perhaps there are less negative outcomes that could ensue
Overgeneralizing	There are lots of complexities in their behavior in the past, present, and the possible future. Am I considering everything? Aren't there some examples of some positive or neutral behavior?
Catastrophic thinking	Why would it be so terrible if we reached a compromise? Exactly what will happen?
Discounting positives	Are there any elements in their position that could be positive—that we could agree on? Can we find any common ground?
Emotional reasoning	Am I basing my thinking on my feelings or the feelings of my constituency? If I were not feeling so anxious or angry, how else could I view this?
Labeling	If I label them as evil, I narrow my options. Aren't there more complexity and nuance here?
Dichotomous thinking	Am I looking at the negotiation—and the options—in all-or-nothing terms? Would it be helpful to gradually build some points of agreement while pursuing other compromises?

accompanied by devaluation of the opponent, is often a formula for foreign policy disaster. Realistic problem solving, relying on unpleasant but true facts, can help one escape from the narrow perspective of self-concepts and the concepts of others.

Just as one can assess one's biases, so also we can assess the biases of the other participants. The individual can ask, "How does the other side view this? What are their automatic thoughts, imperatives, and schemas?" Just as we can have our own

Table 18.3 Challenging rules

Imperatives or rules	Practical thinking
They should do what I tell them to do	Looking at this only in terms of imperatives limits my practical options. They may believe that they did have a right to pursue these actions, so we may simply have different viewpoints and different historical narratives. Even if I am right, they should do what I want; that is not a practical approach to negotiation. I need to think about the realities that exist—not what I wish and what is practical in terms of the options available
I should not have to compromise at all	It would be nice to get my way in everything but that is not realistic in the world that I am living in. Everyone compromises on most things. Why should I be different? What is so bad about compromise if I can avoid worse outcomes and secure some advantage?
They should never have done what they have done—I need to retaliate	Again, their perspective and history may be different from mine, and they may have thought that their actions were justified. Even if they were not, then how will retaliation help me? It might help me if they retreat from their position or if I can deter others, but retaliation may also lead to greater rigidity on their side or escalation of conflict
I am right, they are wrong, so I should win	Looking at the right and wrong of things may be personally satisfying, but it won't help me solve the problems that negotiation can address. They probably believe that they are right, so then we are stuck in taking rigid positions. What are the possible goals and strategies that we might both consider? What outcomes are possible? Moving from moralistic thinking to mutual problem solving might be more advantageous to me

biases of labeling, fortune-telling, discounting positives, overgeneralizing, personalizing, and catastrophic thinking, the opponent can also have these biases. For example, the other side may see us as evil, attempting to control the world, bereft of any positive qualities; as a pattern of imperialism, directed specifically against their interests; and as representing a possible catastrophic outcome.

Given the possibility that the opponent may have these biases, it is often ironic that negotiators end up confirming the other side's worst fears. Accordingly, negotiators may wish to be attuned to the specific cognitive biases that the other side maintains while attempting to act in ways that may help disconfirm these biases. For example, rather than taking a threatening and rigid position with an opponent that views the negotiator as arrogant and demanding, the negotiator might approach the negotiation by attempting to articulate some validity in the claims, history, and concerns that the other side has articulated.

Often, negotiators focus on obtaining an immediate outcome, partly due to tendency toward myopic thinking when emotions are high, partly due to attempts to appease demanding constituents, and partly due to "time discounting." *Time discounting* refers to an emphasis on present events or availability of rewards while reducing the value of delayed gratification (Frederick et al. 2002; McClure et al. 2007; Read and Read 2004). This bias toward the present may contribute to demands for immediate gratification, intolerance of discomfort, difficulty in persisting on difficult tasks, and demoralization about reaching goals (O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999; Thaler and Shefrin 1981; Zauberman 2003). In its extreme form, decisions about emotion regulation may be "myopic"—that is, so entirely focused on immediately reducing an uncomfortable emotion such that the individual chooses (ultimately) self-defeating alternatives, such as drugs, alcohol, or binge eating. Future rewards are discounted to such an extent that the only valued alternative may seem like the one that is most immediate. The negotiator may ask, "What are the long-term and short-term consequences that I need to consider?" Just as individuals fail to anticipate intervening events that may alter the course of their current emotional assessments, negotiators may fail to recognize that the "status quo" is simply that—the current status that may change at any time. In emotion theory, this tendency to overpredict a consistency in a feeling or state without recognizing compensating or mitigating future events is known as "immune neglect" (Wilson and Gilbert 2005). Thus, prudent negotiators might

wish to think divergently and counterfactually about all the possible changes that may occur that may offset the planned outcome. For example, in international negotiation, "unforeseen" events might involve increased casualties and costs of conflict, heightened resistance, loss of trade opportunities, new administrators, and escalation and spread of hostilities.

Collaborative Negotiation

The ideal model for facilitating negotiation is based on a model of mutual persuasion rather than on simply dictating the terms of agreement. This idealized model of persuasion stresses emphasis on rationality, facts, taking turns in communicating, and revising positions, which has been described as "principled negotiation" (Fisher and Ury 1991). On principled negotiation, individuals rely on facts and logic rather than appeal to emotions or personal needs. For example, claims that "I want that" or "I need that" are not sufficient in principled negotiation. Moreover, principled negotiation attacks the problem, not the person so that ad hominem attacks are viewed as interfering with the process that attempts to establish a collaborative set. Negotiation from this perspective proposes that give-and-take, accepting trade-offs, imperfect outcomes, and alternatives will be more productive than rigid adherence to a "position." And, principled negotiation refers to the future relationship, not simply the one-off consequences of a compromise, since parties to the negotiation may need to continue a relationship or, at least, adhere to the agreement. Thus, imposing a humiliating condition on another participant can be examined in terms of its later enforceability or later likelihood of noncompliance. This is an important point for disputants to consider since future interaction may depend on how the current differences are resolved. If one side feels humiliated, then resentments and distrust may interfere with future capability to cooperate. Furthermore, if the future relationship requires compliance as a result of the current negotiated settlement, there need to be ongoing persuasive reasons for cooperation. Thus, issues of perceived legitimacy

become important once the current leverage has dissipated. Finally, both parties recognize that they both have other possible desirable alternatives to negotiating. This is known as the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). Thus, in negotiating, we recognize that the other side may have a better alternative than reaching an agreement with us. In addition, we need to consider our own alternative to a negotiated settlement. Our power over others is also dependent on the degree to which they view themselves dependent on us for outcomes (Kim and Fragale 2005).

Of course, principled negotiation is a model—an ideal—and numerous cognitive distortions, historical narratives, external constraints, and hidden agendas will interfere with pursuing a principled approach. The first issue, of course, is “Why should I follow this principled approach if I can coerce the other party to give me everything that I want?” Second, an aggressive party to the conflict might believe that they have the ability to coerce—through force—compliance with all demands. And, third, the aggrieved party may believe that they have a moral right—or obligation—to insist on specific outcomes. Standing on position rather than considering a principled approach may, indeed, be the general rule in conflicts that unravel—as we will see in this chapter.

Negotiation is a communicative, dyadic process, whereby two or more parties to the negotiation seek an agreement to achieve desired ends. Presumably, negotiators will achieve an “equilibrium” where each side has reached a point where a change in their position will not yield a more advantageous result (Nash 1950). However, an equilibrium reached at Time 1 might not be stable over a longer duration of time and may impose conditions that result in the disintegration of the agreement. Thus, treaties that are imposed without consideration of this “dynamic disequilibrium” may succeed in the short run but fail in the long run. Unilateral imposition of conditions runs this risk. The Versailles Treaty is a case in point: It is one thing to impose burdensome conditions when one holds a clear advantage, but it is another thing to enforce these conditions over a longer period of time. The conditions of

the agreement may carry with it the seeds of its own demise. It is argued here that egocentric and narcissistic approaches to negotiation place excessive emphasis on the perceptions and needs of the party with greater power and underestimate the future ability of the other party to abrogate or retaliate.

Egocentric and Narcissistic Negotiating Styles

I distinguish between two extremes in negotiation—the “egocentric-narcissistic” approach and the “collaborative” approach. The “egocentric” approach only sees one perspective, without sufficient awareness of how the opposing party may view the process of negotiation and without sufficient awareness of historical, cultural, or other contextual factors that may affect the other party. The egocentric approach reflects the fact that one can be captured by one’s own perspective, lacking knowledge and foresight about the other party. The egocentric perspective is one of limited knowledge, focused primarily on how one views the situation rather than coordinating one’s perspective with the perspectives of other participants. The “purely” egocentric style does not necessarily hold a contemptuous view of others or a self-inflated view of the self, nor does this style imply a desire to humiliate or punish and control the other. Egocentrism is more a cognitive limitation than an emotional style. It is more likely that an egocentric perspective can be modified by providing more information, increasing the flexibility of perspective, extending the time horizon of the anticipated consequences, and generating alternatives with trade-offs.

In some cases, a narcissistic approach is superimposed on the egocentric perspective. The narcissistic approach entails a lack of empathy for the opposing party, viewing the other as a need gratifier, an inferior entity, lacking the rights or needs that the more powerful narcissist believes are his or her special privilege. Egocentric negotiation may not be narcissistic—that is, it may not pursue humiliation of the other party and is not necessarily based on beliefs of superiority and entitlement.

I shall discuss this narcissistic style in more detail later, but this style often leads to an overextension of attempts to impose “power,” underestimating the ability, needs, and desires for “justice” from other parties (Leahy 2011). For example, Paul Kennedy has identified this issue of “imperial overreach” of “Great Powers” ranging from Imperial Rome to the British Empire and the extension of the American hegemony (Kennedy 1987). Great powers may become enamored with their “greatness,” failing to recognize that extending their reach may deplete resources to the point where the power either needs to withdraw or collapses under its own commitments. Narcissistic overreach is often a consequence of idealized views of the self’s resources, accompanied by devaluation of the realistic capabilities of the opposing side. The narcissistic negotiator—or policymaker—runs the risk of discounting the actual strength of the opposition.

Narcissistic negotiators do not view negotiation as a collaborative process with “legitimate” concerns of both parties in the dyad. Rather, the narcissistic negotiator views the process as entirely adversarial, emphasizing a winner-loser model. Rather than coordinate mutual interests with a willingness to be flexible, the narcissistic style attempts to impose its will on the other party, ignoring any need of the opposing side to maintain any sense of “dignity” or “esteem.” There is no attempt to provide “face-saving” for the other side—indeed, the goal may be humiliation of the opposition. For example, French demands of Germany for complete acceptance of all conditions of the Versailles Treaty were viewed by Germans of all political parties as a deliberate and unnecessary humiliation, providing valuable propaganda points for the Nazis. A narcissistic approach begins with an assumption that the self is superior and stands on a higher moral ground of self-righteous authority. Rather than viewing others as having legitimate perspectives—or recognizing that differences between parties are not signs of inferiority—the narcissistic negotiator can overlook opportunities for compromise out of “principle.” This self-righteous stance eliminates the chance for flexibility, since the narcissist believes that he or she has a monopoly on the truth.

The narcissist views the self as entitled and views the other’s function as gratifying the needs of the narcissist. Rather than view compromise as a legitimate means of achieving a stable equilibrium, the narcissist views compromise as sacrificing one’s entitlement to “have things my way” and interprets compromise as a defeat or even humiliation (Leahy 2011). Since the narcissist is vulnerable to perceiving slights and insults and views interactions as a battle over humiliation, it is often difficult for them to decenter from power struggles to find a mutually respectful cooperative equilibrium.

For many narcissistic negotiators, a “goal” is humiliation of the other side. “It is not enough for me to win—you have to know that you have lost.” Others must be punished for their “arrogance” in challenging the narcissist. Narcissistic negotiators often overestimate their ability to enforce their position over the long term. Focused on their own sense of superiority, moral self-righteousness, and gratification of their needs in the present moment, the narcissist often wrongly believes that enforced or imposed ultimatums can be executed and will have permanent control. This overestimation of the self and underestimation of the potential of the other are continual elements in the “fall of Great Powers” (Kennedy 1987).

Overestimation of power and underestimation of the resources, power, and willingness of the opposing party are the continual shortcomings of narcissistic approaches. The narcissist holds an inflated view of his or her ability to achieve desired ends—often believing that “If I want it, it will happen.” This includes miscalculations of current resources, overestimation of the validity and completeness of information about the other, overestimation of popular support and its reliability over time, overestimation of the ability to absorb loss, and overestimation of the willingness to persist over time. The narcissistic view is that they possess all of the capability to achieve desired ends—an “illusion of competence.” This may include an overestimation of the capability of military forces, distorted beliefs about knowledge of the opposition, and glorified images of heroism and national destiny. The overconfidence

of Germany in both world wars reflects this distortion.

Often, the narcissist, fooled by his or her own self-aggrandizement, may anticipate an easy and rapid victory. Accompanying this self-enhanced view is a derogatory view of the other side. Often accompanied by categorical views of the inferiority of the other, the narcissist often believes that the other side has few resources—of an inferior nature, few of no legitimate justifications to maintain its own morale, lack of willingness to “fight back,” and an inclination to accede to the will of the narcissist. For example, Hitler’s campaign against the Soviet Union (Barbarossa) assumed a rapid defeat of all major Soviet forces, capture of the major cities, and elimination of a threat on their Eastern Front. There was no “Plan B.” German soldiers lacked sufficient supplies to survive the winter. The overreach of this narcissistic assumption of victory by the “superior race” resulted in significant losses for the Axis Powers and assured ultimate defeat.

Other examples include the underestimation by Central Powers of the power and willingness of Entente forces in World War I; American underestimation of the ability of guerillas and the traditional forces of North Vietnam and the Vietcong; Pakistan’s overestimation (1965, 1971, 1999) of its ability to wage war against India whose forces were far larger, better equipped, and better trained; and Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor which the Japanese assumed would eventually lead to defeat of a much larger, wealthier, and potentially more lethal American and Allied response. Egocentric or narcissistic decision-making and negotiation often carry with it significant miscalculation. Indeed, in several of the foregoing examples, decisions were made either to impose force or to continue in a course of action rather than reach a negotiated settlement. Negotiation was viewed as unacceptable due to a combination of moral self-righteousness, exaggerated sense of capability, underestimation of the opposing side, and—eventually—commitment to sunk costs.

As part of the egocentric, unilateral approach to negotiation, the narcissist is less interested in

the perspectives and interests of the opposing party and more interested in exerting power and control. Thus, narcissistic negotiators may refuse dialogue or independent mediation and may choose to rely on power-assertive strategies such as humiliation, threat, escalation, or stonewalling. For example, the narcissistic negotiator will rely on personal characterizations of the “evil” or “inferior” qualities of the other side, arguing that all faults lie with the other. Trapped in his or her egocentric and self-enhancing perspective, the narcissist will fail to recognize his or her contribution to the initial and ongoing conflict. Indeed, the narcissist, so limited by his or her myopic perspective, may continue to (unintentionally) provoke the opposing party into a behavior that only confirms the narcissistic view.

Conflict is often exacerbated by overestimation of threat and by beliefs about humiliation. Indeed, one can make a strong argument that the willingness to go to war is often a combination of fear, humiliation, and the pursuit of interest (Kagan 1994). I would stress the failure of the narcissistic negotiator in recognizing the other participants’ perception of fear, humiliation, and interest. Since negotiation is an attempt to reach a stable equilibrium, the narcissist may fail to achieve this equilibrium because his or her beliefs do not balance the perceptions held by others with the goals desired by the narcissist. If the negotiator ignores—or is contemptuous of—the fears, humiliation, and interests of the other side, negotiation is not only likely to fail but also to “confirm” the fears, sense of humiliation, or threat to interests maintained by other parties. Dictating terms of settlements may only extend beyond an imposed settlement and further resistance to honoring the terms of “agreement.”

An obvious case in point is the failure of the Versailles Treaty to establish a workable negotiated settlement with Germany. Indeed, the Treaty only added to the sense of humiliation, deprived Germany of its perceived “legitimate interests,” and ignored the fear among many political leaders in Germany of a threat of a Communist putsch. For many Germans after World War I, there was a perception that they had been unfairly

treated—or even betrayed—since they had surrendered with their troops on foreign soil with no enemy troops on German soil. From the German perspective, the armistice was an attempt to end the exhaustion that all participants experienced. The Treaty imposed onerous conditions of reparations, loss of territory, elimination of imperial holdings, disarmament, and general humiliation. Moreover, it appeared especially ironic that demands for payment of reparations—especially by France—were made, while France itself failed to repay the war debts owed to the United States.

Narcissistic “settlements” can be contrasted with strategic and collaborative settlements aimed at developing workable alliances. For example, we can contrast the Versailles Treaty with the Marshall Plan of 1947 (European Recovery Plan) after World War II. While a number of European economies faced collapse after the war, the United States implemented a wide-ranging plan to provide significant financial support to both former allies and enemies. Indeed, similar financial support was made to the Soviet Union, which rejected support because it viewed such support as delegitimizing the communist system (Judt 2006). Unlike the Versailles Treaty, which focused on reparations, retribution, and humiliation of the “enemy,” the Marshall Plan provided support for rebuilding democratic and free-enterprise systems. The conditions of economic liberalism that accompanied the Marshall Plan were generally viewed by Western European nations as a legitimate condition for help. Rather than humiliate, it helped; rather than demand reparations, it provided support; and rather than demand permanent disarmament, it provided the conditions for the inclusion of Germany in NATO. By focusing on a win-win strategy, the Marshall Plan established a strong basis for future alliance. In contrast, the Versailles Treaty stressed a winner-loser strategy which established the three conditions of war that Kagan (1994) identified—humiliation, loss of interests, and fear.

Although it may appear understandable that Entente Powers who suffered greatly during World War I would desire compensation and

assurance of disarmament, the obvious retributive nature of the imposed treaty would lose all legitimacy with Germany once military threat had dissipated years later. Imposed treaties lack legitimacy and may only reflect the egocentric views of the “victorious parties,” ironically leading to a “pushback” from the “defeated parties” once threats are lifted. Narcissistic negotiators seldom recognize that there are different perspectives of legitimacy or that their own self-righteous, retributive, or self-interested beliefs are not shared by others. Even though they may know that their view of legitimacy is not shared, the narcissistic style often fails to recognize that “illegitimate” agreements eventually cannot be enforced. As France and Britain disarmed after World War I, their ability to enforce the conditions of the Treaty evaporated. The Versailles Treaty, imposed from “above” with the purpose of retribution, was doomed to failure. Moreover, it provided strong propaganda points for the rise of the NAZI cause, focused on conspiracies underlying the defeat and humiliation of Germany.

The egocentric perspective is limited to seeing only one’s own needs, desires, and goals. The collaborative perspective recognizes that others have their own needs, desires, and goals and that these may be a function of unique historical events and cultural factors. The narcissistic perspective takes the egocentric approach one step further, with its sense of special status, entitlement, moral self-righteousness, and inflated view of the ability to “get one’s way.” This overvaluation of one’s ability to “get one’s way” without consideration of the possible alliances and resistance that one’s action might provoke is reflected in the sequence of events prior to the outbreak of World War I. A Serbian nationalist (Gavrilo Princip) assassinated the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria. Initially, it was thought by Austrian (and German) authorities that the assassination had been officially coordinated by Serbian separatists and that this reflected an official act on the part of the Serbian government. As a result, the initial Austrian response was to threaten war—including occupation of the Serbian land. During the course of investigating

the assassination, Austria was encouraged by the German kaiser (William II) to use this as a pretext for war to further expand the territory of both Austria and Germany. An Austrian investigation of the assassination revealed that Princip was not acting on official orders of the Serbian authorities, but was part of a splinter group. Nonetheless, Austria did not disclose this information and pursued “negotiations” as if the Serbian government had engaged in this provocative action. Austria demanded the imposition of a ten-point ultimatum (*The July Ultimatum*) which demanded sanctions and conditions threatening the sovereignty of Serbia. Indeed, Point 8 of this ultimatum required that Austrian police would have jurisdiction within Serbia, thereby depriving Serbia of a fundamental condition of its sovereignty. It appeared that the plan by Austria was to “make you an offer you cannot accept.” Serbia acceded to all the conditions except Point 8 which then led to declaration of war by Austria.

The German kaiser viewed this “provocation” by a Serbian nationalist as an excellent *opportunity* to extend joint German-Austrian territory and control and to eliminate the “Russian threat” (as an assumed Serbian ally) while Russia was weak. The kaiser, prior to the outbreak of war, believed that the war could be won quickly, Russia could be defeated before it was able to fully arm, and the western powers would be reluctant to enter the war—in time—to make much difference. As a consequence, the Austrian ally “dictated” a set of terms to Serbia, almost all of which were reluctantly accepted, with the exception of the loss of sovereignty for Serbia under Austrian rule (Point 8). But it was just this “dictation” of an offer (“an offer they would have to refuse”) that was a catalyst to “justifying” a joint Austrian-German invasion. The goal was to defeat, conquer, and annex territory. War was the intention—the goal—of negotiating. The German and Austrian position was directed by a narcissistic over-valuation of their own capabilities, underestimation of the resistance from other nations (e.g., France, Britain, and eventually the United States), and an overly optimistic view of the duration and cost of the war. As often happens, the narcissistic party ended on the losing end.

Overcoming Narcissistic Roadblocks

Parties in negotiation seek to optimize their outcomes. This is a given. But the key dilemma is in determining what would be the best strategy to optimize these outcomes. Limiting oneself to self-confirming biases, getting stuck in an ego-centric perspective, and acting on the emotional agenda of “feeling self-righteous” often will fail to achieve stable outcomes. Appealing to the narcissist’s self-interest while adhering to principled negotiation can be presented as a strategy to obviate oppositional narcissistic behavior to reach collaborative sets that are mutually beneficial. Targeting dysfunctional narcissistic cognitive biases—in order to “help” the narcissist enhance the negotiation process—can sidestep the winner-loser set that impedes negotiation. For example, one can collaborate with the narcissist to help him or her recognize that understanding the other’s view empowers you in negotiation, that others are players with possible equal or superior options to negotiating with you, that underestimating the “opposition” can defeat your goals, and that rather than view others as obstacles, you may be able to complement each other’s needs. By rationally targeting the impediments in negotiation, one can encourage the narcissist to collaborate with more principled approaches so that valued opportunities are not foregone. Several techniques may be utilized.

Identifying Potential Problems

Before one can help modify the narcissistic position, it is essential to describe the particular biases and strategies that are employed. For example, one can identify cognitive distortions that maintain the self-righteous position of the narcissist. These include labeling (“They are the enemy,” “They are extremists”), overgeneralizing (“This keeps happening over and over”), discounting the positive (“They don’t do anything good for anyone”), dichotomous thinking (“Nothing about them is decent”), catastrophizing (“If they get this, it would be terrible”),

fortune-telling (“If we don’t do something, they will destroy us”), and personalizing (“They are doing this to get at us”). In addition, one can identify *shoulds* that propel toward further conflict: “We should attack while we have the chance,” “They should obey us and do what we tell them to do,” and “We shouldn’t accept any mediation.” Furthermore, one can help identify the actor-observer bias—that is, the tendency only to see one’s perspective, thereby labeling the other in overgeneralized traits, rather than acknowledging complexity and variability in the other’s behavior. Another consequence of the actor-observer bias is the tendency to ignore one’s own contribution to the problem or to recognize historical narratives that might apply to the position held by the other side.

For example, in the current standoff between the United States and Iran, both sides are maintaining narcissistic—or egocentric—biases. Iranian government figures engage in labeling (“They are the Great Satan”), overgeneralizing (“The United States is continually provoking us”), discounting the positives (refusing American aid during the earthquakes in Iran), dichotomous thinking (“The United States is the source of all the problems”), catastrophizing (“It would be awful—a terrible defeat—to agree to a negotiated settlement”), personalizing (“American support for Israel undermines Islamic interests”), and fortune-telling (“They are going to attack us anyway”). Furthermore, the Iranian position underestimates the fear that many in the United States may now have of a direct attack in America after the attacks on 9/11, 2001. This is part of the American *narrative*.

Similarly, the American position is characterized by a wide range of biases. These include labeling (“Islamist-terrorists” or “terrorist nation”), overgeneralizing (“They continue to oppose the international community”), discounting the positives (“They are ruled by a tyrannical, oppressive government”), dichotomous thinking (“They don’t have any freedom there”), catastrophizing (“It would be terrible if they acquired a nuclear weapon”), fortune-telling (“If they acquired a weapon, they would attack Israel and destroy Israel”), and personalizing (“They are

supporting Shiites in other countries to attack American interests”). Furthermore, the egocentric perspective held by the American position may ignore the past and current narrative that informs Iranian thinking—namely, years of occupation by Britain as an imperial force, invasion by the Soviet Union, American support for the Shah, and continued efforts by the United States and its allies to isolate Iran. Identifying these beliefs does not imply that there is no justification in holding them. But it allows us to begin to suggest there are consequences of certain beliefs and that it may be possible to amend these beliefs with more information.

Building Motivation to Change

The narcissistic position has its own self-reinforcing motivation—it feels good to believe that God is on your side, you are always right, and you can always win. The first step to building the motivation to change is to examine the costs and benefits of holding specific beliefs. For example, what are the trade-offs for the United States in believing that Iran intends to use nuclear weapons to attack Israel? The cost is that it raises fears among Americans and their allies that there may be a nuclear war, destroying a valued ally and dragging America into a wide-scale war in the Middle East. The other cost is that escalating the perception of threat adds to a sense of urgency to avert the threat and adds to rigidity in thinking about the Iranian position while narrowing the options available. Another cost to the catastrophic fortune-telling is that it makes it difficult for American political leaders to entertain options lest they alienate powerful segments of the voting public. Indeed, their public statements about the opposition (labeling, catastrophizing, fortune-telling) only incite greater popular support for extreme action, thereby limiting the options that negotiators can employ.

The cost to Iran of their position is that viewing America as the Great Satan makes it difficult to cooperate with a negotiated settlement. After all, how can a theocracy form agreements with Satan? Also, the ongoing narrative that Iran is

under threat of a military attack unless they can obtain nuclear weapons to defend themselves provides a self-fulfilling prophecy of obtaining the means to develop these weapons while possibly provoking the attack that is feared. Finally, by viewing any cooperation with the international community for valid inspections and limitations on developing nuclear programs as “defeat” and “humiliation,” the Iranian position forecloses collaborative options by equating them with humiliation. As with many publicly voiced negative appraisals, parties to negotiation can become trapped by their own rhetoric.

Risk Analysis

Egocentric negotiators often underestimate the risks inherent in their position. Driven by the “fact” that they are right and by moral self-righteousness, risk assessments may often be far from accurate. For example, underestimating risk can be seen in the Austrian and German assessment in 1914 that a war against the Triple Alliance would be a short war with few negative consequences for the Entente. In addition, egocentric thinkers may often *overestimate* the risk of maintaining the status quo. An example of this is the American belief that Saddam Hussein had a large arsenal of weapons of mass destruction that would be used against his neighbors and against the United States. Maintaining the status quo would have continued requests for international inspection rather than launch a war against Iraq. Thus, faulty risk analysis may underestimate risks of taking action and overestimate the risks of not taking action.

In the current Iranian situation, advocates of military action against Iran may be underestimating the risk of going to war. With a population of 75 million people in Iran, a modern military, the possibility of nuclear weapons, allies capable of launching terrorist attacks, an American public fatigued by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the lack of any clear and present danger to American national interests, it appears reasonable to conclude that a war against Iran would not receive sufficient domestic support and would run the

risk of further depleting American resources with the further risk of a long and possibly unwinnable ground war. Similarly, Iranian assessments of the risk of war may also be shortsighted. Preemptive strikes by Israel against targeted nuclear installations, the possibility of American blockades of oil shipments, and a wide-scale air war against Iran would have potentially devastating effects on Iran. Both sides may be underestimating the risks and overestimating the potential rewards of military action. It may be that “playing the game of chicken” with both parties racing toward the end of the cliff may lead to mutual destruction. Both go over the cliff.

Modifying Cognitive Distortions

As indicated earlier, both parties to the conflict hold belief systems characterized by labeling, fortune-telling, personalizing, overgeneralizing, discounting the positives, and catastrophic thinking. These cognitive distortions serve the function of confirming belligerent positions and serve a narrative of the inevitability of conflict. Indeed, belief systems justifying World War I also reflected the egocentric biases of the participants. Germany held a belief that their culture was superior, France held a belief that the balance of power needed to be defended, and Britain held the belief that national sovereignty (e.g., Belgium) must be maintained (Taylor 1955). Narratives are developed often to justify actions to be taken. Cognitive distortions about the “enemy” further escalate the likelihood of conflict.

Cognitive therapy provides a wide range of techniques to modify or challenge cognitive distortions or biases. Egocentric negotiators can employ the following techniques to test or modify beliefs. For example, take the belief that the Iranian leader is “insane.” The following questions can be asked to test this belief: What are the costs and benefits of this belief (see above on building motivation)? How would you define “sane” and “insane”? What is the evidence for and against this belief? Are there any behaviors that he engages in within his political party or country or in the international arena that suggest

strategy and intelligence? Is there an alternative interpretation? For example, could his pronouncements about Israel and the United States be strategic attempts to gain popular support in Iran and throughout the Muslim world? Are there others who view him as a political leader who pursues “legitimate” interests? Is he “insane” about everything or only about certain beliefs? Is his “insanity” a crafty guise?

Similarly, Iranian cognitive distortions about America can also be challenged: How would you define “Great Satan”? Is this simply a polemical and emotional appeal or is it a scientific fact? What are the costs and benefits of demonizing the other side? What is the evidence for and against this belief? Are there positive behaviors exhibited by the United States? How do you account for the popularity of America even within Iran?

Extending Time Perspective

Egocentric approaches to negotiation often focus on a narrow time frame—usually the next-to-immediate future in some cases—ignoring the longer-term consequences. Taking a longer-term perspective in the current Iran nuclear program might help place in perspective the problems of these more rigid positions. For example, the Iranian reluctance to allow international inspections—and to step down from advancing their program—may place undue emphasis by Iran on the immediate consequences, that is, loss of face. But loss of face might be either a short or relatively painless consequence—or, alternatively, reaching a negotiated settlement might improve the international reputation of Iranian leaders. Problems over the long term might be much worse if the current course of nuclear development is pursued. The longer-term effects of the United Nations’ embargo can have significant impact on the advancement of their economy and their integration into the international community. The question is, “In the long run is there more to be gained by having a nuclear arsenal or more to be gained by integrating with the international community?” Civil unrest within Iran is more likely to be a consequence of high unemployment and

high inflation, whereas the absence of a nuclear weapon would lead to lifting the embargo and dramatically improving the economy. A nuclear weapon would only tighten the international sanctions. Recalcitrant and provocative policies by North Korea have not benefited the national interest of North Korea and have isolated them from any benefit of trade.

Similarly, a longer-term perspective by the United States and its allies in regard to Iran might consider the possibility that the current regime in Iran has a fragile hold on its people. With a growing younger population, demanding more opportunities and less religious fervor, the potential for a revolution from within Iran may seem more probable as both the embargo takes its toll and younger Iranians, along with the rising middle class, feel unduly thwarted. One possibility of this longer-term perspective is that “waiting them out” may lead to a more amenable government, one with little interest in a nuclear arsenal and more of an interest in international trade. However, a longer-term perspective might also lead to the opposite conclusion that Iran, with nuclear weapons, might attack Israel, obliterating America’s ally and dragging America into a war with a nuclear-armed Iran. Although mutually assured destruction (MAD) kept America and the USSR at a Cold-War standoff of mutually feared retaliation—and both Pakistan and India, armed with hundreds of nuclear weapons, have also maintained a standoff—the risk is always higher when there are weapons that have the potential of devastating destruction. The calculation in the long run is whether Iran and Israel would recognize a mutual deterrent.

Describing the Opposition Viewpoint

The nature of egocentric thinking is to offer confirmation for an opinion that you already believe—your own. The tendency toward self-confirmation and overidentifying with one’s own position may be so overwhelming that any challenges by the opposition will be labeled as “insane.” Thus, in the United States, it is common

for political commentators to label Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the president of Iran, as “insane” and “crazy.” By dismissing the opponent as beyond rationality, all arguments or interests offered by them are rejected out of hand. Negotiation with someone who is “insane” would seem pointless. Alternatively, the Iranian position that America is the Great Satan, that Israel is the cause of all the problems, and that America is simply picking up with the imperialism that the British left behind leave no room for negotiation. These castigations, labels, and all-or-nothing views only solidify the rigid positions taken by both sides, making negotiation appear pointless.

In order to modify the egocentric perspective, negotiators can list all of the major points advocated by the other side. This would include recognition of the historical narrative that has led to the belief system held, the evidence that might seem validating to the other side, the recognition of the emotions (fear, humiliation, desire for revenge) that might be operative, the recognition of the difficulty in modifying that public position, and the ways in which each side has fed into the fears and beliefs held by the other side.

Building a Flexible Set

Getting stuck on fixed positions is like fighting a battle and never changing position or tactics. “Facts on the ground” should partially dictate negotiation strategy in real time, not an inflexible commitment “out of principle” to a particular position. The win-lose strategy that many narcissistic negotiators employ limits them to tactics and strategies that may no longer be effective and deprives them of a set of goals that might be more realistic and rewarding. Indeed, one can view narcissists as trapped within their own perspective and limited to their failed attempts. This is why narcissistic individuals (or negotiators) often have such difficulty getting stuck in a sunk-cost position: “We can’t retreat from Vietnam because we have already lost so many troops.” Because narcissists are overly committed to saving face and getting their way, they commit to redeeming lost causes and proving that they were right.

Often, the most effective tactic is to absorb a loss, change course, and pursue future utility. For example, if the United States had recognized that the Vietnam War was untenable due to the effectiveness of the North Vietnamese, the lack of support in the South, and the reluctance of the American people to commit sufficient military assets, the war could have been ended much sooner, saving American resources. However, narcissistic negotiators often believe that the only way to “save face” is to win at all costs. The narcissistic self-congratulatory process ensues, building messages that victory is right around the corner. This self-confirmation bias traps the narcissist into further commitment to the sunk costs that will never be recovered. Examining the costs and benefits of pursuing the sunk cost can assist the narcissist in recognizing that he or she may be throwing good money after bad. Viewing the current situation from the perspective of negotiated alternatives, rather than power assertion, can open flexible options. However, the narcissistic negotiator will often believe that the loss of face will be catastrophic. Cognitive therapy techniques can be employed: “Exactly what do you think will happen?”; “What are the costs and benefits of this perspective?”; “Is it possible that a more flexible position might enhance credibility and prestige?”; and “If you knew everything that you know now, would you still have pursued this?”

Conclusions

We have seen how a cognitive model can advance our understanding of negotiation and add to a collaborative, rational, and principled approach, as opposed to the approaches based on emotional reasoning, unilateral demands, and power assertion. Identifying how cognitive biases and distortions impact negotiation can be part of the negotiation process. Using a wide range of cognitive therapy techniques to gain flexibility, reality testing, and greater self-control can assist all negotiators in reaching optimal outcomes. Indeed, these techniques can be applied to self and others to reduce the roadblocks that impair effectiveness.

I have focused on one kind of style in negotiation—the egocentric/narcissistic style. The distortions, assumptions, and personal schemas that underpin this style can result in overextension and ultimately self-defeating policy. Using the cognitive therapy techniques outlined here may help participants understand and negotiate better with a narcissist and may assist narcissists in achieving more realistic goals. We have seen how egocentric and narcissistic styles contributed to the events leading to World War I, how these beliefs contributed to the overextension of Axis efforts in World War II, how the imposition of burdensome and humiliating conditions under the Versailles Treaty contributed to the rise of Nazism, and how current Iranian and American perspectives have become fixed by extreme cognitive appraisals of the character of the “other side” and the limits of the current policy. Negotiation should be about interests couched in flexibility and mutual understanding. Unfortunately, negotiators are often a prisoner of their own beliefs.

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Negotiating in the World of Mixed Beliefs and Value Systems: A Compassion-Focused Model

19

Paul Gilbert

Introduction

The study of international negotiations is clearly part of the science of conflict and conflict resolution with a number of dedicated specialist journals supporting it (Ramsbotham et al. 2011). This chapter cannot review this vast literature but rather considers certain elements of the evolutionary dynamics of conflict and competition and the possible value of compassion enhancement and mindful awareness training.

International negotiations take in both the individuals who are conducting the negotiations for their particular group, tribe or country, and also the mediators in the process of mediation and who work with the negotiators. At the time of writing, delegations from Syria are meeting in Geneva to see if they can resolve a particularly bloody civil war between the government and its opposition. Atrocities are being claimed on both sides with newspaper reports of release of 11,000 pictures showing evidence of torture and murder. Bitterness and hatred are now not just for political differences but for what has been and is being done by both sides. Negotiator Brahimi tried to create small steps, first to get some agreement on new humanitarian access and then possible

exchange prisoners. To begin with, the two sides don't even talk to each other but only through the mediator. Indeed, even beginning the start of 'negotiation' can be difficult and requires certain conditions to be met.

When the Rwandan conflict began in April 1994, tribal savagery was released on a horrific scale. As can happen in tribal conflicts, people who knew each other, even liked each other, began killing each other. Students killed their teachers and teachers killed their students; neighbours butchered each other in the streets. Sadly of course history is riddled with these kinds of conflicts including in the Balkans, Cambodia, Vietnam, back in time to the two world wars, the conquests of Genghis Khan and multiple Mediterranean empires. Humans are probably one of the greatest sources of suffering to other humans.

These kinds of situations illustrate the intense ferocity, cruelty and sheer irrationality of the human mind and all too clearly just how difficult international negotiations can be. This is particularly so in areas of conflict because hatred and bitterness, with desires to harm others, so powerfully infect the process. To develop a compassionate approach means to begin to understand what it is in the human psyche that makes such cruelty and conflict so easily triggered and powerful. This allows us to stand back from the conflict and recognise that part of the problem is in the way the human brain has emerged out of evolutionary pressures. For the most part individuals are being controlled by archetypal processes they neither

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understand nor know how to regulate. In addition, of course humans have created ‘culture’ and very complex social groups with different tribes, processes of deciding leadership and fellowship, mechanisms for group belonging and the means by which people take on self-identities according to the group that they operate within. This chapter will explore these difficulties and why cultivating compassionate states of mind is a potential way of conceptualising and working with them.

Competition and Conflict

The reason that humans can behave in such appalling ways to each other is rooted far back in evolutionary time. Competition and conflicts are endemic to the life process itself. Indeed, evolution depends on competition where there are winners and losers, those who survive and reproduce and those who don’t. The emergence of various life forms who compete over food, territories and sexual opportunities gives rise to more complex ‘psychologically regulated’ conflicts where individuals are able to make calculations as to the value of fighting or how to use other strategies to secure resources (Dunbar and Barrett 2007). So in conflicts, there is a motivation for conflict, and much depends upon the value/quality of the resource but also strategies that will be used to engage in or resolve the conflict. The most basic forms of conflict are face to face where individuals weigh up each other’s potential for winning or losing a contest; this was originally called *estimating resource holding power* by Parker (1974). The most classic example is of course the male-on-male fights for dominance which offer resource control, especially for sexual opportunities. Whether any two males will fight or not depends on the value of what they are fighting over and their assessments of each other, with competencies such as social comparison for comparing (say) their strengths and skills against the other. For many males of many species, there is a seasonal variant to conflicts during times of breeding. However, conflicts can also break out at any time over anything, including food or territory. Whatever the forms and origins of

dominance-seeking and resource-controlling behaviour are, there is increasing evidence that it is a basic potential motivation (Johnson et al. 2012) and social mentality that can vary in tactics and focus (Gilbert 1989, 2005). The degree to which dominance motives are cultivated and the way in which individuals display dominance-like behaviours, however, depend on culture.

Over time competition for social position and status in humans also became focused on achieving positive evaluations in the mind of others, such as ‘a good reputation’ (Barkow 1989) and creating positive feelings about the self in the mind of others of those who could be friends or allies (Gilbert 1989, 2009). Competing to be seen ‘in a positive light’ is especially important when ‘audiences’ judge and determine outcomes, rather than them being just individual contestants. While this meant that status could be achieved through displays of competencies, talents and attractiveness, it also opened two new dimensions for aggressive conflict. The first was ‘loss of face’. In these contexts individuals are not physically attacked but are devalued socially in the first instance; they are rendered (or feel they are rendered) socially unattractive to others, perhaps by being shamed or ridiculed or seen as losers. Some individuals may respond to this with relative indifference or walk away, whereas others feel compelled to respond violently. Cultures of honour, which focus on an individual’s or group’s ability to defend ‘their honour and avoid put-down and humiliation’, are prone to the latter (Cohen et al. 1998). In intergroup conflicts too it is well recognised that defences of honour and face-saving are often central to good outcomes (Ramsbotham et al. 2011).

Group Conflicts

The second way of competing for social status and recognition that has given rise to aggressive conflict is more complex. It relates to the way subordinates try to impress and carry out the wishes of dominant individuals in order to obtain favourable relationships with them (Gilbert 1989). While many primates will certainly be

submissive to more dominant animals and, at times, food share, the ability to understand the wishes of a dominant and carry them out to win favour is human. We now know that not only does loyalty and belonging to one's group act as a potential source for intergroup conflict but also the tendency to be a willing subordinate in the pursuit of aggressive conflicts against others can underpin serious atrocities (Kelman and Hamilton 1989). As Haslam and Reicher (2012) point out, it's not (just) that subordinates are unwilling in their complicity, that somehow they are frightened of the leaders' retaliation for noncompliance (though this can be true), but actually they can identify with the values of their leader and can be enthusiastic in their efforts to act out in hostile and at times violent ways.

Many human conflicts are around issues of group formation and their leaders. In the last few thousand years, these leaders had taken different shapes and sizes, have been real but have also been fantasy figures. There have been fantasy figures or gods who are believed to issue commands and dictate and offer promises. In many early societies the gods were seen as fickle at best, easy to displease and difficult to obtain their approval. Many of the older South American cultures sacrificed many thousands of people in efforts to appease their gods—no evidence that it worked though! In a British Sunday newspaper dated January 26, 2014, Tony Blair has argued that all of the major conflicts in the world are now being generated by religious extremists—individuals who are dedicated to a leader and will commit horrendous acts of terrorism or cruelty if you offend the leader's name or dictates.

For conflicts based on religious differences, international negotiations are up against the human tendency to be very subordinate to leaders, even fantasy leaders, behave incredibly cruelly and be prepared to die supporting their leader. We should never underestimate how the desire to win approval in the eyes of leaders or fellow group members can be a cause for terrible violence (Kelman and Hamilton 1989). This psychology can be tricky when it comes to international negotiations.

The major sources of conflicts to be considered here then are not individual but group on group and how the group's values and behaviours are manipulated by the leaders. As noted above, group competition and rivalry can give rise to tribal violence and intense destructive behaviours to out-group members (Van Vugt and Park 2009). Human history is littered with episodes of intense cruelty, ethnic cleansing and slavery. It is also very clear that because we have a very tribal mind where each group tries to privilege themselves over others, we live in a world of serious inequalities. These inequalities can be seedbeds for resentment especially if one group feels another group is exploiting or humiliating them (Gay 1995).

There are of course similarities between individual-based conflicts and group-based conflicts in that estimates of relative power, potential for retaliation and basic motivation to control resources are at the root of these types of conflicts too. However, the most destructive forms of conflicts are socially situated in relationships such as interfamily, tribes/groups and, for humans, nations. Many science-fiction films also depict interplanetary conflicts and wars around the same themes, for example, that 'the aliens' want some Earth-based treasured resource or want to turn us into a resource (food, slaves or clones)! So humans have archetypal ways of seeing out-group threat that are very easy to project. The degree to which some of this is through the cultural cultivation of fear of our group members is unknown.

One of the most common ways groups *avoid* intergroup conflict is spacing, keeping territorial distance. Hostility arises only when groups encountered each other. When groups become mobile over larger areas (e.g. humans discovered horse riding) or where there is overcrowding or potential resources are of great value, intergroup conflict increases. We now know that various species of primates can also have violent and lethal intergroup conflicts. The discovery of chimpanzee wars, where a group broke into two, and the larger group systematically murdered the smaller group, was a shock to those who were studying them (Goodall 1990). These tendencies become more problematic as population size increases and isolation becomes less possible.

We also know that groups themselves can have a kind of *group mind* which is focused on one group dominating and exploiting others. Over a number of years, Sidanius and Pratto and their colleagues have been developing a theory and conducting research based on what they call social dominance theory. This is based on the fact that groups in conflict for resources will compete and try to win advantage over each other and exploit that advantage. Sidanius and Pratto (2004) argue that:

most forms of group conflict and oppression (e.g., racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, nationalism, classism and regionalism) can be regarded as different manifestations of the same basic human predisposition to form group-based social hierarchy. (p. 319)

Social dominance theory blends evolutionary dispositions with socially constructed belief systems that make certain behaviours acceptable. These can be offset by spiritual, religious beliefs, but very often those belief systems themselves can become another means for ascribing dominance and specialness and reasons to persecute others (Gay 1995)—e.g. religious wars. Indeed, one of the important roles that groups focused on social identities and communication networks can do is provide narratives to legitimise inequalities (e.g. to offer reasons to see others are less deserving or inferior in some way) and create fears and terrors around differences. Gay (1995) suggests that the political rhetoric can easily stimulate audiences into fear and, from fear, hatred of the outsider and if not hatred, then certainly a sense of superiority or entitlement. For those on the receiving end, there will of course be a sense of humiliation, resentment and desire for retaliation. So for all kinds of reasons there can be socially constructed values and beliefs of what Pratto et al. (1994) call hierarchy-legitimising myths—ways of justifying our special positions and the subjugation of others. Indeed, there are many ways to entice people to become conflictual and behave aggressively to others (Zimbardo 2008). One of the tragedies of the Balkan wars was the way in which people who had previously been friendly neighbours were so easily enticed, by their leaders, to turn on each other (Ingnatiff 1999).

For groups to behave like this, there has to be a sharing of information, values and a sense of needing to defend their network of relationships and alliances (Haslam and Reicher 2012). Indeed, there are good evolutionary reasons for humans to develop attachments and strong alliances with like-minded others (alliances) and to belong to groups (Baumeister and Leary 1995). In fact, individuals can form a ‘group identity’ ‘them and us’ very easily and then can become extremely hostile to out-groups. The degree to which (family) groups become permeable or hostile to those outside of the (family) group is often linked to their history and social contexts. Indeed, the degree to which people are trusting and trustworthy (or not) is linked to cultural dynamics (Cohen 2001); individuals in poor and crime-ridden environments tend to be more paranoid and distrusting than those in gentler environments. There is even growing evidence that social context in general and the way in which conflicts are resolved can influence on genetic expression (Tung et al. 2012). Importantly, for international negotiators though, as shown by Nelson Mandela, it is still possible to create conditions for reconciliation rather than further conflict.

The way in which personal histories and social contexts influence the way people interpret the world around them and the relationships they have with other people is also crucial to the generation and the resolution of conflict—a key theme taken up by those exploring the cognitive aspects of international negotiations (see Chaps. 3, 16–18).

Why the Brain Can Be Destructive

One way to understand the challenges that human nature poses for us is to recognise that the human brain has evolved with many built-in problems, irrationalities and difficulties. The reason for this is that the human brain has been evolving over millions of years, and its lineage can be traced right back to the reptiles (Bailey 1989). It has many problems built into it (Gilbert 1998). It is now well recognised in neuroscience and evolutionary psychology that humans carry many of

the same motivational systems as other mammals (e.g. for living and belonging within groups, contesting resources, developing status hierarchies, developing alliances, seeking out sexual relationships, raising offspring). However, the human lineage separated from what were to become chimpanzees about 6 million years ago, and then about 2 million years ago, we started to get smart; that is, we evolved cognitive competencies that would allow us to engage in these motivations and life tasks with *more insight and planned enactments* (Geary and Huffman 2002). So for various reasons, supported by different neurophysiological systems, humans are now able to anticipate, imagine, ruminate, plan, fantasise and so on. We also have a sense of self and a type of awareness which allows us to be aware of being aware. This gives rise to voluntary behaviours, such that we can understand we might be overweight and choose to cut down on our eating or try to become physically fit or a musician by deliberate practice. Add to this we have capacities for empathy and theory of mind and can work out what might be motivating other people and how to manipulate their emotions and motives. A combination of genetic change and rapid development of the frontal cortex played an important role (amongst other things) in these extraordinary, quickly developed cognitive competencies (Dunbar and Barrett 2007; Geary and Huffman 2002). These are fantastic talents enabling us to solve all kinds of problems, but they also *cause* all kinds of problems—they are trade-offs in our evolution.

To offer an example of how our new brain competencies can cause trouble with our old brain emotions and motives, imagine a zebra running from a lion. Once the zebra got away, and the lion is no longer in sight, it will calm down and quickly return to the herd for grazing. Humans, however, are likely to start imagining what *could have* happened if they had got caught ('oh my gosh—I can imagine being eaten alive!') and start anticipating ('oh my gosh what happens if the lion is there tomorrow') and predicting ('I will never feel relaxed out there ever again!').

We know then that the way in which we think about, imagine, anticipate and ruminate can stir

up complex emotions and motives which then further drive our imaginations and styles of thinking. These loops are physiologically very powerful and are the basis of Sapolsky's (2004) famous book *Why Zebras Don't Get Ulcers*. But of course we can get into loops when it comes to vengeance or simply wanting to conquer and own. We can dedicate our intelligence to inventing and building nuclear, biological and other weapons, planning wars and enticing, coordinating and training other group members to participate in bloody acts—and of course having very good justifications of doing so. Whether our intelligence is used for medicine or weapons of mass destruction, all depends upon motivation. Without much reflection, it's very easy for humans to simply become actors in the repeating archetypal dramas of life.

Very few trainings in international negotiations start with this fundamental issue that the *human brain is very tricky* and is full of these problematic 'glitches' because it creates loops between emotions and motives and thoughts that can lock in a particular way of thinking. That's not our fault, because it is part of our evolved minds, but if we are to become more than just actors in ancient archetypal dramas, it requires us to take responsibility to understand our brains. Although many international negotiators recognise that human nature can be very complex and tricky, direct training on how we can be trapped in archetypal systems might be helpful.

However, it's always more than the archetypal because of the complexity of the history from which group conflicts arise. For example, the conflicts in the Middle East are deeply archetypal and complex and numerous ways but are also based on group and territorial contests that have plagued humanity for thousands of years. Unless we find new ways of dealing with these conflicts, they will continue to do so. The tragedy is that there is no evidence that in 20 years' time we will not still be where we are today with this conflict. However Peter Beaumont's writing in *The Observer* (Sunday, April 6, 2014, on whether either side has the will to strive for peace in the Middle East) makes clear that there are so many complex factors operating here, including Israel's

and Palestine's political systems, the way in which leaders are trying to hang onto power, the difficulties in forming coalitions that favour peace, the splits within the Palestinian movements, the difficulties with the American electorate's constant cycles of blame, the shame and face-saving and the fundamental disagreements over territory and historically important places conflicts over water too are simmering. The signs are not good—and that's after numerous attempts at negotiation.

A crucial point in understanding conflicts and indeed their resolution is that motivations are central organising systems for our brain. So, for example, imagine what happens to our attention, reasoning, feelings and behaving when our basic motivation is to be kind and caring in contrast to being competitive, self-focused or vengeful. A 'motive' is one of the most important organising systems in our minds. So working with the motives of people who come to the negotiating table are crucial. If we take an evolutionary approach, then we would train negotiators to have more insight into the serious difficulties that arise because of the way our brains have evolved and are designed.

As noted above, it is also helpful to keep in mind that humans actually operate in slightly dissociative states because different motivations have very different priorities, different ways of thinking and different ways behaving. At times they simply are encapsulated from each other (Gilbert 1989, 2013; Carter 2008). For example, people who regard themselves as perfectly kind and compassionate individuals can get into their aircraft and drop bombs that they know will kill hundreds of people, including women and children. Individuals who do this are not psychopathic. This is linked to what has been called social mentality theory, whereby certain motivational systems organise attention, thinking and emotion, behaving in particular patterns, and these patterns are not necessarily easily integrated (Gilbert 1989, 2005).

So, it is very easy for humans to behave in highly irrational and destructive ways while believing that their behaviour is entirely rational and justified, and they themselves are just and

reasonably kind people (Haidt 2001; Haslam and Reicher 2012). We also know that it is very easy to entice ordinary people to do quite extraordinarily bad things (Zimbardo 2008). So while it can be very difficult for international negotiators to become aware of atrocities and not feel affected by them, it can help to recognise that the human brain is potentially very cruel and humans are potentially very nasty species. Indeed over-riding these aspects of our minds an 'trying to find a better way' is the whole point and need for negotiations.

Negotiating in the World of Mixed Beliefs and Value Systems

We have a human brain whereby different states of mind, reflecting different emotions and motives, will have their own ways of justifying themselves (Huang & Braugh, 2014); so when we are angry, we can often justify that anger which perhaps will be calmed down seems a little less reasonable (Haidt 2001). The way individuals use emotions to justify beliefs and actions underpins the ways in which we come to decisions about important social behaviours. In some societies (e.g. ancient Sparta) homosexuality was prized, whereas in Western Christianity it is seen as disgusting and a sin and is abhorred. The affect of disgust (and fear of homosexuality) gives rise to the moral beliefs (Haidt 2001). The Taliban feel quite justified in cutting off limbs as part of their legal system, which in the West we find appalling. Child marriage and female circumcision are similar. International negotiations, which are going to move towards human rights and national agreements on basic law, will have to engage with these 'justified but harmful' practices. Persuading some groups to give up certain valued systems is no easy task and will require an understanding of the emotional and motivational systems that hold beliefs in place. So despite the enormous injustices in the world, the huge amounts spent on arms and the continuing conflicts that are based on tribal psychology, we find it all too easy to justify these difficulties, even on moral grounds (Rai and Fiske 2011).

So whatever else we say about group identity and the way identity forms around values and traditions, the nature of conflict and the desire to control resources, and to have more than others (sometimes vastly more) are fairly archaic, archetypal processes that permeate our human mind. Although conflict drives change, both biologically and socially, it is also at the root of intense suffering. It is not only through violence that people inflict harm on each other in their group relations to get what they want, it is also the economic unfairness that leaves some people with billions of dollars, while others are starving or working for them in sweatshops.

Emotions

The run-up to, and the international negotiations themselves, can be a time when emotions run high. It is our emotions that stop us from listening or even ‘storm out of negotiations’. Regulating threat emotions is not always easy. So it could be helpful if negotiators were offered emotional regulation training and how to be mindful of the complexity and irrationality of our motives and emotions. Although most probably have intuitive wisdom about the irrationality of humanity, few negotiations are trained in mindfulness—and that seems particularly true for politicians.

Another aspect that can help is to train people to understand the functions of emotions in more detail. Emotions vary because they have very different functions. From an evolutionary point of view, ‘understanding function’ often offers the key to understanding process. The last 30 years has seen important developments in our understanding of the *evolved function* of different types of emotion (Panksepp 1998, 2010). For example, it has been known for a long time that *threat processing* evolved to enable rapid detection and rapid responses to threat, and specific neurophysiological systems have now been identified that supports threat processing—such as the amygdala and hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis (LeDoux 1998). The inability to regulate these ancient threat emotions such as anger or anxiety can be deeply problematic in conflict situations.

What is less recognised is there are different types and functions of *positive* emotions that relate to threat processing in different ways. For example, Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky (2005) distinguished between two very different types of positive affect. The first links to agency and sociability, which underpins drive-energised behaviour for seeking out and acquiring resources achieving and reward seeking. This system is primarily sympathetic in terms of the autonomic nervous system. The second type of positive affect, however, is linked more to the parasympathetic system which is sometimes called the rest-and-digest system. This linked to a more contented peaceful calm mind. If negotiators get too much into the drive-seeking system, they can become energised but also could be more easily thwarted and irritated when things don’t work out. In contrast, if they can regulate their emotions by maintaining a calm(er) mind, which will be helped by breath control and mindfulness, they are more likely to stay open, with flexible attention and more creative thinking. It is a matter of balance, but the important point is to see that different types of emotion will direct attention and thinking in different ways, and therefore, gaining control over the attention and the emotion can be helpful in difficult and ‘emotionally hot’ situations.

Calming There is now good evidence that drive-seeking and threat are activating systems that work through the sympathetic nervous system. The sympathetic nervous system influences a whole range of brain processes—mostly for activation and action. In contrast, the parasympathetic system is a system for slowing and calming (sometimes called the rest-and-digest system). These two can balance each other (Porges 2007). Posture, breath control, voice tone and facial expressions can all regulate the balance between the sympathetic and parasympathetic and that can be important in training.

Importantly the ability to activate the parasympathetic, calming and more peaceful states are also linked to affiliation. It has been known for a while that in the context of anxiety, if individuals can reach out to others who are kind and




Diagram 19.1 Three types of affect regulation system. From Gilbert, *The Compassionate Mind* (2009), reprinted with permission from Constable & Robinson Ltd

supportive of them, this downregulates anxiety. Indeed, the basis of attachment in early life is where the parent acts as a soothing object. To put this simply we tend to feel safe and at peace in the context of affiliative relationships that we trust and feel are supporting us (Cacioppo and Patrick 2008). This has implications for international negotiators because they will need a team around them that supports and offers affiliative relationships—those who are able to be empathic and sensitive to the difficulties of the negotiation perhaps without undermining process or justifying self-interest.

So the three functional emotion systems are the following:

- *Threat and self-protection-focused systems* enables detecting, attending, processing and responding to threats. There is a menu of threat-based emotions such as anger, anxiety and disgust and a menu of defensive behaviours such as fight, flight, submission, freeze, etc.
- *Drive seeking and acquisition-focused system* enables the paying attention to advantageous resources and with some degree of ‘activation’—for pursuing and securing them. Most theories of positive affect have identified this positive emotion system.
- *Contentment, soothing and affiliative-focused system* enables a state of peacefulness and

openness, when individuals are no longer threat focused or seeking resources but are satisfied. Also linked to feelings of well-being, this system for calming has *been adapted for many functions of attachment and affiliative behaviour*. The system is linked to the endorphin-oxytocin-parasympathetic dimensions which function to promote trust, affiliative behaviour and recipients of affiliation experience of calming in the threat system (MacDonald and Macdonald 2010; Porges 2007).

These three systems are depicted in Diagram 19.1.

Emotions are also more than individual experiences because they also function as social communications, conveying information about one’s social motives, values and orientation towards others (Keltner and Haidt 1999). So emotions influence not only the behaviour of the experiencer but also those who perceive or are recipients of emotions, making emotions as emotion displays that are part of the dance of social communication that provide the basis for our co-regulation of each other. So, for example, an individual who is in the state of threat and is expressing anger is likely to stimulate the defence and threat system of a fellow participant in the negotiation. If they get trapped here, where one person’s threat system is talking to another person’s threat system, stalemate or deadlock can arise. International

negotiators will be aware that ‘threat minds’ think, feel and pay attention in particular ways—and these are often not helpful. Indeed, many individuals have had experiences of doing or saying things when under the influence of threat emotions such as anxiety or anger which they may regret when they calm down. So international negotiators not only have to manage their own emotions but the emotions of, and communications in, participating parties. Sometimes of course the mediator will call a cooling-off period.

Resolutions

It is not only understanding the roots of conflicts, the motivations and the strategies used to win conflicts but also their resolution that requires our attention (Aquilar and Galluccio 2011; Galluccio 2011; Ramsbotham et al. 2011). Here, of course, it is a question of the degree to which we lift our eyes over the horizon of self-interest and think about the suffering and needs of others. This is not easy because many of our basic motives are set up for self-interest (Huang & Braugh, 2010). The paths to conflict and their resolution both have inhibitors and facilitators. In the field of international negotiations such as in the case of Syria, the mediation process is made even more complex because different international countries are backing different parties. Russia and Iran are supporting the Syrian regime, whereas Europe and America are supporting the opposition. So these conflicts are also being maintained by these different support systems including the provision of weapons. International negotiations then are far more than just working ‘the parties in the conflict’ but at times working with a whole international community. Indeed, the United Nations tried on a number of occasions to get a joint agreement on Syria and failed. So in the modern world, it is often powerful countries who not party to the actual conflict that can determine the outcome.

Motivation is important for the journey to resolution because resolution must begin by parties wanting it. This usually arises when both parties realise gradually the mutual value of a settlement, they become exhausted or see that suffering is really not leading anywhere—they become ‘ripe’ for resolu-

tion. The problem though is that their backers, bigger international countries or even companies, may allow and continue to provide their chosen side with weapons and reasons to continue been. So again negotiators need to be negotiating with the backers as much as the countries or groups themselves. This is particularly a difficulty where a country has quite a lot of resources be it oil and gold and is potentially a good trading partner—the support countries may not want a resolution that damages their own interests.

If there is a problem with some countries becoming overly involved in conflicts, then the opposite is also true—that we too often stand back from international conflicts and problems. When it comes to human rights and the protection of the poor, women or children or how to help a society free itself from the horrors of some religious groups, there are many politicians who would argue that ‘these are not about concerns’. Indeed, often, unless there is some benefit to the home country, the moral call is ignored. But in a world of increasing integration and interdependence, and moving towards an understanding of basic human rights, these become difficult positions to sustain. In the absence of violent conflict, this calls for very sophisticated skills in international negotiations that are culturally sensitive. Indeed, many of the larger countries of the world, even those who are core members of the United Nations (e.g. on the Security Council), have very poor records when it comes to human rights and the regimes they have supported. And all developed nations have worrying discrepancies between the rich and poor.

The International Negotiator

Negotiators come to his/her profession with a whole range of personality, motivational and emotional dispositions already formed. These will obviously be important in how any individual conducts himself/herself in negotiations, including, for example, his/her nonverbal communication, which might help put people at ease. Personalities who are highly competitive (high driven) and ‘have to win’ may have a very different negotiating style than those who have a softer

more affiliative temperament. Those who are easily threatened and prone to anxiety or irritability and anger may have yet a different type of temperament than individuals who feel safe and are relatively stable emotionally, which bears on their negotiating style. Those who are mindful compared to those who are impulsive and those who are self-sufficient versus those who are needing to please their superiors, are all potential variants on negotiator personalities. These qualities of emotional disposition are likely to influence nonverbal communication which conveys information to other participants about the emotional state of that individual. We can say the same thing, but have very different impacts on the listener according to the way it is said.

The Pressures on Negotiators

As mentioned, humans, like other animals, have different motivational systems that orientate our attention, thinking, emotion and behaviour (Huang & Braugh, 2014). The two major ones are the following:

1. The cooperative social mentality, involving seeking mutual benefit, recognising a need to work together to achieve common goals (Gilbert 1989, 2005)
2. The competitive social mentality (Gilbert 1989, 2005) or dominance motivational system to defend resources or acquire more—at the expense of others (Johnson et al. 2012)


As to which of these motivations dominate in a negotiation, it is useful to recognise that negotiators who ‘bat for the home team’ are not free agents. Rather, they are socially highly contextu-

alised in a complex web of relationships linked to their political masters and media pressures. So they are under a range of external pressures (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). Some examples of these can be depicted in Diagram 19.2. These pressures will push towards or away from competitive versus cooperative orientations.

Moving around the circle we note that the negotiators’ ability to think and reflect, to be able to recognise and regulate their own emotions as they arise moment by moment, to have ‘theory of mind’ and mentalise and to be empathic in thinking and feeling will all influence how they handle the process of negotiation. However, currently training in mindfulness and mentalising skills are not traditional training skills for negotiators including politicians.

Related to the competitive mentality are issues related to the degree to which negotiators start from the premise of trying to defend a position or enhance a position and out of a sense of loyalty to a position. The negotiator’s personal identification with the arguments is important, but individuals who argue for a position can, over time, convince themselves of it even if they start of doubtful because it creates cognitive dissonance. Conflicts, where negotiators believe their own group is pursuing an unfair position that they are not personally in favour of, can create difficulties for negotiators and the process. Pressures to conform to the dictates of their leaders and political parties, be these Democratic or other forms, can be intense. Negotiators can feel quite stuck if distal power groups, who have a fragile understanding of the issues or no real interest in ‘a fair settlement’, put pressure on negotiators. They may be caught between the degree to which they

Diagram 19.2 Pressures on negotiators. From Gilbert (2011) *International negotiations, evolution and the value of compassion*, Springer



wish to express their personal preferences versus simply being a mouthpiece for power groups behind them. In these contexts the negotiator may have to face both ways, working with groups at the table but also negotiating and trying to persuade power groups back home (Aguilar and Galluccio 2008). In democratic societies power groups back home may have little interest in a fair deal and simply how the deal will play to their electorate. In this sense neither the power group nor the negotiator has a free hand because they must balance and be cautious of how their own group (e.g. electorate) will respond to any loss of advantage. How the outcome of the negotiation will play with the electorate and how that would affect one's own personal (and parties') chances of re-election has scuppered many international negotiations in areas such as climate change and trade deals.

The state of mind of negotiators and the degree to which they handle pressure, if they are slightly depressed or anxious or worried about maintaining their position and careers, and the degree to which they are narcissistic or affiliative, a shallow or complex thinker, have good social skills, especially nonverbal skills, and are patient and able to play a 'long game' versus impatient will influence the reciprocal dynamic nature of the negotiation process. Opportunities for debriefing and reflection that are provided outside of these forums themselves can be helpful. Opportunities to explore one's own thoughts and feelings may be crucial to working them through.

Finally, there is the negotiator's style which is influenced by all of the above. Some individuals can create a sense of trust and safeness, whereas others portray a sense of closed-off-ness, distrust and wariness. In all social encounters humans automatically respond to nonverbal communication more powerfully at times than verbal communication. Problems in setting a tone which creates a possibility for openness, frankness and safeness can lead to parties focusing primarily on defensive positions. Negotiators can look and sound anxious, frightening, contemptuous or angry—or open, friendly and patient. Even listening to them in interviews on a radio can indicate what they seem to be. So perhaps one of the most important skills is to create the conditions

of sufficient safeness that will allow exploration. That in itself is no easy task in some contexts.

Compassion

How can compassion help in these contexts? First, it helps to understand what compassion actually is, how it is linked to our basic motivation systems and how it can organise our minds in particular, beneficial ways. We can begin with the most basic definition of compassion as simply 'a sensitivity to suffering of self and others with a commitment to try to alleviate and prevent it' (Gilbert and Choden 2013). There are many variations on this basic theme. For example, the Buddhist monk and scholar Geshe Thupten Jinpa who developed compassion cultivation training, for which there is growing evidence (Jazaieri et al. 2013), defined compassion as:

...a multidimensional process comprised of four key components: (1) an awareness of suffering (cognitive/empathic awareness), (2) sympathetic concern related to being emotionally moved by suffering (affective component), (3) a wish to see the relief of that suffering (intention), and (4) a responsiveness or readiness to help relieve that suffering (motivational). (Jazaieri et al. 2013)

Core to the whole process of compassion is to take a wide view on the extent nature and causes of suffering. It is very easy for us to live in our golden bubbles of relative wealth and close down seeing the suffering around us—we dissociate from it (Gilbert 2013). So, for example, there has been very little action over ecology change over the last 50 years despite increasing warnings of potential problems ahead. Although well articulated in Al Gore's famous film 'An Inconvenient Truth' and more recent reports, international negotiators have come up with rather little in terms of national agreements, the same on depleting the seas of fish or the gap between the rich and poor in many countries of the world. The consequence is, of course, we have given very little thought to our own grandchildren and the world they will inherit from us. Negotiators bear the burden therefore not only of dealing with suffering and difficulties now but also those

yet to come and on those not yet born. So a compassion-focused approach addresses four key themes:

1. Compassion has to begin with a genuine and deep insight into what we are up against given the world that we live in and the ‘tricky’ brain we have evolved with (Gilbert 1998). We have no say over the genes we inherit, the personalities that we are disposed to nor our gender. Our capacities for love and compassion live side by side in a brain that can devise the most horrendous of tortures, take delight in watching them and engage with ethnic cleansing on a massive scale. The human brain, therefore, has many glitches and problems with it, not least that it is a brain of multiplicity on dissociations (Gilbert 2009; Gilbert and Choden 2013).
2. We often dissociate from the reality of suffering around us and indeed our own lives which are actually quite short, 25–30,000 days. We are born, grow and flourish for a while and then decay and die. No one escapes this fate and the way of our decay, and death will be much a matter of luck. Life involves tragedy and suffering, and most of the religions believe that the next world is the one of paradise, not this one. So opening our eyes to the reality of our lives is an important step in seeing just how much we are all in this together. This is sometimes called ‘common humanity’, and it is about seeing below surface differences.
3. This leads us to the third proposition that we now know that we are extensively socially choreographed by our backgrounds. Even genetic expression is influenced significantly by our early social life experiences—again over which we have no control (Slavich and Cole 2013). I often say to my patients, ‘imagine I had been kidnapped as a 3-day-old baby into a violent drug gang. What kind of person would I be now?’ I invite them to reflect on the fact that I could be quite violent and may have done bad things, be dead or be in prison. This version of Paul Gilbert that is a therapist and professor would have not existed. So all of us can understand that we have multiple versions of possibilities within us, and that is true for every person on this world, it is a matter of luck as to whether we end up as pauper and diseased or wealthy and healthy. If twins, born in, say, Palestine, were separated at birth so that one was brought up in an Israeli family and the other in a Palestinian family, they could actually end up fighting and killing each other later in life. This is simply because of the social context in which they live. Our capacity for hatred and violence comes because we see others as different from us, not as are part of the same life story. Again this speaks to the dropping of our eyes below the horizon and really understanding the nature of our common humanity and that all of us are having to struggle with a rather tricky brain that is so easily shaped in different ways according to living and growing in contexts that we never chose.
4. In reality we are all interdependent now. Everything about us, from the clothes we wear, the houses we live in, the electricity that warms us and the food on our table—everything in our lives—is dependent on the actions of other people somewhere else in the world. We live in an increasingly interdependent world where the pollution in one country can affect another or the failure to resolve issues of terrorism in one country can result in it spreading around to other countries.

Not only are these challenges important, but we also need to keep in mind the challenges to compassion itself. So, for example, we know that empathy and sympathy are important for the development of compassion, but evolution theory tells us that sympathy, caring and helpfulness are not equally dispensed but rather are targeted, for example, on kinship relationships and others we see as similar to ourselves and are likely to reciprocate. Indeed there are many studies showing this (e.g. see Loewenstein and Small 2007 for a review). In fact, empathy and sympathy to people you see as enemies or opponents are very difficult. This is partly because sympathy and care feelings interfere with competitive and aggressive behaviour and are *designed* to be turned off in the context of hostile competitiveness.

Or consider the hormone oxytocin, which played a vital role in the evolution of attachment behaviour, caring, affiliation and trust (Insel 2010). However, recent evidence has shown that this is a double-edged sword. Oxytocin in the mother will certainly increase attachment and care for her offspring but also aggression to potential others who might threaten her offspring. Oxytocin can increase affiliative behaviour but only to in-group individuals and may actually *increase* hostility to other groups (De Dreu et al. 2011). This makes perfect evolutionary sense of course but can cause us a real headache. Research suggests that there are kinds of beliefs that will inhibit compassionate approaches to conflicts—such that it's a weakness or in being compassionate to others they will simply take advantage (Gilbert et al. 2011). We also know that our emotional basis for caring can at times conflict with a justice concern. Batson et al.'s (1995) famous example is of a boss who has a choice of giving a rise to one of two people. Person A has worked very hard for this company, is well qualified and committed but is also relatively well off. Person B has also worked to a good standard but has a large family and is struggling to make ends meet. On justice as grounds, the rise would go to A, but on compassionate grounds, to B for it would make a huge difference to his/her quality of life. As Loewenstein and Small (2007) note, if we only rely on emotion or only logic, it can be difficult for us to free ourselves from our evolved guides that privilege care to be lavished on kin and friends at the expense of strangers. This is why the cognitive, reflective and mindful attributes also require cultivation of mature compassion. So the motivation of compassion can't just be based on emotion systems but also should involve our capacity for thinking clearly about the dilemmas and problems of suffering.

A Model for Compassion

Although we can define compassion in various ways, it is important to have a model of compassion. If we go back to the original definition that *compassion is a sensitivity to the suffering of self*

and others with a commitment to try alleviate and prevent it, then clearly there are two separate psychologies here (Gilbert 2009, 2014; Gilbert and Choden 2013). These are the following:

1. The evolution of the motivational, emotional, behavioural and cognitive competencies underpinning turning towards and engaging with suffering
2. The evolution of the motivational, emotional, behavioural and cognitive competencies underpinning acquiring the wisdom and courage to do something about suffering

Typically this is represented as two circles of interconnected attributes and skills (Diagram 19.3).

Engagement: As noted elsewhere (Gilbert 2009, 2010, 2014; Gilbert and Choden 2013) psychology for engaging with suffering involves six core elements that include:

1. *Motivation:* The motivation and willingness to notice and turn towards and/or into suffering rather than turn away.
2. *Sensitivity:* Being attentive and allowing one's mind to focus on suffering, at least for a while. In international negotiations this would be a preparedness to be attentive to the problems each other side is facing. For example, how would this play out in arms negotiations with countries that we know are ruining the population by overspending on arms or who may use those arms against their own people? Is it possible to get companies who are overfishing the seas, mining or deforesting to take responsibility and be sensitive to the suffering they are causing that will affect future generations? How do we (or international negotiators) enable people to pay attention rather than be dissociated and blocked off from the harm they are doing?
3. *Sympathy:* If we attend to suffering, then we also need to allow ourselves to emotionally connect to it.
4. *Distress tolerance:* Once we turn towards suffering, then it's not too long before we start to be aware of pain and difficulty and at times even the enormity of what we're up against, the difficulties involved or indeed the suffering involved. This raises the issues of how we learn to tolerate these feelings.




Diagram 19.3 From P. Gilbert (2009). *The Compassionate Mind*. With kind permission from Constable and Robinson

5. *Empathy*: As we engage, and emotionally connect with, hold and tolerate suffering, then we can mentalise and have empathic insights. Again, there has to be a motivation to use empathic skill for compassionate ends. This is because empathy can be used for good or ill.
6. *Nonjudgement*: In the international negotiations' setting, nonjudgement can come partly for the deep insight that we all 'just find ourselves on this planet, thrown together with the brain that is set up for conflict and division'. Such insights are a basis for non-judgement.

Each of these qualities is interdependent in that if anyone of them falters then the compassionate enterprise can struggle. For example, if motivation drops or suffering becomes intolerable or if empathy is lost or we become critical and judgemental, then our compassion can struggle. In this model, empathy is a competency of the social mentality of compassion but is not compassion itself. Indeed, empathy can be used for good or bad ends.

Alleviation and Prevention

Alleviation and prevention involves:

1. *Attention*: Being able to pay attention to what is helpful (may involve attention training, mindfulness or refocusing).
2. *Reasoning and thinking*: Being able to reason in ways that are helpful (may involve many cognitive (re)appraisal approaches and forms of mentalising).
3. *Behaviour*: Being able to act in ways that are helpful—compassionate behaviour often involves courage because we have to face things that are difficult. This could be an area for training—how to train courage for international negotiators?
4. *Feeling*: Compassionate feeling is complex; it can be linked to calmness or kindness. But sometimes anger can be a feeling that generates compassion of action. A classic example is Sir Bob Geldof and Midge Ure who in 1994 became angry with the prevarication the government do anything about the starvation in Northern Africa so created Band Aid and Live Aid.

5. *Imagery*: For developing compassion within ourselves it can be useful to engage in various imagery exercises that stimulate particular kinds of emotion and motive systems.
6. *Sensory focusing*: It is a way in which we can use the body to generate physical states which are conducive to affect regulation and compassion. In particular paying attention to the breath, body posture and facial expressions and ‘in-the-body’ experience.

Training on Compassion

In the last 10 years, there has been a great interest in training people on compassion (Gilbert 2009). For example, Stanford has pioneered *compassion cultivation training* based on the Buddhist model of compassion showing significant improvements in well-being Jazaieri et al., (2013). Hutcherson et al. (2008) found that a brief loving-kindness meditation increases feelings of social connectedness and affiliation towards strangers (see Chap. 16). This could be especially useful for international negotiators. Fredrickson et al. (2008) found that six 60-min weekly group sessions with home practice of loving-kindness meditations (compassion directed to self, then others, then strangers) increase positive emotions, mindfulness, feelings of purpose in life and social support and decreased illness symptoms. Practices of imagining compassion for others produce changes in the frontal cortex, immune system and well-being (Lutz et al. 2008). These are just a few of a large number of studies now on the benefits of compassion training on a range of physiological and psychological processes. These could be especially useful for international negotiators. There are also a number of interventions based upon developing what is called ‘mindful compassion’ (Gilbert and Choden 2013). These can be taught as a series of exercises and insights, such as training mindfulness which is learning to pay attention to the present moment on purpose and without judgement (Kabat-Zinn 2005; see Chap. 16). There are different aspects of mindfulness. One is to help us become more rooted in the present moment and

the sensory experiences of the present moment. A second is to become an observer of our minds in action—to notice thoughts and emotions as they arise rather than simply getting caught up in them and acting them out (Gilbert and Choden 2013; Kabat-Zinn 2005). Mindfulness helps us to be able to make distinctions between feeling and acting so that emotions do not have an immediate claim over behaviour. We learn to stand back and become an observer of the mind and allow thoughts and feelings to arise and dissipate—without judging, ruminating or amplifying them. We can learn to reason and act for an inner calm wisdom rather than a threat based emotion.

Conclusion

An evolutionary approach illuminates what we are up against in terms of a very complicated brain that has been evolving over millions of years. It is now capable of wonderful things but also horrendously terrible things. Part of the reason is because the basic motivational systems in the human brain are old and relate to things such as hierarchy status, fighting for resources and tribal group identity. Many animals live within groups and can be hostile to outsiders. Add to this our new thinking brain and all the complex processes that go with seeking self-identity, status formation, group identification and the way leaders manipulate the values and views of others—and we can see the complexity of the difficulties we face. The history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an example of how all of these complex themes can easily come together, including: the archetypal nature of the conflict (over territory and tribal identity), the history of the conflict and the social construction of current political realities giving rise to extraordinary complex difficulties that seem to have defeated many efforts in negotiation. As Nelson Mandela and Ghandi have shown, personalities matter.

One of the reasons that negotiations can fail is because there is no external law enforcement or arbitration process that can offer rulings. So each group is not really bound to anything other than their own arguments. When we look ‘inside’

countries or conflict between companies, we find that it is the rule of law which is binding which in the end settles conflicts.

Could compassion training help? We don't know, but there is increasing evidence that it does change people's basic orientation to the world, sensitivities to others and their abilities to regulate their own emotions. Would this help negotiators? Possibly, but the bigger question is how to bring more compassion to business and politics and encourage politicians to create fair compassionate solutions, That means helping the electorate understand and accept compromise means. Rather than seeing the issue of no compromise as a tough decision, we should judge decisions on whether they are compassionate or fair, and toughness should have little to do with it.

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Cognitive Behavioral Therapy Inspiring Values in the Planning and Management of Lebanon National Conflicts Resolution: A Brief Essay

20

Aimée Karam

Lebanon and Identity Negotiation

Lebanon is still today struggling to protect the unity of its community and the core definition of its identity: Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity. It is an active and founding member of the Arab League and is committed to the league's charter. It is an active and founding member of the United Nations Organization and is committed to its charters. Lebanon is a member of the nonaligned movement. The state of Lebanon shall embody these principles in all areas and spheres, without exception. Despite this clear legal-political definition, the country is still embedded in an unequal diarchy.

The compromise reached at Taif¹ in 1989 (also "National Reconciliation Accord" or "Document of National Accord") did not reach the stabilization effect that was intended. In 2014, after almost 25 years, revisionist attempts to discard the Taif,

partly due to extreme polarizations that continue to risk pushing the country toward a renewed civil war. On several levels, the foundation which held this compromise is seriously shaken. Every now and then, political factions voice their intentions to redefine and implement the agreement that ended a 15-year civil war. Yet, the Lebanese political leaders seem to fail every time and at every turn to move forward with the Taif Agreement to a modern secular state that will guarantee fairness and equal opportunities to its citizens in the different aspects of life. The political factions and leaders continue to misunderstand where their true, vested interest should be. The Taif Agreement was an agreement reached to provide the basis for the ending of the decades-long Lebanese wars and the return to political normalcy in Lebanon, forming the principle of "mutual coexistence" (al 'aysh al-mushtarak) between Lebanon's different sects and their proper political representation as the main objective of post-civil war parliamentary electoral laws. It covers general principles such as the sovereignty of Lebanon; its identity; the system of government; the social justice; unity; economic system; democracy; cultural, social, and economic development; and political reforms. It is however way below expectations; the philosophy of community coexistence on which the document is based is not even rethought of or reflected on. It is therefore essential to renew the political class, to question the nepotism and the clientelism, and to create a new policy development and a true sense of conviviality that cannot be confused with coexistence.

¹ The Taif agreement was signed in October 1989 and ratified by the Lebanese parliament in November 5, 1989. It was negotiated in Taif, Saudi Arabia, by the surviving members of Lebanon's 1972 parliament, fathered by Parliament Speaker President Hussein El-Husseini. The agreement came into effect with the active mediation of Saudi Arabia, discreet participation by the United States, and behind-the-scenes influence from Syria (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taif_Agreement).

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Today, sovereignty is only hypothetical and requires serious consolidation.

In March 2006, the “National Dialogue” meetings, aiming at easing political tensions, have brought together all key Lebanese political leaders: the “majority” and the “opposition” in the broadest gathering since the end of the Lebanese wars in 1990. Christians and Muslim leaders met to forge a compromise over a host of conflict issues that have divided the Lebanese political scene, paralyzed the government, and led to a very problematic state of sectarian polarization since the February 14, 2005, assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. The result was a failure in the national dialogue. Today, national politics remain deeply affected by ethnic and religious sectarianism and external influences which are kept alive by an entrenched sense of prejudice, power struggle, and distrust among the different communities in Lebanon and the region. We are facing new versions of technocratic authoritarianism, oligarchies of neopopulism, masses that are in search of charismatic leaders, and the disturbing revival of religious nationalism. In this context, initiatives from the civil society are raising. They aim at reducing political and sectarian conflicts contamination among the civil community and also to change mentalities in order to keep alive the Lebanese model of “the living together” concept, with our diversities, differences, and commonalities. It seems that when push comes to shove, many civil society volunteers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), initiatives, and public figures rally for peace and communal bridging. Such rallies are often attributed to the people, who demand a secular regime and natural evolvment in post-Taif political life that is hindered by the political sectarianism and sectarian distribution of political roles and responsibilities.

A Third Voice for Lebanon

A third voice has always existed throughout the world into several countries. It offers an alternative when the situation of a country reaches a stalemate. Due to the inextricable situation facing Lebanon for years now, “The Third Voice For

Lebanon” (3V) has emerged from the civil society as an independent association, secular and nonpartisan. It is created and implemented as a platform encouraging progress and change by Lebanese civilians residing in Lebanon and among the Diaspora abroad. The aim of the 3V is to respond to the current divisiveness in the social fabric by creating among people a model of interconnectedness that would offer an alternative to the current divisiveness and polarization.

Objectives

Educate people into respecting and valuing public and common societal interests in forging and directing attitudes toward principles of secularism, equality, and meritocracy:

1. Create a meaningful platform for people who share the same crucial beliefs of the value of restoring the concepts of one nation, respect of diversity and pluralism, citizenship, and rule of law.
2. Promote peace in Lebanon, identify the pillars of peace, promote and consolidate them through specific actions, involve all stakeholders, and develop a sense of ownership.
3. Reduce sectarian divide.
4. Facilitate dialogue between all the components of the nation.
5. Promote civil neutrality.
6. Engage the civil society.
7. Create national enthusiasm to build, strengthen, and maintain the national unity and the Lebanese social fabric.

Areas of Interest

The 3V is active in the following areas as they represent the vectors of possible change among all factions of the community:

1. Citizenship awareness
2. Good governance
3. Environment and heritage
4. Economy
5. Health
6. Women’s rights
7. Public services

8. The educational system
9. Societal ethics and values: attitude toward racism, sexual orientation, domestic violence, handicaps, and poverty

The 3V constitutes a paradigm through which principles of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) are highlighted in the process of communication to its members, among its members, in its structural management, and among administrators themselves (Aquilar and Galluccio, 2008, 2011). The principles of CBT adopted are the following (Aquilar and Galluccio, 2008; Beck, 1976; Beck J. 1995; Beck, Freeman, and Davis, 2004; Beck, Rush, Shaw and Emery, 1979; Galluccio, 2007, 2011).

1. Awareness of intimate relationship between thoughts, emotions, and behaviors.
2. Awareness of the central role of beliefs and assumptions in generating specific types of communication, dialogue, and interactions. For example, the view of self as: "We are the only ones who are honest, credible, and truly dedicated to protect our country, not others" and "Others are criminals, corrupted, and only serving personal interests." These types of beliefs constitute serious buffers in the process of dialogue and openness to others' realities in order to achieve a beneficial consensus, agreement, or even an agreement to disagree.
3. Tackle and educate about faulty thinking by highlighting the shortcomings of prejudices and ideologies, black and white reasoning, overgeneralization, and absolute and categorical cognitions.
4. Collaborative approach.
5. Interpersonal effectiveness, which emphasizes the wealth of diversity and the necessity to work together within a paradigm, where the recognition of others is a necessary platform to go further.
6. Feedback, in order to make sure of the fluidity of the interaction, what we communicate among each other is truly understood and accepted.
7. Work outside prejudices.
8. Train administrators and members to guided discovery by initiating them to the Socratic questioning, "tell me more about this, what does it mean? How do you know that? How would you do it differently? What do you think this could mean to the other person?" It is indeed conducive to a new learning style of communication and "give and take" procedure without falling into the trap of giving advices or feeling manipulated or fearing criticism.
9. Identify patterns of dysfunctional schemas, like mistrust, feelings of insecurity, and constant threat. These are important parameters to identify in order to capture the maintaining factors that perpetuate miscommunications, confrontations, and conflicts.
10. Identify areas of strengths and resilience against adversities: prime the strengths of the people, their levers of resilience, and what they are good at.

Expected Results

1. Consolidate national awareness, interest, and concern toward preserving the national unity and the Lebanese social fabric, which is made of diverse religions and cultures, living within one unified country, and accepting their differences as an added value.
2. Educate people into placing public interest as a priority and forge the concept of citizenship in terms of rights and responsibilities.
3. Encourage an attitude of civil neutrality toward external politics.
4. Empower and equip the civil society to acquire a major role in the peace-building process and increase its sense of ownership.
5. Reduce sectarian divides and fight the hegemony of one party over the other and condemn obscurantism.
6. Enhance and facilitate a culture of dialogue to sustain communication and effective interaction among the various components of the nation.
7. Push higher the standard of our politics, the way it is implemented, and let it match with an acceptable democracy.

Then, use strength-based approach strategically within a societal perspective: "what are we good at, as people, as groups, as society?" This is why being a member of the 3V is becoming part of a culture

that forges an attitude, develops a vision, and traces a choice. Implementing CBT principles to make violent polarization less likely to occur could be facilitated by implementing the following parameters as the precursors for changing mentalities, emotional attitudes, and core beliefs in people (Young and Beck, 1980; Wells, 2000).

1. Developing more positive attitude toward the "other."
2. Accept dual identities.
3. Show and emphasize the many commonalities in the daily people's life.
4. Humanize the different groups, making groups more open to dialogue and reconciliation.
5. Intensify contacts among different factions of the society, whether between political elites from different groups, between the political elite from one group and members of the public from another, or between lay people from different groups.
6. Healing from past victimization.
7. Altruism born of suffering.
8. Creating constructive ideologies underlying groups.
9. Promoting moderate respect for authority.
10. Public education promoting readiness to reconcile and promote feelings of trust, forgiveness, and empathy.
11. Develop prevention strategy and conflict-reduction strategies.
12. Training of leaders.
13. Emphasizing the truth and collective memories.
14. Work toward reaching a sense of justice after violence.
15. Ownership of these initiatives that would enhance the sense of belonging, responsibilities, and mission toward one's community.

Making Interventions and Training Effective

The main question is how to make interventions affect larger numbers of people and have lasting effects. Changes can be initiated from bottom-up, top-down, or mid-level influence. To create social change, many people need to join and work

together. Members of civil society can be agents in preventing violence and building peaceful societies by changing attitudes, beliefs, and values. These new attitudes and actions could be likely to affect the leaders. The power of concerned people to influence other people is great. Members of the population could develop community standards of positive behavior, activism, and the necessary motivation and skills to generate positive environment. Today, Internet facilities, social media, para-social contacts, and civil society's movements are the expression of this attempt to maintain people in contact, to indirectly pressure the dialogue among them, and to lessen conflicts severity.

This has been the main goal of the 3V when it was created as a response to the severe polarization in the Lebanese community among two major political lines, who have drifted away from any kind of relatedness and exchange. The 3V is the expression of the majority who is keen to protect the diversity of people in a context of a "living together" formula, within a spirit of conviviality and not only cohabitation. When implementing CBT principles in fields such as national conflicts resolution via civil societies, we need to maintain an interdisciplinary dialogue with geopoliticians, sociologists, lawyers, judges, and historians (Aquilar and Galluccio, 2011). There should be a (re)consideration of the cross of knowledge, the practical nature of the problems, their historical dimension, and the close relation between their several components.

Meanings are processed through different beliefs and specific emotions that deserve particular attention, such as the sense of dignity, justice, hostility, altruism, and fear (Galluccio, 2013). Their expressions are permanently there, and we need to deeply know and understand them in order to inform the levers of the needed changes, via civil societies, toward conflicts resolution.

Relevance to the Process of Negotiation and Mediation

The added value of inserting psychological dimensions and concepts used in CBT into training people

to the process of negotiation and political mediation is to equip them with the following tools:

- Identify the vehicles of reconciliation and prevention.
- Build the pillars for peaceful societies.
- Develop positive attitudes, constructive visions, and values that emphasize caring, connection, contacts, and respect in order to promote and maintain peace.
- Understand how different perceptions of the same situation occurred when processed through different schemas and underlying assumptions.
- Understand concepts such as beliefs, self-definition, style of thinking, and faulty thinking.
- Use a guided discovery and collaborative approach to understand the persistence of a conflict and its negotiation.
- Watch one's prejudices and personal beliefs and their impact on the process and procedure used in the ongoing negotiation.
- Avoid becoming obstructive and keep the dialogue open and possible.
- Be aware and trained in managing different personalities' style and their respective pitfalls in the process of negotiation.
- Keep in mind the macro picture and the specificity of the context in which the negotiation is taking place.
- Aim for the best possible solution not for the ideal solution.

Conclusions

The civil society could be today encouraged and empowered to take action in the process of peace building in conflictual political situations, especially in national politics that remains deeply affected by ethnic and religious sectarianism which is kept alive by an entrenched sense of prejudice, power struggle, and distrust among the different communities coexisting on the ground. Mediators and negotiators may find among the civil society's initiatives an interesting and powerful lever to invest in, educate, collaborate with,

and help in order to reach solutions and induce changes. A formal cognitive behavior training, tailored to match the needs of a specific conflictual situation and added to an interdisciplinary approach, would be necessary to consider in order to maximize the chances of success in the process of negotiation (Galluccio, 2007, 2011). CBT knowledge and practice would implement in its model the very subtle variables that get involved in managing conflicts. It would help a better understanding of human's mind and functioning and offers avenues toward peace-building processes and prevention.

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Part VI

**The Intercultural Dimension
of International Negotiation**

Reflections on the Cultural Contexts of Conflict Resolution via Truth and Reconciliation Processes

21

Anthony J. Marsella

Introduction

Ubiquity of Conflict

“Conflict” is one the most frequently used terms in our daily lives. It refers to states and/or situations of discord, disharmony, and opposition within, between, and among people, groups, and nations. It can also refer to intrapsychic tensions in which beliefs, values, impulses, and behaviors contend with one another. This opposition or contention can assume the proportion of a simple disagreement, or it can extend to the levels of national violence, aggression, and warfare. In all instances, a conflict has its roots in “differences” that require resolution because of the inherent state of tension, stress, and/or emotional and intellectual discomfort and discontent they may elicit. For a conflict to exist, the “differences” usually are perceived as threatening to identity, security, and/or health and well-being. It is important to point out, however, that differences do not have to lead to conflict, and conflict does not have to lead to antagonism and violence. Indeed, if responded to with sensitivity to the issues and backgrounds of the parties, the differences can result in positive change and growth.

This is especially true when the differences are seen as offering all parties beneficial consequences (Marsella 2005; Moghaddam 2010).

Conflicts within, between, and/or among nations have often led to violence, destruction, and war. The twentieth and twenty-first centuries, in particular, though characterized by a growing consciousness and awareness of the destructive consequences of violence and war and also by distinctive efforts to promote peace and justice (e.g., League of Nations, United Nations, Declaration of Human Rights, Truth and Reconciliation Panels and Commissions), have been, nevertheless, the bloodiest and most brutal centuries in history. These centuries have witnessed numerous examples of genocide, ethno-political warfare, ethnic cleansing, widespread torture of civilian and military populations, development and use of weapons of mass destruction (e.g., nuclear weapons, poisoned gas, germ warfare), oppressive and dictatorial governments, and the continuation of the age-old problems slavery and human trafficking (e.g., Marsella 2005; Moghaddam 2010).

Today, we find ourselves living in a global era filled with conflicts endangering and threatening all life as we know it, not only with destruction but with extinction. Across the world we continue to find widespread anger, hate, and violence fueled by humiliation, vilification, and exploitation of entire populations. Populations within and across nations are resisting efforts after cultural homogenization of ethnic, racial, cultural, religious,

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and political differences in favor of open debate and protest recognizing that diversity and differences are the essence of human life, and ultimately offer the best opportunities for change, growth, and development (e.g., Marsella 2009).

Some of the most powerful perceptions that engender conflict include: (1) perceptions of danger for survival, identity, and well-being; (2) perceptions of “other” as evil, dangerous, and threatening; (3) perceptions of the situation as unjust, unequal, unfair, humiliating, and punishing; and (4) perception of self as righteous, moral, justified, and “good” by virtue of religion, history, identity, ethnicity, and race. To these perceptions can be added the following: (5) availability of means to engage in violence and war; (6) availability of media and community ties for gaining support through propaganda, lies, deception, delusions; and (7) the presence of an acceptable and justifiable history of violence, abuse, oppression, and exploitation (e.g., Marsella 2005).

The “Versus” Mentality of Our Times

Amidst the growing tensions of our times, a “versus” mentality has developed in which individuals, societies, and nations are being forced to choose among competing interests, identities, and loyalties. The choices involve identifying with different moral, ethical, ideological, economic, political, and legal issues that range in their consequence and proportion from the local to the global level. McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) have pointed out that widespread “radicalization” is occurring as a result of numerous “frictions.” The “versus” mentality includes a constant consciousness of “competition” and the risk of loss. Table 21.1 lists some of the competing issues we are facing that both promote and sustain the “versus” mentality of our times. As Table 21.1 indicates, whether our situation compels us to join in revolutionary national protests (e.g., Tunisia, Egypt, Wisconsin) or to act and speak against a local injustice, the reality of our times is filled with contestations and frictions.

Table 21.1 The “versus” mentality of our times: examples of conflicts in values, ideologies, and lifestyles

Freedom from governmental oppression <i>versus</i> acceptance of abuses
Support of universal human rights <i>versus</i> national/local rights, laws, and policies
Support of national homogeneity <i>versus</i> national and local diversity, heterogeneity, and countercultures
Support of colonialism/imperialism policies and practices <i>versus</i> sovereignty, self-determination, and autonomy for nations, societies, and cultures
Hegemonic globalization, modernization, and westernization <i>versus</i> self-determination, tradition, and continuity with the past
Nation <i>versus</i> nation
Religions <i>versus</i> religions
Level of living <i>versus</i> quality of life
Spirituality <i>versus</i> materialism, consumerism, and commodification
Militarism <i>versus</i> peace
Profits <i>versus</i> people
Equity in wealth distribution <i>versus</i> concentration of wealth distribution
Environmental exploitation and abuse <i>versus</i> environmental protection, preservation, and sustainability
Unions <i>versus</i> open shops and businesses
My identity (my culture, my nation, my world) <i>versus</i> our identity (our culture, our nation, our world)

There are, of course, many approaches to resolving conflict and negotiating peace (e.g., Aquilar and Galluccio 2011; Bercovitch et al. 2009; Deutsch et al. 2006). Truth and reconciliation processes represent one effort among the many approaches to address and resolve the challenges we face, especially by bringing all aspects of a conflict out in the open (e.g., perpetrator, victim, culpability, regrets). They are not only an approach but they do represent an approach that has found widespread use even if results have often proven successful to all parties.

The list of international and domestic conflicts in which cultural differences have emerged as serious impediments to solutions is long.

Mercieca (2009), on a hopeful note, suggests that there is an inevitable human willingness to address problems once they are identified and brought to attention. He cites

Socrates (470–399 BCE), the ancient Greek philosopher, who 2,500 years ago stated:

“We can solve every problem we encounter by simply taking the first step.” . . . The first step is to bring into the open the involved problem, because unless people know that it exists they will do nothing about it. But once they discover that it exists, they will immediately begin to figure out how such a problem may affect them. Then steps are definitely taken and the problem is solved.” (Socrates, quoted in Mercieca 2009, p. 3)

Whether the optimism of Socrates is warranted remains a topic of debate and controversy.

The Truth and Reconciliation Process

Definition

Truth and reconciliation refers to those processes designed to address and to resolve past and present conflicts of varying proportion and consequence according to a series of prototypical steps that involve various combinations and progressions of confession of harmful/injurious acts, sincere apology, requests for forgiveness, acceptance of apology, promises/vows to never again commit similar acts, penance, restitution, and reconciliation. Oftentimes, a commission is constituted to mediate and to address the disputes using these procedures. The parties involved in the truth and reconciliation process can include individuals, groups, societies, and nations. However, the prototypical steps are complicated by many factors, including differences in party beliefs about the nature of forgiveness and restitution.

Myths About Forgiveness

While the order of the truth and reconciliation steps may vary, the essence of the process cannot be compromised: a truthful revelation of a harmful act, a promise to refrain from ever repeating the act, and a request for forgiveness are essential. And the grieved party must be willing to accept the various acts. It is here that we encounter potential problems, for as Kalayjian (2006)

points out, forgiveness is not an easy matter and is subject to a number of considerations. Kalayjian described a number of myths exist about forgiveness that make it difficult to forgive, including the beliefs: “If I forgive, I will forget; If I forgive, you will do it again; If I forgive, the enemy will be set free; If I forgive, I will hurt those who died; If I forgive, there will be no justice; If I forgive, I will no longer be a victim; I need the anger to live and fight back; Forgiveness will help the “enemy,” but not the one who is doing the forgiving.” In the case of South Africa, one of the most well-known efforts to apply the truth and reconciliation processes to resolve the tragic consequences of “Apartheid,” many of the family members of the victims of the brutalities of the police force were outspoken that they did not forgive the perpetrators (e.g., Wikipedia 2011). Wikipedia (2011) states:

A 1998 study by South Africa’s Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation & the Khulumani Support Group, which surveyed several hundred victims of human-rights abuse during the Apartheid era, and found that most felt that the TRC had failed to achieve reconciliation between the black and white communities. Most believed that justice was a prerequisite for reconciliation rather than an alternative to it, and that the TRC had been weighted in favour of the perpetrators of abuse. Another dilemma facing the TRC was how to do justice to the testimonials of those witnesses for whom translation was necessary. It was believed that, with the great discrepancy between the emotions of the witnesses and those translating them, much of the impact was lost in interlingual rendition. A briefly tried solution was to have the translators mimic the witnesses’ emotions, but this proved disastrous and was quickly scrapped. (See Wikipedia 2011), [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth_and_Reconciliation_Commission_\(South_Africa\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth_and_Reconciliation_Commission_(South_Africa))

In these current author’s opinion, many of the reasons these problems reside in the cultural insensitivity of the truth and reconciliation assumptions and procedures. The processes were heavily rooted in Christian religious premises and dogma pushed strongly by Christian leaders in an effort to prevent widespread violence and the breakdown of the economic system. The fact that the South Africa situation today remains filled with social injustices, especially mass racial

inequities across the economic system (e.g., diamond industry), calls attention to the fact that the efforts were less than effective for the majority of people, especially the blacks.

Efforts to resolve conflicts using the truth and reconciliation process—whether via a formally established T & R commission or via a local mediator—face the problem of widespread popular beliefs regarding forgiveness. These beliefs are deeply ingrained in our minds, and they resist the reflexive premises of truth and reconciliation. Quite simply, confessing offenses, apologizing, and asking for forgiveness are not an automatic pathway to conflict solution. Among some of the popular beliefs that are widely held are: “Don’t Get Mad, Get Even,” “Forgive but don’t forget,” “I am obligated by my culture to seek revenge,” and, of course, the old biblical admonition, “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.”

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

Typically, for major issues of national concern, the truth and reconciliation process proceeds from the formation of a commission that can be initiated by international organizations (e.g., United Nations), national governments, and/or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Avruch and Vejarano (2002) and numerous Internet sources provide a listing of the many truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) that have been established. In a review of the literature on TRCs, Avruch and Vejarano (2002) identified more than 22 TRCs beginning in 1974. They noted that many were never completed, and the many proved ineffective for different reasons. Some of the better known TRCs include the TRC established in South Africa to resolve the *apartheid* situation between government/authority crimes and black citizens who were killed, tortured, and imprisoned and the TRC established in Argentina between government/authority crimes and citizens who were victims of similar offenses (*Nunca Mas—nothing like this ever again*). Among the most widely known truth and reconciliation commissions used to address national problems are those that were formed in Argentina,

Chile, Central American nations, Liberia, Panama, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and East Timor. There has been widespread controversy regarding the methods and outcomes of many commissions, and some suggestions have been made about alternative procedures that speak more fully to justice.

Reparology

Perlman (2007). A clinical psychologist with strong interests in national and international conflict resolution, has proposed a number of changes in the conventional truth and reconciliation processes. She termed her process “Reparology—A Nine Step Formula.” Perlman states that reparology is “A science of repair, a concept more comprehensive and primary than reconciliation, which is a problematic term for some.” For Perlman, there must be (1) safety and termination of the dangerous, oppressive situation; (2) acknowledgement of truth and recording of an accurate historical narrative; (3) bearing witness, containing truth with the survivors; (4) individual and collective atonement; (5) personal and public apologies (“earning forgiveness”); (6) restitution, reparation, and compensation; (7) justice (restorative, symbolic, and compensatory justice); (8) memorials and collective rituals of mourning and remembrance; and (9) redemption of the perpetrator and renewal for the victim. Perlman’s recommendations represent important considerations for resolving conflicts because they go far beyond the more expected steps of confession—apology—forgiveness. Efforts at resolution can be caught in an endless debate about who is right and who is wrong, and this impacts the perceptions of apologies, atonement, and compensation.

Some Critical Considerations: Emotion and Culture

Emotions

An essential assumption behind the TRCs is that the parties involved are motivated and willing to respond “rationally” to the process, especially the

promise to never again commit the act or similar acts, to forgive, and to move on toward peaceful relationships. Unfortunately, “rationality” is a complex process that is easily entangled with emotion. No matter how well intentioned the parties and how much they wish to respond in a rational way to the TRC process, differences in their histories and cultures may elicit a reflexive spectrum of emotions (e.g., anger, hate, grief, resentment, remorse, distrust, trauma, paranoia, and revenge) that will be difficult to overcome.

Amidst these differences, it can be asked whether a psychology that considers (1) “reason” to override “emotion,” (2) the “present” to override the “past,” (3) complete “forgiveness” to override “partial” or “unresolved” forgiveness, and (4) the “decisions of participants” to override the “decisions of nonparticipants” is, in fact, realistic. We may be asking too much for the human psyche, filled as it is with images, memories, trauma experiences, emotions, symbols, and words, to yield to efforts that are situational.

It is also important to note that growing recognition that emotions—although considered to be common among humans, particularly in their facial expression and displays—are profoundly different in their culturally contextual meanings and implications and in their motivational imperatives. Research suggests that emotions may compound or combine together in ways that are difficult to decode and translate. It is not only the denotative meaning of an emotion but also its connotative meaning and behavioral implications. In other words, what elicits an emotion, what psychological and physical systems are involved, how the emotion manifests itself, what are its sociolinguistic aspects, and what are its behavioral and social consequences are all critical and may conflict with “rationality.”

Cultural Considerations

1. Potential Risks

Cultural differences are a particular source of interference in all conflict resolution procedures (e.g., Fry and Bjorkqvist 1997; Huang and Bedford 2009; Marsella 2011), but espe-

cially in TRC procedures because of variations in confession, apology, forgiveness, etc. A number of writers (e.g., Avruch and Vejarano 2002; Marsella 2007) have argued that the failure to consider considerations in the truth and reconciliation process may ultimately limit its success. Indeed, they note that failure to respond to cultural considerations can lead to even greater conflicts as parties consider the cultural insensitivities as affronts. Avruch and Vejarano (2002) write:

Most of the truth and truth and reconciliation commissions covered in the literature have worked (when they do) in Christian countries, and have recourse to broadly (if not perfectly) shared Christian values. But any attention to culture should alert us to the recognition that such notions as justice, truth, forgiveness, reconciliation, and accountability—to name a few—are always socially constructed and culturally constituted. Research in conflict resolution has already established different modalities for Islamic and “Western” cultures around such key ideas as justice, peace, and reconciliation—and contrition and forgiveness—and there is no reason to think that cultural differences stop there. Here then is one area for further research suggested by our review of the extant literature that follows: for whatever the value of these commissions may be, they will certainly face new sets of challenges if and when they seek to work to ascertain truth(s), or to affect reconciliation, in cultural settings different from the ones attempted thus far—and, perhaps even more so, if and when they seek to do their work across significant cultural borders. (Avruch and Vejarano 2002, p. 43)

2. Defining Culture

The issue of cultural differences involves often the coming together of two different cultural constructions of reality. Cultural differences are not to be dismissed lightly amidst the good intentions to enter into a TRC process, for culture ultimately shapes our constructions of reality in profound ways that may alter our epistemologies (i.e., ways of knowing), ontologies (i.e., views of human nature), and praxeologies (i.e., behavior patterns and practices). Marsella and Yamada (2000) has defined culture as:

“Shared learned behavior and meanings that are socially transferred in various life-activity settings for purposes of individual and collective adjust-

ment and adaptation. Cultures can be (1) *transitory* (i.e., situational even for a few minutes), (2) relatively *enduring* (e.g., ethnocultural life styles), and, in all instances are (3) *dynamic* (i.e., subject to change and modification). Cultures are represented (4) *internally* (i.e., values, beliefs, attitudes, axioms, orientations, epistemologies, consciousness levels, perceptions, expectations, personhood) and (5) *externally* (i.e., artifacts, roles, institutions, social structures), and (6) *construct* our realities (i.e., they contribute to our world views, perceptions, orientations), and, with this, many of our ideas, morals, and preferences (Marsella and Yamada 2000).

Table 21.2 lists the steps that occur in the cultural construction of reality beginning with the human brain's reflexive tendency to process and order stimuli from the very moment of birth. The cultural construction of reality serves a number of functions that assist survival and development within a particular milieu or setting. But, cultural constructions can vary considerably, and the differences may be difficult to negotiate when cultural constructions encounter one another as may occur in truth and reconciliation efforts.

Metaphorically, culture can be considered a template or set of spectacles that frame and guide the different ways a culture may know, codify, and experience reality. In addition cultures may vary in the particular modalities in which they codify reality including verbal, imagistic, visceral, emotional, proprioceptive, and skeletal/postural means." Appealing to words, logic, and reason can create a problem rather than bring a solution. Acknowledging the differences at the very beginning may seem to undermine the possibilities, but unless they are considered, it may be difficult to proceed.

Examples of Existing Cultural Variations in Truth and Reconciliation

Recognition of the importance of culture is not new. Indeed, there are scores of examples from different cultures that use "truth and reconciliation" processes to heal conflicts. Some examples include:

Table 21.2 Steps in the cultural construction of reality

1. There is an inherent human impulse to describe, understand, and predict the world through the ordering of stimuli
2. The undamaged human brain not only responds to stimuli but also organizes, connects, and symbolizes stimuli and, in the process, generates patterns of explicit and implicit meanings that help promote survival, adaptation, and adjustment
3. The process and product of these activities are, to a large extent, culturally contextualized, generated, and shaped through sensory, linguistic, behavioral, and interpersonal practices that constitute the cultural socialization process
4. The storage of stimuli as accumulated life experience, in both representational and symbolic forms in the brain and in external forms (e.g., books), generates a shared cognitive and affective process that helps create cultural continuity across time (i.e., past, present, and future) for both the person and the group. To a large extent, individual and collective identities are forged through this process
5. Through socialization, individual and group preferences and priorities are rewarded or punished, thus promoting and/or modifying the cultural constructions of reality (i.e., ontogenies, epistemologies, praxeologies, cosmologies, ethos, values, and behavior patterns)
6. "Reality" is, thus, "culturally constructed." Different cultural contexts create different realities via the cultural socialization processes

- **Catholic confession:** Act of contrition, confess sins, ask forgiveness, penance, renewal/rebirth.
- **Indigenous cultures:** Numerous indigenous cultures accept restitution in the form of material gifts along with an apology.
- **Jewish holiday:** *Yom Kippur*. Day of atonement for commission of grievous acts. Forgiveness and intention to do better.
- **Mediated legal and labor disputes settlements:** Under the best of circumstances, the process involves identifying the problems, discussing common concerns, and then compromising.
- **Native Hawaiian culture:** *Ho'opono'ono*. A healing process for making things right by a group sharing their anger and resentment toward a perpetrator, followed by a willingness to forgive, especially with an apology by perpetrator.
- **Protestant confession:** Individual or group engaging in public and/or private confession

of sins and through expressions of remorse and prayer, asking God's forgiveness and acceptance.

- **US court and legal systems:** Reduced sentencing for showing remorse, asking forgiveness, and sometimes restitution to victims. Rulings by judges may consider T & R factors.
- **Western psychotherapies for marital and family therapy.**

Developing a Truth and Reconciliation Equation

Truth and reconciliation outcomes are a function of many cultural variables that require understanding and consideration in the conduct of the processes. For example, in the Palestinian-Israeli situation, there are many diverse cultural variations that must be considered by both parties including variations in cultural ethos and axioms, institutional structures and function, religion, history, language, models of causality, and so forth. These variables can be framed as an equation (see Marsella 2007):

This seven-variable equation identifies critical cultural variables that should be considered in the

truth and reconciliation process. Details for each of the variables follow:

- V_1 **Cultural ethos/axioms** (e.g., ethos, axioms, basic values, beliefs, epistemology)
- V_2 **Socialization institutions** (e.g., political, economic, cultural, religion, legal, education)
- V_3 **Social structure/formation** (e.g., gender, age, class, race, ethnicity status markers)
- V_4 **Historical considerations and relations** (e.g., past and present animosities and hostilities and maintenance of issues associated with historical events and forces)
- V_5 **Models of causality/agency** (e.g., destiny/karma/inshallah, self-responsibility, event situational determinants, gods, evil forces (curses, witches, spirits, chosen people))
- V_6 **Language/communication considerations** (e.g., linear, poetic, indirect communications, silences ["Listen to what is not said"], nonverbal (tone, posture, facial, body distance))
- V_7 **Cognitive processes** (cost-benefit analysis, priorities (e.g., honor, face, financial), consequences of outcome, election or citizen reactions, power loss/gain, probability of reoccurrence, sources of argumentation

$$\begin{aligned} \text{T \& R outcomes} = & \text{Function of } V_1 (\text{cultural ethos / axioms}) \times V_2 (\text{socialization institutions}) \times \\ & V_3 (\text{social structure}) \times V_4 (\text{historical institutions}) \times \\ & V_5 (\text{causal models / agency}) \times V_6 (\text{language / communication}) \times \\ & V_7 (\text{cognitive decisions processes}) \times \\ & V_8 (\text{cultural context of mediation}) \end{aligned}$$

[*argumentums ad hominen, ad baculum, ad authoritium, ad datum, ad logos*])

When different parties enter into a truth and reconciliation process for the resolution of a conflict, each brings with them not only a view of the conflict to be resolved but also a construction of reality that is firmly rooted within the socialization history of their culture. This construction includes a lifetime of cultural learning, attachments to historical relations, and a psychology (e.g., ethos and values, causal models, cognitive

processes) that is both ethnocentric and resistant to change.

The Culture of the TRC Process

The truth and reconciliation process is complicated further by the fact that the coming together of different cultures creates a third culture that is the culture of the T & R process. The third culture is actually an emergent product of the inter-




Fig. 21.1 Representation of the emergent culture of mediation

action of the two parties. The complexity of the “negotiation culture” is increased beyond the immediacy of the parties (e.g., culture A, culture B, and emergent culture) involved, by pressures from many external forces who try to influence the negotiations in many ways in the pursuit of their own interests. The media can play both a positive and/or negative influence depending on their agendas. It is important to recognize that the small number of global media corporations today often evidence bias in their coverage of the negotiations. Thus, we now have a complex of cultures that must be understood, negotiated, and respected for their influence (i.e., culture A x culture B x culture of T & R context). Sometimes, the situation is complicated even more by the presence of a third party that may be seen as less than neutral. For example, consider a T & R process between Palestinian and Israeli parties that is mediated by the United States. Given the disproportionate support of the USA for Israel, its presence introduces yet another complexity into the equation. This is why calls are often made for mediator “neutrality,” albeit that this may be impossible in today’s world. Figure 21.1 displays this situation graphically.

The Use of Third Parties

A final consideration in the truth and reconciliation process is whether a third party can—even with its

own cultural constructions of reality—serve to facilitate and promote the T & R process by contributing to the conflict resolution through clarification of key considerations. In my opinion, Carpenter and Kennedy (1988, Ch. 4) are quite useful. They recommend the third party complete a *conflict analysis chart*, inclusive of the basic elements of a particular conflict; this seems to be a useful and essential function for assisting the conflict resolution process. They recommend that the *conflict analysis chart* clearly identifies the parties involved (direct and indirect), critical issues, interests, the importance of the issues (high, medium, low), the sources of power and influence for effecting change or movement, the positions and options of each party, and the interest of the parties in working with other parties.

In brief, the decision to embark upon a truth and reconciliation process for resolving conflicts of different proportion and consequence is not an easy matter. It assumes “good will” and “good intentions” can solve all problems. At the heart of the matter is the reality that cultural constructions of reality represent major challenges that require an awareness of the differences, efforts to establish agreements that may transcend the differences, and willingness to compromise. There may be an important role in all of this for cultural psychologists to inform, educate, and mediate, based on their knowledge and sensitivity to cultural differences.

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David P. Barash

Introduction and Early Conclusion

It seems likely that specialists in international negotiation and mediation are optimists about the potential of human beings to reach lasting and peaceful agreements. Otherwise, they would be wise to look for an alternative career! On the other hand, I wouldn't be at all surprised to learn that even within so self-selected a group, questions and doubts occasionally arise, especially when negotiations reach a rough patch and—more dire yet—when violence or even the serious threat of violence might arise.

After all, there has of late been a serious intellectual undercurrent, almost like a small devil whispering in the public ear, to the effect that *Homo sapiens* is an inherently violent and war-prone species for whom peaceful conflict resolution is unnatural, rendering peace not only exceptionally difficult to achieve but necessarily unstable at best. It is challenging to pursue peace if all around, voices are suggesting that it is fundamentally beyond our collective reach.

This chapter is an attempt to provide reassurance, if it is needed, and further confirmation, if it is not, intended for current mediators and negotiators, as well as for people interested in pursuing these mat-

ters. I shall briefly review the rather sordid history of humanity's assessment of its own nature with respect to violence and war and then explore the fraught but intellectually rewarding question of what—if anything—evolutionary biology can tell us about the human penchant for organized violence. Since this chapter is not intended to generate suspense, I'll give away the punch line here and now: Our species-wide bequest from evolution is neither that of a naturally war-lusting, violence-embracing species of killer apes nor of peaceful, conflict-avoiding, wonderfully nonviolent flower children.

As Theodore Geisel (“Dr. Seuss” 1990) advises in *Oh, the Places You'll Go!*:

“You have brains in your head.
You have feet in your shoes.
You can steer yourself any direction you choose.”

A Human Capacity for Peace, War, and in Between

When it comes to violence in particular, we have what can be described as an “open program,” which is to say that we are biologically endowed with both behavioral inclinations toward violence (individual as well as group organized) as well as toward peace (including various mechanisms of nonviolent conflict resolution). Moreover, I urge negotiators and mediators to avoid the widespread error of extrapolating from nonhuman primates to *Homo sapiens*, as well as generalizing to

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“human beings” findings derived from one or a small number of non-technological human societies.

To be sure, Shakespeare’s Hamlet admires human beings, asking “What a piece of work is a man, how noble in reason, how infinite in faculties, in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals ...” And there are numerous historical and contemporary references, especially in the Judeo-Christian tradition, to our species having been made in the image of God. Nonetheless, there seems to be a special pleasure derived by many observers when it comes to criticizing human beings, especially when it comes to our presumed penchant for aggression and violence.

The Perverse Appeal of Identifying a “War Instinct”

It may be that some of this comes from a paradoxically pleasant *frisson* associated with pointing out the worst in one’s fellow humans, which might itself derive from a peculiar payoff that comes from showing one’s self to be especially hardheaded and “realistic,” hence nobody’s fool and therefore, perhaps, not susceptible to being personally taken advantage of. This seductive tendency may well be not unlike the motivation of certain political scientists and specialists in international relations when they proudly adhere to *Realpolitik* in preference to more “soft-headed” attempts at benefitting the human condition. I also suspect that men in particular succumb to yet another seductive aspect of this intellectual stance, deriving perhaps from a secret thrill that comes with pointing out the very worst in human violence, thereby somehow burnishing—or even, indirectly bragging about—their own testosterone levels.

In any event, here is South African anthropologist Raymond Dart, who discovered the first australopithecine fossil in 1924. Dart wasn’t shy about concluding that these early hominins were

“Confirmed killers: carnivorous creatures that seized living quarries by violence, battered them to death, tore apart their broken bodies, dismembered

them limb from limb, slaking their ravenous thirst with the hot blood of the victims and greedily devouring living writhing flesh.” (Dart 1953)

Of course, even this lurid perspective had its antecedents, notably in certain branches of Christian doctrine. “The mind of man,” according to the zealous Protestant theologian John Calvin (2012):

has been so completely estranged from God’s righteousness that it conceives, desires, and undertakes, only that which is impious, perverted, foul, impure and infamous. The human heart is so steeped in the poison of sin, that it can breathe out nothing but a loathsome stench.

My present concern is more secular, however. Although it is bad enough for substantial numbers of people to be convinced of humanity’s irrevocable sinfulness—to be paid for, presumably, in the afterlife—it may well be even worse when those who claim to speak for science promote a perspective that has threatened to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, right here on Earth. Thus, in his widely influential book, *African Genesis* (1961), playwright Robert Ardrey picked up Dart’s suitably pointed perspective and announced:

We are Cain’s children. ... Man is a predator whose natural instinct is to kill with a weapon. It is war and the instinct for territory that has led to the great accomplishments of Western Man. Dreams may have inspired our love of freedom, but only war and weapons have made it ours.

This assertion, in addition to being scientifically inaccurate, has been downright pernicious when it comes to impacting the often unconscious attitudes of people concerned about practical policy concerning war and peace. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, why seek to pursue nonviolent solutions to pressing international political problems when such solutions have already been ruled irrelevant or—worse yet—simply impossible?

Self-Fulfilling Prophecies

In his book, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, psychologist B. F. Skinner (1971) wrote that “no theory changes what it is a theory about. Man remains what he has always been.” This is certainly true with respect to our knowledge of the

physical world. Before Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler, when many serious thinkers believed in the Ptolemaic model of a geocentric universe, their error did not impact the astrodynamics of the solar system itself, which was then and has continued to be heliocentric, regardless of what theories human beings applied to it. This is similar for gravity before and after Newton, relativity before and after Einstein, and so forth.

Strictly speaking, the same applies to the theories of human nature, too: People's ostensible "instinct" for violence and war should remain whatever it is, regardless of what we think about it. But when it comes to such matters, the connection between expectation and reality becomes complex, with a risk that theories of human nature feed directly into the behavior of humans themselves, who in turn are liable to modify their behavior—if not their "nature"—as a result. Consider the militarists in country A, who may be convinced that inhabitants of country B are caught in the grip of unshakeable, instinct-driven war proneness. As a result, country A refuses to engage in serious negotiations, preferring to arm itself; the leaders of country B, observing these actions (and equally convinced that country A is composed of people with an irrevocable proclivity for war), do the same. Each side points to the other as justifying its bellicosity while at the same time confirming their often unspoken assumption that war is both natural and inevitable.

The danger, in short, of assuming that *Homo sapiens* has a "natural instinct" for war is that it can become a highly destructive self-fulfilling prophecy, not only closing off possible avenues of peaceful conflict resolution but actually making war more likely. Nonetheless, a purportedly scientific view of anything—humanity's presumed instinct for warfare included—must stand or fall not on its social and political consequences but on its scientific credentials. And here, the "war is in our genes" perspective is scientifically invalid.

Misleading Animal Parallels

Let us look first at the pseudo-evolutionary claim that *Homo sapiens'* war-promoting instinct can be inferred from our animal relatives, specifically

the nonhuman primates. It warrants mention that research on the social behavior of even highly social primates has looked overwhelmingly at aggression and competition rather than at strategies of conflict resolution. In the early days of naturalistic primate studies, savannah baboons constituted the most frequent research subjects, mostly because they were easy to access, to watch, and to habituate to the presence of human observers. As it happens, baboons are also somewhat unusual in the degree to which their social behavior is ruled by rigid dominance hierarchies and high levels of agonistic behavior.

Our closest living relatives, however, aren't baboons but the great apes, which include chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans, as well as the so-called lesser apes, the gibbons and siamangs. None of these species demonstrate social behavior directly parallel or comparable to that of human beings. Gibbons and siamangs practice a kind of "solitary monogamy," in which mated pairs remain more or less isolated from others (except for occasional extra-pair copulations). Orangutans are more solitary yet, with male and female associating only very briefly, to mate. Gorillas live in multi-female, multi-male troops with a strict age-graded hierarchy in which a single "silverback" male essentially maintains a harem.

This leaves the chimpanzees and bonobos. When field studies of these animals were in their infancy, the former were initially described as experiencing a socially chaotic but basically benevolent lifestyle; more recently, however, chimpanzees have been observed to engage in far more violence than had been reported, complete with "search and destroy" missions that are worrisomely similar to that seen in human warfare. No less a pro-chimpanzee advocate than Jane Goodall has reported, in her classic book *The Chimpanzees of Gombe*, that "as a result of a unique combination of strong affiliative bonds between adult males on the one hand and an unusually hostile and violently aggressive attitude toward nongroup individuals on the other," the chimpanzee "has clearly reached a stage where he stands at the very threshold of human achievement in destruction, cruelty, and planned intergroup conflict." Numerous other field reports have confirmed this description.

Looking only at chimpanzees, therefore, it is tempting to presume that human beings have inherited a chimp-like predisposition for war. But wait! Today's living chimpanzees are definitely not our ancestors; rather, we share a common ancestor with the living great apes such that we are no more descended from any of them than they are descended from us. Moreover, what about the bonobos? These animals—sometimes inaccurately labeled “pygmy chimpanzees”—are renowned for their peaceful and nonviolent ways, characteristically avoiding conflict by engaging in intense bouts of hetero- and homosexual activity; i.e., they “make love, not war.” The problem is that modern human beings have not evolved from either chimpanzees or bonobos; rather, we share a common ancestor with these two ape species. Moreover, DNA analysis has found that *Homo sapiens* is no closer, genetically, to either species. The most accurate conclusion to be drawn from an examination of our closest animal relatives is that ... no conclusion can be drawn!

The Prehistoric Human Condition?

Since we cannot derive insights into the fundamentals of human behavior from examining the other extant great apes, what about looking at other human beings? Here, the situation is fraught and potentially misleading. Part of the allure of anthropology has long been the assumption that “primitive” (i.e., stateless, non-technological, and, where possible, precontact) human societies represent a reasonable approximation to the prehistoric human condition. Once again, however, there are several obstacles to any clear conclusions. For one thing, just as we are descended from neither chimps nor bonobos, current human societies, too, are not ancestral to those of us who currently live in state-based, technological human communities. We have no “contemporary ancestors.”

On the other hand, given that our Pleistocene pre-hominin ancestors almost certainly lived as hunter-gatherers on the early African savannah, it seems reasonable that such people, currently alive, would offer at least a glimpse of those early humans from whom we are all descended.

But even in this case, there are problems, of which the greatest is probably—once again, as with our brief and somewhat aborted survey of the great apes—the fact that the range of observed behaviors is very great, while no basis exists for identifying one “primitive” human society as somehow more representative of *ur*-humanity than is any other.

In fact, the difficulties are greater yet, because even beyond the problem of distinguishing among numerous human groupings with regard to which are the most accurate exemplars of untrammelled, natural humanity, today's scientists have themselves been significantly biased in their choice of subjects from which to generalize. As with the bifurcation between chimpanzees and bonobos, there are dramatic differences between societies widely recognized to be pacific and conflict avoidant and those that have traditionally been violent and war prone. Once again, which shall we designate as exemplars when it comes to expressing “natural” human nature?

Not surprisingly, there are substantial sources of bias, notably involving the ease of gathering empirical data, the literal safety or danger experienced by field workers, the availability of research funds, and—perhaps most important although most obscured—the sociopolitical, ideological, and even emotional bias of the researchers themselves. Thus, some archaeologists and anthropologists have been criticized for “pacifying the past” by focusing excessively on those societies known to be comparatively gentle and nonviolent, whereas others—currently, it seems, in the majority—could equally be called to account for “warmongering the world” by developing global theories about the war-prone nature of human nature as a whole based on a small number of dramatically violent human societies.

Generalizing from the Famously “Fierce” Yanomamo

Notable in this regard has been the widely reported findings of anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon (1968), who conducted multi-decade field research among the Yanomamo of the

Venezuelan/Brazilian Amazon. His findings led to identifying the Yanomamo as “the fierce people,” prone to violent quarrels and inter-village raids that offer a close approximation to early, non-technological human warfare. Especially striking was Chagnon’s discovery that Yanomamo men—“*unokais*”—who have killed other men, have fathered significantly more offspring than have non-killers. This direct correlation between perpetrating lethal violence and evolutionary fitness provides a clear empirical basis for concluding that natural selection has favored a predilection for killing other human beings.

Professor Chagnon’s research results have been immensely influential, widely read by college students as well as being cited repeatedly by other scholars (including, I must acknowledge, myself). There are probably two major reasons for this selective attention to Yanomamo violence. For one, the available data comports nicely with a theoretical perspective derived from evolutionary biology, whereby selection is likely to have favored whatever contributes to fitness, with successful violence being almost a textbook case. For another, and as already noted, I suspect that there is a paradoxical appeal derived by many—especially men—in describing human nature as violence and war prone. Not surprisingly, this perspective is likely to be especially favored by men, who—for understandable biological reasons—are particularly inclined to emphasize their “macho” qualities and to minimize any presumption that they might be personally naïve.

It must be emphasized, in addition, that there is no reason to consider the Yanomamo as in any way “more human” or more accurately representative of “natural” humanity than is any other group of people. And although the Yanomamo do indeed appear to be at the violent and warlike end of the human continuum, there are numerous other human societies that are strikingly peace loving and that eschew war. These include, but are in no way limited to, the Batek of Malaysia, the Hadza of Tanzania, the Mardu of Australia, a half-dozen or more indigenous South Indian forager societies, and numerous others, each of which is no less human than those such as the

Yanomamo who are regularly trotted out to “prove” our inherent war proneness.

Let me be clear: I don’t think there is any doubt about the validity and value of Chagnon’s findings. The fault, or problem, dear reader, is not in Dr. Chagnon but in ourselves (i.e., myself and many of my fellow evolutionists), insofar as we may well have generalized excessively from Chagnon’s extraordinary research findings, thereby conveying a likely misleading impression about the “inherent aggressiveness,” “violent tendencies,” and “warlike inclinations” of “natural human beings,” whatever and whoever they may be.

The reality is that the public in general and students in particular are highly susceptible to messages from the scientific community as to the underlying predispositions of *Homo sapiens*, a susceptibility that becomes especially acute—and potentially dangerous—when they are taken to paint a picture of our own species as irrevocably and unavoidably violent and warlike. All too often, as a result, we encounter (and help generate) assertions to the effect that war is inevitable because our species is hardwired this way. Such problems don’t arise, for example, among scholars concerned with Renaissance harpsichord music.

Also worth noting: One of the consistent differences between a right-wing and left-wing political orientation is that the former generally takes a dark view of human nature and the inevitability of crime and warfare (which leads, in turn, to enthusiasm for law enforcement and a vigorous military, often to the exclusion of governmental programs of social betterment), while the latter espouse a more benign vision of human potential—leading, when possible, to more social investment and reduced reliance upon the use of force. I am *not* arguing that we should orchestrate our scientific work around data sets that support our particular political profile, but, rather, we should acknowledge that our decisions in this regard not only reflect these preferences (often unwittingly), they also influence the attitudes of those who follow and seek to generalize from our research. I agree with Dr. Chagnon that with respect to the Yanomamo, “blood is their argument.” But what is ours?

Which People, If Any, Are More “Fundamentally Human”?

At this point, my biologist colleagues in particular might be tempted to quote Darwin, who pointed out in *Sexual Selection and The Descent of Man* that “we are not here concerned with hopes or fears, only with the truth as far as our reason permits us to discover it ...” Fair enough. Let’s stick to the truth—something that Napoleon Chagnon, I am entirely convinced, has done (even as the same cannot be said of his critics). Nonetheless, a fair-minded—not to say, scientifically accurate and politically sensitive—perspective must ask whether it is “the truth” that the fierce Yanomamo are necessarily the best or, in the worst case, the only models for generalizing about the fundamentals of human nature.

Note: I am *not* claiming that the Yanomamo are inappropriate exemplars of pre-technological human nature, just that data derived from their ethnographies aren’t necessarily more relevant than that associated with other social groups. There are also numerous nonwarring societies, such as the Machiguenga swidden farmers of Peru, the Batek of Malaysia, the Mardu of aboriginal Australia, the Ladakhi and Lepcha of Asia, the Pemon and Piaroa of South America, and so forth. And I would bet that Napoleon Chagnon’s most vigorous supporters and defenders (among whom I include myself) would agree that there is little if any reason for seeing the Yanomamo as being somehow more indicative of evolution’s behavioral bequest to *Homo sapiens* than are the Mardu, the Machiguenga, and so forth (Fry 2013).

The Fallacy of Platonic “Types”

In the early days of evolutionary biology, taxonomists used to identify a “type species” within each genus, seeing it as somehow representing a kind of platonic archetype. Fortunately, we have moved well beyond these phony and arbitrary idealizations. Are we now to have “type societies”? And if so, how are we to decide which ones qualify?

I fear that to an extent most evolutionists do not realize or acknowledge, there has been a tendency to fix upon certain human groups as especially and uniquely revelatory, and not simply because the data are convincing but rather (at least in part) because the stories are riveting and the data are consistent with our preexisting expectations and biases—or even, just plain fun to talk about, especially for men.

An additional reason, moreover, why the Yanomamo have received special attention may well be because they are “poster children” for a particular perspective on human nature (and one, incidentally, that I generally share and have promoted, sometimes—I now realize—excessively). It must be acknowledged that the consequences of adopting a limited model for human aggressiveness, violence, or war proneness can readily go beyond helping to make a persuasive case for the relevance of evolutionary analysis generally to the point of influencing and even subtly constraining our sense of the boundaries of human potential, thereby possibly becoming self-fulfilling prophecies.

I feel strongly that ideology (whether antiwar or prowar) should not be permitted to color scientific research and the conclusions derived from such study. At the same time, we need to be alert to the prospect of subtle and unintentional bias, especially when one or a few human societies are taken as indicative of an entire species. It is fair to conclude that when I write or lecture about the social behavior and reproductive strategies of different marmot species—the animals that have occupied much of my research effort in behavioral ecology and evolution—no sociopolitical implications are involved; however, when I write or lecture about violence, aggression, and/or war making among human beings, it makes a huge difference whether I describe the fierce Yanomamo or the pacific Lepcha.

To repeat: Napoleon Chagnon did what he was supposed to do and then some. He deserves honor and commendation. He was and is not at fault, but many of the rest of us are, insofar as fascination with his findings, and especially with the remarkably clear correlation between Yanomamo violence and male fitness that have,

I believe, blinded us to the full range of human nonviolence along with violence, realms of peacemaking, and patterns of war making.

The Janus Face of Human Nature

Much as the human mind is drawn toward simple either/or statements, reality is more nuanced, complex, and Janus faced, named for the Roman god who looked simultaneously in two opposed directions (hence, January as the month that looks backward to the previous year as well as forward to the one just beginning). The Janus nature of our evolutionary bequest applies particularly to the seemingly simple question of whether human beings are “naturally” or “instinctively” aggressive or violent, as opposed to peaceful and cooperative. In the past, popular treatments of human beings as “killer apes” have clearly been misguided in their single-mindedness, ditto for others purporting to demonstrate that we are uniformly cooperative and pacific. Our human nature is neither Rousseauian nor Hobbesian; instead, both a devil and an angel perch on our shoulders, whispering evolutionary predilections in competing directions.

The archaeological record appears to confirm that human warfare—in the sense of organized, group-level, lethal violence—became widespread in the Neolithic, roughly 10,000 years ago, in association with several factors, including the development of agriculture (which generated material of surplus value that could be obtained via warfare and that could, in turn, also be defended), along with a tribal/chieftain level of political organization, which enabled a transition from interpersonal revenge or acquisitiveness among egalitarian societies to violence on an essentially impersonal and larger scale, orchestrated by state-level societies about 5,000–6,000 years ago. Although there is a reason to assume that prehistoric, ancestral hominins engaged in personal aggression and occasional violence, there is no convincing evidence that anything approximating “war” occurred in our more remote and formative past. This is important, because for war to be “in our genes,” it

would require a much longer historical pedigree than merely a few thousand years.

Moreover, current scholarship strongly suggests that a species-wide stage of nomadic foragers/hunters/scavengers preceded the invention of agriculture, and what we know of such nomadic societies is that although their members are endowed with the usual human capacity to get angry and even to fight, they typically do not engage in anything resembling warfare.

Adaptations Versus Capacities

For some, an “evolutionary analysis” of any phenomenon involves reconstructing its likely phylogenetic history. For most evolutionists, however, it requires assessment of the relevant selective pressures that acted in the past as well as those currently underway. It also requires recognizing the difference between an adaptation (something generated by natural selection as a result of the selective advantage acquired by its possessors) and a capacity (a trait that can be acquired, or left unattained, depending on experience and building upon one or more existing adaptations). Thus, language is a human *adaptation*, providing individual *Homo sapiens* with the *capacity* to learn English, Urdu, Japanese, and so forth, but without biasing the specific outcome. Walking and running are human adaptations, shared by all healthy, normal *Homo sapiens*; cart-wheels or handstands are capacities that some people develop, while others don’t.

Aggressiveness and violence—under certain circumstances—are human adaptations. They would likely be very resistant to elimination. War, involving as it does coordinated group-level violence, is a capacity and therefore something that recent human history reveals as unquestionably within our behavioral range, but that can also be prevented. Peace scholar Kenneth Boulding promulgated what he called “Boulding’s First Law” that anything that exists is possible: The transition of Switzerland, for example, from one of the most feared war-prone people of Europe into a model of armed but war-avoidant neutrality serves as an excellent example, as does

the Iroquois Great League of Peace, which, in historical time, united the Cayuga, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, and Seneca tribes (eventually joined by the Tuscarora), thereby ending a bloody history of endemic raiding.

One of the most stringent requirements for establishing an ethos of peace, however, is to overcome the widespread but erroneous belief that war is as natural to human beings as is individual aggressiveness.

Fortunately, a strong case exists that nomadic social systems in particular predispose *against* violent intergroup competition. For one thing, the population structure of extant groups suggests that individuals often have close genetic relatives in neighboring groups, which would mitigate against violent conflict. For another, when they do arise, conflicts between nomadic foragers are nearly always interpersonal—between two men, for example, over a woman—rather than among groups. In addition, it is common for competition over variable and limited resources to result in agreements for reciprocal sharing and cooperation rather than prototypical warfare.

We can safely conclude that although individual human beings have long been equipped with a capacity for individual-level aggression and even violence, peace is every bit as much “in our genes” as is war. And since war isn’t part of our deep past, it need not be part of our future.

Neither Inherently Peacemaking nor Warmongering

By this point, it should be clear that from both the animal and anthropological record, human beings are not destined to war. This does not mean, however, that we are destined for peace. Indeed, just as *Homo sapiens* cannot be convicted of being inherent murderers, we also cannot conclude that we are a uniquely and especially peaceful primate. Our bequest from biological evolution is no more one of instinctive peacemaking than of warmongering. Anyone hoping to derive a simple, straightforward, and unitary behavioral vector from evolution is doomed to disappointment. We must live, instead, with what may seem like an

oxymoron: a dualistic, bidirectional momentum, under the influence of two-faced Janus rather than Mars, the god of war, or Irene, the less well-known goddess of peace.

When it comes to evolution’s influence upon human war and peacemaking, nearly every identifiable factor works in two contradictory and seemingly confounding directions. If anything, however, there has been a tendency to misinterpret an evolutionary view of human nature as essentially synonymous with a description—even, an endorsement—of violent competition. This error derives in part from a common misunderstanding of evolution by natural selection, which was encouraged by some unfortunate late-nineteenth-century verbalisms. Thus, “survival of the fittest,” a phrase initiated by Herbert Spencer but regrettably employed later by Darwin, suggests that natural selection operates by conveying benefits to those who survive, often at the cost of others’ survival.

To this, the British poet Alfred Tennyson contributed the unfortunate verbal construct of “nature red in tooth and claw,” further emphasizing a presumably gory process whereby evolution works its way. Biological reality is quite different. The most meaningful quick and dirty definition of natural selection is “differential reproduction,” which is to say that the evolutionary process operates by the deceptively simple fact that some individuals—more precisely, some genes constituting those individuals—are more successful than others in getting themselves projected into the future. Such genes are thus “selected for,” relative to alternative packets of DNA, competing for representation on future chromosomes.

It is important to note that when it comes to evolutionary implications of human behavior, inferences from our closest biological relatives are only one way of proceeding. And since this avenue is blocked—or rather, it leads in multiple directions, no one of which is more promising or likely to be objectively valid than another—let us explore another evolutionary perspective, namely, that which derives from considering the dynamics of natural selection itself. In short, how, precisely, does evolution by natural selection

influence us when it comes to predispositions for violence and war?

The answer is complex and quite unsatisfying for anyone seeking simple yes or no answers.

On the Visibility of Violence

Adding to the complexity is the fact that people generally pay considerable more attention to violence and war than to nonviolence and peace. Consider, for example, that desert-dwelling Bedouin have more than 100 words for “camel,” including not only whether it is male or female but if a given animal is gentle or vicious, fast or slow, strong or weak, easily mastered or stubborn, etc. Similarly, the Inuit (“Eskimos”) are said to have more than ten different words for what in English is simply designated “snow.” The take-home message is that when something is considered important or especially interesting, people become quite specific when designating it.

Now, consider that there are many different phrases used to identify various wars: We have the Peloponnesian War, the Hundred Years’ War, the American Civil War, the Vietnam War, and so forth, ad nauseam. By contrast, the English language doesn’t even have a plural form—“peaces”—to match its intensive focus upon different wars, even though, for example, the peace that obtained in Europe between the Franco-Prussian War (1872) and the onset of World War I was presumably quite different from that occurring in the interim between World War I and World War II. Peace, in short, is widely treated as a comparatively uninteresting, unimportant, and mostly inconsequential homogeneous interregnum between what really matters: wars.

In itself, this isn’t surprising. After all, given the biological as well as the social import of such episodes, it is reasonable that we might be especially attentive to such events. By the same token, consider the journalist’s chestnut “If it bleeds, it leads.” You are unlikely, for example, to encounter a headline or Internet posting that announces “France and Great Britain Did Not Go To War

Today,” although a bloody encounter—even involving a mere handful of participants—will probably be breathlessly covered.

Mohandas Gandhi (1951) recognized this asymmetry of attention pointing out that the daily reality of personal nonviolent conflict resolution is something that we take for granted:

History is really a record of every interruption of the working of the force of love or of the soul. Two brothers quarrel; one of them repents and reawakens the love that was lying dormant in him; the two again begin to live in peace; nobody takes note of this. But if the two brothers, through the intervention of solicitors or some other reason, take up arms ... their doing so would be immediately noticed by the press, they would be the talk of their neighborhood and would probably go down in history. And what is true of families and communities is true of nations ... History, then, is a record of an interruption of the course of nature.

On the Adaptive Significance of Peace

It can reasonably be argued that human society itself owes its very existence to our species’ pro-social inclinations and thus, to some extent, our innate capacity for nonviolent conflict resolution. Nonetheless, by a process of selective awareness of the sort that Gandhi warned about, warlike societies—including but not limited to the Yanomamo—have generated attention from scholars and the public alike, out of proportion to their actual significance as exemplars of the untrammelled human condition. And the danger is that out of such selective attention (which might well be adaptive in itself, in view of the importance of such uncommon but consequential events), there arises a distinctly maladaptive assumption that such violence is the human norm.

There are many routes whereby evolutionary success is achieved, of which aggressiveness and violence represent only one potential axis and one that is actually more restricted than is widely believed. Imagine, for example, a bull elk that spends much of his time and energy threatening and fighting with other bulls; his aggressive disposition is itself very much a product of natural

selection, which rewarded his ancestors who behaved intolerantly and often violently toward competing bulls. Those who came out ahead in the resulting head-to-head or rather antler-to-antler contests were the ones who projected their gene-influenced violent inclinations to their progeny. Score one for evolution-inspired violence.

And yet, these violence-prone individuals would not necessarily be selected for, at least not when they carried their intolerant aggression too far. It has been observed, for example, that in such cases, peripheral “sneaky” males, who are unaggressive, often succeed in copulating with females while the harem master is otherwise engaged.

Among birds, the phenomenon of “aggressive neglect” has been reported, whereby individuals—once again, typically males—spend so much time interacting aggressively with their territorial neighbors that they are insufficiently attentive when it comes to provisioning their own offspring. Such inappropriately violence- and threat-prone individuals are literally less fit than others whose agonistic behavior is less pronounced.

Predation Is Not War

Another common misunderstanding of the role of evolution with regard to aggression and violence concerns the extent to which predation can and should be generalized. To be sure, predation involves violence, but it should be sharply distinguished from the threats, aggression, and violence that often occur within a species. Thus, predation is an *interspecies* phenomenon that is quite different from the *intraspecies* behaviors that characterize our concern for human violence and war. A leopard that is hunting zebra, for example, typically makes itself inconspicuous and, if successful, performs its predatory act promptly, efficiently, and without any indication that it is in any way “angry.” By contrast, that same leopard, when defending its hunting territory from possible encroachment by another leopard, will manifest a variety of postures and vocalizations that make it more conspicuous, rather than less, and its behavior as reflected in its facial expressions and body posture will be much

closer to what human beings readily interpret as “angry” indeed. The brain regions involved in interspecies predation and intraspecies aggression are also quite distinct.

The upshot of this with respect to human violence is that regardless of the validity of the popular image of early human evolution as being based upon “man the hunter,” there are no direct implications for “man the war maker.” In addition, although natural selection often mandates competition among individuals of the same species (leopards with other leopards, squirrels with other squirrels, etc.), an enormous contribution of evolutionary relevance comes from the impact of many other traits: an individual’s success in establishing himself or herself within a larger social unit; in attracting and keeping a suitable mate; in rearing successful offspring, not to mention success in resisting disease; in dealing with various non-biological environmental factors (drought, floods, etc.); and so forth. Head-to-head competition is only one among many other considerations when it comes to how natural selection influences the behavior of all living things, human beings not least.

Making things even more ambiguous, there is a viable converse of the “Man the Hunter” trope, namely, “Man the Hunted.” Perhaps we weren’t shaped so much by the differential success of ancestral hunters than by our predecessors’ ability to avoid becoming victims of other creatures that hunted us. As Paul Trout (2012) makes clear in his fascinating *Deadly Powers: Animal Predators and the Mythic Imagination*, the important distinction, from a human point of view, is not between animals and humans but between animals that we eat and those that eat us. And in this regard, too, there are many different narratives. On the one hand, perhaps primitive humans harvested their group-focused predatory skills in the service of group-focused, intraspecific violence (i.e., early war). Or maybe we were victims more than initiators. It is also possible that even as victims, our early species-wide experience as such may have set the stage for various adaptations that migrated from anti-predator, interspecific defense to anti-competitor, intraspecific warfare, as suggested by Barbara

Ehrenreich in her fascinating book, *Blood Rites: origins and history of the passions of war* (Ehrenreich 1998). Given our present state of knowledge, the only safe conclusion is that we may to some extent be endowed by evolution with a capacity for group violence, or maybe not!

The Paradox of Altruism

Another example of the Janus-faced impact of evolution upon human peacefulness versus violence concerns the complex question of altruism. For biologists, altruism is not a matter of subjective intentionality—doing good by conscious decision—but, rather, a result of the objective consequences of certain behavior. Thus, it has long been theoretically troublesome (at least for evolutionists) that some individuals, animals as well as human beings, regularly engage in actions that reduce the personal reproductive success of the individual in question while increasing that of someone else. From a straightforward (and, we now realize, naïve) perspective, such behavior is genuinely paradoxical since it should be strongly selected against; any individual who altruistically benefits other individuals along with their genes should be less fit than one who selfishly looks out only for his or her genetic success. In short, genuine altruism should not exist.

And yet, altruism abounds in nature, and not only among human beings. Prairie dogs give alarm calls when they spot a coyote, even though doing so subjects the alarmist to greater risk of predation than if it simply kept quiet and allowed the other members of the prairie dog colony to suffer the consequences of their relative inattentiveness. Many flock-dwelling birds give a specialized “food call” when they locate a nutritious payload, even though doing so means that their discovery will then be shared, resulting in fewer calories for the discoverer than if she had selfishly remained silent. Given the starkly nonethical algorithms that underlie evolution by natural selection, such altruistic, selfless behavior—if it arose, say, by mutation—should promptly have disappeared, having been selected against.

Most challenging was the long-standing recognition that certain insects in particular (the social wasps, bees, and ants) practice an extreme form of altruism in that whole castes of “workers” remain nonreproductive, laboring instead for the breeding success of another individual, the queen.

These paradoxes have largely been solved with the stunning realization that since evolution by natural selection proceeds via the differential reproduction of genes, those genes that predispose their bodies toward seemingly altruistic acts can readily be favored so long as they ultimately provide sufficient benefit to identical copies of themselves, housed in other bodies, to compensate for the cost incurred by the altruist. As a result, what appears to be an altruistic behavior at the level of organisms is often selfish, at the level of the genes in question. An alarm-calling prairie dog is actually behaving in a way that enhances the fitness of its alarm-calling genes when by virtue of its “altruistic” act, it conveys sufficient benefit to identical copies of itself, present in those other prairie dog bodies that are enabled to survive and reproduce by virtue of the warning they receive. By the same token, food calling, although it often reduces the nutritional payoff to the caller, can “pay for itself” at the genetic level insofar as it delivers enough benefit to genes that generate food calling within the bodies of those who hear and respond, even if the caller herself is less reproductively successful as a result.

Even the so-called eusocial (“perfectly social”) insects conform to this explanatory model, in that they are notably “haplodiploid,” with haploid males developing from unfertilized eggs, whereas females are diploid. As a result, worker bees, ants, and wasps are actually more closely related to their full-sib sisters (by a factor of .75), than to their own offspring (.50), were they to reproduce. Accordingly, such workers and their constituent genes are more fit staying home and helping their mother, the queen, to reproduce, than they would be if they attempted to rear a family of their own.

The underlying insight in such cases is known as “inclusive fitness,” the maximization of which is recognized by most evolutionary biologists as

the fundamental driving force of evolution by natural selection. When Richard Dawkins coined the phrase “selfish gene,” he was speaking metaphorically, as though genes had personalities and intentionality, which of course they don’t. It would have been equally accurate—although less attention grabbing—had “altruistic gene” been used instead. In any event, the important point for our purposes is that evolutionary pressures do not operate unilaterally in a simplistic way, promoting selfishness and its more physically vigorous cousin by extension, violence. Once again, our bequest from evolution no more favors simple selfishness than it mandates altruism, just as it is no more convivial to violence than to peace.

Neither War nor Peace Is “More Natural”

This hints at yet another example of how an evolutionary perspective has often been mistaken to privilege aggression and violence over conflict avoidance/resolution and peace. It is widely assumed that the former is necessarily biological and the latter cultural; thus, that aggression and violence are closer to our “natural” inclinations as opposed to peaceful motivations, which are often considered to be more “artificial,” having been superficially and artificially imposed upon a ravening core of innate violence. (This harkens back, in a sense, to Freud’s view of the id, as a more deeply seated, biologically generated core of violence and sex, as opposed to the ego and especially the superego, which is generated by cultural pressures and is therefore more vulnerable to disruption.)

Biological reality, however, is quite different. Many animals engage in behaviors that turn down the violence thermostat, using numerous techniques of reconciliation and peacemaking. And human beings are no exception. It is often the case—perhaps even overwhelmingly so—that various nonviolent tactics (avoidance, subordination displays, reassurance activities, as well as nonviolent competitions such as singing duels) contribute more to the ultimate fitness of their

practitioners than do recourse to violence, with its risk of injury and potential lethality. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that such behaviors are no less biological, and no less “natural,” than are their more blood-stained alternatives.

To some extent, we are indeed naturally selfish and, on occasion, naturally violent, but it is no less true that we are also naturally altruistic and, on occasion, naturally peaceful. There is, in short, no basis for an evolutionary-derived pessimism about the human potential for peace.

Cultural Evolution and Brain Evolution

That potential, along with the ability to choose, must of course somehow exist within the biological organ that most distinguishes *Homo sapiens* from other animals: the human brain. During the evolution of our species, our brain—especially the part devoted to higher cognitive functions, the cerebral hemispheres—increased dramatically in size, strongly implicating selection for increase brainpower. We know, in short, that we are smart and that our smartness is a deep part of our humanity. What we don’t know, however, is how our ancestors achieved this distinctness: What drove the rapid increase in human brain size and capacity. Not surprisingly, interpretations vary, and once again, there are potential lessons to be drawn on both sides of the war/peace and violence/nonviolence debate.

One perspective suggests that human beings owe their big brains to war, or more precisely, to intergroup violence. A case can indeed be made that the greatest threat to our primitive hominin ancestors came from other primitive hominins. It is exceedingly likely that by the mid-Pleistocene, our apelike forebears lived in coherent social groups. Early in our shared evolutionary past, we also developed primitive but effective tools, including hunting implements as well as limited control of fire. With likely competition for resources—territories for hunting and gathering, safe sleeping trees and/or suitable caves, access to good water sources, as well as access to fertile

mates—it is plausible that having largely succeeded in ecologically dominating other large mammals, it came to pass that the greatest threats to the survival and success of australopithecines as well as early members of the genus *Homo* were other similar creatures.

Given that our early cultural evolution would have reduced, at least somewhat, the fitness payoff of sheer size and strength, selection would also likely have been influenced by the comparative abilities of competing prehuman bands to make and wield tools (especially weapons), along with the capacity to communicate within each group so as to coordinate actions. The rather depressing consequence of such a scenario is that to a substantial degree, we may owe our large brains to successful intergroup warfare.

Once again, however, there are alternative narratives, which point in a diametrically opposed direction (Barash 2012). For one thing, effectiveness in waging war—even its non-technological predecessors—depends on communication and coordination within the warring group. Even accepting the hypothesis that intergroup war was a major (perhaps even *the* major) driver of human brain evolution, therefore placing substantial emphasis on peaceful, pro-social virtues. More significant is the competing hypothesis that brain evolution derived from the adaptive significance of effective and complex social communication and coordination, irrespective of anything remotely resembling early war. Psychologists and primatologists have been emphasizing, for example, the likely selective pressures generated by the “Machiavellian intelligence” required to influence the perceptions and behavior of other group members, as well as the powerful benefits of achieving effective theory of mind, which enables accurate predictions about the actions of others and which, in turn, requires substantial brainpower on the part of a successful “theorist.”

Compared to other savannah-dwelling animals, hominins are notably weak bodied, something that was even more pronounced among our more immediate predecessors, whose evolutionary success doubtless relied heavily—if not entirely—on their ability to employ tools not

only to obtain prey but also to drive scavenging creatures from kills, prepare food, dig efficiently for tubers, carry food back to camp, construct shelters, and so forth. These activities would almost certainly convey a reproductive advantage to those of our ancestors who were especially adroit, and not simply as warriors.

Moreover, as life became more complicated, it would doubtless have become increasingly important to convey knowledge of all sorts to one’s offspring, who had a lot to learn. The fact that human young are remarkably helpless compared to nearly all mammals, requiring many years of protection as well as instruction, would lend adaptive significance to those parents who were intelligent enough to be effective teachers, not to mention the ultimate payoff obtained by those youngsters who were smart enough to be good learners.

The bottom line with regard to brain evolution, once again, is that although it could have been facilitated and accelerated by early war, it also might not have been!

Condemned to Be Free

At this point, readers looking to evolution for guidance can be forgiven if they feel confused, even frustrated by the not-so-simple fact that our biological heritage is so ambiguous or—if you prefer—ambivalent. Either way, although it is definitely worthwhile to interrogate our evolutionary background for indications as to our predilections, the answers lead us to Jean-Paul Sartre’s famous formulation that human beings are “condemned to be free.” Whether devotees of peace choose to be relieved that we are not biologically obliged to war or to be distraught that by the same token, we are not unilaterally predisposed, through our biology, to peace, we are all stuck with an obligation (if not necessarily a predisposition) to respond to Sartre’s simple, daunting, existentialist challenge: “You are free. Choose.”

And so, even as we choose to support untrammelled, data-based, ideologically unmoored

empirical and theoretical inquiry into everything—including the nature of human nature—we would also do well to keep in mind that these choices have consequences, and not just with respect to our science. I have heard the following story, said to be of Native American origin (ostensibly Cherokee), but have been unable to confirm it. Whether “true” or not—in the sense of being a genuine folktale—it is certifiably true for my purposes, as a statement of the human condition and something that supporters as well as critics of Napoleon Chagnon’s research might be well advised to take into account. A young child was greatly frightened by her dream, in which two wolves fought viciously, growling and snapping their jaws. Hoping for solace, she described this dream to her grandfather, a wise and highly respected elder. The grandfather explained that, “There are two wolves within each of us, one of them benevolent and peace-loving, the other malevolent and violent. They fight constantly for our souls.”

At this, the child found herself more frightened than ever and asked her grandfather which one wins. He replied, “The one you feed.”

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Beyond Impasse: Addressing Sacred Values in International Political Negotiations

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Nichole Argo and Jeremy Ginges

Introduction

Sacred values (hereafter, SVs) are those exalted values or principles upon which one would never conceive to make material trade-offs: selling one's children, for instance. They intersect with the world of international political negotiations because when people construe issues central to a conflict as SVs, they become "devoted actors" willing to fight and sacrifice for them (Atran 2006). Indeed, once committed to using violence to protect their SVs, the act of violence itself can become sacred to them (Ginges et al. 2011).

The past 15 years have brought renewed attention to the devoted actor in international politics. State and insurgent leaders and populations in well-known, intractable conflicts such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the Balkans, Kashmir, and beyond have shown themselves to be bound by their SVs, employing a cost-insensitive, moral logic to defend them using means that shock the international community while garnering calls of heroism at home. Consider today's suicide bombers, many whom view their missions as a sacred

duty, whether or not they draw the sacredness of the value from religion (Argo 2009).

The rise of the devoted actor corresponds to challenges on the scorecard of international negotiation. A vast majority of today's conflicts are intrastate, or civil wars, yet in 2012, only one of them was negotiated into a settlement (Themna and Wallensteen 2012). Indeed, the one settlement that was achieved in 2012—the Addis Ababa Agreement signed by the Sudanese government and SPLM/A-North in June—was never implemented. Fighting resumed just 3 days after the signing (Themna and Wallensteen 2012). The preferred means for ending such wars since 1990 has been negotiated settlements, yet civil wars ended by negotiated settlement are more than 50 % likely to recur, a rate higher than those ending in battle victory (Toft 2010). Often at issue in these types of conflict is that the identity of one or both sides is tied to an SV—perhaps simply winning the conflict itself; whatever the sacralized issue, these devoted actors will not let go their commitment for any material benefit or cost. It is for this reason that Edward Luttwak has argued against international settlement interventions, writing: "the transformative effects of both decisive victory and exhaustion are blocked by outside [negotiated] intervention" (Luttwak 1993). This logic seems to fit well onto rebellions motivated by sacred values, where the commitment is to fight until one no longer can or give up one SV (the goal of the fight) for another (life itself, assuming there are no other means for fighting).

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Is international negotiation thus futile in political conflicts involving SVs? Not necessarily. Indeed, traditional models of conflict resolution—negotiations relying on cost-benefit models and interest-based calculations—appear to fare poorly. But nearly 15 years of research into sacred values, new frameworks for negotiating amidst SVs are being crafted. Their underlying theme is that process can matter: how a war ends may indeed determine its postwar outcome. Similar to the way that nonviolent rebellion leads to more sustainable postwar democracies than violent rebellion (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), process-driven negotiations which put SVs at the center of strategy may lead to more sustainable settlements. Such strategies will require that negotiators and parties improve their understanding of how values can affect decision making and point to tactical changes in the way that agreements come together. Intensive, pre-negotiation meetings may be needed within each party in order for the parties themselves to reflect upon their own and the others' conflict-related SVs and to creatively generate ways of reframing, reprioritizing, and/or repositioning their SVs to achieve a peace that will satisfy and benefit their people.

We begin the chapter by reviewing the literature on sacred values (section “Sacred Values”), drawing from laboratory experiments, neuroimaging studies, surveys, and interviews amidst real conflicts. We consider their nature and consequence, whether and how they may be immutable, and what we know about how mundane values sacralize and defuse. In the next section, “Implications for international negotiation”, we discuss the relevance of SVs for international negotiators by showing how they challenge traditional negotiation models. We review alternative, research-based and field-based approaches for dealing with them. Special attention will be paid to the role of respect, recognition, and/or apologies in SV-related issues, and the surprising flexibility leaders may have to reframe, reprioritize, recontextualize, or reposition the SV within the negotiating space. In the following section, “Practical Recommendations”, we seek to operationalize the SV framework in order to sketch the

contours of a specialized training and strategies for negotiators who will lead negotiations amidst SVs. In the last section “Future Research”, we identify critical areas for future research on SVs, with an eye towards how these notions might affect negotiations. We conclude with the observation that sacred values, and the skills they require from negotiators, are heavily grounded in processes of interaction, rather than outcome-based tools. This suggests that a “value-based” negotiation training might help those who operate in the international political arena.

Sacred Values

Sacred values (SVs) are moral imperatives that drive behavior independently of any concrete material goal (Boyd et al. 2010; Ginges et al. 2007). They can have their basis in religion, as in the obligation to journey to Mecca if you are Muslim, but they can also be secular, such as a transcendent commitment to security, the welfare of one's children, justice, or nationhood.

In all of these cases, SVs comprise a unique form of human cognition. They inhabit the core of one's personal and social identity and, as such, are processed as moral rules, duties, or obligations rather than the cost-benefit calculations of realpolitik or the marketplace (Atran 2012; Ginges et al. 2011). This means they are “treat[ed] as possessing infinite or transcendental significance which precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with founded or secular values” (Baron and Spranca 1997; Tetlock et al. 2000) (p. 853).

What happens when material trade-offs are proposed in exchange for SVs? In early research, Tetlock et al. (2000) compared participants who considered routine trade-offs such as paying someone to clean his or her house with participants who were asked to consider trade-offs involving ostensibly sacred issues such as buying and selling body parts (*taboo trade-offs*). Those in the taboo trade-off condition were angry, thought poorly of anyone who would allow this, and wished to sever all contact with such individuals. That is, when asked to make a

taboo trade-off, people experience a cocktail of emotions—such as anger, disgust, and moral outrage (Baron and Spranca 1997; Tetlock 2000)—and a need for moral cleansing. Indeed, even the thought of a taboo trade-off leaves people feeling “contaminated” by it (Tetlock 2003). These emotions, and the destructive reactions they manifest in intergroup relations, have since been coined *the backfire effect* (Ginges et al. 2007). Moreover, the outcomes discussed above have been tested in field settings such as Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Iran, the Levant, and North Africa. In each case, attempts to trump an SV with material offerings not only trigger unintended negative responses but can bolster respondents’ adherence to their SV and in some cases can even provoke a professed willingness to endorse violence (Atran 2012; Dehghani et al. 2010; Ginges et al. 2007).

For years, some commentators responded to such evidence with disbelief, claiming that SVs could only be *pseudo-sacred*. In a world of scarce resources, they argued, there is always room for trade-offs (Hoffman et al. 1999; Tetlock 2003). Since people cannot devote all of their time, energy, and life to upholding any one value all the time, they argued, even apparently “irrational” behaviors like what these studies showed must reflect “rational” calculations of the holdout’s long-term interests (even if they seem incomprehensible to others). For instance, displays of willingness to avenge at any cost could have the long-term payoff of thwarting aggressive action; likewise, the willingness to sacrifice for buddies might help create a greater esprit du corps that could lead to a more formidable fighting force. However, proponents of SVs replied that, in both examples, the act in question far exceeds the effort required for any short-term payoff, and offers no immediate guarantee for long-term success (Atran and Axelrod 2008). This debate has finally been put to rest by recent evidence demonstrating the unique neural processing of SVs as opposed to nonsacred values or that of instrumental decision making. When neuroscientists compared brain scans for values that people would and would not make trade-offs on, SV processing correlated with increased activity in the

left temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC), areas associated with rule-based behavior and the inhibition of negative emotions and inappropriate behaviors, respectively (Berns et al. 2012).

Moreover, individual reactions to SV violations also evince a neural signature unique from cost-benefit, expectancy-, or norm-violation processing. The self-reported response of anger and moral outrage previously shown to accompany *taboo proposals* has recently also been shown to correspond to activation in the left anterior temporal lobe and bilateral amygdalae—areas associated with rule-based processing and emotion. This activation also correlated with moral disgust ratings (Duc et al. 2013). Importantly, this activation did not occur for tragic or routine SV trade-offs. The new neuroimaging data triangulates nicely the data from earlier, implicit paradigms. In one such study, when a taboo trade-off was juxtaposed with a decision involving two SVs or a simple cost-benefit calculation, the taboo trade-off decision was made more quickly and easily, with greater confidence and with less negative affect (Hanselman 2008). SV processing and the taboo reactions that go along with them truly do have a heuristic, privileged access to emotion and identity.

To recap, the first decade of SV research established that devoted actors will refuse to trade-off on their SVs (for material goods) and could be cost-insensitive in their efforts to protect their SV—both in terms of self-sacrifice and in terms of punishing violators. In the past year, research has further characterized the cognitive bounds of a devoted actor. Jeremy Ginges and his team have shown that devoted actors are unlikely to be swayed by ingroup or out-group opinion (Sheikh et al. 2013). Also, events related to the sacred value—whether in the past or the future—seem to be perceived by the devoted actor to be closer in time. For example, Palestinians who viewed the right of return as sacred (as compared to other Palestinians) perceived the *Nakba* (when they lost or were driven from their land) to be closer in time than the end of WWII (which is farther). Moreover, when asked to estimate how long until a return to their homes would be pos-

sible (right of return), devoted Palestinians perceived that time to be closer to the present than did non-SV-holding Palestinians (Sheikh et al. 2013). Lastly, actors devoted to the SV-related conflict were less likely to embrace face-saving strategies of exit from a conflict—such as to leave the resistance in order to make the haj—even, as in the haj, when the reason for exit was another sacred value (Sheikh et al. 2013).

As a manifestation of commitment, emotion, identity, willingness to sacrifice and punish, and absolute focus, it is no wonder that SVs are considered to be the driving force behind much intergroup aggression (Ginges et al. 2007).

Sacralization

Given the high stakes involved when SVs come into conflict, understanding the proximal causes of sacralization seems imperative. How does a mundane preference become sacred, like the transformation of land into “Holy Land”? What triggers the process?

Ritual

One pathway appears to be participation in religious ritual, or ritual in general. In studies carried out with both Americans and Palestinians, Ginges and his team have shown that the more frequently people participate in religious rituals like prayer and attendance at a religious service, the more they consider their preferences to be sacred (Sheikh et al. 2012). The mechanism for this is unclear; however, the authors suggest the possibility that a previously mundane preference is paired with a sacred one (already part of the ritual), thus transforming the newly paired preference into something sacred. Importantly, the ritual in question may not need to be religious. Growing research shows that secular rituals can bind groups cognitively, affectively, and behaviorally (Fischer et al. 2013; Hove and Risen 2009; Miles et al. 2009; Valdesolo and DeSteno 2011; Valdesolo et al. 2010; van Baaren et al. 2003); thus nonreligious ritual could be capable of the same type of sacralization. Indeed, the sacralizing power of both religious and nonreligious ritual

has been hypothesized as a factor in the socialization of human bombs (Argo 2006). Moreover, preliminary data evinces an increased propensity for meditators (representing frequent engagement in nonreligious ritual) to sacralize, similar to that of respondents high in religious ritual (Argo unpublished data).

Lastly, Sheikh et al. (2012) have shown that the sacralizing effect of frequent religious ritual is amplified by the perception of high threat to the ingroup. One might expect that insecure environments involving group threat—such as war zones or areas of high ethnic tension—would themselves lead to increases in extremism, as Michael Hogg has argued (Hogg 2012), and thereby lead to an increase in sacred values. However, and critically, high threat itself did not predict sacralization in Sheikh et al.’s (2012) sample, and other operationalizations of threat have not turned out to be a significant variable either (Argo 2013).

Thus, it may be that threat increases the salience of ritual, which, through pairing of values or some other process, sacralizes previously mundane preferences. These findings draw obvious attention to the potential power of religious leaders and institutions amidst intergroup conflicts, e.g., the sacralizing potential of political sermonizing. But given the possibility that nonreligious ritual affects sacralization, too, the implications extend far beyond them. “Unsettled times” of group threat have been theorized to lead to the creation of and increased performance of ritual (Marshall 2002; Swidler 1986). In war zones, where even the universal ritual of burying the dead becomes a frequent activity, as do new communal chores caused by the loss of water or electric infrastructure, daily life is potentially ripe with opportunities for sacralization.

Sacred Rhetoric

Another pathway to sacralization is the use of sacred rhetoric. Perhaps because of their privileged access to emotion and identity, SVs seem to be almost intuitively employed by political leaders as a way of mobilizing constituents to action (Varshney 2003), as a low-cost method of enforcing

policy goals (Atran et al. 2007), and as a low-cost method for discrediting adversaries (Atran and Axelrod 2008). But does this strategy indeed work for them? And if so, how? The answer, as Morgan Marietta has shown, is twofold: listeners exposed to sacred rhetoric “think differently and care more” (Marietta 2008) (p.767). Marietta asked 237 undergraduates to read brief political appeals dealing with gay marriage, the death penalty, the environment, and guns. For each topic, participants were randomly exposed to either sacred OR negotiable rhetoric.¹ All appeals argued for the same political position and were drawn from language employed in actual public advocacy. After reading the appeals, participants responded to a series of questions about their political views. Marietta found two results. First, participants exposed to sacred rather than negotiable rhetoric were more likely to invoke absolutist reasoning to support their actual views, be they similar to the test appeal or in opposition to it. Thus, while sacred appeals were not more likely to shift the outcomes of participant judgments, they did shift the way readers processed the issue. In some political contexts, like democracies, this dynamic could transform the character of public debate to become more absolute and less willing to entertain trade-offs. Second, participants exposed to sacred rhetoric were more activated about those issues. Marietta argues that this *activation effect* connects previously held beliefs of citizens into political meaning, motivating them to action. If politicians can shift citizens’ mindsets—from seeing the other side as intellectually wrong to seeing their behavior as an SV violation or indecent act—then they have created a social and internal pressure to act.

Do leaders themselves benefit by exploiting sacred rhetoric? In a follow-up study, Marietta analyzed Republican and Democratic debates

from 2000 to 2004, asking what effects it had on how those leaders were viewed. He found that leaders who use sacred rhetoric activated a *valorization effect*. Voters saw them as principled and determined and therefore liked them more. However, sacred rhetoric did not influence how leaders were viewed in terms of caring, competence, or intelligence (Marietta 2009).

A few observations seem worthy of note: Both ritual and sacred rhetoric are forms of persuasion centered on process rather than outcome. Both transform the individual in the process of the body and/or the mind’s performance; that process is emotionally charged, and not calculating. Both *activate* a previously mundane preference or issue into something worth sacrificing for (e.g., time, money, etc.). As an alternative to the paired-value hypothesis (Sheikh et al. 2013), future work might investigate whether rituals and sacred rhetoric are simply activating rule-based processing, affecting whatever issue is brought to bear during the process.

Defusing SVs

Initial research suggests that symbolic compromise, or genuine apology, can help defuse the stalemate around a sacred value. Ginges and his team sampled 535 Palestinian refugees, 719 Palestinian students, and 601 Jewish adult settlers residing in the West Bank and Gaza (Ginges et al. 2007). They each voted on political compromises over right of return, sovereignty over Jerusalem, and exchanging land for peace, respectively. Each compromise also included symbolic recognition of the other side’s SV, and/or the possibility of material incentives, such as payments to individual families, offers to relocate or rebuild destroyed infrastructure, etc. As predicted by the backfire effect, when respondents perceived the compromise to be a sacred value, material concessions were seen as violations of those sacred values and taken as insults. In contrast, symbolic concessions such as recognition of the pain caused by the Nakba actually enabled holders of SVs to negotiate. Moreover, support for violence decreased in the symbolic

¹Sacred rhetoric comprised high scores on the following properties: protected status, non-consequentialist reasoning, non-instrumentalism, non-negotiability, citation of boundaries, citation of authority, and moral outrage.

recognition condition. This finding, perhaps above all others, has constructive import for international negotiations involving sacred values.

Immutability

Despite their rigidity, SVs appear somewhat immutable (Villarroya and Hilferty 2013). After all, lab studies show that the passing of moral judgments may be sensitive to framing and context (Bennis et al. 2010). As a real-world illustration, consider findings from a survey of more than 1200 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, which sought and found differences between those who refused political compromise because they believed it would violate a sacred value and those who did not. At that time during the second intifada, when retaliation and counter-retaliation was rife between Israelis and Palestinians, both SV-holding and non-SV-holding Palestinians supported suicide bombings that may include the killing of Israeli civilians. Each group was given a hypothetical choice to delay a suicide bombing to save the lives of an entire Palestinian family or to delay it to save only the sick father. Those who did not consider political compromise a violation of sacred values expressed the rational preference of trading off an obligation for the sake of the entire family. Those who did think political compromise would violate an SV were more likely to delay the bombing if only the sick father would benefit (rather than save the entire family, including the father) (Atran et al. 2007). Thus, delaying a martyrdom mission to help a sick father was allowed within an overarching moral frame of social duties, under which martyrdom also falls—indeed, delaying the mission was an attempt to balance them. But saving one’s family from retaliation did not fall within the moral frame of duty; instead, avoidance of retaliation would be considered cowardly and immoral (Atran and Axelrod 2008). Herein lies the potential of framing (and reframing) SVs, a topic on which research is still in its infancy. Implications, however, will be discussed in a later section, “Implications for international negotiation”.

Also related to immutability, there is evidence that people will go to great cognitive lengths *not to recognize* that an SV is being violated. In the laboratory, for instance, when forced to trade off on an SV, people will redefine their situation from one in which a taboo trade-off is made into one where a routine trade-off (it must happen) or tragic trade-off (trading an SV for an SV) has occurred (Tetlock 2003). It seems that people look for ways that will enable them to interpret SV violations in a respectable light. Perhaps this is because, as Kevin Gibson argues, SVs are just representations of a belief that have a physical manifestation (Gibson 2011). Consider, for example, the Palestinian SV of the right of return. The physical component of the SV is the return to homes, but the belief component is the *right* to do so, which derives from the understanding that being expelled from those homes in the first place was wrong. In Gibson’s logic, holders of the value can be made to understand that compromise of the physical (e.g., return to original home) doesn’t necessarily imply the abandonment of a core value (e.g., the right to do so, and acknowledgment of how that right came about). Indeed, in the case of this example, a hypothetical Israeli acknowledgment of the belief, or core SV, led to a willingness to give up the physical right of return for Palestinians in one study (Ginges et al. 2007).

These insights help to make sense of interviews with political and cultural leaders across location, who suggest that political and advocacy groups have reframed and reprioritized SVs according to changing circumstances (Atran and Axelrod 2008; Atran et al. 2007).

Implications for International Negotiation

SVs and Traditional Models of Negotiation

Traditional models of negotiation are based on rational choice models. Individuals are encouraged to identify their differing preferences in a negotiation and to make trade-offs on the differences with the goal of maximizing outcomes

(Hammond 1999; Raiffa 1982; Thompson 2005). This process employs a cost-benefit analysis: negotiators assess how much they value each issue at stake—be it monetary or nonmonetary—and try to make trades that will create value (Bazerman et al. 2008; Fisher 1991). Of course, in order to engage in any of these tasks, the assumption is that parties are able and willing to make trade-offs. Enter SVs: sometimes bargainers will act in apparently irrational ways that lead to impasse, even when negotiation options are available (Atran and Axelrod 2008; Bazerman et al. 2008; Susskind et al. 2005).

Impasse occurs if a party refuses to negotiate on an issue and a solution is impossible without negotiation on that issue. The literature on traditional negotiations has tried to understand the irrationalities of impasse. For instance, one of that field's giants, Roger Fisher, proposes a framework consisting of three potential causes of impasse: *substantive problems like too few options, inappropriate procedures, and problems involving people's behavior, such as displays of strong emotion or miscommunication* (Fisher 1978). Although SVs were not recognized as negotiation factors when Fisher wrote about impasse, Kevin Gibson has recently argued that SVs play a lead role in all three of these pathways (Gibson 2011). According to Gibson, the first problem—substantive issues like too few options—results when something considered “priceless” by the holder of an SV is thereby taken off the material trade-off market. Accordingly, the parties would thus need to attend to the beliefs that lead to some objects and places being highly treasured and work within those constraints (later, we discuss how the negotiation space may open back up once acknowledged).

The second issue—the risk of applying inappropriate procedures—is all too common with SVs, since insensitivity to value claims might lead to material offers for an SV and the resulting backlash. Other authors have noted that, generally speaking, the nature of the dispute should govern the process (Brett 2000) and that advice stands absolutely in the case of SVs. But determining the appropriate procedure in the case of SVs may require articulation of individual

beliefs and how these are manifested (Gibson 2011). For instance, in the wake of oft-disrupted discussions, the Aspen Institute's Program on Energy, the Environment, and the Economy developed an innovative deliberative process designed to promote value-based dialogue (Wade 2004). Participants are invited to reflect on their most deeply held values and share them with other participants. It might be that the focus on individual values ushers in a nonjudgmental, empathy-oriented exchange devoid of the threat inherent in debating value-laden policy issues and exchange that humanizes the different perspectives and allows stakeholders to see underlying commonalities even when their policy positions differ. Whatever the mechanism, Gibson argues that when diverse underlying values of stakeholders have been acknowledged by the various parties—despite more initial investment in time and resources—it has led to more binding agreements (Gibson 2011; Mason et al. 2003). A clear implication is that interest-based procedures risk offending and frustrating both parties when SVs are involved and that value-based procedures might better suit the goal.

As for Fisher's final issue—behavioral problems—negotiations involving SVs often lead to strong displays of emotion and miscommunication. Threats to sacred values prompt anger and moral outrage, typically including support for punishment of the violator (Tetlock 2000). Such a dynamic has profound consequence for both parties, and even negotiators whose levels of working trust and overall view of each other will begin to suffer. Indeed, empirical work has found that negotiators who experience negative emotions such as anger achieve fewer joint gains than negotiators who experience more positive emotions (Allred et al. 1997; Bazerman et al. 2008). High levels of emotional stress can impair the decision-making process and diminish decision outcomes (Bazerman et al. 2008; Janis 1977). More importantly, the engagement of a sacred value can change the way one engages in decision making. Absolutist rhetoric begets absolutism, shifting decision making to an uncompromising domain associated with inflexibility and a refusal to entertain creative solutions—sometimes even

without a person's awareness (Marietta 2008). This can lead to hard-bargaining strategies (Baron and Spranca 1997) and, ultimately, impasse.

In sum, threats to sacred values are clear obstacles to negotiation success, as juxtaposed onto a traditional model. This helps explain why there can be almost nonexistent bargaining leverage when dealing with ideological or religious groups (Hassner 2011; Hayes 2002) or sacred spaces (Hassner 2009), and in any case where parties to the conflict hold something to be sacred.

The conventional wisdom on what to do with SVs has been twofold. First, because of the inviolability of sacred values, some negotiators try to avoid value conflict altogether or to emphasize more tangible issues and promote mutual tolerance, leaving value conflicts until last (Moore 1986). Instead, we will join previous authors in arguing that negotiators can address and avoid impasse across these areas (Atran and Axelrod 2008; Gibson 2011). Before we do that, however, the second challenge – discerning when an issue is an actual sacred value, can be difficult. Below, we discuss some issues and strategies for identifying SVs.

The Discerning Negotiator

The first goal of discernment is to recognize sacred value commitments in the context of a negotiation, a quest that requires sensitivity to a variety of cues. Sometimes, cues to sacred claims may seem irrational or inconsistent, leading to the danger that negotiators dismiss them. As Kevin Gibson notes, someone might claim that life has infinite value but also be willing to take a high-risk employment such as mining. Moreover, that individual may forego medical checkups because of their immediate expense. One could say that the individual doesn't truly consider life sacred, but in reality these differing actions cannot be measured according to a common economic baseline (Gibson 2011). In addition to physical health, the belief in the sacredness of life may be manifest as "right to choice," "right to put children before one's self," or a host of other attributes leading the individual to eschew health care or

take on the risks of mining. None of these actions can therefore be cause for determining that a person's view of life is "nonsacred" (Gibson 2011). When seeking cues about sacred commitments, we must remember that the logic surrounding an SV can be counterintuitive.

Second, negotiators must look for moral framing amidst the cues. Consider another example offered by Gibson, that of the Swiss national referendum (2011). The Swiss government was examining options for the placement of toxic waste sites to see what differences compensation would make (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). People were informed about the necessity of the sites, the benefits and risks, and their civic responsibilities. In the absence of information about compensation, half of those surveyed agreed to have the site placed in their community. But when the same question was asked with the promise of significant financial payment, the rate declined to a quarter. Perplexed at first, the study's authors eventually concluded that the economic incentive was perceived as a bribe, thereby crowding out social and ethical motivations and leading to lower support for the waste site. Without the ability to discern the impact of moral framing in a case like this, negotiators could risk miscommunication and even insult to parties that see themselves as having higher motives (Gibson 2011). In the eyes of their holders, of course, sacred values stem from the highest of all motives.

A third goal of negotiators is to identify if and when sacred values are being *inauthentically* invoked as an instrumental tactic by one or both parties. Max Bazerman has argued that SVs are a challenge for negotiators because a party may just be using them as a tactic. Negotiators must figure out if: (a) a party is truly constrained by an SV, (b) a party is using the SV as a tactic, or (c) the issue is actually "pseudo-sacred" or sacred to the party under some but not all conditions (Bazerman et al. 2008). Bazerman cites a negotiation between a logging company and a Native American tribe, where researchers found that, when negotiators had strong alternatives to a negotiated agreement, focusing on sacred issues led to more impasses, lower joint outcomes, and

more negative perceptions of one's opponent (Tenbrunsel et al. 2007). These effects did not occur, however, when the negotiators did not have strong alternatives to the negotiated agreement, leading the authors to conclude that upholding the sanctity of one's values may depend on whether people can afford to do so. Bazerman argues that if the issue is truly sacred, then the impact of focusing on it will be consistent, independent of structural factors (Bazerman et al. 2008).

In our view, and given the preceding discussion on immutability, this argument does not hold: both structure and context can affect the processing of an SV. In terms of structure, Tetlock (2003) have shown that tragic trade-offs (trading an SV for another SV) render very different responses than taboo trade-offs (trading an SV for a material good) and not having alternatives might indeed lead to a tragic-tragic framing. In terms of context, *how* an SV is approached appears to be pivotal, with respect and recognition among the most important qualities. The Tenbrunsel et al. (2007) working paper does not provide details regarding critical procedural elements that would enable us to comment on this latter point.

In another example from Bazerman, the Lacandon Mayans in Mexico believe that when a tree is cut down, a star falls from the sky. Yet despite this seemingly sacred valuation of trees, the Lacandon negotiated an agreement with the Mexican government for selective harvesting of its forest. When asked how they could make such an agreement, the tribal leader replied the agreement was the best alternative for keeping as many stars in the sky as possible (Bazerman et al. 2008). While Bazerman interprets this to mean that the trees weren't sacred to the Lacandon, other commentators note the apparent duress under which the Lacandon were made to negotiate. That is, at the mercy of a far more powerful opponent, they compromised in the only way they could to retain at least some portion of the sacred (Moore 1986). Again, while more details would be needed in order to offer an official interpretation, structure and moral framing (tragic-tragic) might have played a role. The more salient question in such a case is whether the negotiation will be sustainable.

The fourth goal of discernment is to decipher between absolutist and sacred language. As Morgan Marietta has shown, absolutist rhetoric can be frequent even when sacred values are not at stake (Marietta 2009). In the USA, the Republic Party has used such rhetoric to create an "absolutist advantage" in discourse by simultaneously activating constituents on the issue while discrediting liberals in the moral sphere. While not all issues discussed in absolutist terms are sacred, it is important to note that such rhetoric tends to create a similar logic on the other side...quite possibly turning a mundane issue into a sacred one over time. In such a case, it may be best to survey the population to figure out who—if anyone—perceives the issue to be sacred, and how they are prepared to communicate about it.

Managing Sacred Values

See SVs as Opportunities

Having discerned the existence of SVs, negotiators can and should examine them to determine how they might serve as potential opportunities. Indeed, appeals to SVs can motivate both war and peace. Atran and Axelrod (2008) invoke the autobiography of Egypt's Anwar Sadat to show how an SV motivated peacemaking when nobody saw it coming. Having recovered pride and confidence after the October 1973 war with Israel, Sadat felt freed to think about the "psychological barrier" between Arabs and Israel. He wrote:

Change should take place first at the deeper and perhaps more subtle level than the conscious level...We [Egyptians] had been accustomed...to regard Israel as 'taboo', an entity whose emotional associations simply prevented anyone from approaching it (Sadat 1978: 304).

He decided that he would be willing to go anywhere in search of peace and chose to visit the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, as well as the Israeli Knesset, writing: "I regarded my mission in Israel as truly sacred" (Sadat 1977: 304). Polls in both Israel and Egypt at that time showed a virulent distrust of the other, but Sadat's humanist speech at the Knesset trans-

formed relations. Indeed, a peace was made. This story suggests two things: first, status changes might be opportunities for reframing or reprioritizing sacred values. Sadat cites Egypt's victory over Israel as what "freed" him to reflect on that relationship. Second, at the outset of every international negotiation, negotiators might ask themselves how SVs that appeal to war can be reframed to appeal to peace (Atran and Axelrod 2008).

This approach of actively engaging claims of SVs is in contrast to the conventional wisdom, which is to keep SVs off the negotiating table if possible or deal with them last. The problem is, if the SV is in any way central to the negotiation, the party holding it will be aware of the threat up until it is dealt with. It will be "in the room" regardless of whether it is on the table, and its psychic presence may be enough to influence or stall talks. For this reason, we and other commentators suggest that negotiators actively engage in claims of sacred values to prevent or overcome impasse (Atran and Axelrod 2008; Gibson 2011).

Another reason that SVs represent opportunity is because understanding or even acknowledging the other side's SVs can lead to a breakthrough. Atran and Axelrod (2008) show how the USA used such information to provide something of great symbolic value to the Chinese, at little cost to itself: ping-pong. In the USA, ping-pong is a basement sport, but it is the Chinese national pride. In 1971, during the Cold War, the USA sent myriad American table tennis teams to China, who won match after match against them. It gave the Chinese pride, led to a thawing of relations, and ultimately led to a historic breakthrough in Sino-American relations (Eckstein 1993). Of course, such efforts might become problematic if recognizing the others' SVs entails compromising one's own. Furthermore, recognition will not lessen tensions if it is perceived as halfhearted or insincere (Atran and Axelrod 2008).

While acknowledging SVs won't necessarily make a deal, doing so can recast deal-making in a new moral frame. This new frame "determines the scope and limits of possible material transactions and negotiations" (Atran and

Axelrod 2008: p.233). Second, acknowledging SVs can create a central and mutual trust between both sides, which is an important factor in negotiations.

Of course, if neither side will recognize the other's core SVs, negotiations are certain to encounter problems. Moreover, in some cases values talk can be deeply challenging to core beliefs, and parties may react by rejecting any further attempt to negotiate. For this reason, when SVs appear to be involved, it may be important to conduct some pre-negotiation preparation within each group.

Strategy Basics

Any overview of the SV literature leads to three direct implications, which serve as the backbone of negotiation strategy when SVs are involved. First, once an SV has been shown to exist for the other side, demonstrate respect for that SV by stopping to offer material incentives or costs in exchange for it. Any material exchanges will be viewed as offensive, leading to a backfire effect that may manifest in violence or refusal to continue to talking (Ginges et al. 2007, 2011). Second, do not underestimate the power of symbolic compromises. One such compromise is an apology: if possible, apologize for what is sincerely regretted, but remember that insincere apologies can have adverse effects on a conflict (Atran and Axelrod 2008). It is noted that apologies and symbolic compromises are often perceived by politicians to have material consequence and thus may require within-group bargaining. Again, such matters may be instigated in pre-talk mediation. Lastly, when trades on SVs must be made, trade one SV for another (internally) or for the other's SV (externally). Tragic trade-offs do not engender outrage and can be framed as both necessary and heroic.

Beyond Impasse: Reframing and Reprioritizing

Atran and Axelrod's 2008 article on SVs and negotiation sought to fill a gap in the negotiation literature dealing with SV framing, particularly by examining how one framing of an SV can replace another. They suggest using the ambiguity

and fluidity integral to SVs to achieve a constructive reframing, reprioritizing, or re-contexting of the SV on the table.

Let us begin with reframing, for which they offer two of examples. The first is Israel's sacred value of *land*. In the name of *land*, it justified the original taking of Gaza; it later retracted it by stating that Gaza was not a true part of the *land of Israel*. Another example can be had in the US demand for the "unconditional surrender" of Japan. Given the US losses entailed in that war, unconditional surrender was an SV for the USA. Dethroning the Emperor of Japan was part of this original demand, but upon learning that the Emperor's standing was a Japanese SV, the USA later allowed the Emperor to retain his title. It was able to redefine unconditional surrender, allowing that the Emperor's complicity could help it implement its postwar goals (Atran and Axelrod 2008).

Another tactic that Atran and Axelrod (2008) attribute to leaders is their ability to shift the context. They view this as a fluid and changing appreciation of values according to how circumstances can be framed in terms of them. Here, their example is how Stalin changed the scope of an SV by moving it from the present to the distant future. He chose to emphasize the role of communism within the USSR ahead of its role in the world, to fight the fight at home (in the present) before taking it abroad (in the future).

Leaders can also reprioritize SVs as the situation dictates, sometimes fulfilling one SV before others (Atran and Axelrod 2008). A small step towards prioritizing some SVs may be able to lead to a more permanent change and realignment. Here, examples include Israel's Ben Gurion not accepting the city of Jerusalem in exchange for a Jewish state in 1948 (Israel won it later) and Lincoln's decision to salvage the Union by postponing emancipation (which he did later).

Lastly, it may be useful to distinguish between *sacred positions* and SVs. Parties can adopt a different version of their SV position that will not immediately call the value into question, such as Stalin did by emphasizing communism at home rather than worldwide, and may actually reaffirm it better than the previous position. For instance, Israel views its ability to use any means necessary

to protect its security to be an SV. One of its corresponding sacred positions is ownership over nuclear weapons, but if Arab states would recognize Israel's right to exist, its nuclear position would no longer be necessary. As Atran has noted: "The question then becomes identifying sacred positions as opposed to sacred values and working on changing positions within those values" (Atran 2013).

Practical Recommendations

Both SV negotiator training and a tailored change to the traditional format of international political negotiations are needed to equip both discerning negotiators and their parties to deal with SVs.

The Need for an SV Negotiator Training

A true understanding of SVs and their implications for negotiations will likely require a focused, interactive training designed for negotiators. The content of that training would include both curricula focused on understanding and managing SVs as well as facilitating value-based dialogue.

The SV-related curricula content would examine the nature of SVs, how to identify and handle them, how they have played out historically in negotiations, and ways of reframing them within and between parties. But this short-term pedagogy would only be an initial step. The essential component of training, as with all expertise, would be building active familiarity through interactive problem-solving exercises based on discernment (e.g., Is this an SV, or a bargaining tactic? If an SV, what is the underlying belief and what is the physical manifestation? If I'm guessing, how can I find out?) and reframing (e.g., What is the current frame? Is it at odds with the negotiation goals, and if so, how? Are there useful historical parallels? How could this frame be reprioritized or repositioned?).

A second component of the training would be geared towards learning the necessary facilitative skills for value-based dialogue. As mentioned earlier, Jeanne Brett argues that the nature of a

dispute should govern the negotiating process (Brett 2000), and the nature of SVs is to demand respect and recognition. We believe that disputes involving sacred values may require more intra- and intergroup articulation of individual and group beliefs, as well as how they are manifested (Gibson 2011). As noted previously in the chapter, people are often not aware of their sacred values until they are challenged, and then, they have often not been thought through or understood—by the individuals themselves much less their groups. Thus, without proper handling, anything that touches upon these values can trigger explosive metacognitive and emotional processes and miscommunications (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). A second issue is that while almost all cultures readily acknowledge their own sacred values as being core to a conflict, they have difficulty understanding others' SVs (Atran and Axelrod 2008). Enabling individuals and groups to do so may require some sophisticated perspective-taking exercises. While we are not practitioners in either of these arenas, we are aware of literatures that address them as well as organizations that are currently employing these skills. In terms of literatures, the Nobel Peace nominated therapist Carl Rogers brought conflicting world leaders together using his "person-centered approach" to communication, sometimes requiring listeners to restate the other's position to the other's satisfaction (Kirschenbaum and Henderson 1989). Such a tool might be useful for both within-group and intergroup dialogues. Aquilar and Galluccio (2008) set up a specific tailored training program for negotiators and mediators aimed to nurture metacognitive abilities to understand oneself and the other side and situated context while mastering cognitive and emotional processes for managing and transforming conflicts (Aquilar and Galluccio 2011; Galluccio 2011). Additionally, new work on empathy induction within experimental social psychology might be useful. Explicitly trying to persuade or inform someone about one's SVs might be threatening to both parties, but empathy and perspective-taking inductions often work implicitly and without a goal orientation, an angle well suited to

facilitating value-based dialogue (Tropp and Page-Gould 2014).

Outside of academia, there are already programs based on a value-based facilitation, and these may be useful prototypes. Such procedures have been taken up by the Getty Foundation, which studies the management of cultural heritage sites. Here, negotiations include value-based discussions among many stakeholder groups, based on agreement on the overarching principle of sustainability. While the value-based processes require more initial investment in time and resources, articulation and acknowledgment of underlying values among the participants have led to more sophisticated and binding agreements (Mason et al. 2003).

Structure Change: Pre-negotiation Preparation for Stakeholders

Since the intent is to embrace rather than ignore the SVs at the negotiating table, it may make sense to prepare the parties beforehand. Elucidating our own and others' SVs is a thorny matter; even well-trained negotiators will likely be unable to elicit instant transformation during negotiations. For parties themselves to "do the work" we have discussed above, they will need both time and space outside of the instrumental and often threatening environment of negotiations. We suggest a structural change to international political negotiations involving SVs—that is, a pre-negotiation preparation period created for the internal teams of each stakeholder.

Negotiations are likely to be improved if parties have clearly articulated their needs among themselves, with a serious eye towards the upcoming talks. The within-group goals of pre-talk mediation would include:

- (a) To fully process what the relevant SV or SVs signify to one's people or team
- (b) To determine what they would be needed (or not needed) from the negotiation in order to recognize the SV and be able to sell it to one's people

- (c) To determine how much flexibility surrounds it and how the team can or should communicate these things to the other side
- (d) To refine the SVs to exclude outmoded claims (Atran and Axelrod 2008)
- (e) To familiarize one's group as to the other side's SVs, how they may enter the negotiation, and creative ways of recognizing them

While we are not expert in how to best facilitate intragroup values dialogue, ongoing programs have likely generated expertise and best practices. The strategy of the Aspen Institute, which seems a good start, appears to be guided group reflections on participants' most deeply held values (Wade 2004), or in this case, the relevant SVs. One thematic note for such discussions is offered by Kevin Gibson (2011), who suggests that:

...discussing sacred objects is a shorthand way of talking about the values of particular individuals and groups, with the consequence that the values themselves may remain constant while the manifestation of the values may change (p. 490).

The discussion described by Gibson would address goal (a), "To fully process what the relevant SV or SVs mean to one's team." His message here is relevant to facilitators: be aware of when individuals are conflating sacred objects with sacred beliefs. Negotiators need to determine whether the individual or group is asserting that an object ought to have moral standing in the conversation or that it has great symbolic and representational value. Whatever the case, bargaining should be facilitated by conceptual clarification.

Gibson's distinction between object and belief can allow for the reframing of the SV (goals b and c) so that values are preserved even in the face of a material concession. For instance, one could preserve "equality" as an SV even if the way that value was manifested is caused to change. Thus, people may hold consistent sacred values even in the face of trade-offs or compromises. Negotiators should not reason *post facto* that making concessions demonstrates that the party's values were not sacred or have been

relinquished (Gibson 2011). To the contrary, figuring out just how much flexibility exists to do this should be a major goal of both mediators and groups.

Goal (d), "To refine the SV to exclude outmoded claims or demands," is especially relevant to ethnic conflicts and civil wars, which tend to have long histories of mutual suffering. Here, one of the primary goals of pre-talk mediation would be to exclude outmoded SV claims (Atran and Axelrod 2008). Atran and Axelrod (2008) write:

Overcoming historical precedents and emotional barriers to renouncing even patently false claims may require neutral mediation by those who understand both sides. Even then it takes time. According to Lord John Alderdice, a principle mediator in the Northern Ireland conflict, it took nine years of back-and-forth for this to happen in Northern Ireland (Alderdice 2007, p. 235).

Lastly, a significant part of intragroup mediation may be to prepare the groups for working together. A dispute over values will involve sensitivity to varying beliefs by all parties and a significant exploration of common ideals (Gibson 2011). Unfortunately, as Atran and Axelrod (2008) report, despite widespread understanding of the role that SVs play within one's own culture, the "who we are" aspect of identity is often the most difficult challenge for members of one culture to understand regarding another. Recognizing one another's SVs is not a transparent process, even for allies and for members of societies that seem similar in many ways. Barriers to understanding will be that much harder for societies in conflict or, worse, for societies whose SVs stand in opposition to one another. Towards the goal of better understanding the other side, efforts may be taken to provide insight into how the other side views their relevant SVs—but without them in the room. Recent research has shown that perspective-taking (and empathy-invoking) exercises successfully lead to enhanced understanding of the others' experience when *not* undertaken during intergroup contact. When such measures are undertaken simultaneous to an interaction, they often backfire (Vorauer and Sasaki 2009).

Future Research

In many ways, research on SVs is in its infancy. In future research, it will be important to further explore the constraints and contexts that are able to influence SVs (Berns et al. 2012; Vilarroya and Hilferty 2013). For instance: How might conflict primes influence an individual's susceptibility towards sacralization? One can imagine pathways led by arousal or social identity activation.

Relatedly, is it possible that emotional valence in general—negative versus positive affect—primes sacralization? Emotional context certainly affects nonsacred moral judgments, shown to operate from a related deontological process (Valdesolo and DeSteno 2006). For instance, happiness has been shown to decrease deontological processing (Valdesolo and DeSteno 2006), the close cousin of sacred values—does it also possibly decrease sacralization? Lastly, might sacralization, or SV-related recognition needs, differ according to ingroup status? Emile Bruneau and Rebecca Saxe have identified different intergroup contact needs for low- versus high-status participants (Bruneau and Saxe 2012). Given the relevance of recognition for SVs, a possible SV-status interaction seems test-worthy.

Much work remains to be done on the social processes related to SVs as well. For instance, for issues that grow into, or are manipulated into, sacred ones (e.g., climate change, the Iranian nuclear program), how does that work? Do some instrumental stakes (e.g., sacrifices) require sacralization, whether as an implicit motivational component or a mobilizing strategy? Can a position or campaign that begins as instrumental posturing (high-risk acceptance to evince commitment, or absolutist rhetoric that is untied to an SV) become an SV? Are SVs ever the consequence of a desire to save face, personally or collectively...a dignifying tactic taken up as a last resort in the face of defeat or humiliation? If yes, how are they tied to self-esteem? Is sacralization a common strategy for sides playing weak instrumental hands or perceiving themselves to play weak hands? How, then, might

it be tied to (weak) entitativity or group strength? Lastly, within the realm of intergroup relations, how does the other side change their actions/strategy when they learn (or think) that something is sacred for their opponent? Does perception of the other side's SV effect their perception of that side's power or entitativity?

Another area for future research concerns the defusion of SVs. What strategies can be used to keep values from becoming sacred? What effects do the negotiation and facilitation strategies described herein have on the nature and outcome of SVs in conflict—to date, nobody has measured or documented such a process in its totality. When does letting one SV trump another work? Is there a way to “walk it back” once you've sacralized an issue? Within the realm of sacred rhetoric, are there times that such rhetoric has been deployed without success? Lastly, what is the role of symbolic and ritualistic values for international negotiations? Much work exists on the symbolic value of an apology (Brown and Jennifer Gerarda 2004; Goldberg et al. 1987; O'Hara and Yarn 2002), whereas actions—like symbolic gestures—dealing with sacred values have largely been unexplored (Gibson 2011). If rituals have a role in sacralization (Sheikh et al. 2012), then rituals and ritualized or symbolic gestures seem appropriate ways to engage these values within the bargaining sphere.

While many of the questions above can be at least partially addressed by psychology and neuroscience, we argue that some advances will need to come from disciplines that study higher levels of analysis, such as political science, communications, and sociology. Particularly for students of ethnic conflict, the timing seems right for further inquiry into sacred values. Prominent scholars have concluded that rational choice—the dominant paradigm in political science—has the least amount of explanatory power for ethnic conflicts because it cannot account for nationalist feelings that do not depend on material benefit (Kaufman 2005, 2006), such as sacred values. In addition to the questions above, we offer questions for future research at these levels of analysis. First, what sorts of political structures or processes are necessary for the type of

reframing and reprioritizing of SVs discussed in this article? Is defusing an SV only possible via leadership outbidding or intergroup status changes (dominant group falling) (Varshney 2003)? Second, do the functions of SVs differ according to political system, e.g., are they more dangerous, volatile, or common in authoritarian regimes versus democracies? What implications would this have for negotiation strategies?

Conclusion

In this modern era of “devoted actors”—nationalist leaders, insurgents, or suicide bombers bent on protecting or establishing their sacred values at any costs—the success and success rate of international agreements have become unsustainable (Toft 2010). In this chapter, we have argued that agreements which ignore or table sacred values relevant to the bargaining table have a higher chance of dissolution and that achieving sustainable negotiated agreements will require the successful acknowledgment and inclusion of sacred values in negotiating strategies. In contrast to traditional negotiating approaches, the skills and tools needed to broker deals including sacred values are relational rather than just interest based and *reliant on process*. We suggest pre-negotiation preparations involving within-group mediation (reflection on the meaning and nature of a society’s SVs; translation into how such values can be reframed, reprioritized, or repositioned; and understanding of the other party’s SVs), negotiating strategies involving symbolic recognition of the other’s SVs, creative reframing of one’s own SVs, and even the establishment of bargaining rituals that can bring parties together. Because value-based mediation is a complex psychosocial process, often attended by confusing and unchecked emotions, we recommend a tailored training for negotiators that would enable them to identify and facilitate SVs via within-group reflection and intergroup management. Lastly, given such high stakes, we call for scholars to double their attention to research on the contexts and constraints that influence SVs, a better understanding of the

processes of sacralization and defusion, and for an understanding of how SVs are manipulated and managed at higher levels of analysis.

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Introduction

Consider a group of people who are part of the same family, have common ancestors, live in the same neighborhood, and together form an interdependent community. They face some serious problems that will affect adversely the lives and well-being of many of the people in their community, as well as make much of their neighborhood less habitable. This will happen unless they are able to cooperate effectively to manage these problems or solve them. It seems clear that such a group of people are apt to be considerably more successful in dealing with their problems if they are a strong community whose members are very much identified with it and committed to its survival and its effective functioning.

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The people who live on planet Earth, a very distinctive neighborhood in the universe, are members of a human family with a common ancestry. The people of the Earth face serious problems that will affect them and their planet with significant adverse effects unless they are able to organize themselves and cooperate effectively to deal with these problems. They do not, as yet, appear to have developed two of the sociopsychological prerequisites of effective cooperation: a strong community with members who are strongly identified with it and members who are committed to helping the community develop the values, knowledge, and skills to engage in effective cooperative problem-solving.

It is clear that we have not yet developed a global community. Yet we need a global community in the face of the momentous, common problems that affect all the people of the planet Earth. There are many such problems that could be enumerated. We shall mention a number of the most important: global climate change; weapons of mass destruction; global economic disruptions; disease pandemics; gross inequalities within and among nations; the enormous cost of militarism, wars, and the disastrous consequences

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of war; the enormous costs of sexism, racism, and other forms of social injustice to the world community; the inadequate education of children to be capable and responsible world citizens; etc. These problems will require effective global cooperation if they are to be managed well.

What Is a Global Community?

A global community would have five key elements: (1) the diverse people of the planet Earth who strongly identify with the global community; (2) various institutions which help develop, encourage, and support people's identification with the global community; (3) institutions which enable people to cooperate effectively at all levels, from the local to the international, to manage global issues; (4) resources which facilitate effective cooperation at the various levels; and (5) governance structures which support the development and functioning of each of the previous four elements.

In this chapter, we have neither the space nor the competence to discuss the five elements of a global community. This will require much thought and research by many different academic disciplines as well as others. Here, as social psychologists, we will outline what we know about groups and personal identity in Part A as a basis for discussing some important aspects of the development of a global community in Part B.

Part A: Groups

What Are Groups?

The term *group* is commonly used when there are two or more people who have:

(1) one or more characteristics in common; (2) perceive themselves as a distinguishable entity; (3) are aware of the positive interdependence of some of their values, goals, and interests; (4) interact with one another directly or indirectly; and (5) pursue their positively interdependent values, goals, or interests together. Groups that endure over time typically develop (6) a set of norms that guide member interaction with one another and with their external

environment (which may include their habitat as well as other groups, persons, species, and objects) and (7) a set of institutions and roles, each of which has specific activities, obligations, and rights associated with it (see Forsyth 2009; Levi 2011; Wheelan 2004 for numerous citations, definitions, and characteristics of groups).

For a group to exist, it is not sufficient for people to be aware that they have a common characteristic (e.g., the same gender) nor that they are a distinguishable entity, different from others (they are female, not male), nor that they have some common interests (e.g., for females to have equality with males and fair, dignified, participation in the various institutions of society). Additionally, they must be able to interact with one another in some way, directly or indirectly.

Many friendships and other sociable groups only require the first four characteristics mentioned earlier. By interacting with other people who are similar to themselves in some important way, people with similar values and interests may feel more comfortable, less on-guard, more affirmed, and more able to maintain their self-esteem despite differences and derogation from others with other characteristics and values. Although such a social group may contribute to the satisfaction of two important needs described by Maslow (1943), *belongingness* and *self-esteem*, such a group, unless they have the characteristics of (5), (6), and (7), will not contribute much to the fulfillment of Maslow's other three needs: *physiological and physical well-being* (such as for good food, clean water, comfortable and safe shelter, pollution-free air, disease prevention and treatment, and health maintenance), *safety* (protection from dangers that arise from the destructiveness of nature, other living species, other persons, other groups, and other nations), and *self-actualization* (development of one's talents through education and fulfillment of them through meaningful work, by active participation in one's community to create a just, beautiful, joyful habitat which stimulates curiosity and openness to the possibilities in life).

It is well to recognize that to become a member of a group, one does not necessarily have to form the group. One is *born into many existing groups that are already formed*, e.g., a family, a religious group, a tribe, and a nation. One may be *required to become a member* of an existing group if you are a child in a given community, e.g., to be required to go to school, to be a member of a class or team in the school, to be drafted into the military, and to be assigned as a member of a given unit. To be in good standing in a larger community, the norms and obligations of the larger community may require you to participate in specific institutions and subgroups of the large community. Finally, you may become a member of an existing group by *choice*, if the group is willing to accept you (e.g., when you apply for a job in a company or admission to a college) or if the group is required to accept you by superior authority or power. As we shall see later when we discuss personal and social identities and community, these three different ways of becoming a member of a group (being born into it, required to join it, and choosing to join it) are relevant to the development of personal and social identities as well as to the development of a global community.

Group Formation

To turn back to the question of how does a group get formed, small groups may get formed spontaneously from the interaction of people who discover that they have common interests and values and are compatible. However, it often requires a “change agent” or a collection of change agents who believe that it would be desirable if a large group is established and acts cooperatively to effectively achieve mutually desired objectives: objectives desired by the change agents, by the group members, and possibly by the larger community within which the group would exist. Other names for the “change agents” are “social entrepreneurs” or “community organizers.”

Social entrepreneurs are a type of change agent who are interested in using their entrepreneurial

skills to create organizations whose mission centers around bringing about social change on a critical social issue. Sometimes their work is directed at people in power (CEOs, others with influence) and sometimes with people who have little power as individuals but, collectively, could have much. Some of their characteristics include: flexibility in approach; a willingness to self correct; a desire to share credit and at the same time work quietly; a willingness to explore beyond established structures, since many such organizations start from scratch rather than within existing ones; freedom to cross disciplinary boundaries; and a strong ethical motivation (Bornstein 2007).

Community organizers are another type of change agent who work collectively with members of a community to solve social problems in that community. They are similarly guided by a strong set of values that include: social and economic justice, equality, democracy, and peace.

Alinsky, in *Rules for Radicals* (1971), suggests that in order to be a good community organizer, one needs curiosity, irreverence, imagination, a sense of humor, a bit of a blurred vision for a better world, an organized personality, a well-integrated political standard, a free and open mind, and political relativity.

Change agents commonly engage in a series of activities to promote their vision of developing new groups. They may work at the “top” as well as at the “bottom.” Some of the things that change agents typically do are as follows:

1. They identify the individuals or groups that they seek to change.
2. In terms of group formation, they communicate empathetically with other individuals and groups why, and how, their values and interests could be furthered by their participation in the group that is being formed. This requires a clear, attractive, compelling *mission statement* for the group. Here, they must often overcome lack of trust, skepticism, defeatism, or inertia among those they seek to influence. By getting “influential” people who have credibility and influence among those they seek to influence to support their efforts, those efforts are often much helped. Influential people who are well known and well respected in their communities

are then well positioned to effect change. Others value their opinions and are motivated to respond to their call to action. Also, having members of their social network, who are favorable to the formation of the group, communicate their support will be an important influence upon those who are initially reluctant to make a commitment. In large communities, there is evidence to indicate that the structure of the communication network which exists among potential members (or which is created by the change agents) will affect the propensity of individuals to join a community and will affect the rapidity of community growth (Westaby 2012).

3. Further, it would be useful for the change agents to provide suggestions for how the group could function to achieve its values and interests: how the group might organize itself and develop the norms, procedures, capabilities, and institutions to cooperate effectively to identify, analyze, and work creatively to deal with the problems, present and future, they face. Although change agents may make useful suggestions with regard to these matters, the ultimate responsibility for their development and implementation rests with the group members.
4. Finally, it would often be helpful for the change agent to suggest clear markers for the group which clearly identify the group and its members and which distinguish it from other groups and from nonmembers. Here, we refer to such things as songs, flags, clothing items, pins, rings, pledges, rituals, celebrations, etc. Group markers such as these not only make the group more visible to nonmembers but also to members. When markers are developed and used well, they make a group more cohesive and make its members more strongly identified with it.

Group Development and Functioning

There is considerable literature on group development and functioning (see Tuckman 1965; Tuckman and Jensen 1977; Wheelan 2004;

for a comprehensive review, see Wheelan 2005). We shall not attempt to summarize this vast literature. Instead, we shall present our own views that are based on our studies of group dynamics, our participation in various organizations, and our observations of various community groups.

As a group forms, begins to develop, and starts the process of functioning to achieve its objectives, it faces a number of issues that will require attention throughout the group's life. They include:

1. *The development of a clear, attractive, and compelling group mission which is well publicized.* This is not only important for maintaining, as well as attracting group members, but it is essential for developing well-focused institutions and organizations and for defining the purposes of their activities. The mission may require redefinition from time to time as circumstances change.
2. *Group cohesion.* For a group to function well, its members must have strong motivation to become and remain members, and they must be able to have considerable trust and respect for one another as well as honest communication and the ability to work together without unnecessary hassle, treat each other fairly, and demonstrate a readiness to help one another. Those are some of the characteristics of effectively developed and functioning cooperative groups (see Chap. 2 for a more detailed discussion).
3. *Organization.* The group must be able to organize itself (or be initially organized by its change agents) so that it can develop the subgroups (the institutions, organizations, and social roles) necessary to achieve its mission. Among its most important are several interrelated roles or functions:
 - (a) Keeping the mission of the group clear, visible, and highly motivating
 - (b) Maintaining group productivity (its effectiveness in achieving the group's goals)
 - (c) Maintaining group cohesiveness (the dedication and loyalty of its group members)
 - (d) Maintaining a productive relationship with its external environments

- (e) Evaluating itself (which keeps the group aware of how well it is functioning)
- (f) Researching new ways and means (which seeks to develop new, improved methods of achieving the group's goals)
- (g) *Conflict resolution* and negotiation (which seeks to foster constructive rather than destructive processes and outcomes for the inevitable conflicts that will arise among the different members as they function within their different roles)
- (h) And finally, most importantly, *leading with skill and integrity* (which includes playing a central role in keeping the group's values and goals alive and salient, developing and coordinating the various functions and roles into one well-integrated and well-functioning group, developing the resources which are needed for the group to function well, and providing an inspiration model with which group members can identify and be proud of)

In a small, face-to-face group, each of its members, working together, may be engaged in implementing all of the functions listed above. As the group grows larger, there will be more subdivision with different members composing subgroups that implement different functions, and within each subgroup, different members may fulfill different roles.

Some of the advantages of increased group size are that as the size of the group increases, it permits opportunities for individuals with different talents to take on different tasks, the human resources available to the group may increase, and as a result larger groups may be able to accomplish more difficult, complicated tasks. However, increases in group size with accompanying role specialization often increase such problems as coordination and communication among group members. Also, with division of responsibilities and role specialization, there is typically the development of special interests and an accompanying desire to further one's own interests over those of others. Additionally, specialized language is often developed in various subgroups which makes intergroup communication

more difficult. (Consider how psychology has grown since World War II into many subspecialties and how difficult it is for any psychologist in any given specialty to know what is going on in all of the specialties and often how difficult it is to communicate with those in other specialties.)

One particular difficulty of the development of special interest in one's own role or subgroup as the size of the group increases has to do with the *role of leadership*. Commonly, this role has unique responsibilities and challenges as well as unique rewards and power associated with it. Unless the group has well-developed democratic procedures for the election of leaders and the limitation of their power, as well as norms to prevent corrupt leadership and make it undesirable, those who occupy leadership roles often are able to maintain themselves in these roles when they are no longer serving the group's values and purposes well. Although there are exceptions, without the deterring influence of a well-structured democratic group that emphasizes the values of participation, freedom, equality, and justice, those who are advantaged in power and its resources will too often seek to maintain their advantages.

Personal and Social Identities

One's social identities are important components of one's personal identity, but they do not completely define any individual's sense of a unique identity. This sense arises from a number of factors including having a memory of experiences that you and no one else personally had and the awareness that one's perceptions, one's thoughts, and one's personality exist in a unique body that is uniquely located in space and time even though others may have similar experiences, perceptions, thoughts, and personality. However, components of one's personal identity are the various social identities that one has acquired. George Herbert Mead, in his classic work *Mind, Self, and Society* (1934), pointed out that the individual's self as well as his or her capacity for reflective thought develop in the course of social interaction with the members of his or her family and other groups in the community to which he or she belongs. By taking the

role of others and responding to his or her own action as they would, the individual learns to anticipate the social effects of his or her actions. In addition, he or she learns that he or she and others are expected to behave toward one another in specified ways as a function of his or her particular personal and social attributes—such as age, gender, social class, race, religion, ethnic background, and nationality.

Thus, a “black” boy learns to behave differently toward “black” than toward “white” children, and he learns to expect “whites” to behave differently toward him than they do toward “whites.” Similarly, children learn that certain activities are “feminine” and others are “masculine” and that disapproval is risked by engaging in behavior that is considered appropriate for the opposite sex but not for one’s own. However, each child’s experience is in some respects unique, and thus, the conceptions among a group of what it is to be a member of that group will not be identical. Moreover, the meaning of any particular sub-identity, such as “black,” is influenced by the total configuration of social identities of which it is an element. Thus, the conception of “black,” like that of “Jew,” is affected by the linking of the two attributes in the configurations “black Jew.” Adding other elements to the configuration, such as “rich,” “young,” “woman,” and “Brazilian,” further alters and defines the meaning of the initially specified sub-identity “black.” (See Turner et al. 1987 for a discussion of these ideas as they relate to self-categorization theory.)

Although the meaning of any personal sub-identity is influenced by the total configuration of sub-identities, it would be a mistake to assume that all elements are equally influential in determining an individual’s thoughts, feelings, and behavior. It is evident that situational factors help determine which sub-identity will be elicited most strongly at a given time: different sub-identities are likely to be most salient and most influential in different social situations (Abrams et al. 2005). The sub-identity of “white” is more likely to be elicited in the presence of “blacks” than in the presence of other “whites”—unless the other “whites” are discussing “blacks” or

interracial relations. A New Yorker and a Texan are more likely to feel a common identity as Americans in China than in the United States. Thus, a sub-identity is made salient in a situation by contrast with the presence of members of other different or antithetical groups that are used to mark off the boundaries of one’s own group (Alderfer and Smith 1982). It is also made salient by the presences of threats, danger, discrimination, or other potential harm to oneself because of membership in a given group. If derogatory comments or discriminatory actions are liable to be directed at you or other members of your group at any time from almost anybody, then you will be continuously aware of your membership in this group. A sub-identity is also made salient by the prospect of reward or other potential gain resulting from membership in a particular group. More generally, the more eliciting stimuli that are present in a situation—whether those stimuli are negative or positive in implication—the more salient will be the identity in that situation.

It is apparent that sub-identities differ in their readiness to be evoked. Some sub-identities are more pervasive than others and are readily aroused in many different types of situations. One’s sub-identity as a member of one’s family group enters into many more situations than one’s sub-identity as a member of one’s tennis club. It connects with more people and with more of one’s other sub-identities, and thus, it is a more pervasive influence on one’s thoughts, feelings, and behavior.

Sub-identities also differ in how central or important they are to the individual’s self-esteem; the more central a sub-identity is, the more likely it is to be evoked and the more influential it will be when evoked. One measure of the centrality of the sub-identity is one’s readiness to resist its derogation or elimination. Thus, one of the authors is more willing to give up being a squash player than a tennis player, and he would abandon either of these rather than quit his profession. Similarly, he is more ready to resist derogation of his ethnic group than his age group.

The importance of a sub-identity to one’s self-esteem is determined by the strength of the different types of bonds binding one to it.

Several different types of bonds can be distinguished (McCall 1970): ascribed bonds, bonds of commitment, bonds due to investment, bonds of attachment, and instrumental bonds. The first three types of bonds (ascription, commitment, and investment) are in large measure “restraining bonds”; they restrain one from leaving a group even if one desires to do so. The latter two (attachment and instrumental) are “attracting bonds,” which pull the individual toward the group.

The strongest restraining bonds are those arising out of certain *ascribed* statuses – such as family, gender, racial, ethnic, and national group membership, many of which one acquires by birth rather than by choice. Such statuses can rarely be changed. It is the combination of their inalterability and their social significance that gives these ascribed statuses their personal importance. One’s handedness, left or right, may be as difficult to alter as one’s race, but it is rarely as socially significant. Membership in a family, racial, sexual, ethnic, or national group affects one’s thoughts and actions in many situations; these effects are pervasive. In addition, by common definition, membership in such groups typically excludes membership in other groups of a similar type. Thus, if you are male, you are not also female; if you are an orthodox Muslim, you are not also an orthodox Christian. Thus, being a member is thought to be more or less distinctive, and since membership is linked to experiences from early on in one’s life, it is not unusual for one to get emotionally attached to such groups, with the result that these memberships play an important positive role in determining one’s sense of identity.

Bonds of *commitment* may also tie one to a group and to the identity connected with it. The commitment may be to other members of the group or to interested outsiders. Thus, a woman who is engaged but no longer interested in marrying may be reluctant to break the engagement because of her commitment to her fiancé or because of the expected disappointment of her parents and friends. Similarly, one’s *investments* in a given identity—the amount of time, energy, life changes, money, and emotion

previously expended in establishing and maintaining the identity—will generally serve to bind one to continue it even when one might not otherwise choose to do so. Nevertheless, it should be noted that people do break up long-standing marriages or change well-established careers if they expect that continued investments will be costly and not worthwhile. This is particularly likely if they are aware of a more rewarding alternative for their future investments. The restraining bonds of commitment and investment are, however, usually easier to break than those of ascription.

Bonds of *attachment* attract one to a group; such bonds develop when significant personal needs—for security, acceptance, and meaning—have been fulfilled in the group, and the group is thought to be largely irreplaceable or matchless as a source of fulfillment for these needs. A group is likely to be viewed as irreplaceable when no readily available alternatives are perceived (as in the case of the small child in relation to the nuclear family), when the feasibility of leaving the group to go to another one is small (as is the case of the citizens of most nations), or when, as a result of an extended history of participation in the group, the group has taken on a unique significance (as is the case of family and ethnic groups).

Bonds of attachment provide a diffuse, non-specific form of attraction to a group and to the idea of expressing one’s identity by membership in the group. In contrast, *instrumental* bonds arise from the success of the group in providing dependable rewards for fulfilling one’s specific roles or functions within the group and for being identified as a member of the group. Instrumental bonds are linked to the specific success of the group in providing specific satisfactions. However, the more success the group has in doing this and the wider the range of satisfactions it provides, the more likely it is that diffuse bonds of attachment will also be developed.

It is evident that an individual who is getting ample instrumental satisfactions from her group and is deeply attached to it will not find herself in conflict, because her investments and

ascription will restrain her from abandoning her identification with the group. To the contrary, the more the individual is attracted to a group, the more willing she will be to make investments in it, to make personal commitments to it, and to bind herself irrevocably to it. Conversely, the less she is attracted to a group, the less willing she will be to bind herself so tightly that it would be difficult to leave it if she should choose to do so.

Suppose that one is emotionally attached to one's sub-identity as a Jew, woman, or "black"—and irrevocably bound to it by bonds of ascription, commitment, and investment—but that it places one at a distinct instrumental disadvantage in obtaining many kinds of opportunities and rewards. How one copes with this situation will be largely determined by whether one views the disadvantages to be just or unjust and whether one thinks one can leave the disadvantaged group to join a more advantaged one (as when a "black" passes as "white" or a Jew converts to become Christian) (Tajfel 1982). If those who are disadvantaged by their group identity accept their disadvantages as being warranted (and seek to separate themselves from their group by derogating it), they are unlikely to challenge and conflict with those who are profiting from their relatively advantaged positions. The sense of being treated unjustly because of one's membership in a group to which one is strongly attached and bound is the energizer for much intergroup conflict; it often strengthens one's identification with the group (Dietz-Uhler and Murell 1998; Grant 1993). The sense of injustice is felt particularly intensely in interracial, interethnic, and intersex conflicts because of the centrality of these group identities to the individual's self-esteem. When women or blacks or Jews are devalued as a group, those who are identified and identify with the groups also are personally attacked.

The fact that one has many social identities may, of course, lead to internal conflict. Thus, one's obligations to one's work as a psychologist may conflict with one's obligations to spend more time with one's children. However, Lindner's (2012) fascinating discussion of her sunflower identity indicates how the various

sub-identities of an individual can be integrated into a coherent whole. As she points out, there can be unity in diversity: one can be an African-American, Irish-American, or Italian-American as well as male or female and a student or professor and not feel conflict among one's various identities. As Roccas and Brewer (2002) have indicated, when one's various social identities are not fully convergent or overlapping, one's social identity structure is more complex. In their research, they found that lower social identity complexity was associated with stress and higher social identity complexity was associated with increased tolerance and positivity toward out-groups. They suggest that "individuals who live in a multicultural society that embraces an integrationist ideology are likely to have more complex representations of their multiple identities than individuals who live in a monocultural or a stratified society" (Roccas and Brewer 2002, p. 104). This view is concordant with Lindner's "sunflower identity" model (2012).

Part B: Global Community

In this part, we draw upon the framework presented in Part A to discuss the development of a global community, the identification of its members and its component groups with the global community, and aspects of the functioning of the global community. A global community is one that necessarily includes all nations and people of the Earth due to their political, social, physical, biological, and economic interdependence. The people and nations of the global community are inextricably bound as they are interrelated and mutually subject to the impact of global forces and events. In this section, we are more tentative and claim no extraordinary skill in how to create a global community beyond our collective expertise in social psychology, conflict resolution, and group dynamics. Yet our aim is to illustrate how this framework could be used to think about a global community. Our hope is that others who have additional expertise will find this framework useful and that they will use it to develop more detailed ideas and proposals for action.

Development of a Global Community

If you are a change agent and you wish to help develop a global community, the first thing to realize is that there are many other potential change agents who are interested in the same objective. Thus, if one “Googles” such terms as “global community” or “global citizen,” one will find many other individuals, groups, NGOs, and other organizations that are interested and active in relation to this topic. Thus, one of the first tasks of a change agent would be to identify a small group (30–50 in size) who could initially serve to organize, coordinate, and provide leadership for the larger collection of potential change agents. Once this initial group is organized and functioning, it will be active in recruiting other change agents to contribute to the development of a global community.

Once a group of dedicated and well-organized change agents has been developed, it is important that they formulate a strategic plan for action. Such a plan would address the following questions:

1. What are the common values and interests which most of the people in the global community share? What are the common problems they must deal with if they, their children, or grandchildren are to avoid severe harm and to prosper?
2. How can most people on the planet be communicated with so that they become aware that their values, interests, and problems are widely shared, locally and globally?
3. How can guidelines be developed and communicated which will encourage and provide workable models for effective cooperative action, at the local and global levels, to fulfill their values and address their collective problems?

We believe that it is important to develop strategic planning for two levels: (1) the “bottom,” the people of the world, and (2) the “top,” the leaders of the existing institutions in the world such as the UN, nation-states, the global economy, education, healthcare, etc. The strategic planning for the different existing institutions would, undoubtedly, have to vary for each kind of institution.

Despite these differences, it seems essential to communicate to those at the “top” as well as at the “bottom” the common values, interests, and problems that most humans share.

What Are Some of the Common Values of a Global Community?

Below are listed some that were drawn from various sources, mainly from the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* adopted by the United Nations in 1948; *The Declaration on the Rights and Responsibilities of Individuals, Groups, and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Freedoms* (adopted by the General Assembly of the UN in December 1998); and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Address to Congress on January 6, 1941, on *The Four Freedoms*.

Some common values are:

1. *Survival of the human species*. This value implies recognition that we all are part of a common human family who originated in common ancestors despite our diversity in wealth, national origin, religion, race, gender, education, etc.
2. *Sustaining the earth as a habitat that is suitable for congenial human living*. This value implies that each generation of humans has a responsibility for doing this not only for themselves but also for future generations.
3. *Freedom to live in dignity, without humiliation*. This value implies that all individuals have the rights described in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.
4. *Freedom from fear*. This value implies that one or one’s loved ones would not be the victim of war or violence between groups which lead to harms such as death, injury, loss, or forced displacement from one’s home.
5. *Freedom of information, speech, beliefs, and assembly*. This implies access to free sources of information (such as books, the press, media, TV, the Internet); freedom to express one’s thoughts publicly and through the media; and freedom to assemble with others to exchange information, thoughts, and plans for nonviolent action. This also implies freedom of religion, as well as the freedom to reject religion.

6. *Freedom from want.* This implies that one is free of such impoverished circumstances that one and one's loved ones can have adequate care, food, water, shelter, health services, education, and other necessities for physical and emotional well-being as well as a dignified life.
7. Finally, all people should have the *right to be protected from violations of their freedoms and the right to seek redress if they are violated.* This implies the responsibility and freedom to protect others whose freedoms and rights are being threatened or violated.

All of the preceding common values, and more, are included in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and the *Declaration of the Rights and Responsibilities of Individuals, Groups, and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*. However, we have aimed for some of the brevity and simplicity well expressed in F.D.R.'s statement of *The Four Freedoms*.

Some Common Problems the Global Community Faces

Undoubtedly, as change agents seek to recruit people to active membership in the world community, initially, they will have to focus on only a few of these important collective problems. Which should be chosen? We shall nominate three. Our choices are:

1. *Climate change.* As a result of recent climate changes, there have been extensive droughts, floods, and devastating storms, which have affected worldwide food production and water supplies, killed many people, and made many homeless. As pollutants continue to accumulate in the Earth's atmosphere, it can be expected that such disastrous effects will intensify and, as the seas rise, the land on which hundreds of millions of people live will be flooded and become uninhabitable.

In the Stern Review (2006), a 700-page analysis, which was commissioned by the UK government and authored by Nicholas Stern, an economic adviser to Prime Minister Tony Blair and a former chief economist of the

World Bank, it was estimated that the costs of climate change, if not addressed, will be equivalent to losing 5 % (and potentially as much as 20 %) of the global domestic product (GDP) "each year, now and forever." Hundreds of millions of people could be threatened with hunger, water shortages, and severe economic deprivation. The report concluded that staving off such crises would require immediate investments equivalent to 1 % of global GDP over each of the next 10–20 years, before the window of opportunity to mitigate the biggest impacts of climate change closes.

Although there is increasing political awareness of the importance of addressing climate change, the critical investments needed to stave off an irreversible, catastrophic climate change have not yet been made. This is an issue of much urgency.

2. *Wars, violence, and their disastrous consequences.* To prevent wars, their causes will need to be addressed. There are of course many causes of war that could be identified. Here, we wish to emphasize several sociopsychological causes: (a) the belief that one is in a win-lose (competitive) relation to the other; (b) the view that one can intimidate, coerce, or defeat the other by the threat or use of force; (c) the belief that the other will seek to win through intimidation, coercion, or defeat of one by the use of force; and (d) the development of a military-industrial complex for the purposes of (b) or (c) which needs to justify its existence and large costs, once established, even if the preceding conditions (a, b, or c) no longer exist. Win-lose relations often develop between individuals, groups, or nations when they believe that what is essential to their well-being (e.g., wealth, scarce natural resources, power) is in scarce supply and cannot be shared at all or fairly. Leaders and the populations of various groups (nations, regions, political factions, etc.) must acquire the values, knowledge, and skills of constructive conflict resolution and integrative negotiation if they are to avoid the disastrous consequences of a win-lose approach to conflict (Deutsch 1994).

3. *Economic disruption and lack of effective economic functioning.* A well-functioning community requires a well-functioning economy that develops the resources and produces the goods and services which foster individual physical and mental well-being. It enables the support of the various institutions and roles within the community that foster such well-being: the family, education, health providers, government, a legal system, etc. Many factors can contribute to the poor functioning and disruption of an economic system. These include: poor cooperation and coordination among the various components of the system; corruption which siphons off considerable value produced by the economic system from the general population; injustices and social unrest resulting from gross inequality in the distribution of the income and wealth produced by the economic system; a short-term rather than long-term perspective; poor planning and poor regulation of the system so that overconsumption and greed lead to repeated crises and breakdown in the economic system; and the lack of recognition that a well-functioning system requires “social rationality” as well as “economic rationality.”

Some Other Sociopsychological Prerequisites for Developing a Global Community

There are several prerequisites to developing a global community in addition to identifying important values in common. They include: *communicating* to the possible members of such a community; helping those potential members *imagine* what it would be like; and helping them become *active*, at their local level as well as global level, in developing such a community. Each of these prerequisites is briefly discussed below in order to provide a context in which more expert knowledge could be presented or developed.

Communication

As events in Tunisia, Egypt, and other nations of the Middle East, known collectively as Arab Spring, indicate, modern communication

technology (e.g., social networks such as Facebook and Twitter) can quickly interconnect large numbers of people, motivate them, and help them coordinate their actions. This did not happen without some preplanning by a small group of change agents who were dissatisfied with the autocratic government in their countries and knew how to employ such technology to reach large numbers of people and organize them to demonstrate nonviolently for freedom and the end of autocratic rule.

Similarly, experts in modern communication technology could undoubtedly develop a communication strategy for reaching much of the world’s human population (see Bachstrom et al. 2006; Westaby 2012). Any group of change agents seeking to develop a global community should clearly include experts in modern communication technology who understand how access to such technology could be made available in areas of the world currently devoid of such technology. Such technology would have to include the capacity to communicate in languages and imagery appropriate to the various human populations of our planet. Online activist networks such as change.org and Avaaz are examples of organized change agents using social media to effect change at the global level.

Imagining

The context of the communication, we believe, should be hopeful, interesting, clear, and brief (with the possibility of accessing a fuller statement). It would communicate in shortened form (a) the basic rights and responsibilities, as well as the common problems, facing the members of a global community; (b) seek an affirmation or pledge of their willingness to be a responsible, active member of such a community; and (c) indicate what forms their activity might take. Specialists in public relations or in marketing, in creating illustrative imagery and in dramatizing, could provide invaluable guidance in developing a well-crafted, interesting message.

A prestigious, well-recognized group or organization should introduce the message in a detailed and compelling manner using a well-recognized, prestigious spokesperson. We are not specialists

but let us indicate how we might begin such a message. Our suggested message would begin as below:

Imagine a global human community in which you, your children, and grandchildren as well as all the others in our shared planet and their children and grandchildren:

... Are able to live in dignity and are treated fairly.
 ... Have freedom from the fear of violence and war and can live in peace.

...Have freedom from want so that you do not ever have to live in such impoverished circumstances that you and your loved ones cannot have adequate care, food, water, shelter, health services, education, and other necessities for physical and emotional well-being as well as a dignified life.

...Have freedom of information, publication, speech, beliefs, and assembly so that you can be free to be different and free to express open criticism of those in authority individually or collectively.

... Have the responsibility to promote, protect, and defend such freedoms as those described above for yourself as well as for others when they are denied or under threat.

...Will work together cooperatively to make the world that your grandchildren will inherit free of such problems as war, injustice, climate change, and economic disruption.

Are you willing be a member of such a global human community? If "yes", please make the following pledge:

I pledge to promote these rights and responsibilities in my own life, in my community, and in the global community as best I can through constructive nonviolent personal actions and working together with others. I also pledge to seek a constructive resolution of conflict about implementation of the foregoing values, when it arises, by working cooperatively to resolve the conflict with those with whom I am in conflict.

Now think of an action that you can take by yourself or with others, to implement the pledge and commit yourself to take this action. When you have taken the action let others know that you have done this by using social media or other means, so that you can inspire others to do so also.¹

¹The authors have undertaken an initial change effort to inspire people of the world to learn about, take, and act upon this pledge. We are at the beginning of our efforts: gaining prominent and well-known people to endorse and act upon this pledge as a way to influence others to do so. This is one of myriad ways to support the development of a global community.

Action Possibilities

For the global community to maintain the support of its members and to develop and function well, it has to develop a variety of institutions, social norms, and social roles as well as strategies for actions to deal with its collective problems and achieve its various goals. In our current world, some of this already exists but, unfortunately, much of what exists at all levels, (e.g., local, national, global) does not promote well the values described above nor the effective cooperative efforts to deal with the problems that confront us all. Thus, much action has to be directed at changing and reshaping what exists as well as erecting new institutions, norms, and roles.

The world is complex and multifaceted. Although "renaissance thinkers" may help provide an integrated overview, many problems at all levels of community also require specialized knowledge for their solution. Thus, we believe that it could be useful for change agents promoting a global community to seek to develop many internationally composed "Specialists Without Borders." Thus, in addition to Doctors Without Borders, there could be "Engineers Without Borders," "Business Leaders Without Borders," "Educators Without Borders," "Democracy Leaders Without Borders," "Farmers Without Borders," "Musicians Without Borders," "Artists Without Borders," and "Community Organizers Without Borders." Many other "specialists without borders" could be listed.

The point is that as members of a community seek to act in an effective way to deal with the problems of their community at whatever level, they may seek guidance in any or all aspects of problem solution: identifying the problem, diagnosing it, developing possible solutions, employing criteria to select the most effective in terms of the criteria, implementing the solution, evaluating its effectiveness, and making changes to improve its effectiveness. Having such help available will affirm values of a global community and stimulate action to deal with global problems and will also increase one's personal identification with the global community.

Personal Identification with the Global Community

Lindner (2012) has much that is relevant to this topic. Here, we would add that personal identification will grow as: (1) an individual experiences that more and more people are becoming so identified; (2) an individual engages in cooperative actions with others who are so identified; and (3) such actions begin to have some success in achieving goals of the global community.

Personal identification can be enhanced as the members of the global community develop unique indicators of membership such as: rituals (e.g., songs, chants, prayers, pledges, gestures), insignia (e.g., attire, rings, jewelry), displays (e.g., flags, posters, pictures of leaders), space (e.g., special buildings for global community functions, special cemeteries for global heroes, special arenas), celebrations and holidays, media and publications, education, history, and research disciplines. Of course, these would not supplant other important aspects of one's identity.

Group-as-a-whole theory (Wells 1995) is a useful perspective in thinking about how individuals and groups may identify (or not) with the global community. Group-as-a-whole theory posits that groups have "an élan vital" that binds them together that is more or less than each individual member (Wells 1995, p. 55). The theory includes the idea that groups engage in defense mechanisms, in particular splitting, to ward off anxiety when under threat (Wells 1995; Brazaitis 2004; McRae and Short 2010). The defense mechanism of splitting in this context refers to dividing the world, individuals, groups, subgroups, nations, etc. into all good or all bad. When former US President George Bush made his State of the Union speech on January 29, 2002, he identified states that constituted "the axis of evil." This is an example of the concept of splitting at the international level. If some nations were identified as evil, the implication is that others were the opposite. Identification with the global community necessitates working against destructive group dynamics such as splitting whereby other peoples, groups, nations are not

seen as "other," "not me," or "evil" but rather that each person recognizes their connection to each other person. Thus, the individuals in the global community make up the élan vital of the global group-as-a-whole. Said more specifically, in order to identify with the global community, Americans need to view Middle Easterners not as exotic or foreign, but rather as part of their own group; the French need to see Moroccans as *we/us*; the Koreans need to see the Chinese as a part of them, rather than "other"; and so on.

Indeed, personal identification with the global community can be difficult if it is perceived to be in conflict with one's other identifications—with, for example, one's national group or one's religion. Lindner's (2012) discussion of "subsidiarity" and "unity in diversity," as well as her image of a "sunflower identity," is very relevant here. Subsidiarity refers to the idea that local identities are preserved as much as possible (the European Union captures this idea) and building on the common ground that unites us in our commonality while rejecting that which separates groups into enemies or forces us into uniformity. Similarly, the idea of unity in diversity recognizes our commonality and appreciates our uniquenesses without letting those uniquenesses divide us.

Buchan et al. (2011) conducted a highly relevant study that suggested a key aspect in contributing to a global collective is social identification with the world community. Global social identification (GSI) is an inclusive identification with the world community and includes feeling attached to the world as a whole, defining oneself as a member of the world as a whole, and feeling close to other members of the world as a whole. The authors' study included over 1,000 participants from six countries around the world and their results found that global social identification played a role in motivating cooperation at the global level. Those who strongly identified with the world community made decisions that contributed to the collective good regardless of whether they expected a return on their investment. Further, this identification with the global collective played a role in global cooperation regardless of whether or not the participants thought others would behave cooperatively.

The authors posited that self-reported identification with the world as a whole may then generalize to the psychology of in-group behavior. Therefore, what one considers one's "group" may be as large as the world with the result that those in the world group or global community would exhibit the in-group behaviors of positivity, trust, cooperation, etc. Just as Wells (1995) suggested a group-as-a-whole mindset, Buchan and her colleagues (2011) suggested there may be a world-as-a-whole identification that could be critical to the development of a global community.

In her review article, Brewer (2007) cites research that suggests that the creation of a superordinate in-group identity need not lead subgroup members to give up their original group identity. Research supports the idea that dual or even multiple identities can reduce intergroup bias, particularly with a salient, inclusive superordinate identity. This implies that the creation of a strong identification with a broadly inclusive social group such as a global community need not lead one to give up or deny one's ethnic or other important identities.

Facilitating Change to Create a Functioning Global Community

To establish a functioning global community, we believe that we have to reform many existing institutions and create new ones, as necessary, so that they support the central values of a global community and contribute to the cooperative efforts to deal with global problems.

There are many different types of institutions and many exist at the international, multinational, national, and local levels. They include governmental, educational, health, economic, scientific, and others. It is clearly beyond the capacity of the authors to indicate how the institutions of the world should be reformed or to indicate what new institutions need to be created. However, we wish to make several points.

Just as change agents will seek to have many individuals in the world embrace active membership in a world community (including acceptance of its basic values and responsibility for

engaging in cooperative actions to deal with global problems), so too they should seek to have as many institutions in the world embrace active membership in the world community. They would seek to influence international corporations (such as Microsoft, General Electric, Exxon Mobil, and McDonalds) as well as nation-states and international organizations (such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Global Water Partnership), educational institutions, and so on. The existence of an active world citizen group should be able to help provide incentive and pressure for changes in institutions (and vice versa).

There are, undoubtedly, some institutions such as the United Nations that already embrace the values and responsibilities of active membership in a world community. The United Nations in its *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and its *Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups, and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* has articulated the basic values of a global community. And in its many agendas for action, it has articulated meritorious action related to dealing with global problems. Yet despite the many valuable activities of its various agencies (such as UNICEF, UN Development Programme), the United Nations has not yet been able to communicate to the world's people the values of its declarations defining human rights, freedoms, and responsibilities. Nor has it had much success in having implemented its agendas of action for global problems. This inability to accomplish these objectives undoubtedly reflects problems in the way the United Nations is structured and its lack of adequate resources. We shall not attempt to articulate here how the United Nations and other worthwhile global institutions could be changed to become more effective and have more resources. But change agents should have this as an important objective.

We organize the remainder of this section around the ways of thinking about bringing about change to increase the effectiveness of a global community. We address five psychological issues for change agents to address in working to

strengthen our global community: First, how do we resolve the dilemma of making decisions that favor individual interests versus those that favor collective or community interests? Here we apply and extend the ideas of Diesing (1962), Hardin (1968), and others around what change agents would need to do in order to address the “commons dilemma,” the tendency to act in favor of individual self-interest (of one’s group, community, organization, or nation) over common, global interests. Secondly, what strategies exist to encourage open-minded discussion so that the conflicts inherent in the myriad perspectives of a global community may be worked on constructively? Third, how can we extend individual entity time perspectives so that long-term global issues can be worked on without the constraints of the need for short-term gratification? Fourth, what are some ways to enhance the use of constructive conflict resolution techniques to deal with the inevitable conflicts inherent in this endeavor? And lastly, what kinds of influence strategies would be useful for bringing about change in the status quo between low power and high power groups? A last section offers some well-tested skills and methods for change agents working with large and diverse groups.

We particularly emphasize the commons dilemma as we see this as the central dilemma facing the development of a global community.

The Commons Dilemma and Complete Rationality

In developing a global community, it is important to avoid a common social dilemma: “the tragedy of the commons.” Hardin (1968) described *the tragedy of the commons* as arising from the situation in which multiple individuals, acting independently and rationally in terms of their own economic self-interest, will ultimately deplete a shared limited resource even when it is clear that it is not to anyone’s long-term interest for this to happen. This dilemma exists not only for interdependent individuals but also for interdependent groups, corporations, and nations. Thus, if individuals, groups, corporations, and nations disregard the costs to the global community of such sources of pollution of the

atmosphere as employing coal to produce electricity, gasoline guzzling cars, not keeping habitats and buildings well insulated, the methane gas resulting from certain forms of agriculture, the destruction of forests (which absorb pollutants), etc., global warming will occur with harm to individuals, groups, corporations, and nations. Similar to this dilemma are the variety of public goods dilemmas that we face as an interdependent community: when individuals create a public good, its benefit is available to all members of that community regardless of contribution. Opposite to this is the idea that when one entity creates a public harm, that harm is able to affect all members of that community even though they did not contribute to its creation. My country’s acceptance of high carbon emissions will affect the quality of your air.

Many solutions have been proposed for the tragedy of the commons (see Wikipedia, “The Tragedy of the Commons”). Here, we emphasize a motivational solution: recognition that the promotion of well-being for an individual (group, corporation, or nation) requires the employment of the other forms of rationality as well as economic rationality. As Diesing (1962) has indicated, there are five forms of rationality: *technical* (efficient achievement of a single goal), *economic* (efficient achievement of a plurality of goals), *legal* (rules or rule following), *political* (referring to the rationality of decision-making structures), and *social* rationality (integrating forces in individuals and social systems which generate meaning and allow action to occur). He defines rationality in terms of effectiveness and he describes a number of fundamental kinds of effectiveness in the social world: effectiveness refers to the successful production of any kind of value. A sixth type of rationality has also been added and labeled *ecological rationality*—reasoning that produces, increases, or preserves the capacity, resilience, and diversity of an ecosystem or, in its largest sense, the biosphere (Bartlett 1986).

We suggest extending the concept of social rationality and ecological rationality to include community or *global* rationality. Global rationality could be thought of as decision-making that is

guided by the effective creation of value for our global community. So, in addition to looking at decisions from technical, economic, legal, political, and ecological rationalities, an extension would be to look at decisions in terms of their global rationality or value in creating or strengthening global community. It is based on the salience of the “interdependence, obligation, and solidarity of unique relationships” connecting us to our global identity. *Complete rationality* would go beyond economic rationality and would require the integration of economic rationality with social (global) rationality and other forms of rationality as is appropriate to the specific situation of decision-making.

The limitations of “economic rationality” have been addressed in criticism of the measure of gross domestic product (GDP). The GDP is a flawed economic measure of the economic value of the goods produced nationally in a given year (it does not include many costs of increased economic production such as the costs produced by environmental pollution) which is often taken as an indicator of the well-being of the nation’s citizens, individually and collectively. Thus, Stiglitz et al. (2010) argue, in *Mismeasuring Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn’t Add Up*, that the GDP is a deeply flawed indicator of well-being. Also, Nussbaum (2011), in her recent book, *Creating Capabilities, The Human Development Approach*, indicates that equating doing well (for a nation) with an increase in GDP per capita distracts attention from the real problems of creating well-being for all members of a society by suggesting that the right way to improve the quality of life is by economic growth alone (i.e., increased GDP).

A question that arises, then, is how can change agents encourage individuals and organizations to use *complete rationality*, and not simply *economic rationality*, in their long-term strategies and day-to-day decisions?

This is a complicated matter that has been looked at from different perspectives. One important way is to redefine national as well as global well-being to include many more indicators than GDP. Thus, at the national levels, one would also include measures related to education, health, longevity, civil rights, income and

wealth equality, social mobility, incarceration rate, and so forth. At the global level, one would include not only measures similar to those at the national level, but for the global level such other measures as number of refugees, value of global arms trade, recurrences of violent conflicts within and between nations, global measures of atmospheric pollution, and measures of existing natural resources such as water, minerals, forests, biodiversity, etc. would be included.

It is an important task for scientists from many disciplines to work together to develop systematic, comprehensive measures of global functioning. Such measures, if taken annually, would help identify problems which need addressing and when addressed, if they are being addressed effectively. Currently, there exist many different measures of various aspects of global functioning. Most of the measures compare the various nations of the world on one or another measure. For example, the Gallup Poll provides polling data in 170 countries on individual well-being (percentage of people thriving): in the United States it was 57 % for 2010 and in Denmark, 82 %. The United Nations has also developed many measures: the Human Development Index is a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education, and standards of living worldwide (in 2010 Norway ranked #1 and the United States #4); Standard of Living World Statistics provides data on various measures of all the world’s nations; thus, the United States ranks highest among the world’s nations in GDP, but it has a relatively high measure of income inequality (a Gini index of 45, compared to Sweden’s 25). In addition, there exist various global measures such as: the atmospheric buildup of greenhouse gases and the status of various natural resources (such as oil, water, minerals, forests, etc.).

There may be a need for additional measures of national and global well-being. However, we suggest that it would be valuable to develop several meaningful indices at the global level which would provide a clear, simple picture to understand the state of our world. We timidly suggest that they might include global indices of the status of: Human Development, the

Environment, Natural Resources, Destructive Conflict, and Economic Productivity.

One relevant perspective here is that of the conflict between decision-making that maximizes self-interest in the short term and decision-making that maximizes self and common or global interests in the short *and* long term. Ironically, in terms of global rationality, decisions that maximize self-interest in the short term often have a deleterious effect on the long-term community interests, which therefore would include oneself in those deleterious effects. For example, your decision to purchase a gas guzzling car rather than a hybrid car might involve a short-term gain for you in terms of a lower price and a long-term harm to the larger community (e.g., increased carbon dioxide pollution). When you make decisions, individual (economic) rationality must be supplanted with a global (social) rationality. Your decision to purchase a gas guzzling car is best considered in light of not only what is best for you now but what is best for you and your global community now *and later*. Your short-term decisions that benefit you also have long-term consequences that harm you along with the larger system of which you are part. Hardin (1968) expresses this dilemma poignantly in the following: “The individual benefits as an individual from his ability to deny the truth even though society as a whole, of which he is a part, suffers” (p. 1245).

This framework can be applied to how we look at some of the world’s problems: by expanding our emphasis from individual (group, corporate, or national) harms and benefits to include benefits and harms to our global community. Change agents need to work to change the orientation of nation-states, multinational organizations, and other entities that have a significant influence on our global community.

They should be encouraged to recognize, and to act upon their recognition, that they are part of an interdependent global community and that their own welfare is linked to the welfare of the other members of the global community. Here, we again note briefly an interesting research study, “Global Social Identity and Global Cooperation” (Buchan et al. 2011), which employed a typical

commons dilemma experiential format involving 1,195 participants from six countries. Its results indicate that those subjects who had a global social identification were significantly more likely to overcome the commons dilemma.

Developing Open-Mindedness

A second obstacle concerns the challenge of overcoming closed-mindedness or encouraging open-mindedness in embracing divergent viewpoints to address common problems. Open-mindedness as defined by Tjosvold and colleagues (2014) is the willingness to seek out evidence that goes against one’s own ideas and beliefs and to judge them on their merits, without favor to one’s own perspective. Therefore, closed-mindedness would be the opposite—the unwillingness to seek out information that goes against one’s beliefs or positions or to discard any evidence that does not support one’s own views or beliefs. How then can we overcome this challenge and promote open-minded discussion among members of the global community? Tjosvold and colleagues define four mutually reinforcing aspects of open-minded discussion: developing and expressing one’s own ideas (perspective giving), questioning and understanding other’s views and ideas (perspective taking), integrating and synthesizing to generate new perspectives, and agreeing and implementing some kind of solution. The second characteristic entails the acknowledgement of the other side’s perspective. The importance of being heard has been documented in some interesting research by Bruneau and Saxe (2012). The four qualities are presented linearly, but parties may move back and forth between them. When this happens interpersonally or across groups, organizations, and nations, it promotes constructive conflict resolution. These four qualities are embodied in an effective and well-tested methodology for addressing complex problems and conflicts: Constructive Controversy (Johnson et al. 2014). This is a methodology used in large and small groups to creatively address controversial and complex conflicts facing the group. Unlike debate and concurrence seeking, in constructive controversy, different advocacy groups seek out

information to support their perspective and present their strongest arguments in favor of those perspectives. This is followed by changing perspectives and now developing their strongest argument supporting the opposite point of view. Upon mutual clarification, group members drop their advocacy and synthesize the best of both perspectives to reach a consensual decision. Once a decision is made, the group reflects on their process and performance and implements their decision.

Encouraging a Long-Term Time Perspective

The third issue of importance to change agents is understanding ways to shift the time perspective so that individual decision-making is not constrained in favor of short-term gratification to the detriment of long-term benefit and goal attainment. In the United States, for example, many public corporations are governed strictly by short-term stock price. Executive compensation, stockholder dividends, and department budgets are based almost entirely on quarterly earnings. The short-term focus impedes accomplishment of long-term, far-off goals that have few near-term success indicators (such as reducing carbon emissions to slow the rise of sea levels). The research and theorizing on the delay of gratification conducted by Walter Mischel and his colleagues over the last several decades provide some insight and understanding into developing complete rationality. Mischel and colleagues have investigated the cognitive processes and conditions involved in why people are able to delay gratification or not. We can link the ideas to the commons dilemma. Mischel et al. (2006) suggested that to successfully enable willpower, one must understand two interacting “systems:” a “hot” or “go” system may be understood as that which is emotional, simple, reflexive, and fast. We are often well aware of how particular actions will gratify self-interest. In contrast, they propose a cool or “know” system that is complex, contemplative, strategic, reflective, and emotionally neutral. It is this system that, in successful instances of self-control, comes into play to balance the actions of the “go” system.

Relating this to the commons dilemma suggests that learning of ways to increase the activity of the “know” system can have useful benefits for strengthening decision-making that is based on global rationality rather than solely on economic rationality.

Another way to increase our skills at increasing our focus on long-term thinking was investigated by researchers interested in ways to minimize excessive discounting of the future. Here the focus of study was on looking at ways to increase retirement savings among college-age students. A recent study conducted by Hershfield et al. (2011) used a creative method for influencing greater retirement savings, a long-term goal, for people whose time perspective is far shorter. College-age individuals in this study were shown computer-generated images of themselves as senior citizens. These visualizations of self had a positive impact on their retirement savings intentions in the present day. Such reality-based visualization is one way of lengthening our time perspective to work toward far-off goals that are difficult to see and feel in the near term.

Applying this idea to the development of a global community might lead to developing imagery that connects the physically familiar with the temporally distant. For example, using vignettes that offer visions of communal life in which a cooperative global community has worked to successfully develop a stable and functioning economy slowed global warming and/or eliminated violence, and its aftermath could encourage the longer-term time perspective that is essential.

Use of Constructive Conflict Resolution Techniques

A fourth area of challenge for the change agent is to identify ways to address the inevitable conflicts inherent in the creation of a global community using constructive rather than destructive methods of resolution. In other words, it is imperative to find ways of reducing the overreliance on destructive conflict resolution methods (e.g., use of coercion, violence, power over others, escalation, a win/lose orientation, impoverished communication between parties in

conflict, autistic hostility, to name just a few) and increasing use of constructive conflict techniques. Such techniques as creative problem-solving, using active listening methods of communication, reframing the conflict as a joint problem rather than the other's problem, and so forth are important characteristics to develop in a cooperative global community. These and other techniques have a solid history of empirical support in moving conflict in a constructive rather than a destructive direction. See Coleman et al. (2014) for a comprehensive discussion of issues related to constructive conflict resolution and negotiation.

Influence Strategies

One can anticipate that those with values interested in the existing institutions will often resist change. This is strongly the case when preserving the status quo also preserves one's power over others. Elsewhere, Deutsch (2006) has discussed extensively two important strategies for overcoming this kind of injustice: *persuasion strategies* and *nonviolent power strategies*. The essences of these two strategies are briefly summarized below, followed by some implications for their use by change agents to enhance the functioning of a global community.

Persuasive Strategies

Persuasive strategies involve three types of appeals:

1. *Moral values*: Appeals to moral values assume that those high power group members are not fully aware of the negative impact of their power on low power group members. For example, one might appeal to values related to justice, to religion, and to the welfare of one's grandchildren, to name a few. Engaging high power members to see the discrepancy between their practices and their moral values, or conscience, could move them to take action and change their behavior.
2. *Self-interest*: These kinds of appeals emphasize the gains that can be obtained and losses that can be prevented when the high power group gives up some of its power and cooperates with the request of the low power group. It is important that such messages be carefully constructed to include characteristics as described by Deutsch (2006). Two examples are to clearly state the specific actions and changes requested of the high power group and to highlight the values and benefits to the high power group by cooperating.
3. *Self-actualization*: Appeals to self-actualization focus on enhancing the sense that one's better self is being actualized, a self that one has wanted to be. In a sense, these are a type of self-interest appeal. The gain for the high power group is the feelings associated with an actualized self. In considering ways that one might give up one's power *over* others, change agents may emphasize the use of one's power to further common interests, the spiritual emptiness of power over others, and the fulfillment of creating something that goes well beyond self benefit. By creating power *with* others rather than maintaining power *over* (Follett 1924), high power groups may actually increase their power. For example, the Gates Foundation acts in ways that are patriotic to a global community (in, e.g., their efforts at eradicating certain diseases and thereby increasing the health of the global community). Here, economic power is being used to address one problem in our global community, and doing so increases the power of the global community. Contrast this with the reluctance of Egypt's military leaders to give up some of their control over Egypt's industries. Here, persuasive strategies aimed at self-actualization might emphasize the possibility of increasing the total economic output by engaging a wider sector of the labor force, perhaps with greater skill and qualifications.

Low power groups seeking change in those who have a vested interest in maintaining their power sometimes find it difficult to employ persuasion strategies because of rage or fear. *Rage*, as a result of the injustices they have experienced, may lead them to seek revenge, to harm, or to destroy those in power. *Fear* of the power of the powerful to inflict unbearable harm

may inhibit efforts to bring about change in the powerful.

Given the possibility of the prevalence of rage or fear among low power groups, it would be the goal of change agents to harness the energy created by feelings of rage and fear and convert it into effective cooperative action (see Gaucher and Jost 2011). By engaging large numbers of people through social media and other communication methods, the energy generated by feelings of rage or fear can be channeled toward effective action. Here the task of the change agent is to help people realize that they are more likely to achieve their goals through effective action including cooperation with potential allies among members of high power groups. It is important for the change agent to recognize the power of the motivational energy of low power groups, regardless of its source.

A potentially effective strategic starting point using persuasive strategies would be for low power groups to use social influence strategies by seeking out and creating alliances with those members of high power groups, as well as other prestigious and influential people and groups, who are sympathetic to their efforts of building a global community (Deutsch 2006). Developing allies is a key method of increasing a low power group's power and of increasing its influence and credibility with those in power.

It is useful for change agents to understand the psychological implications of appealing to the power needs of members of high power groups: i.e., understanding how to convince those in power that their power needs can be fulfilled through fostering social or "global" rationality.

Nonviolent Power Strategies

Nonviolent power strategies involve enhancing one's own power (by developing the latent power in one's self and one's group, as well as developing allies), employing the power of the powerful against the powerful, and reducing the power of the powerful. Gene Sharp (1971) has elaborated in great detail the many tactics available to those who seek to employ nonviolent power strategies. There are three types of nonviolent actions:

1. Acts of protest such as what has been occurring recently in the Middle East
2. Noncooperation such as in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* when the women withhold sex from their spouses until war is abolished
3. Nonviolent intervention such as general strikes and other methods of disrupting the economy and other components of the status quo

It is well to recognize that the employment of nonviolent methods against a potentially violent, autocratic, resistant-to-change power often requires considerable courage, discipline, stamina, as well as effective preplanning and organization.

There is a difference between persuasive strategies and nonviolent strategies. Nonviolent strategies are often used when persuasion strategies by themselves are not effective in bringing about change. The aim of nonviolent strategies is to "open" those in power so that they can be persuaded to change: resistance to and interference with the implementation of the power of the high power group makes its power ineffective and opens it to the possibility of persuasion. Both are useful in altering the status quo in service of strengthening the global community. However, in contrast to violent strategies, neither persuasion nor nonviolence seeks to destroy those in high power: they seek to change the relationship so that power is shared and used to benefit the entire community.

There are two major problems with the use of violence. It commonly leads to increasing destructive cycles of reciprocating violence between the conflicting parties. And, it can transform those using violent methods into mirror images of one another: so, if a low power group employs violence to overthrow a tyrannical high power group, it may become tyrannical itself. The foregoing is not meant to suggest that violence is never necessary to stop unrelenting violence and resistance from a murderous other. However, one should guard against the potential self-transforming effects of engaging in violence.

Change Agent Skills and Methods

Change agents will need to be skilled in facilitating intergroup relations as they work to

develop the global community. Ramsey and Latting (2005) offer a set of 14 competencies that can be applied to working across social differences – race, ethnicity, religious identity, nationality, etc. These competencies make up a theoretically and empirically grounded typology that includes both reflection and action at multiple levels of a system (i.e., the individual, the group, the organization, and the environmental context). Their typology looks at skills useful for: self reflection and action, effective relationships with others, enhancing critical consciousness (e.g., addressing dominant/nondominant group dynamics), and surfacing and working through systemic patterns. The authors delineate and describe such competencies as “reframing mental models,” “empathizing with multiple perspectives,” “connecting the personal to the cultural and social,” and “advocating and engaging in systemic change” all of which are directly relevant to fostering the global community (Ramsey and Latting 2005, p. 268).

Methods and models for large systems change efforts needed to develop the global community have been created by organizational psychologists with expertise in large-scale group interventions. Bunker and Alban (2005) have compiled numerous examples of successful efforts to engage large groups of people to plan and implement needed change in a special issue of *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* on large group interventions. In that issue Lukensmeyer and Brigham (2005) describe a method for holding town meetings with thousands of citizens so as to effect national scale change. Tan and Brown (2005) detail using the technique of the World Café with citizens from all walks of life in Singapore as part of an effort to create a national learning culture and to move from a hierarchical societal structure to a more open and inclusive one. Lent et al. (2005) discuss using the processes of Future Search and Open Space to help a religious community decide and implement its new future directions. Each of these examples provides possible strategies and methods for change agents working to develop a global community.

Negotiators working in the international arena are change agents in this realm. As such, they would be well served to increase their facility in

working in groups, in enhancing their influence skills, and in dealing with some of the complex problems arising from the above five areas.

Conclusions

In this chapter, we have employed social psychological knowledge about groups and how they form, how they develop, and how individuals identify with them—to provide a framework for thinking about some of the issues related to developing a global community. We have considered how ordinary people who live on our planet might be approached to induce them to become members of a global community. We have also considered how those in power who control the existing institutions in the world might be influenced to take a global perspective. Our discussion is only an outline of some of the important social psychological issues involved in developing a global community. Clearly, scholars from many different disciplines have a lot of work to do to build a base of knowledge that would help to foster an effective, sustainable global community. It is our belief that developing such knowledge is an urgent need that should involve more and more scholars and receive encouragement and support from universities, foundations, and governments.

We conclude by borrowing a phrase from a fine novelist, Colum McCann (2009, p.366): “*It is more difficult to have hope than to embrace cynicism.*” Let us maintain hope that we can improve the world and let us act to fulfill that hope.

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Part VII

Diplomacy and International Negotiation

Cardinal Renato Raffaele Martino

Introduction

Why do human beings harm each other and, in the worst case scenario, themselves? What inner forces lead us to choose destruction rather than constructive building, to prefer conflict rather than cooperation? What psychological processes enable us to listen to our demons, letting them escape into this Garden of Eden where we should all be living together? What makes humanity so dangerous to itself? What uncontrolled mechanism tempts us to open our Pandora's boxes, and where are the negotiated solutions to be found? Questions of this kind have been raised by men and women throughout history, seeking an answer to the reasons for the violent conflicts which have shaped our history. Nowadays, questioning such conflict and the seemingly interdependent processes of war and peace requires that we consider the context of our globalized world, a world that day by day is becoming increasingly interconnected. As never before, the world seems poised on the edge of a huge clash between culture and civilizations. We retain the twentieth-century legacy of an unprecedented threatened humanity with new destructive capabilities which

showed how human beings cannot only exterminate but, perhaps worse, alienate and annihilate each other. We have just left behind a century that was peculiar from all points of view. Unprecedented growth, both demographically and a technologically, provided the context in which humanity sustained the two bloodiest episodes of our history. The horrific events of the first half of the century were followed by survival in a world with a new and dangerous balance of terror, which characterized the second half of the century. With the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, one of the darkest periods of human history subsided, leaving all the elements for an even darker one. The years across the two centuries greeted the new millennium with further fratricide conflicts at the heart of Europe and in the world, followed by 9/11, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, to mention but a few.

Just when two big blocks of countries stopped threatening and fighting each other, several new and smaller centres of power followed the same old path: of choosing death instead of life, conflict and competition instead of cooperation and war instead of peace. In a world where conflict and war often seem to signify a clash between cultures and religions, the point of view of the Church of Rome on the meanings of conflict and its opposite, cooperation and peace, may be relevant. In this regard, as President Emeritus of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace and former Representative of the Holy See at the United Nations, I have dealt thoroughly with the prob-

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lem of peace, investigating the concept according to its ontological meaning and within the historical context of the contemporary globalized world.

Theological Meanings of Peace

The real meaning of peace is not to be found in a mere and temporary absence of its opposite—i.e. war—but rather should be viewed as a social status based on the rule of law on the one hand and on the inevitable observance of human rights on the other. Peace is a dynamic process that exists in a society in which important values such as *tolerance*, *solidarity*, *development* and *social justice* are deep rooted (Matsuura, in Martino 2005). In order to pave the way, the people of the world must build a common space where they can live together in respect, tolerance and enthusiasm, instead of the fear of diversity on the basis of mere prejudice. It is just in this that the difference between freedom and the cage of fear may lie. The real meaning of peace does not simply lie in a word, universally acknowledged by all mankind, but rather gains its strength according from the idea that we ourselves—socially, culturally and individually—create it. As I have pointed out: “There is no doubt that the Old Testament recommends the ideal of peace, but it is necessary to interpret its message in a particularly careful way” (Martino 2005, p. 9). In the same way, it is quite easy to find several messages, doctrines and systems of beliefs based on the value of peace in all religions. In particular the three monotheistic creeds base a major part of their dogmas on the ideal of peace. Nevertheless, a huge paradox has characterized the story of humanity: good ideas and theories versus their negative application in society, showing how applying the wrong meaning to a positive idea can bring about evil outcomes. Countless are the episodes in which a deep-rooted perception and misinterpretation of sacred writings has led to thinking errors and biases, leading humanity into dangerous intolerance, chauvinism and extremism, with consequences far from the original message of peace and fraternity. As a matter of fact, words often carry meanings that we have given them ourselves. In order to find complete reconciliation

between the members of a given society and ultimately between societies, the real meaning of peace needs to be found in the inner nature of men and women, within the deepest ego of each social subject. As with every idea, peace will become real at the social level only when we find it within ourselves.

Theologically, the concept of peace may be understood according to two levels, which to some extent have alternated with different eras of Christianity. On one hand, in the common use of the word, it merely implies an absence (usually temporary) of war and conflict. On the other hand, it may display a deeper meaning, if linked to the fulfilment of an inner harmony of the self, both with others and with God. In this regard, in order to understand the kind of peace that we should try to achieve and to have a clearer idea of how to get there, I come back to the Hebrew word *shalom*. In its deepest meaning, this word transcends a simple commonly understood idea of peace; rather it includes concepts such as harmony and serenity. In this view, peace comes directly from God, who grants it to men and women in return for virtuous conduct. To this extent, justice is the main virtue for the purpose of achieving peace. This is an idea of peace derived from the Old Testament, implying the fulfilment of both material and spiritual well-being, for individuals as well as the community. It is a whole understanding of peace, according to which not only war in the strict sense but also a broader meaning of conflict including the ideas of sin and injustice is the main threat to its fulfilment. Sin and injustice are seen as elements introducing imbalance and disorder into the community. Therefore, peace is conceptualized as existing on two levels which coexist and are mutually influenced, namely, personal and social. Indeed, only if peace exists within people can it be achieved socially and vice versa. If we contextualize such a principle according to our contemporary environment, it follows that, in a globalized world, community should be seen as such, and therefore peace should be achieved at a global level. If one area of injustice exists, though it may be far from our area of concern, there will not be peace in the community of citizens on this planet and, consequently, within ourselves.

This view of peace is deepened in the New Testament where, in compliance with the Old Testament, the alliance between man and God is embodied in the figure of Jesus Christ. To this extent, God grants peace to mankind, as a gift that frees him from sin, which, in turn, is the main obstacle to the achievement of peace. The only condition for men and women to live in peace in society is to be at peace with God. In this regard, God is ultimately “the God of peace, which is also identified with Jesus himself” (Ibid., p. 19). How then is war justified, if Jesus is to some extent the guarantor of peace? As with every gift given by God, peace requires man’s cooperation, starting with his identification with Jesus Christ. In this way, every Christian is de facto a promoter of peace. “Peace is a concession granted by God, as a God of peace Himself, but it is subject to human freedom, which in turn is also a gift from God, but which implies fallibility” (Ibid., p. 24, 29). History tells us that it is far easier to talk about war rather than peace. Since its appearance on Earth, human beings have been fighting and challenging each other, and countless episodes of violence have soiled our lost paradise with blood. So far we have paved a way built with conflict more than cooperation, and where we have surely witnessed more scenes of blood than of doves. With this reasoning it is easy to identify peace as a “dependent” concept, finding its realization only in the absence of its opposite process—i.e. war—and therefore subject to impermanence and instability, faced as it is with the daily suffering and fear that characterizes the world. In contrast, a concept of peace based on a broader view, relying on inner fulfilment and contemplating harmony and respect for self and other, tends to be linked to a vain and remotely utopian dimension. As I have already stated, words are very meaningful in this regard: “[...] hence, every discourse on peace must begin from the widespread and devastating presence of conflict and violence in men and women’s world—both on the level of interpersonal relations and relations between social classes, national powers, cultural provinces in which humanity is divided—and even within every single man and woman’s heart. This observation brings us face to face with

the unintelligible dimension and the concept of the absurdity” (Ibid., p. 31).

From the point of view of the faith in God and Jesus Christ, all forms of violence—even those that may apparently have a rational ground—are unjustified and unjustifiable. Indeed, the use of violence breaks both the alliance between man and God and the project of peace and inner realization that God envisages for humanity. Thus, the divine design posits a twofold idea of community: the first is between man and God, and the second is between men themselves. Any breach in the human relationship with God arises through sin, which in turn comes from human free will. Men and women can choose peace rather than war, cooperation rather than competition and harmony rather than disharmony. As stated by Albert Ellis in the foreword to Aquilar and Galluccio’s book (Ellis, 2008, p. vii): “Peace negotiators can choose, if they will, to select peaceful negotiation or combative methods to try to solve national and international conflict. Yes select. Most nations and individuals choose to select fighting—with predictable results”. Nevertheless, the power of this choice may go further towards individual responsibility, given that sin may find a ground for spreading through social interaction, starting a process that becomes unmanageable for individuals. Nevertheless, the seed of peace lies within individuals and the society, and the challenge for human beings is to nurture it.

Ethical Compromise or Absolute Non-violence?

Even within the ethics of the Catholic Church, there are diverging interpretations, which can be identified as the *ethical compromise* or the *prophecy of absolute non-violence*. The ethical compromise posits the idea of a *just war*, one that is waged for the sole purpose of self-defence, which excludes, for instance, the concept of preventive war. The just war is also limited by another categorical imperative, namely, the principle of proportionality, according to which the damage of the counterreaction must be proportional to the threat of the aggression. Beyond this is the

Machiavellian idea that the end justifies the means must be turned upside down; in fact, no action is justifiable if carried out by evil means. Interestingly, such limitations to the concept of a *just war* are embodied in many parts of the actual rules of international law, especially under its humanitarian branch. The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and additional protocols, for instance, are meant to guide the behaviour and emphasize the responsibilities of combatants, not only towards civilians but also among themselves. Seemingly, the principle of proportionality is frequently adopted in the rules of engagement. This shows how much has been accomplished in the last century, especially after the WWII, towards normalizing—if not avoiding—belligerent activities and violent conflict. Moreover, it suggests teaching following the tragedy of the aforesaid war allowed humanity to take a big step towards a more unified world.

On the other hand, the Church has always envisaged a more radical way of sustaining peace through the absolute and uncompromising abstention from violence, which more properly embraces the example of Jesus Christ and the will of God, calling for active but non-violent methods of defence preventing armed conflict. Moreover, nowadays the destructive potential possessed by not only superpowers but also other nations and groups changes the warlike logic of the past—as the two world conflicts and the following cold war have shown—to the extent that contemporary war could, by extension, lead to a nuclear holocaust rather than an ultimate means of reaching peace. As a matter of fact, “more than a defence, it [war] is revealed as a symptom of the same illness that it wishes to cure; as continuity, rather than rupture, with the logic of violence that it wishes to hinder and that it finally perpetuates in similar forms” (Ibid., p. 41).

Educating to Peace

At the end of the day, one of the hardest challenges to social solidarity is personal interest, which exacerbates a blind impulse for self-gratification, preventing action at a more empathetic level. For

instance, the weapon industry, whose motive often goes beyond self-defence (to sustain shady and lucrative business dealings). This kind of behaviour may be hard to eradicate, in terms of achieving peace, simply because greater importance is placed on personal profit—rather than the sympathetic will to prevent suffering and death. Nevertheless, there is another less pragmatic and more psychological aspect of war, namely, feelings of hatred, rage, hostility and disgust. These feelings together with thinking errors and beliefs trigger dangerous vicious circles, leading people to evil perceptions of themselves and others, freezing the effects of war during periods of peace and therefore increasing the risk of further violent conflicts. On the contrary, peace is a process, a long and twisted road, which must be paved gradually, step by step. Peace is not the destination at the end of the road; it is the road itself. In this regard: “Who wants peace should prepare for war is just the epiphenomenon of a previous absence of peace. Building peace means above all to take ground away from two causes of violent conflicts and wars: injustices and oppression. [...] This peace building [...] begins with the education to peace. But educating to peace means above all to be witnesses of peace, it means having realized it within oneself and starting from oneself” (Ibid., p. 44–45). Peace is a state of mind.

As I am writing, violent conflicts are in reality occurring in the world, provoking the killing and blessing of thousands of civilians. This is rapidly turning—along with the actual situation in Syria—into one of the worst contemporary crises in the world. Only 2 years ago, the world welcomed the advent of democracy in a large section of the Middle East, following the Arab Spring. To this extent, the Egyptian crisis, for instance, reveals not only instability in that delicate area but also how feeble, fragile and temporary, in general, the concept of peace may be if it has no underlying support. Again, this reminds us that it is critical for peace to be deep rooted in peoples’ consciousness, in order for it to arise, and not only be accepted as the temporary resolution of a crisis situation. As we have anticipated, in the contemporary era, people are more closely

committed in increasingly interconnected relationships, informed by the media about what is going on in each other's countries, virtually linked through the massive presence of social networks. This globalizing process brings peoples together, building mutual acceptance and global concern for the well-being of others. The widespread focus on human rights violations or other global concerns—such as food, global warming and pollution—is an example of the relatively recent emergence of a global civil society. The European Union may be a prime example of the contemporary direction of international relations: following the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht, the free movement of goods, capitals and people on a big regional common territory has become a daily norm in Europe, enhancing a slow but progressive process of mutual acceptance and welcoming. Nevertheless, there is also another darker side of the same coin. Bringing people together does not always guarantee peaceful and respectful relationships, since proximity does not necessarily engender empathy and cooperation. Instead, if not addressed correctly, sharing may increase the spread of a dangerous xenophobia. In order to live peacefully, people have to respect each other, and to do that they need to understand each other. Again, this is a road that can only be travelled step by step; it is a long process that cannot ignore the building of confidence and trust. In turn, confidence and trust are not built but instead developed continuously through the reiteration of thoughts that reflect respectful relationships. This reaffirms the necessity for peace to be built on solid ground and to become deep rooted within consciousness, which can only be achieved through education and training activities.

Positive and Negative Meanings of Peace

It is worth it to understand how we actually tend to give peace a negative rather than positive meaning. As we have noted, peace is usually defined by default, namely, as the absence of war. Such an approach relegates peace to a secondary plan, strictly depending upon war, a consequence

rather than a condition in itself. On the contrary, war is usually taken for granted, as necessary and expected. Enlightenment philosophy, which has considerably influenced our view of society, advanced the concept of the social contract, according to a *homo homini lupus* rhetoric. From this perspective both war and conflict are seen as the prime agents of society and as the necessary cause for agreement on basic rules and a common set of laws. Consequently, peace and cooperation would not be an exception but an artificially derived product of the social contract. In my view this is an incorrect idea, which leads us to tolerate war and forget that instead it should not exist. In this regard, I warn that in focusing on an overly simplified conception of “peace as absence of war, we risk overlooking the idea that peace is also and perhaps above all, the outcome of ethically positive attitudes. It is these attitudes which need to be promoted and about which we have to be educated. [...] Not only is it a situation, but first of all a virtuous quality of the person, and not simply a happy event that an adequate ‘just cause’ may interrupt at any time” (Ibid., p. 26).

Accordingly, the only way to achieve peace is to pursue truth, because it is the only possible criterion for comparison and of making every perspective worthy of a hearing. Indeed, “it is possible to understand one another, because beyond personal interests there is the need of peace, beyond the different ideologies there is human nature, beyond different peoples’ stories—often conflictual—there is the common human family” (Ibid., p. 58). If we acknowledge the strict relation between peace and truth, then it follows that what causes human beings to choose war and conflict rather than peace and cooperation is the weakening of the sense of truth within the consciousness of men and women themselves. I identify such a phenomenon as nihilism, which may in turn lead to the dangerous spread of terrorism and fundamentalism. Especially nowadays, these latter are a main cause for the clash of civilizations and ultimately a massive threat to peace. The Church’s teaching obstructs nihilism with reason and faith, claiming that “the word of God reveals men and women’s ultimate aim, giving a global sense to their acting in the

world” (John Paul II, in *Ibid.*, p. 61). In this regard, human intellect has been formed to know the truth, which contemplates peace as the ultimate end. In fact, such universal truth drives men to approach each other, minimizing the perception of diversities in the light of human universality. To the contrary, what leads to fundamentalism is the conviction that one is owner of an absolute truth—rather than being owned by the truth—to the extent that you will impose this view through extreme and even violent means.

Horizontal Wars

One of the direct consequences of globalization and the information revolution has been the damaging of classic historical societal assets. Both conflict and cooperation are nowadays located in several centres of power which go beyond the individual power of states. While everything seems to be at one’s fingertips, in this big global village, the world is also more unpredictable, with new facets arising every day. War and conflict may be everywhere and start at any time and in any way. It is the attack of 9/11, 2001, that seems to have inaugurated a new era for mankind; when the twin towers collapsed, they also destroyed a certain view of human life: “It has been as if the whole world, with all of its tensions and conflicts, fell into a room all of a sudden; it has been as if the tragedies of the world dropped by our houses. History knocked on all our doors reminding us that even there, in our houses, it was not possible to hide. [...] Just because it is daily and widespread, war is also much less possible to control, since it happens without respecting any rules anymore” (Martino 2005, p. 74).

Even though, in my view, the causes of our current uncertainty have an ethical and anthropological nature, more so than sociological; nowadays war and conflict are entrenched within society. The damaging of society from the inside through various forms of daily injustice and violence has been exacerbated by the transforming and transformative nature of globalization. This imbues situations of both war and peace with profound meaning as well as a sense of uncer-

tainty. The new millennium brought deep changes for societies. In the course of history, the world has never been so small, and its peoples never as close as they now are today. Today news can be delivered anywhere in the world within a second. Consequently people may be witnesses of what happened or what is happening at their antipodes, almost instantaneously. This dissemination of information can strengthen or weaken ideas, and the power of ideas can tear regimes down. The recent events that led to the burst of the Arab Spring are a clear example of that. All this is unavoidable and apparently uncontrollable, but still we should be vigilant, because it is happening, for better or for worse. Thus we are all like inhabitants of the same neighbourhood, making us responsible for our actions before the eyes of the world village.

There is a great paradox in current global affairs, a kind of tension between the profound need for cooperation and normalization of relations, as opposed to the uncontrolled and uncontrollable flood of conflict and violence at every level. An easy objection might be that, at the end of the day, there is nothing new about this and cooperation and conflict have always been the two magnetic poles of humanity. Nevertheless, in the new millennium, these forces seem to operate according to a new factor, namely, an apparent uncontrollability. The aftermath of WWII kept the world breathless, under the atomic threat, but everything was regulated by the balance of terror. On the contrary, the globalization process “does not have a precise face, but an elusive, ambiguous and controversial face. It is a multifaceted process, with many nuances, which is not possible to completely classify. [...] It is a phenomenon rejecting all forecasts and that ‘seems to be going ahead by itself’”. Just for this reason “globalization asks to be ruled [...] [and] all its meaning will depend on its human face” (Martino 2009, pp. 26–28). Another aspect of the legacy of WWII is just the aforesaid attempt of normalizing international relations: the United Nations was established; the Geneva Conventions were signed, starting a progressive process that included establishment of the International Criminal Court, as well as the start of a general

human rights dialogue leading to an international community and civil society. These days no one who is responsible for crimes against humanity may go unpunished before the eyes of the international community. In this regard, “the mechanisms provided by international law for a peaceful resolution of controversies, such as negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration [...] have to be institutionalized by authorities having a judgmental function and operating at an international level. [...] The changing situations [...] and the close range of the global village make it increasingly important that we have an international permanent political and legal organization having substantial room for efficiency”, in order to achieve a twofold objective enhancing not only peace but also sustainable development, on the basis of a bearable international social solidarity (Martino 2009, pp. 16–18). Evidently, the latter must imply an unconditionally equal availability of and accessibility to global resources, regardless of social and geographical diversities, which—in John Paul II’s words—means “to globalize solidarity” (quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 30). Moreover: “The logic of the conflict between blocs, which has conditioned international relations legitimizing military spending, must be abandoned. This makes it necessary that the international controversies are dealt with using recognized common rules; through negotiation and mediation, giving up the idea of realizing justice through force, or resorting to violence” (*Ibid.*, p. 16). Nevertheless, what we seem to have lost nowadays is a balance of power, as a variety of poles of power have emerged. Therefore, if on the one hand there is an increasing desire to establish common rules for a shrinking world, on the other hand it has also become more and more difficult to keep it under control. This finally creates a huge gap within societies and within individual consciousness. This is also part of what I identify as “an innate contradiction of globalization that, while stressing the element of universality and hence of distance, it does not exclude—on the contrary, to many extents it highlights—the local and proximity element” (Martino 2005, p. 75). Nevertheless, such analysis is not only valid with regard to the evil side of

the frame, that is, war, but it may also be applicable to the good one, namely, peace, and its implementation. Indeed, the aforesaid horizontality of the international relations not only led to a widespread global consciousness, that is, becoming more and more critical about violations of any kind in every part of the world, but it also creates room for new non-political actors. The creation of non-political actors helps to promote peaceful international behaviours, in the name of such global consciousness and global public opinion.

Globalization and Perpetual Peace

Interestingly, we may find several connection points between the ongoing globalization process and the cosmopolitan theory advanced and favoured by Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century. As a matter of fact, investigating and seeking solutions to the causes of war, in his philosophical essay *Perpetual Peace*, the German thinker advocated the need for—and the tendency of—humanity to build a cosmopolitan society in order to implement the ultimate good of peace. Moreover, Kant’s theory is to be understood according to its teleological dimension, which is the idea that everything in history—good or evil—is meant to be, as a necessary step leading to a predestined final aim, which, in Kant’s view, is perpetual peace. Such a perspective clearly complies with the Christian idea of providence contemplating a divine design. Particularly, Kant posits in the *spirit of commerce* the force binding men together, creating connections and cooperation. In fact, “the commercial spirit cannot coexist with war, and sooner or later it takes possession of every nation. For, of all the forces that lie at a command of a state, the power of money is probably the most reliable. Hence states find themselves compelled—not just from motives of morality—to further the noble end of peace and to avert war, by means of mediation, wherever it threatens to break out”.¹ This is how

¹ The German thinker deals with his cosmopolitan theory in what may be considered the arrival point of his moral philosophy (Kant 1903, p. 157).

the positive side of globalization may be characterized, as a tendency that may lead to the crowning achievement envisaged in Kant's perpetual peace theory, as "a cosmopolite tendency enhancing a 'universal citizenship' and rights potentially extended worldwide. Indeed, an open society requires openness of cultures, traditions, and value systems recognized in a specific scope. Because conflicts and wars arise from closed-mindedness and contrasts, by injustice and intolerance, an open society would allow the gradual removal of the main obstacles to peace" (Ibid., pp. 81–82). Unfortunately, more than ever, the present time is showing us that the spirit of commerce in itself may be a necessary condition for men and women to establish long-term relationships, but it is not a sufficient reason to establish fair and equal relationships respectful of other's dignity and well-being. After a century—the twentieth—of unprecedented economic growth, global commerce eventually led to foolhardy speculations and instability of markets, suddenly crumbling in the 2008 financial crisis, widening the gap between the two extremes of the social pyramid. To this extent, the ongoing economic crisis is a clear example of the fact that even a healthy spirit of commerce, if subjected to financial and political anarchy, may lead to effects opposite to the ones desired. In fact, I see the binding of people in a world community not through the Kantian idea of the spirit of commerce, but rather in human will itself, irrespective of any economic, political or ideological reasons. The unifying force of Christian's thinking stabilizes what we may see as the tension between a centrifugal and a centripetal force, honouring diversity among peoples while also willing to go beyond dangerous nationalisms (Martino 2009, p. 11). Such an isolationist stance in turn brings competition and then conflict rather than cooperation when compelled to share something such as the same territory or, more current, the same world.

The international stance of the social doctrine of the Church upholds this universality "starting from the basic idea that humanity is only a human family aiming for unity". Moreover, "the international community represents the most important

level of cohabitation among the different members of the human family. It rests on the principle of subsidiarity according to which human society organizes itself first in the family unit; then as a civil society with its structure of social organization; then organizing communities in single states, and finally all gathering in the community of peoples" (Ibid., pp.11–13). Of course there is a negative side which would be embracing a too simplistic, idealistic, and maybe naive, view of the matter. I would suggest that the main limit of cosmopolitan theories, typical of the Enlightenment, lies in theories being too abstract and ignoring the concreteness of people, who are integrated within specific communities. Accordingly, every human being's moral concern is moulded by his or her interaction within a given and particular ethical and cultural system. In this light, cosmopolitanism must be envisaged not only on the political level—contemplating a *super partes* decision-making power—but also on the moral and ethical level, finding a common ground in the same transcendent orientation of all mankind. In this regard, the approach of the Church contributes to globalization in its cosmopolitan potential, namely, putting forward the idea that the whole community of persons must be given the same rights, duties and possibilities, in the name of the common and universal dignity of the human being.

Preventive Peace and Human Dignity

One of the main consequences of the effects of the globalization process on the nature of conflict and war is linked to its unpredictability. Not only war may break out at anytime and anywhere, but conflict can also be eradicated within the deeper roots of societies. Each crisis is no longer just a matter of interstate or intrastate conflict but is more and more a matter of global concern. Each is a piece contributing to the common instability of the whole interconnected and interdependent frame. Nowadays, new actors have entered the scene, transcending national borders, building international networks and eroding the classical

Westphalian concept of power. Drug traffic and terrorism are just a few examples of the issues contributing to social instability and conflict. Their underground status makes “the enemy” even more difficult to defeat, in its “invisibility”. “There is an objective difficulty to solve war situations once they have started, just owing to the complex factors and the intersected maze of the interconnected problems” (Ibid., p. 60). As a consequence, the quest for peace must, more than ever, be based on conflict prevention rather than finding *ex post facto* solutions, which in any case would not eradicate the problem. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan come immediately to mind as a clear example of our era in this regard. Once again, the centrality of the need for societies to be educated for peace should be self-evident. Only in this way can cosmopolitanism be carried out effectively and Kantian peace be realistically perpetual: if it is spread among men and women at a psychological level, as moral agents, and not just at a political level, which might instead be dangerously understood as a paternalistic imposition by the West. In this regard, paraphrasing John XXIII’s words, I introduced the concept of an *international human ecology*, intended as the whole set of characteristics (such as family, society, economy) that—within the social environment—affect human dignity (Martino 2005, pp. 98–102). Nowadays, not only war but also peace is a global issue. Therefore the causes of social instability and conflict, as well as the way to build peace, are to be found in a threefold order of ecologies (natural, social and political), which in turn defines the human ecology, all influencing each other. Firstly, natural ecology is intended as “the responsible respect of the ambient”; secondly, social ecology lies in “justice and the promotion of persons and groups”; thirdly, political ecology deals with “the relations between states and political organisms”. Finally, human ecology is “a moral environment in which the dignity of the person is respected” (Ibid., p. 100). The latter—as we have already seen in terms of human dignity—is the unavoidable starting point for peace to be achieved, as “today war unequivocally appears as the final outcome of the progressive destruction of human ecology” (Martino

2009, pp. 61–62). Moreover, the latter cannot be if the conditions for the other kinds of ecology are not fulfilled, that is to say, if the respect of human dignity is not observed at all levels. At this stage, I wonder whether the concept of the human person and, therefore, dignity may be universal. As a matter of fact, the clash of civilizations often seems to be due to different and conflicting understandings of the idea of human dignity and the minimum conditions that sustain it. Nevertheless, the importance of the actual discourses on human rights, following the related declarations signed by most (even though not all) states of the world, has entered the scene since the early aftermath of WWII. This suggests that we are moving towards not only a normalization of international relations but also towards a common ethical understanding of the basic and inalienable rights that a person must be granted to live a worthy and respectable life. I am optimistic on this subject, believing that the importance of the Church lies in its contribution to the achievement of peace in the world. It teaches the strengthening of a common understanding of human dignity, which can only be achieved starting from and reaffirming its transcendent nature. Moreover, in line with Pope John Paul II’s words, I say that, in order to control an increasingly open society and the threats that lie at its very heart, there is a deep need to strengthen politics at the international level, giving a new insight to the main international organizations.

The Social Doctrine of the Church

In the aftermath of the Cold War era, when the public dimension of religion was limited by a strong laic position of the state on both sides of the iron curtain, just as peoples, ethnicities and religions suddenly found themselves pushed closer together, increasing the potential for conflict and war. Moreover, the situation was exacerbated by the intensification of immigration at the world level, which more than once led the Islamic religion—fuelled by its fundamentalist deviation—to the heart of global instability and tension. The actual situation indicates the strong

responsibility of religion in matters of peace and war, which puts it in the front line on both the social and political level. Indeed, it is necessary to go beyond any form of fundamentalism, either religious or laic, including the freedom of cults not only within constitutional texts but also in terms of practical political actions. Only in this way, alienating its fundamentalist leanings and finding a new space of social and political concern—in other words emancipating itself from laic fundamentalism constraints—religion may help light the way towards peace. As a matter of fact, Christianity has of course a main spiritual dimension, as the implementation of the word of God, but, on the other hand, it also represents a laic dimension, as social solidarity deriving from the teaching of the Church and upon which society must be based. In this light, the matter of peace—especially nowadays—needs a wider focus, since on the one hand it is de facto a matter of global concern which requires cooperation and coordination between states, on the other it is interdependent with other global problems of a different nature. Moreover, I identify some of the aforesaid issues in the words of Pope Pius XI, who talks about “the concentration of prosperity in the hands of few, the excessive power of finance compared with productive economy, the lack of rules for the global market, the giving out of state dignity against bank internationalism or the international imperialism of money” (Martino 2005, pp. 125–26). With these words, he is suggesting that a globalization process had already started to become entrenched and that the same problems which undermine social peace and solidarity nowadays were surprisingly and extremely present in the first part of the twentieth century.

My reflection about peace is the outcome of a thorough inquiry considering the issue in an ample sense. Indeed, I advance an exhaustive epistemological approach contemplating the concept of peace according to not only theological considerations but also bringing in some of the main issues of moral philosophy and some others more typical of the sociological sciences. As a consequence, claiming that nowadays the problem of peace needs to be

addressed through a multidisciplinary approach, I intend to demonstrate the central role of the Church in addressing men and women’s consciousness in their desire for peace. The Social Doctrine of the Church is a proof of the aforesaid interdisciplinary focus and a clear example of the commitment of the Church in the global quest for peace. In turn, since it is the expression of God through Jesus Christ, peace is a central theme—rather than one among others—and an essential dimension of the Social Doctrine of the Church.

“*The Social Doctrine of the Church is an integral part of her evangelizing ministry.* Nothing that concerns the community of men and women—situations and problems regarding justice, freedom, development, relations between peoples, peace—is foreign to evangelization, and therefore it would be incomplete if it did not take into account the mutual demands continually made by the Gospel and by the concrete, personal and social life of man” (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 2004). This view is reaffirmed even more carefully by (Pope John XXIII (His Holiness), 1963). Encyclical *Pacem in Terris*, where he calls for the need to revise political and economic relations in order to give a more proper response to contemporary global conditions. Indeed, *Pacem in Terris* (Pope John XXIII (His Holiness), 1963) provides reality-based insight, focusing on natural law and its contemporary evolution which led to the common acceptance of basic human rights. The latter are to be applied globally and indiscriminately, ignoring the intellectual borders that signal mere belonging to a given community, in favour of a more fair and inclusive ethical cosmopolitanism. Moreover, the Encyclical is in line with not only the establishment but also the reinforcement of international organizations—such as the United Nations—which were just developing at the time that it was written. In fact, the clear need for a global authority, for the purposes of better coordination and for the pursuit of the common good, emerges within the lines of its text. In this light, the international organizations must be guarantors and promoters of peace development in the world, “within a

context of global cooperation” (Martino 2005, p. 129; Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 2004). An increasingly globalized and interconnected world will need to be based on the principle of subsidiarity (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 2004). Paraphrasing the words of Pope John Paul II, this means the observance of a system in which communities of inferior orders have to observe the common rules envisaged by a community of a superior one. Despite this, at the same time, every single community must be granted the respect of its own identity, its basic and characteristic traits, in coordination with the common good of a higher level (in *Ibid.* p. 136). In this light, peace will not be achievable if it does not arise from process that transcends the dichotomous tendency towards opposites, in other words, the overly strict rigidity that a world government would entail, leading to a lack of freedom, on the one hand, and on the other an exaggerated flexibility, entailing feeble connections and therefore individualism, selfish regionalism and ultimately conflicts. In fact, as time goes on, peace will require a constructive, comprehensive and synthetic rationality, able to include diversity and to diversify by including, to subdivide by maintaining connections and to connect by allowing subdivisions, to give rules that do not eradicate the acceptance of responsibilities and to foster responsibilities in a regulated context. In other words, it will be necessary to avoid dangerous extremes, rather than pursuing a right equilibrium between two coordinated poles of action. “Thus, circles and multiple spheres of political authority linked between them in various—and subsidiary—ways becomes possible. A government without centralizing, and a devolution without dispersing becomes possible”. Accordingly, the globalization process will only benefit humanity in its quest for perpetual peace, if it is directed “towards a universal culture and a plenary humanism without denying the validity of cultures and of peoples’ traditions” (*Ibid.*, pp. 135, 140, 141).

The rule of law, human rights and both national and international organizations in charge of their observance and implementation

are an essential resource for the achievement and maintenance of peace. Nevertheless, they are only structural and instrumental resources, whereas peace must be sought and nourished within the very inner nature of men and women, since “we will never have peace structures without persons of peace, pacific persons” (*Ibid.*, p. 143). In this regard, once again the importance and need for humanity to be trained in a culture of peace and to negotiation as a process to achieve peace is unavoidable. Ethical subjects have to be educated on peace in order to create, to negotiate, to mediate, to promote and to spread peace around them, mutually influencing their environment accordingly. The achievement of global peace must begin within individuals as intrapersonal and interpersonal processes (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 2004).

Conclusions

The modernity of the Social Doctrine of the Church understands the main issues of our time precisely because of its burden of humanity, for it sets man and human dignity at the centre of its preaching. Human dignity transcends—or so it should—any change or trends. “In this perspective lies the main objective of the Social Doctrine of the Church for the international order: to tie international relations to a concept of international justice as an essential component of the common good” (Martino 2009, p. 15). War and peace are two universal concepts with antithetical meanings, but their real nature may be more similar than we may commonly think. In the light of the tendency of human categorization to think dichotomously, as every couple of opposites, war and peace may be said to lose their own meaning without each other. In other words, war may need peace in order to be, as well as peace might need at least the idea of war, in order to find complete fulfilment. From this perspective, an idyllic word in which any kind of conflict is nothing but a far memory of a darker time may sound

naïve, belonging only in utopic thinking. Nevertheless, as with every aspect of knowledge, the relation between peace and war derives meaning from statistic considerations. Therefore, the world that we should try to improve and live in might be one where conflict exists—given that it is an unavoidable aspect of the human mind—but the shift to violence has become statistically negligible, a world where we have found a way to address its destructive potential in ways that do not harm others around us. At any rate, such a world may be possible only if peace is realized inside of men and women, before spreading socially and, finally, globally. This condition, in turn, needs the fulfilment of human dignity and justice, in order to be achieved. As I have pointed out, “[...] before being a *social order*, justice is a human virtue. There will be no just *social order* without just human beings.” Faith, empathy, compassion, and charity are then very important in order to have human beings *able to realize justice*.

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Cameron Hume

Introduction

In this century improved means of communication have changed the setting for international negotiations and therefore the nature of the negotiating process. Instantaneous, inexpensive, and personalized communications have taken discussions that once took place in private and put negotiators in the public arena, where the dynamics of negotiation change significantly. In today's open, multi-stakeholder negotiations, it is wiser to consider negotiating partners to be necessary friends, not likely foes.

The classic picture of negotiating partners easily comes to mind: two delegations arrayed on opposite sides of a long, rectangular table. Delegation chiefs are in the center of the table, sitting behind stands that display small flags of two governments. Flanking the delegation chiefs are deputies and senior advisers, certainly including a lawyer if one delegation represents the United States. Document folders are in front of the two chiefs; advisers and notetakers carry in

thick briefing books. Bargaining will resemble a zero-sum game, with any concession offered likely to be exploited as weakness. Negotiators will exchange and divide value. Compromise on any point can be seen as defeat for one side and victory for the other. They are poised between conversation and confrontation.

This picture misleads us. The setting for most negotiations is quite different. More frequently the conversation is informal, perhaps over a cup of coffee. There are multiple parties, not just two sides. The negotiators sit together to look at a large video screen as a briefer goes through a technical presentation on consequences of climate change. Or, a mediator may talk separately with the parties, such as the UN's Lakhdar Brahimi trying to convince first the Syrian government and then the Syrian opposition to stay engaged in peace talks. A flexible and fluid dialogue can displace the stereotype of two opposing sides.

Today we may find the negotiators are in a large room with conference seating for a range of parties: governments, but also private businesses, trade associations, and civil society representatives. All are stakeholders. They each approach the negotiation from a unique perspective that reflects individual interests and values. No outcome can succeed unless most, if not all, give it their support. Interests and values must be accommodated, not compromised. Without a practical consensus the negotiations fail. There should be no winners or losers.

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Two Sides or One Community

Of course many negotiations still primarily divide benefits between two negotiating partners. This model is valid and often prevalent in commercial transactions in societies where the rule of law is strong. The two sides exchange benefits or promises of different value, but, when dialogue is restricted to issues already on the table, opportunities to create more value are forgone. If no agreement is reached, the two sides can seek out other negotiating partners. Once the exchange takes place, the two sides may no longer have any direct relationship. If a dispute arises over the implementation of the agreement, the two sides have recourse to the legal system, with the possibility of being awarded either damages or judicial enforcement of the agreement. The legal system validates or legitimizes the agreement.

Rarely do international negotiators operate within such a framework. International law and the general rule that agreements are to be honored are assumed, but on very few points can the negotiators count on judicial redress for assurance that an agreement will be performed as promised. Perhaps they agree on a separate mechanism for arbitration or referral of potential disputes to the courts of a specific state, but even such provisions underline how uncertain the legal framework for international agreements can be. When the parties to the agreement are governments rather than businesses or individuals, usually one cannot choose the negotiating partners, and the legal uncertainties are even greater. International negotiators face the challenge of how best to validate, legitimize, or enforce an agreement.

Most likely the negotiators will invoke shared values and interests, such as peace, mutual security, protection of the environment, promotion of trade, advancement of science, improved health services, or respect for human rights. Texts often begin with lengthy preambles citing references from the UN Charter or prior agreements to demonstrate the shared values and interests that legitimize the agreement. However, such provisions assume that the parties by the time the negotiation is completed become members of a commu-

nity that subscribes to the references in the preamble. When negotiations began, delegations sat on opposite sides of the table. At the concluding signing ceremony, they are side by side, both on the same side of a table that faces the audience that represents the shared community. Now they both have a stake in the outcome.

A second major difference is that the relationship between negotiating partners was likely to be symmetrical: governments discussing a border demarcation with other governments, businesses seeking long-term supply arrangements with other businesses, private organizations designing joint actions with other private organizations, or individual citizens exchanging their views. Today international negotiations likely involve a government discussing an oil lease with a consortium of private companies or that consortium negotiating a new contract with a labor union or a humanitarian organization seeking the promise of an armed opposition group that it will have safe passage to bring food and medical supplies to a besieged population.

Today negotiations include multiple parties with very different characteristics. Opposition parties may lack international legitimacy, but they jostle with established governments at UN talks. Nongovernmental and international organizations become the strongest voices for humanitarian concerns, and they are often the strongest actors in the field. Think of the work done by the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), Doctors without Borders, Caritas, or World Vision. Civil society campaigners, like Amnesty International and Greenpeace, raise issues that governments tend to overlook. These various voices must all be heard and accommodated or shared problems will not reach good solutions.

Today's negotiating partners contain all of the above, and together they come together within a community of stakeholders. When a conference is convened to discuss how best to solve a shared problem, the negotiating partners may include parties from all categories affected by the problem or able to contribute to a solution. There is no longer an illusion of symmetrical pairing of partners for negotiation.

Moreover, despite the fact that the character and purpose of these stakeholders may be very different, they often resist being corralled in separate chambers for governments, businesses, and private groups. Everyone wants to be in on all of the action. Without full “transparency,” these new partners explain that no agreement can be fully legitimate.

Third, negotiations may be less about striking a deal to divide value than about creating a joint solution to a shared problem. Stakeholder negotiations concern something that affects the interests and values of a community of parties, not just those of a few separate community members. Striking a deal between two parties is like the work of merchants in a bazaar who seek to get maximum value for their side; this model can help explain negotiations to demarcate a boundary, or to control arms, or to reduce a tariff schedule. No one is trying to change how to manage a problem; they are seeking within a system all except a more advantageous distribution of the costs and benefits.

Finding a joint solution to a shared problem is quite different. To manage such a problem effectively, negotiators ought to create additional value at the negotiating table rather than merely to divide value. Perhaps the most complex examples come from environmental negotiations, where every government, business, private organization, and indeed many individuals have an interest in a solution. However, many negotiations, even on more traditional subjects, have moved toward becoming community discussions. Trade negotiations have shifted from adjusting tariff schedules to facilitating trade and harmonizing regulatory frameworks among the various states. Even the most traditional issues of war and peace have expanded beyond the core challenge of getting two parties, such as the Assad government and the Syrian opposition, to accept an outcome. Negotiators seek comprehensive solutions that add value rather than simply return to the status quo ante. They want an outcome that ends the dispute in a new framework that satisfies the interests of regional neighbors, distant powers, and indeed in this case Syrian citizens.

Often, in addition to creating a joint solution, a stakeholder community can create a broad social license that is needed to legitimize for the entire community a negotiating outcome that perhaps will be concluded between a limited number of stakeholders. Social license is a powerful concept in an age of Twitter and Facebook.

Fourth, traditional negotiators keep their focus primarily on the direct exchanges with their partners. It is adequate to concentrate on the messages exchanged across the table or in the conference room. Other statements may confuse or distract. Although statements made at press conferences or in interviews given to the traditional media supplement the story for specific audiences, these statements have less credibility than what is said at the negotiating table. Now, however, we live in a multitasking world in which direct messages may be less persuasive and indeed less relevant to understanding the entire dialogue of negotiation. New means of communication are not an echo of what happened across a table but can drive the process by instantaneous feedback.

Much of the dialogue needed to bring together a variety of stakeholders to discuss problems that concern an entire community does not take place across a negotiating table or even in a conference hall. Even in diplomatic negotiations messages are constantly passed between delegations and principals back in national capitals, and parties make frequent use of the media to get their messages out not just to their supporters at home but also to other negotiators. The revelations of Edward Snowden tell us that among governments there might even exist other channels for intercepted messages or messages intended to be intercepted so that another partner is convinced of certain points. In the past 10 years, the development of social media has created a vast panoply of ecosystems for disseminating messages and gathering support, with tweets reverberating far more quickly than the standard news cycle. The multiplicity of communication seems without limit.

Accurate messaging is essential for an agreement relying on community consensus to be

reached and to be implemented. In the past rulers or owners were far more able to control communication, keeping from the public sensitive information. Decisions could be reached and implemented by a handful of leaders. Today leaders must assume that secret information will be public in a matter of time, perhaps shortly; problems that concern a wider community can often only be solved with wide community involvement. The authority models associated with the industrial age are out of date in the twenty-first century. Any initialed agreement would be weak and uncertain if its announcement were met by a tsunami of outraged tweets challenging both its fairness and its effectiveness in solving the problem. The effective support of many stakeholders is needed to secure the implementation of many agreements today.

The new means of communication have created stakeholder communities that in turn create social license. Negotiating partners operate within those communities. The creation of communities has changed the rules of engagement. Partners must negotiate not as separate sides, but within one community. What does it mean to negotiate in a community?

Negotiating Within a Stakeholder Community

A few years ago one of Africa's foremost diplomats, a friend then serving as a UN mediator, shared with me wisdom from his father, a traditional tribal chieftain, on friends and foes. When my friend was an adolescent, his father told him that in an African village it was never possible to have too many friends. But at times even one enemy could be too many. Avoid making enemies if you can. Should you be cast into a conflict, avoid the temptation to defeat your opponents and to secure a clear victory. Instead, make your best efforts to build a path toward common ground. Do everything to work together.

Although a twenty-first-century stakeholder community and a traditional African village are not identical, they share certain characteristics. Members of a community see themselves as

respecting comparable values, even if they may share some interests but not others. When they compete, they are expected to obey the same rules of the game. When they perceive a problem that they want to solve, those community members who are willing and able commit themselves to work together for a solution. They may, however, be individually exceptionally diverse: several levels of government, businesses, or civil society organizations. In such a community one cannot have too many friends, but one enemy could be too many.

These community members who become negotiating partners are stakeholders in a special sense. Originally a stakeholder was a person who held a partial ownership of property rights, a stake, in a business. Today the term usually refers to a person or a party who is either concerned by the problem being discussed or whose participation is required for an effective solution. Such stakeholders often have no ownership rights, but perhaps they have a beneficial interest in a potential solution. Their participation in any negotiation is required if the community is to reach an optimal solution to the problem and to implement it.

In stakeholder communities the negotiator no longer benefits from two basic choices that are available among businessmen in modern industrial society. First, businessmen can usually select their negotiating partners, such as when going to an agent whom they like and trust to help look for a new factory site and to negotiate a fair price. Consumers return to merchants with whom they have had positive experiences, and they can avoid those who have disappointed. On the contrary in a community all of those members with a stake are potential negotiating partners. Second, in stakeholder communities negotiating partners must address problems that arise, not opportunities they select. By definition, shared values have bound the stakeholders into a community. It is a community decision, not an individual choice, which problems to address. For example, international health regulations to halt the spread of communicable diseases require universal adherence to be truly effective. No community member can be allowed to opt out.

For such negotiating partners to succeed, they must achieve two goals. First, they must reach a shared definition of the problem, consistent with the values and interests of the community. Often this may be the most difficult challenge, as the members of the community may stand in very different relations to the problem—perhaps a local government trying to maintain security, a developer clearing a concession area, and a forest community asserting traditional land rights. The second step is problem-solving: to agree on a process to resolve conflicts and to implement that process. To succeed at either step, the stakeholders must gradually build trust in each other and more importantly trust in their shared commitment to the agreed solution. In many ways this process is different from the implementation phase of traditional deal making, in which domestic courts can be relied upon to enforce agreements. Here trust is what must ensure performance.

The value of such stakeholder community agreements must be judged by the extent to which they solve the problem they set out to address. They require implementation by members of the community, and the community members must collaborate. There is no external mechanism, like a court and police force, to ensure implementation. Going forward from the achievement of the agreement community members may not necessarily be friends of each other, but nor can they be foes. And certainly they must all be friends of the negotiating process and trustworthy performers of their own commitments. When these conditions are met, there should be durable social license that gives legitimacy to the agreement.

How might such a process come together to address a long-standing problem?

One Plausible Picture

In February 2014 the World Resources Institute (WRI) announced the launch of Global Forest Watch (globalforestwatch.org), described as “a dynamic new platform to protect forests worldwide.” The idea is simple, but the consequences could be radical. Google Earth, in partnership

with WRI, had collected in digital form 40 years of publicly available satellite pictures of the earth from NASA (the National Aeronautics and Space Administration), from the Russian government, and from other public and private sources. The project united satellite technology, open data, and crowdsourcing to provide timely and reliable information about forests. The fast-forward capacity of the archive provokes the imagination by enabling one to see the vast extent of change in tropical forests and the risk to remaining forest areas. More than 40 very different partners, ranging from governments to regional organizations, universities, corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and foundations, had provided funding and early input. Anyone anywhere with an Internet connection can access the site, specify forest areas of concern, and receive timely, free alerts reporting changes in forest conditions. At the public launching of the site Paul Polman, CEO of Unilever, said, “The launch of Global Forest Watch—a fantastic, innovative tool—will provide the information we urgently need to make the right decisions, fostering transparency, enforcing accountability, and facilitating partnerships.”

Within 2 weeks hundreds of thousands of individuals from over 40 countries had accessed the site. Global Forest Watch had created a virtual community of users, many of whom consider themselves to be stakeholders in the condition of forests and who like Unilever’s CEO want to keep their supply chains “deforestation free.” How might such a community go about making the right decisions, fostering transparency, enforcing accountability, and facilitating partnerships?

One could begin by drawing lessons from the experience of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). RSPO members include growers, millers, traders, and purchasers, as well as service providers to the industry and civil society organizations. It provides certification to growers based on their adherence to requirements specified in eight principles, among them developing forests into palm plantations only after assessments guaranteeing set asides of “High Conservation Value Areas” and procedures assuring the “Free, Prior, Informed Consent” of

local inhabitants. RSPO has an annual general meeting and is governed by an elected board; a secretariat manages the organization and provides some services to members. RSPO members are not really friends or foes: there is intense competition in the industry, environmental groups do not share a unity of core values with trading corporations, and the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia (where 90 % of all palm oil is produced) do not always see eye to eye with civil society activists from Europe. Nevertheless, all of the above are stakeholders in the economic well-being of millions of people and supply of food oil to many millions more.

RSPO has produced a gradually improving common denominator of standards for its members. Its work has been both commercial and political. The community that formed RSPO has been able to achieve a high degree of consensus on basic standards and to sustain a process of change that is gradually raising those standards. By doing so it has both created value for its members and allowed them to claim market place and public relations benefits from that value. In other words, RSPO confers on its members the benefits of social license. Inevitably, some members judge that the common denominator sets standards too low, and these members then formed another community (the Palm Oil Innovation Group) that raised standards in certain areas. There are early signs that this vanguard group will succeed in changing practices of large trading companies that provide palm oil to key global consumer product companies.

How might the vast improvement in information now available through Global Forest Watch be used to form a similar community?

Let us look at the problem of severe air pollution caused each year in parts of Southeast Asia by forest fires, afflicting in particular Sumatra, Malaysia, and Singapore. Many of the worst fires are in the Riau province of Sumatra, and prevailing winds carry the smoke toward Singapore. In 1998 this problem was exceptionally severe, but it recurs every year during the dry season, which runs from February until September. Some small farmers may light fires to clear land for planting, but sparks then spread easily to other dry forest areas. Moreover, the area has deep and extensive

deposits of peat, and peat fires are difficult to extinguish. Neither the Indonesian government nor voluntary associations have made adequate efforts to prevent fires or to bring them quickly under control. These forests are a critical habitat for endangered wildlife, in particular the Sumatran tiger. These fires release huge amounts of greenhouse gas into the atmosphere, pollute the air in the immediate region, risk the capital invested in plantations and farms, and destroy a living treasure house of nature. Those concerns are the basis for a broad range of potential stakeholder partners.

Who could be the significant stakeholders in negotiations to prevent and to control forest fires in Sumatra? A list would surely include:

1. The government of Indonesia, which has sovereign control of the territory, bears responsibility both for the well-being and safety of its inhabitants and for ensuring that events on its territory do not damage the citizens of neighboring states. Surely the Indonesian government would be in the vanguard of any comprehensive effort.
2. Local governments, which have more authority than capacity, have a direct interest in the local economy and population. They could be the key to bringing together a public private partnership with effective means in a specific area.
3. Local communities, whose welfare is directly at risk in any uncontrolled fires and whose members would inevitably be on the front lines in any effort to prevent and to control fires.
4. Plantation owners, whose capital in the palm oil, acacia, and eucalyptus forests is at risk and who have firefighting teams with equipment.
5. Small holders of palm or rubber tree farms. Fire also puts their capital at risk, but they lack firefighting teams and equipment. They also lack the equipment needed to clear land, and they at times resort to fires that they plan to control to clear land for planting. They must be part of any prevention effort.
6. The governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, whose citizens are affected by the smoke of forest fires in Sumatra.

7. Local and international nongovernmental organizations, such as WRI, World Wildlife Fund, Conservation International, and Greenpeace, are also stakeholders. Their networks in the region and around the world will be activated by the information made immediately available on Global Forest Watch.
8. Trade associations, such as the Consumer Goods Forum and the Sustainability Consortium, and their corporate members. These groups are nongovernmental, but their decisions often impact trade more directly than government action. They have standards for the greenhouse gas footprint of products, the impact on the natural environment, and the accuracy of labeling for the consumer. Corporate members, which play a vital and central role in world trade, are intent on keeping out of their supply chains products that offend consumers. Their reputations are at stake. The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil is another such association. As Unilever's CEO stated, the Global Forest Watch can be a key tool in keeping product that damage tropical forests out of his company's supply chain.
9. Foreign governments and international organizations have programs to protect tropical forests. Australia, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States all have major programs designed to protect Indonesia's forests, and the World Bank has both forest and wildlife protection programs.

With this list and the information being created and disseminated by Global Forest Watch, the potential to conduct negotiations that would form a stakeholder community and public/private partnership is evident.

What Kind of Actions Could Such Partners Agree to?

When fires broke out in February, 2014, Singapore's environment minister posted on his Facebook page a proposal that his government should adopt legislation making the setting of forest fires in Sumatra a criminal offense in Singapore. Such legislation would be unilateral.

It could authorize the government of Singapore to try and to judge individuals who set fires, to assess damages and criminal penalties against any companies found responsible, and to allow Singaporean citizens to bring civil suits for damages. Such a national law would be a punitive approach to the goal of preventing and controlling fires; it would challenge Indonesia's sovereignty; and its implementation would face barriers in traditional international law. Working together with other stakeholders, it should be possible to expand and reach better solutions.

Previously governments in the region agreed to stand up a monitoring system, but at the start of the 2014 fire season, it was not yet active. Now they can build on the information available on Global Forest Watch, including the automatic alert capability. A simple reporting obligation triggered by each alert could ensure that local and national authorities engaged and reported on steps taken, measures that if nothing else would increase trust among stakeholders. Because of the capabilities of Global Forest Watch, such reports can be posted directly, also by individuals, to the website.

To eliminate the financial incentive for smallholders to use fire to clear land, a public/private partnership could bring together plantation owners, who have equipment and crews able to clear land without use of fire, and government donors, who want to reduce both area-wide smoke pollution and the release of greenhouse gases. Such a partnership could provide a service such as land clearance free to small holders but at reasonable cost to donors and without undue burden to plantation operators. Done comprehensively such action would reduce the risk of fire generally, including to plantations.

Authorities in target areas should take the lead on prevention and control measures. They could partner with local businesses and citizens to organize, train, and equip firefighting brigades, similar to the volunteer fire departments in rural areas of the United States. One immediate task of such brigades should be to teach and monitor prevention measures. Another urgent task is to address the health risks to local people caused by inhalation of the dense smoke. Other stakeholders

could help by surveying the need for actions to reduce fire risk, such as best practice management of plantation and forest areas on peat soil. It might make sense to identify one area for a pilot program to test out how best to organize and implement such a program.

Stakeholders outside of Indonesia have the ability to promote positive outcomes. For example, some financing should come from governments, such as those of Malaysia and Singapore, whose citizens would benefit from a reduction of smoke pollution. Businesses that contribute to the joint effort would be reducing their risks of fire, a prudent measure in any case. Global business partners, such as the members of the Consumer Goods Forum and the Sustainability Consortium, could encourage this work by agreeing to sign long-term contracts and to pay some premium for products certified as originating in an area with an effective fire prevention and control program. Some international purchasers of palm oil have already signed such contracts with sellers that have put in place effective no deforestation policies. Trade associations, influenced by civil society organizations, could support better terms for suppliers involved in fire prevention efforts. At some point a matching policy not to purchase products originating in areas without effective fire prevention and control measures might be justified, but relying primarily on punitive policies is a poor way to develop the trust needed for collaboration.

Putting together a community of stakeholders should be possible. Perhaps the best way to build a vanguard team to manage a process of negotiations would be for a senior Indonesian government official, close to Indonesia's president but not necessarily from one of the line ministries, to contact potential stakeholder participants, especially the governments of Malaysia and Singapore, major plantation companies, and local governments. The next step should be consultations that include local communities and civil society organizations. Assuming there is a core of stakeholders ready to act, they could immediately intensify an information campaign to announce a pilot

program in one of the areas with committed local political leadership and plantation operators. The pilot program is certain to confront additional difficulties in constructing a comprehensive, community-based fire prevention program, but the odds of eventual success would be good. The stakeholders might be competitors in commerce, but they could become collaborators in lowering the costs and risks from forest fire to all.

Advice on Building a Stakeholder Community Strategy

Given the ongoing proliferation of stakeholder communities as a primary means to address international issues, it is urgent to understand when negotiating partners may be enemies and when they must be friends.

Few significant international negotiations now resemble the two party negotiations on which much negotiating theory is based. A generation ago Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan negotiated one on one a possible end to the nuclear rivalry between the superpowers. They tried and failed to create a transcendent value by eliminating nuclear weapons. There was inadequate trust between the two governments to overcome undeniable technical challenges and decades of suspicion. Nevertheless, they still opened the path to so much progress in the reduction of the nuclear threat. Today, world leaders need the capacity for comparable aspirations if they are to make progress addressing problems such as global warming, the risk of the next pandemic, or food insecurity. Such problems call out for action by stakeholder communities.

Today How Can Negotiators Best Go About Building a Strong Stakeholder Community Strategy?

Such communities have flexibility of membership. Stakeholders often include direct parties to a specific conflict plus mediators, neighbors, international organizations, and friends of the process. Significant stakeholders may initiate,

convene, influence, and legitimize the negotiations. Other stakeholders may represent civil society (including nongovernmental organizations, trade associations, labor unions, religious bodies, and professional associations) and play equally significant roles, especially in legitimizing and implementing any agreement. For this reason, for example, it is essential to build an inclusive negotiating process. The objections raised by environmental and labor organizations to the ongoing discussions to expand the Trans-Pacific Partnership and to conclude a US/EU free trade agreement remind us just how crucial it is to build a process that makes friends, not enemies.

There are at least four critical elements to building such a process. Whatever the differences among the stakeholders, there must be a *shared purpose*. As Pope John XXIII advised at the opening of the Second Vatican Council, members should expand their areas of agreement and minimize their areas of disagreement. Such an approach means shifting from the model of compromise inherent in many deal-seeking negotiations to a model of accommodation, in which areas of agreement are maximized. When such an approach is followed, no table divides negotiators into opposite sides. Teams form to address specific issues, with different perspectives welcomed. Everyone knows that for a community to succeed, the different views of all members must be heard, although unanimity of perspective is not required. With open dialogue communities can define their shared purpose.

Every community needs *leadership*. On many issues community members naturally look to political figures for leadership to convene negotiations, to set an agenda, to organize discussions, and to involve those stakeholders who can help the process. In situations of war and peace, the UN Secretary-General often plays this role. However, leadership may come in many forms. Back to our example, the World Resources Institute, in collaboration with national governments, nongovernmental organizations, scientific institutions, and companies such as Google, has provided the leadership needed to

build a stakeholder community around the goal of protecting tropical forests. A stakeholder community with the purpose of preventing and controlling forest fires in Sumatra would probably need different leadership: perhaps an Indonesian government official to convene and facilitate negotiations, a local political figure to galvanize community support, a few plantation operators to provide expertise and practical capacity, and outside financial supporters. While some of these stakeholder leaders may compete in their everyday operations, they could cooperate for this purpose. Such a group would provide strong, collective leadership.

Any negotiating process needs *organization*. Organizing negotiations for a stakeholder community can become a supreme challenge. Amid the cacophony of differing views, clarity becomes essential. It is probably best to include in initial discussions an open dialogue that encourages stakeholders to voice their concerns, minimizing later surprises; to have a small, disciplined secretariat to keep the rules of discussion clear and the record accurate; to concentrate earlier detailed discussions on subjects where more consensus exists; and to encourage as many informal discussions as possible. When the stakeholders represent different categories, such as small holders or plantation owners or local officials, it is frequently best that issues are discussed horizontally in such categories as well as vertically among representatives of the various categories. Members of any community, especially stakeholder communities, need mutual understanding.

The more inclusive a community and the more diverse its members, the more essential it becomes to build *trust*. Whether between long-time friends or with new partners, conflicts will of course arise. Leaders of successful communities must be ready to face difficult issues and to address them directly, especially when there is no likely immediate solution. To build trust leaders must be able to address and to work through conflicts.

In speaking to the German Parliament about the concerns caused by Edward Snowden's

release of information on the workings of American intelligence services, Chancellor Angela Merkel described such a challenge. She said: “We are discussing this with the US. I am convinced that friends and allies must be willing to agree on the principles of their cooperation in defending themselves against threats, and indeed each in its own interest. Today our views are far apart. Many say that attempts to reach such an agreement are bound to fail, that it is an unrealistic undertaking. That may be. Certainly the problems will not be resolved by my taking a trip. And certainly breaking off discussions in other areas, such as a trans-Atlantic free trade agreement, would not really be helpful. In my opinion there is no other leverage, as it is so often called these days, that could compel America to think differently. In any case defiance has never led to success. I am conducting these discussions—very emphatically—with the force of our arguments, no more and no less. But I believe we have good ones.” Such a capacity for dialogue is needed for stakeholder communities to build and maintain the trust required for joint actions.

This trust is needed for many reasons. To explore how best to expand value negotiators need trust. To seek outcomes that do not divide a diverse community into winners and losers needs trust: we need negotiations without losers (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). To secure outcomes that gain the widest support and legitimacy needs trust. To build a process of implementation that can rely on the active participation of the widest range of stakeholders needs trust. Above all trust is essential for a stakeholder community to grant social license for any agreed course of action.

It turns out the traditional wisdom of an African village is more important than ever. One can never have too many negotiating partner friends, but sometimes one negotiating partner enemy is too many.

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Environment and Science: Finding Common Ground Through International Agreements. An Insider's View of Negotiation Processes

Richard J. Smith

Introduction

My last years at the State Department, from 1985 to 1994, witnessed a period of intense diplomatic action involving activities related to science and the environment. As the Cold War wound down to its end, interest in the negotiation of arms control, and other security-related agreements, declined, and international agreements on environmental and scientific matters became more pressing subjects of international negotiations.

Countries around the world grew increasingly aware that transboundary and global environmental threats, such as acid rain and the deterioration of the stratospheric ozone layer, required internationally negotiated solutions. Further, they recognized that major scientific ventures, such as a permanently manned space station, would benefit greatly from a cooperative international approach.

The decade between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s was notable not only for an increase in the number of environment and science nego-

tiations but also, in some important cases, for their changed character. More than previously, these negotiations dealt with problems that posed unprecedented worldwide threats. The Montreal Protocol, for example, had to meet the challenge of a potentially catastrophic global prospect—the deterioration of the stratospheric ozone layer. This challenge could be met only through urgent and coordinated action by all the major developed and developing countries. Climate change, with which we have yet to come to grips, is of the same nature.

During this period, I served as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State Department's Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) and was called on to head the US side in numerous negotiations. I wrote about eight of those negotiations in my book, *Environment and Science: An Insider's View of International Negotiations from Driftnets to the Space Station*, published in 2009. Those negotiations, which included the negotiation of the *London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Stratospheric Ozone Layer*, called for different approaches and negotiating strategies. They ranged, for example, from the decade-long series of exchanges with Canada on the acid rain problem to the single conference in Sofia, Bulgaria, that resulted in wider cooperation on environmental issues among Cold War adversaries. There were, however, shared elements among these negotiations that may provide useful lessons for future negotiators.

This chapter is a revised version of the last chapter of Smith's book: Richard J. Smith, *NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENT AND SCIENCE: An Insider's View of International Negotiations From Driftnets to the Space Station* (RFF Press, 2009).

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What I try to do in this chapter is to convey a sense of the kind of issues that face a US negotiator of environment and science agreements and suggest, based on my own experience, ways in which the obstacles which may arise to a successful negotiation can be managed and, hopefully, overcome. While this is done from the perspective of US negotiator, I suspect that negotiators from other countries face a similar set of concerns.

Managing the Interagency Process

Much of the most important work in reaching an international agreement takes place before a US negotiator begins formal talks with his or her foreign counterparts. The negotiating strategy, including the degree of flexibility that will be given to the chief negotiator in reaching agreement, is worked out in an interagency process that is often contentious. This “internal negotiation” results in the preparation of negotiating guidance. Basic guidance is usually incorporated in the Circular-175 memorandum, a document through which the Department of State grants the authority to undertake the negotiation.

The same interagency group that manages the preparations for the negotiation often provides continuing direction to the negotiator as the talks proceed. It helps greatly if the US chief negotiator is named early and is engaged throughout the interagency process. For example, I might not have been able to successfully complete the negotiation of the space station agreement, given the disagreements between the State Department and the Department of Defense, without having chaired the interagency group that was set up to provide guidance to the US negotiating team during the negotiation.

The Role of the Department of State

Much of the structure of the US government’s executive branch reflects a special concern with the views of various interest groups. The Commerce Department, for example, ensures that the perspective of the business community

is taken into account. Environmentalists look to the Environmental Protection Agency to be sensitive to their point of view. The National Marine Fisheries Service, an agency within the Commerce Department, looks out for the interests of fishermen as well as for the health of the fish stocks that they exploit. Some agencies relate to more than one domestic constituency, which can have conflicting interests. The Department of the Interior, for example, works closely with both conservationists and with those who make use of resources on public lands.

The Department of State, with its mandate for managing the foreign affairs of the United States, does not have a special relationship with any particular domestic sector. Thus, a negotiator from the State Department is institutionally in a good position to act as an honest broker in sorting out the various interests that other government departments and agencies bring to the interagency table. International negotiations on environment and science usually raise issues on which agency views differ. The chief US negotiator needs to play a central role in efforts to resolve these interagency disagreements.

Critics of the State Department argue that it does have a bias—one that operates in favor of getting an agreement at any cost. This criticism often comes from individuals who are suspicious of international agreements and are concerned that they might limit US sovereignty and freedom of action. This was the case in the dispute between the Department of State and the Defense Department during the negotiation of the space station agreement over how to handle the issue of potential national security uses of the station. As a State Department negotiator, I operated from my conviction that reaching agreements to cooperate with other countries in dealing with transboundary and global issues of mutual concern is usually a constructive and useful thing to do.

The renewal of an agreement with the Soviet Union on cooperation on basic sciences in the late 1980s provides another example of the difficult role that a chief negotiator from the State Department must play in the interagency process. In that instance, I initialed a negotiated text in the face of vehement objections from the head of the

White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). He was deeply skeptical of the positive developments taking place in the Soviet Union and was opposed to any agreement that might increase the number of unsupervised contacts between US and Soviet Scientists. I felt compelled to do so even after receiving a call from the Deputy National Security Advisor to the President reminding me that I needed to give careful consideration to the views of a senior White House Official.

The negotiations on both the space station and the US–Soviet basic sciences agreement were undertaken as a result of presidential initiatives, reinforced at summit meetings with foreign leaders. In both cases, individuals involved in the interagency process raised concerns from the point of view of their agencies. It was my job as lead negotiator in those instances to find a way of responding to legitimate agency concerns while at the same time seeking to ensure that the president's initiative was not unnecessarily frustrated. In undertaking this task, a chief negotiator has to accept that he or she will sometimes be caught in a cross fire between disputing agencies and subjected to sharp criticism. When that happens, he or she has to be prepared to take the heat that comes with advocating a decision disputed within his delegation.

Moreover, the job of a negotiator does not end with the initialing of a draft agreement. After concluding a negotiation, a US chief negotiator is responsible for leading the effort to have the agreement signed and ratified by the US government. That is not always an easy task. In the case of the drift net negotiation with Japan, for example, as chief negotiator I had to vigorously argue the merits of the agreement, noting the support of the affected fisheries' interests, in the face of strong opposition from a powerful senior US senator, the late Ted Stevens of Alaska.

Working with the Stakeholders

A US negotiator needs to be sensitive to the concerns of all the US groups that have a stake in the issues under consideration. The negotiator must

listen carefully to the people affected by the negotiation, to their representatives in Congress, and to the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are their advocates. For example, keeping in close touch with both Alaskan fishermen and the concerned environmental NGOs proved critical in the case of the drift net agreement with Japan. In another instance, the key to the successful completion of the Porcupine Caribou Agreement with Canada was having representatives of all the interested parties, both governmental and private sectors, involved in the decisive final negotiating session. In another instance, my NASA counterpart, Peggy Finarelli, and I met with concerned congressional staffers before and after every negotiating session on space station cooperation over a 3-year period. These meetings gave us strong congressional support for the agreement that we finally achieved to proceed with this multibillion-dollar project.

Negotiating Approach

During the negotiations with foreign partners, I found it crucial to minimize the perception of an adversarial relationship. I tried to nurture the sense that the parties to the negotiation, notwithstanding their differing interests and perspectives, were working together to deal with an issue that concerned them all. In this regard, it was often useful to limit the number and length of plenary sessions, especially after the opening stages of a negotiation. Such formal sessions have a role in airing the views of all the participants at the beginning of a negotiation and in confirming that agreement has been reached at the end. However, overuse of plenary sessions tends to waste time and encourage counterproductive restatements of entering positions. Instead, informal working groups and side discussions among heads of delegation assist in creating a sense of common purpose among the participants in a negotiation. This approach was particularly effective in the final conferences that dealt with fishing in the Bering Sea donut hole. Also, informal exchanges can be helpful in setting the stage for negotiations, as, for example,

with the months-long initial talks that I had with Canada on “proposed elements of an agreement” before the actual negotiation of an air quality agreement began.

Sometimes a negotiating counterpart might be prepared to accept a certain result substantively but for various reasons be uneasy about having the issue highlighted in the final agreement. In the space station negotiation, for example, we dealt with this issue by having our understanding on national security uses of the station covered in a side letter between negotiators rather than placed in the agreement itself.

In other instances, impasses arise over the decision-making rules that the parties would follow when implementing the agreement. The multistep procedure for making major decisions about the Bering Sea pollock fishery may appear unduly complex, but the insertion of that procedure overcame a serious obstacle to the successful conclusion of a negotiation that we had been pursuing intensively for several years. (The provision provided for, at various stages, the involvement of private research institutions as well as a review committee of coastal and distant-water fishing states in determining the total pollock biomass in the fishery. It took account of the interests of both categories of fishing states while avoiding deadlock and assuring that needed substantive decisions could be made.)

In the negotiation of the Porcupine Caribou Agreement with Canada, we reached agreement by using a “double-majority” approach, which would require majorities of both the US and the Canadian members of the International Porcupine Caribou Board to agree to send recommendations to the two governments. This approach overcame a seemingly intractable obstacle to the successful completion of an agreement to jointly manage this transboundary caribou herd.

To achieve their purposes, environment and science agreements require continuing cooperation among the parties. Thus, a US negotiator needs to be acutely aware of the negotiating priorities of the other countries involved, as well as his own, and ensure that they achieve their primary objectives to the extent possible. Countries will withdraw from agreements that they do not

view as in their interest. Although sanctions for noncompliance—such as the Montreal Protocol’s restrictions on trade in chlorofluorocarbons—can be helpful, the best assurance of compliance over time is the sense of the parties to an agreement that their concerns and interests have been adequately taken into account.

Science-Based Agreements

Agreements dealing with global environmental issues often must be concluded on the basis of incomplete and uncertain information to avoid waiting until environmental damage becomes irreversible. To conclude a viable environment or science agreement, all sides in a negotiation need to be convinced that the commitments being undertaken are based on sound science as it is understood at the time of the negotiation, while recognizing that in most instances the relevant scientific knowledge is still evolving.

The Montreal Protocol, which was aimed at reversing the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer, provides the most compelling example of the importance of a flexible, science-based approach to negotiating such agreements. The parties to the Montreal Protocol set up a science committee to report to them on the adequacy of the initial steps taken to reduce emissions of ozone-depleting chemicals. Reports from the science committee to subsequent meetings of the parties, such as the 1990 London conference, led to commitments to further reductions and phase outs of ozone-depleting substances, which are now arresting ozone layer deterioration. The drift net agreement with Japan provides another example of setting up a process that incorporates commitments to review and revise agreement provisions on the basis of new information. Such agreements must both make sense in light of the existing state of scientific knowledge and also include an agreed process for the regular reevaluation of their provisions on the basis of new information.

To make the best use of available science, a negotiator needs access to sound scientific expertise and must make the effort to become as

informed as possible. Fortunately, the US specialized agencies, such as NASA, the National Science Foundation, and the Environmental Protection Agency, have a wealth of scientific experts who can lend support to US delegations to international negotiations. Expertise from the private sector is also readily accessible. Close working relationships need to be established between a negotiator and his or her scientific advisers.

US Leadership

The United States played a less dominant role in the world at the time of these negotiations than was the case earlier in the post-World War II period. Nonetheless, other countries continued to look to the United States for leadership in meeting global environmental and scientific challenges. When the United States was among the leaders in recognizing and addressing a problem, the prospects were good for a successful negotiation.

The Montreal Protocol negotiation provides an example of the impact of US leadership. Before the negotiation of the protocol, the United States was in the vanguard of those urging forceful measures to limit the production and use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and we backed up our arguments by being among the first to unilaterally ban CFC use in most aerosols.

As a result of US leadership, some other countries were moved to go beyond initially more restrained positions and agree to the strong first steps that we sought to deal with the problem of ozone layer depletion. Subsequently, at the London meeting dealing with amendments and adjustments to the protocol, US leadership temporarily wavered over the issue of funding for the developing countries, and this almost led to the collapse of the Montreal Protocol process that the United States had been so instrumental in starting. It was only when the United States returned to a more forthcoming position on the formation of a Montreal Protocol Fund to assist developing countries that it was possible to bring the negotiation to a successful conclusion.

The issue of US leadership remains critical in global science and environment agreements. The record is clear. When US leadership falters, the prospects for success in such negotiations drop precipitously, which bring us to the Kyoto Protocol.

Kyoto: Lessons Not Learned

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which dealt with the issue of climate change, did not result in commitments to reduce carbon dioxide emissions that the United States has been prepared to accept and to ratify. Nor did the protocol include any such commitments by developing countries. Part of the problem, in my view, was that we failed to adequately take into account our experience in previous environment and science negotiations. For example, before the Kyoto meeting a designated US chief negotiator did not develop over time a productive dialogue with Congress and with the domestic groups that would be affected by the protocol.

The lack of a coherent strategy for working with Congress was an especially glaring omission. It was clear throughout the run-up to Kyoto that we faced a highly skeptical, if not hostile, congressional majority. Yet there was no sustained and determined effort to work with Congress to try to overcome this obstacle to achieving an agreement. My experience in previous negotiations indicates that it is better to work closely with concerned domestic interest groups and Congress, even when they are initially opposed to what we are trying to accomplish.

In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, the United States sought to lead the development of a domestic policy through international negotiations. I am convinced that such an approach is almost always fruitless. In the case of acid rain, for example, the United States went through more than a decade of frustrating and inconclusive efforts to join with Canada in dealing with this problem. Before we could reach an agreement to resolve this issue with Canada, however, we had to come together domestically and pass legislation calling for national reductions in emissions of acid rain precursors, particularly sulfur dioxide.

Although I had retired from the State Department several years earlier, I was asked, in September of 1997, to serve as a consultant and assist in the preparations for the Kyoto negotiations. My first memo to Melinda Kimble, the acting assistant secretary in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, painted a gloomy picture of our prospects. I concluded, "It is hard to envision an achievable result in Kyoto which we would view as fully satisfactory."

In a preparatory meeting for Kyoto, held in Berlin, the parties reached certain understandings on what they would seek to accomplish in Kyoto. The so-called Berlin mandate called on all countries, including the developing countries, to advance the implementation of their existing commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. "Existing commitments" referred to the framework agreement on climate change that both developed and developing countries signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The Rio agreement included no specific mandatory emissions reduction targets.

In Berlin, only the developed countries made a commitment that they would agree to specific reductions in carbon dioxide emissions at the Kyoto conference. The developing countries did not view the vague, general language in the mandate about the responsibilities of all countries as obligating them to take any particular actions to reduce their emissions. My memo to Melinda Kimble noted the problem created by the Berlin mandate: "In Berlin, we clearly made a commitment on which we cannot deliver—mandatory reductions from a 1990 base in the early years of the next century, with no balancing mandatory obligations on the part of the developing countries."

Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Tim Wirth, who had been supervising preparations for Kyoto, left government service several months before the Kyoto meeting. Under Secretary of State for Economic, Commercial, and Agricultural Affairs Stuart Eizenstat was then named to head the US delegation in Kyoto. The US negotiating team arrived with no clear instructions on what level of reduction of carbon

dioxide emissions, if any, it could accept. The final reduction numbers were worked out in Kyoto in talks among representatives of the developed countries, and the levels varied from country to country.

It would be hard to make the case that the emissions reduction commitments were determined on the basis of the science involved or that they adequately took into account economic realities. In some cases, it was not clear how the countries concerned could meet their emissions reduction targets. Further, the developing countries made no specific commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The US Senate had put down a marker in July 1997 in the Byrd–Hagel Resolution, which passed 95 to zero, that any agreement without such commitments by developing countries would be unacceptable.

At the United Nations Bali conference on climate change in December 2007, the United States signaled its intention to join in a worldwide effort to develop by 2012 a successor regime to the one put in place under the Kyoto Protocol. Since then, the parties to the Protocol have not succeeded in achieving that goal. As the United States continues to participate in global negotiations on climate change, we would be well advised to reflect on the lessons learned in other global environmental negotiations.

The Montreal Protocol provides a particularly useful precedent. This is true even though the climate change problem is much more complex and far-reaching than was the threat posed by substances that deplete the stratospheric ozone layer. Whereas the response to the threat to the ozone layer affected major industries and involved adjustment costs amounting to billions of dollars, addressing global warming effectively requires fundamentally rethinking our carbon-based societies and taking steps that will affect virtually every aspect of economic activity.

The workshops that the US negotiating team on the Montreal Protocol held with the affected industries, for example, helped greatly in gaining their acceptance of the constraints to be imposed by the agreement. Although the target audience would necessarily be much broader, some comparable attempt to work with affected industries

could be helpful as the United States reengages on climate change. Since the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, many major companies have, in fact, become more concerned about global warming and are considering how they can best respond to the threat that it poses. In establishing science and economic committees that regularly reported their findings, the parties to the Montreal Protocol took a critical step. The parties considered those reports every couple of years and, on the basis of those reports, made changes to their commitments under the agreement. This continuing review-and-revise process was essential to the ultimate success of the Montreal Protocol in achieving its objectives.

The parties to the Kyoto Protocol have taken note of the outstanding work done by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme. This panel, which involves the work of more than 2,000 scientists from more than 130 countries, shared the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize with former Vice-President Al Gore. It is, however, a separate body, not the Kyoto parties' own creature whose findings they would be obligated to review periodically as a basis for considering modifications to their commitments under the agreement.

It was also significant that the Montreal Protocol, unlike the Kyoto Protocol, included a specific commitment by the developing countries to contribute to emissions cuts. Their reductions were to take place over a longer time than those of the developed countries and were expected to be accompanied by funding to assist them in phasing out ozone-depleting chemicals, as well as technology transfers from developed countries. The developing countries' acceptance of some specific requirements in addressing the problem of ozone depletion, even though they were weaker commitments, was critical to the successful completion of the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol.

A commitment to achieve some limitation on carbon dioxide emissions from leading developing countries, particularly India and China, will be needed if the world community of nations is to

deal effectively with the problem of climate change. Developing countries remain strongly resistant to specific mandatory targets for reduced greenhouse gas emissions, fearing that their economic development will be undermined. A possible interim step might be to implement a "pledge and review" approach, whereby developing countries undertake to develop their own emissions limitation programs and agree to submit them for review and comment by other parties to an agreement.

Such an approach could usefully be buttressed by commitments by developing countries to some particular goals, like reaching a certain level of renewable energy use or an energy intensity target to reduce the amount of energy needed to achieve a given increase in gross domestic product. Any of these steps would need to be accompanied by assurances from developed countries of financial and technological assistance for accomplishing them.

Commitments from developing countries will probably not be forthcoming unless and until developed countries, particularly the United States, which have been most responsible for creating the problem of global warming, show greater leadership in mitigating it. The importance of having both the leadership of the principal developed countries and the full involvement of the major developing countries was shown in the 1990 London meeting of the parties to the Montreal Protocol. It was not until China and India decided to join the United States and the other major developed countries as parties to the protocol that the final breakthroughs were achieved, which put us on a path to reversing the deterioration of the stratospheric ozone layer.

Looking to the Future

The world will be facing some serious environment and science challenges in the years ahead. In addition to global warming, developments in such fields as nanotechnology and biotechnology will pose new problems. More will need to be done to limit emissions of individual pollutants, such as ground-level ozone and particulates.

Desertification, loss of tropical forests, biodiversity, and coral reefs will continue to be on the agenda. An alarming collapse of fisheries around the world will have to be addressed. Further, we will need to find ways to continue moving forward with cooperation on major science projects, such as space research, the development of fusion power, and advanced super colliders, to expand our knowledge of microphysics. Moreover, we can be sure that other environment and science issues not now envisioned will arise.

In many cases, the challenges to be faced will require a coordinated multilateral response. On the basis of what has so far been accomplished, there are some grounds for optimism that those challenges can be met. I remain confident that with US leadership, coming international negotiations on environment and science issues will

yield positive results and contribute importantly to the resolution of many troublesome global problems. A central message that I carry away from my negotiating experience is that in addressing these issues, it is essential that the US chief negotiator be named and fully engaged from the earliest stages until an agreement is completed and in force. Further, that negotiator must take the necessary time to develop a strong and effective working relationship with all those interested and concerned about the issues under negotiation. This includes the domestic stakeholders who will be directly affected by the terms of an agreement and the members of Congress who represent them, as well as relevant nongovernmental organizations and the scientists and environmental experts who advise the US delegation.

Micro-negotiation in the Security Sector Advising Context: A Case Study from Afghanistan

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Erik J. Leklem

Introduction

The fields of security sector reform and assistance encompass the cross section of diplomatic, development, defense, and law enforcement perspectives and negotiations. When governments are either building their security sector anew e.g., after protracted conflict has destroyed the institutions or pursuing a reform of the sector due to a change in government or society (e.g., a shift from autocracy to a democratic form of governance), they must make a number of significant choices with regard to how their security sector will be formed. Countries like the United States, which promotes democracy and rule of law through its foreign policy, often interact with countries embarking on security sector reform in ways that will further US national interests. Other countries interact with security sector reforming countries chiefly through the lens of their own domestic economic interests; for example, there may be more emphasis on foreign military sales, rather than capacity building. International organizations like the United Nations advise nations on security sector reform, from a seemingly more neutral and multinational perspec-

tive. Nongovernment actors, whether individuals or organizations, will also seek to shape or recommend options for a country's security sector reform efforts. Where these interactions occur, there is conflict, cooperation, or a mixture of both. Ultimately, all of these types of interactions involve a range of negotiations.

For example, at the strategic level of a bilateral relationship, the United States may negotiate with a country undergoing reforms in order to seek preferred outcomes for that country's security sector and may be welcomed, rejected, or reconciled to some degree. Nongovernmental organizations may attempt to influence a country via lobbying or advocacy efforts. The United Nations (UN), the United States, and many other countries employ advisors to deepen negotiations with countries' leaders and organizations by providing a consistent presence. Advisors in these roles seek to guide those leaders and organizations toward outcomes that may not immediately be embraced by the counterpart nation, a diplomatic task of some complexity. They also pursue these reform efforts by conducting hundreds of micro-negotiations on a daily basis while pursuing a broader advising relationship.

This broader advising role is often designed with the overarching purpose of building a partner's capacity. Building capacity is normally viewed as a development objective; however, when mixed with the diplomatic and/or defense and law enforcement objectives of security sector advising, a number of contradictions emerge.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the US Government.

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The successful security sector advisor navigates these. Making trade-offs between capacity building and achieving overarching strategic objectives, compromising during interpersonal negotiations, employing cross-cultural skills to better understand the counterpart's perspective, and reconciling intrapersonal debates all characterize the security sector advisor's challenging role.

This chapter explores these themes in greater detail. First, I introduce my experience as a security sector advisor, before reviewing the general roles and missions of such advisors. Next, I describe how negotiations will need to be conducted as an advisor, with particular emphasis on the micro-negotiations of advisor tradecraft that advance capacity building in small, measured ways. Additionally, I describe how the nature of these negotiations can change over the time frame of an advisor's presence in a security sector reform environment. Some of the main challenges in advising and advisor negotiations are reviewed followed by a survey of restorative best practices that should inform security sector advisors seeking greater and more sustainable success. Lastly, I conclude by examining why training for security sector advisors is critical, but often not well done, and how trainers and advisors might pursue more rigorous preparatory training programs so as to produce better outcomes in future security sector reform contexts.

My Experience

In my experience as a US security sector advisor in Afghanistan from March 2011 to March 2012, I worked closely with senior officials and their staff in the Afghan Ministry of Defense. My fellow advisors and I were there at the request of the Afghan government. I pursued a range of diplomatic, development, and defense objectives of the US government and also supported the ambitions of an established, but fledgling, Afghan government. I advised my counterparts on how they might improve the functions of their offices, shared best practices in defense management techniques associated with strategy and policy

development, and encouraged ministry officials to establish a more professional and transparent ministry in order to improve security within Afghanistan. These objectives all depended on my ability to be persuasive, which ultimately involved both higher-level negotiations and many day-to-day micro-negotiations. Both of these types of negotiations were characterized by my work to inform, motivate, or (rarely) compel my negotiating partners that my advice was prudent, useful, or actionable. These experiences, and the intrapersonal debates I had to wage with myself, inform the observations of this chapter and the associated recommendations.

The Advisor Role

The international community uses advisors around the world, in a variety of capacities, to foster greater cooperation and mitigate conflict. Employed by the United Nations or individual countries, advisors are assigned to help a country or local populations improve their conditions—whether in governance, agriculture, economic development, or building law-abiding police and military forces, among others. Countries emerging from conflict, or seeking improved development, will employ these advisors as well. Advisors also occupy positions of influence and power in leading economic and military powers. The modern version of the management consultant is in many ways a variant of the advisor role.

For the purposes of this paper, I am narrowing our discussion to the advisor that is employed to prevent conflict, support a country recovering from conflict, or assist in national transitions of government (e.g., from autocracy to democracy). In particular, this paper will examine how advisors work in what is commonly referred to as a “security sector reform” environment. The role of the advisor in these situations is guided by a development principle: to assist a country, organizations of that government, or an individual government official in improving their performance and effectiveness in the security sector. This basic development principle distinguishes an advisor from other international actors

commonly in this space; diplomats, businesspeople, humanitarian relief officers, and general development actors all have duties and functions that either are not development focused or are principally focused on providing aid/assistance to non-security-oriented elements of a society or government.

Security sector advisors help the client, or “principal,” perform better. They do this through a variety of activities, including:

- Serving as a sounding board. In these cases, the principal will share information and ask for the advisor’s views or recommendations on what should be done or what that information/analysis might indicate.
- Diagnosing organizational or individual strengths/weaknesses. The advisor helps his/her counterpart assess what is working and what needs to be improved and helps him/her to identify recommendations on what should change.
- Building capacity. The advisor develops and administers training, recommends new processes or organizational structures, and conducts professional development.
- Helping the principal to identify strategic, operational, and tactical objectives while providing analysis about the strategic context and possible spoiler elements that could derail those objectives.
- Measuring performance. The advisor serves as an objective assessor of the counterpart’s day-to-day activities, monitoring and assessing progress of an office or security sector function toward strategic, operational, or tactical objectives.
- Keeping an eye on the strategic horizon. The advisor scans an organization or security sector context and provides warnings of danger (external or internal). Particularly in fledgling governments, internal rivalries and power struggles can derail progress. The advisor may also help the counterpart identify potentially negative second- and third-order effects of new policies, procedures, or other organizational changes.
- Gently agitating in order to stimulate creative thinking. The advisor serves as an external

challenger, pushing an organization that is adrift or stuck in archaic ways of doing business to reexamine its procedures and ways of operating.

- Guiding. An advisor can coach a counterpart through the development of standard operating procedures and provide insight drawn from well-accepted organizational management processes, making a direct, real-time impact on ministry operations.
- Providing comparative examples drawn from experiences in other contexts. Principals often have not had exposure to lessons learned from other situations; this can build principals’ confidence in unfamiliar approaches that have been successful elsewhere.

In almost all cases, these advisors are agents of an entity: an international organization, a country, or a company. In rare cases, the client hires these advisors on an individual basis. But in almost all situations, advisors have “two masters”—the counterpart they are advising and the entity that they represent. This creates conflicts of interest and tensions, which will be explored further, below.

Conducting Advisor Negotiations

The Basics

As mentioned above, the security sector advisor’s role is to artfully advance the interests of their home organization as well as the client state. The advisor pursues this role on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis, over the term of their assignment. Most of the advising work is undertaken during planning sessions, meetings, workshops, inspections, or facilitation sessions. The work is in pursuit of a security sector objective that is identified by the counterpart. Generally, such objectives focus on building capacity or improving the performance of a particular element of a nation’s security sector, such as its police force or a budget office in the defense ministry; an illustrative example is: “Establish a functioning Ministry of Defense.” In immediate post-conflict environments, where a nation’s security sector is fledg-

ling, advisors have been called upon to establish objectives for an inexperienced local official or representative to pursue; ideally, however, these objectives are established collaboratively (Gerspacher and Shunti 2012).

Normally, however, the advisor works with a counterpart and his/her staff, sharing knowledge, recommending policies or procedures to be adopted, troubleshooting host nation proposals or implementation efforts, or assessing a security sector project for improvements. The advisor may maintain a regular presence, with an office in a principal's ministry in order to serve as a full-time counselor to that principal, or visit daily or semi-daily, interacting for portions of a workday and departing to allow security sector officials to work on their own, implementing advisor recommendations, or administering ministerial functions such as managing a defense sector's personnel systems. In most circumstances, the more professional and developed the security sector personnel, office, or function is, the less amount of time an advisor should spend on a day-to-day or weekly basis being present. If the advisor does not modulate the scale of their interactions appropriately, their very presence may slow institutional growth. A successful advisor will be able to detect when this is happening and step away when needed to allow the counterparts to implement their job functions, systems, and procedures without assistance or advice.

As an example of these basics, in my role, I was assigned by the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) as the Senior Advisor to the Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategy and Policy in the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD). At the time, the Assistant Minister was Lieutenant General Hamayoun Fawzi. He, along with a deputy, managed a staff of approximately 100 personnel. Together, they oversaw four directorates, each led by subordinate MoD officials at the major general or brigadier general level. My role was to advise LTG Fawzi and his staff on how to better develop strategy and policies for the Afghan MoD, to ensure that the government of Afghanistan was forecasting its security

challenges, and to support translating those requirements into midterm and near-term plans and budgetary requirements. I was aided in my efforts by a team of advisors that I eventually led (after starting out as the deputy to the incumbent leader), each of which was assigned to different subordinate offices and staff sections.

Together, my advising team and I worked toward capacity-building objectives mutually identified and codified with LTG Fawzi and his key leaders. In essence, we had a work plan designed to improve MoD strategy and policy functions, with measures of performance and effectiveness, key milestones, and other objectives. Progress on this work plan would be reviewed on a quarterly basis. Our advising work in the intervening time consisted of daily or near-daily engagements, including training sessions or planning sessions with LTG Fawzi or his staff. Many of these sessions were sounding board sessions—where Afghan MoD officials would ask for advice or second opinions on work that had been assigned to them or duties they had to perform based on established Afghan law or their job description. As the level of trust between us deepened, my advising duties would also extend to listening to their private views on the government, the war, or the history of their country. By the end of my tour, these sessions would invariably reveal additional and more systematic challenges they faced in their profession and their role in the Ministry.

In reality, the average week of advising was rarely as simple as following a work plan, or responding to the vagaries of a ministerial workflow calendar. With a war underway in the country, our advising occurred under occasional threat of attacks (the Ministry of Defense was targeted several times during my tenure), and our counterparts worked in an environment of near continuous threat to their families, friends, and colleagues. Planned advising meetings or workshops could be cancelled on short or no notice, envisioned projects to build capacity would be delayed due to more important work to be done, and key human talent would be distracted from their duties to complete non-job function assignments or duties given by the Minister of Defense.

That said, our advising duties and affiliated negotiations would stem from the interactions we had with our Afghan counterparts. The main types of interactions were:

1. Attending staff meetings and providing advice on weekly priorities
2. One-on-one engagements with key leaders, to give advice on their priorities and to advocate for their attention to our priorities
3. Preparatory sessions for meetings between a leader or office and an outside party, to include post-meeting feedback
4. On-call advising feedback or consulting on a work project challenge or assignment
5. Review sessions, consisting of advisor-led reports on the counterpart's performance or that of his/her staff
6. Checking in with staff sections of an organization, to test how policies were being implemented or to see where there were disconnects between lower level staff and senior leadership
7. Preparation for and attendance at counterpart organizational meetings and provision of observations on the counterpart's effectiveness in those meetings

My team of advisors conducted our negotiations in these venues. Other teams of advisors were working and conducting negotiations in other areas of the Ministry, such as personnel offices, legal offices, and the finance department. Some of these negotiations were more formal and diplomatic, involving conveying official positions to the Afghan government, for example, as part of a structured process to secure a government-to-government agreement. Most of our negotiations, however, were much smaller in scale: they were micro-negotiations, seeking to convince our partners to accept our principles and best practices of capacity building in order to make incremental progress toward longer-term defense or diplomatic objectives.

The Negotiations

Negotiating is part of the tradecraft of being a security sector advisor. Given the mandate of representing another country, organization or

international entity, the advisor's mission is to foster change and improve capacity in a security system. Advisor counterparts may share these objectives, oppose them, or be somewhere in between. Along this spectrum, the advisor's negotiating skills and strategies will have to be applied differently—especially when the advising mission objectives are opposed or not embraced by the counterpart.

Even when shared, mutually understood, and accepted, a counterpart may not feel he/she has the power, position, or authority to implement reforms. In this regard, advisors must negotiate with their counterpart in order to convince them to take actions that they are otherwise disinclined to take. These micro-negotiations seek small, incremental changes to the status quo, so that those being advised take new actions, discover an answer to a problem they are facing based on their own learning, come to believe a different point of view, open their mind to learning new concepts, or direct staff to perform new or different tasks.

These micro-negotiations can occur over relatively banal aspects of management and day-to-day organizational behavior. For example, an advisor may need to negotiate with his/her counterpart to schedule a meeting with stakeholders across a ministry to discuss challenges or discrepancies with the budget, which may be an unfamiliar method for budgetary oversight. An advisor may need to negotiate with a counterpart over the value of drafting and publishing a policy directive on new personnel evaluations, without which follow-on development aid may not be provided. Other rationales may need to be raised by the advisor that their counterpart may not have experience with, such as the pernicious effects of personnel advancement without appropriate evaluation, which can lead to rampant nepotism or incompetent officers leading military operations. In other cases, advisors may need to negotiate with their counterpart's supporting staff, to influence them to take actions such as preparing a report to inform senior leaders of a project's status, dispatching questions to a subordinate unit several hours away, or making time in their daily schedule for attending training sessions. While

somewhat obvious in more advanced and educated societies, in many developing country contexts, security sector personnel may not have enough education or appreciation for how institutional systems depend on these sorts of behaviors to function as a whole.

Negotiating as an advisor entails hundreds of such “micro-negotiations.” In order to be successful, the advisor in a typical day will have to navigate a series of these interactions in order to advance his/her capacity-building agenda. As a change agent with minimal power, the advisor must work through his/her principal, the principal’s immediate office staff, and, as needed, the general employees. The forms of these micro-negotiations can vary based on a number of factors, including the timeline of the advising relationship.

Forms of Negotiation During an Advisor’s Tenure

Establishing an Advising Relationship In some cases, the decision to bring on an advisor may have been imposed on a counterpart. In this case, the counterpart may reject the premise that an advisor is needed at all and seek to sideline him or her, depriving the advisor of access to necessary information and/or the counterpart. In all cases, the advisor must both convince the counterpart of the advisor’s credibility and utility and negotiate the frequency of their weekly interactions. Establishing early credibility as an advisor is critical to gaining influence during later negotiations; the more the counterpart views the advisor as an untested novice, or as someone who does not respect the host culture, the less traction that the advisor will have in later stages of the advisor’s tenure.

The Mature Advising Relationship Once credibility and initial rapport are established, progress may be made in capacity building, knowledge transfer and helping to improve the counterpart’s grasp of their duties. The advisor must then solidify the advising relationship, determining with his/her counterpart on how to demonstrate newly acquired capacities, knowledge, or functions. The counterpart and

advisor will most likely have to negotiate the timing and terms for the counterpart to employ these new approaches or skills.

As an illustrative example, assume that, as a result of a capacity-building project conducted with an advisor, a security sector official has the opportunity to take on a new, authoritative role in a bureaucratic process in their Ministry. The process could be planning for and overseeing the execution of soldier pay. As a result of failures in the execution of this process, frontline units are not receiving their monthly pay on time and desertions are on the rise, hurting the combat effectiveness of these units. The advisor believes that the counterpart should take on the new role immediately. The counterpart disagrees, citing a number of hierarchical issues as well as lack of confidence that he/she will implement the new processes correctly. The advisor would then find himself/herself in a place where negotiation with the counterpart is required; in particular, it is useful for the advisor to probe the counterpart for contextual details that could strengthen his/her negotiation position. In our example, let’s assume that the counterpart reveals that as a newly minted official, he/she is reluctant to assert himself/herself among other, older officials. In this case, the advisor may have to mix his/her micro-negotiation methods with additional capacity building (focusing on will of the counterpart) to build his/her confidence and map out how and when the counterpart could assert himself/herself in a culturally relevant and acceptable way.

Micro-negotiation can occur when the advisor identifies a power or authority conflict between their direct counterpart and another actor in the security sector. These situations can distort capacity-building progress if not handled well by security officials. In my work within the Afghan Ministry of Defense, it was not uncommon for my counterparts to identify ministry functions and work that different staff sections would argue over in terms of who had “control” or the authority to oversee such work. If there were conflicts that were causing ministerial system breakdowns that I knew would be harmful to the long-term health of the ministry (or to my counterparts), I would test these findings in my advisory ses-

sions. In those cases where my counterparts were disinclined to respond on their own, or did not see the ramifications of such conflicts, negotiations over why and whether and how to respond might follow. When I had the advantage of understanding my counterpart's value set or priorities, I could use this information to recast the ramifications of failing to act or demonstrate how an appropriate response from my counterparts may propel their own objectives and interests.

The relevance of my experiences in Afghanistan to other country contexts depends largely on a country's unique security sector reform environment. These contexts are determined by a combination of the country's governance, culture, level of economic development, infrastructure development, and ethnic, gender, and conflict dynamics. In Afghanistan, as in Iraq, the broader dynamic of the relationship between the host country and advisor's nationality plays a critical role; the deep involvement of the United States plays a significant role in how advisors are viewed and how negotiations are conducted to this day. This is not unique to the United States; developing countries where advisors are provided by former colonial powers often view these advisors as paternalistic, while advisors from countries with less historical or economic involvement tend to be viewed more neutrally.

These variables impact the micro-negotiations in explicit and implicit ways. Some explicit impacts are driven by the nature of negotiations in the country; for example, whether bartering over prices for goods is accepted or prices are traditionally fixed. In a bartering culture, micro-negotiations while advising may take the form of haggling—where coming to agreements on actions to take may feel like a bartering session in which both sides meet in the middle, vice a discussion purely on the merits of the case. Implicit impacts may stem from the security sector context—especially if the reputation of the advisor's nationality has been jeopardized or tarnished. Advisors in this context must account for distrust that can make micro-negotiations more difficult than one might think. For example, the simple act of scheduling a meeting between an advisor and a counterpart may be blocked or delayed by the

counterpart's staff, if they hold ill will toward the advisor's home country.

Sustaining Impact After Departure These micro-negotiations and the other capacity-building work of an advisor should support an advising strategy that spans the advisor's tenure. The strategy, informed by the political and organizational context, will benefit from simple and modest end states. It should account for an assessment of the capacity, strengths, and weaknesses of the counterparts being advised. Time will be a critical factor informing the strategy and its implementation. An advisor who will have 2 years in a country will likely be better positioned than an advisor who is only working with a counterpart for months. As a general rule of thumb, the shorter the duration of an advisor's tenure, the more modest the objectives should be. Ultimately, the success of an advisor is determined by how fully the counterpart accepts and implements the skills acquired through the capacity-building effort; this success is directly linked to the advisor's efficacy at conducting micro-negotiations with the counterpart through the length of the deployment.

Challenges of Advisor Negotiations

Conflict Versus Cooperation

Few advising negotiations will be free of conflict. As discussed previously, the security sector advisor may have objectives that violate or threaten the counterpart's position, values, or comfort with change. Part of the art of advising is to assess the areas where cooperation can be found, identify where conflict will naturally occur, and maximize the trade-space between these areas. In some cases, the issues of potential conflict or discomfort might be altered through advising tradecraft and negotiations on multiple levels—education and training, deconstructing misperceptions, or bolstering the counterpart's acceptance of organizational change. In association with an advisor's overarching strategy, an advisor should develop a map of where these conflict and cooperation

zones exist in the relationship. This will improve the chances that any major negotiations are successful and reduce the chance that micro-negotiations will be fruitless.

Interpersonal Relationships

Interpersonal negotiation abilities are the main skills people may have to manage, solve, and transform conflicts (Galluccio 2011). Several examples of interpersonal negotiations for security sector advisors have been described thus far. The prospects for challenges in those negotiations are directly linked to the advising context, the scale of organizational change in the security sector being pursued, the quality of the relationship between the advisor and his/her counterparts, and the acumen of the advisor. Advising in a war zone will usually present more challenges, as will situations where cultural differences are physically apparent. Large, complex security sector changes will be harder to navigate, while smaller-scale modifications to security sector policies or procedures may prove to be easier. In general, if the interpersonal relationship between the advisor and the counterpart is weak or lacks trust, negotiations will be more challenging and time-consuming. Lastly, advisors who lack negotiation and other advising skills—or have not been trained in advising tradecraft—will face repeated interpersonal negotiation challenges (Aquilar and Galluccio 2011). In societies that are less rules based and where daily negotiations are commonplace, an unskilled advisor with weak negotiation skills will likely fail. They will simply be marginalized or ignored by their counterpart.

Internal Debates

A security sector advisor will encounter numerous situations that will force intrapersonal negotiations over what course of action to take. These internal debates may be the most difficult part of being an advisor. This is especially true in situations where an advisor is not among a trusted circle of fellow advisors, and thus must be their

own counselor, jury and judge. The advisor will invariably face an endless stream of substantive, cognitive, moral, ethical, motivational, and emotional processes and consequential choices when in a security sector environment (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). Therefore, to better understand potential interpersonal challenges, it is important to promote in advisors an awareness of intrapersonal processes, especially of the emotional and behavioral mechanisms that may affect main actors in the field (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). An illustrative list of choices that an advisor may have to negotiate with one's self:

- Does the advisor push harder on their counterpart to change or adapt a new position (to achieve progress in the short run, at some risk to the relationship), or does the advisor wait for conditions to change, perhaps allowing the counterpart to fail in their job so that there is a learning moment to leverage as an advisor (perhaps hurting the mission, but in the long run, generating more sustainable capacity building)?
- Does the advisor challenge factually incorrect statements by their counterpart, in order to correct them (to demonstrate expertise), or does the advisor avoid correcting them (so as to not threaten relationship building)?
- Does an advisor defend his/her country against criticisms by the counterpart (to defend one's honor), or does the advisor seek to understand what is behind the criticism (in an attempt to forge a closer relationship)?
- Does an advisor encourage their counterpart to reveal cases of corruption in their office (to uphold rule of law), or does the advisor use the corruption event to work with the counterpart to establish more transparent rules and oversight for the future (to increase institutional capacity and resilience)?

These choices rarely have a clear-cut, correct answer. They often result in ambiguous outcomes, with consequences that play out over months or years. The advisor that sets an internal compass, before their tour starts, to guide their moral and substantive choices, will stand a better chance of navigating the frequently uncertain environment of security sector advising.

Best Practices in Advisor Negotiations

Security sector advising, as a professional field, has a range of best practices that will position an advisor for improved chances of success, despite the challenges listed above. A number of these “best practices” can also improve negotiation outcomes by giving the advisor culturally and bureaucratically informed advantages. Empathy, humility, and identification of value sets, when combined with a demonstrated respect for the host culture and language, are powerful tools that both build trust by the counterpart and help to shape more effective negotiating terms and lines of argumentation.

Empathy

In the post-9/11 world, the US military rediscovered the importance of “winning hearts and minds,” relearning a lesson from prior conflicts and one that the development community had implicitly understood for years—that understanding a country’s culture and being able to speak its language(s) made knowledge transfer more effective. Likewise, by communicating in ways that people could understand and which demonstrated a level of empathy, development projects are more likely to be sustained. Empathy for us and for others is a crucial skill for negotiators and mediators (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008). Similarly, when an advisor attempts to see the security sector situation as the counterpart does, the advisor is increasingly able to imagine his/her own negotiating preferences and limits from the perspective of the counterpart. The advisor is able to negotiate from a position of understanding their counterpart’s potential positions, values, and concerns. When that empathy is applied to advisor-counterpart interactions, trust is built. In this case, empathy is a useful approach to take so that trust can be built more quickly, thereby reducing the need for drawn out micro-negotiations over relatively simple issues such as scheduling meetings or encouraging a counterpart to raise a pressing policy issue with more senior officials.

Empathy is a by-product of at least two major elements of advisor tradecraft. First, the advisor should be approaching their mission from a mindset that seeks information and observations that can help the advisor to be more empathetic. Second, the advisor should be leveraging their relationship building sessions with their counterparts to generate an empathetic perspective. In many cultures around the world, these relationships will be developed not only in formal office meetings but in the informal conversations over tea or coffee, during lunch, or in the evenings after a workday is complete (Gillette 2011). Ideally, the advisor pursues the invitations to such social events, which may extend beyond the grounds of a Ministry or the base of a security unit. Getting outside of the day-to-day work environment with the counterpart is critically important, as this will allow the advisor to better understand the societal pressures and risks facing those they are seeking to support.

Do No Harm

When negotiating from a perspective of doing no harm, an advisor will be guided by the rationale of this state-building development principle. The principle holds that an advisor must be aware of the drivers of conflict or state transition which underlie the security sector environment, so as to not undermine the native process of state building (Putzel et al. 2010). Power dynamics and ongoing political settlements will affect the advising context, and thus, an advisor will need to have some sense of how these factors are impacting their counterparts. When negotiating, advisors will have more success when they are aware of and operate within their counterpart’s power and power limitations. If an advisor forces a negotiation that undermines their counterpart’s power in the security sector, this will reduce their negotiating effectiveness in future interactions. Additionally, negotiations should seek the development of policies or new institutional processes that advance the existing state-building process rather than counteract them. For example, in Afghanistan, advisor negotiation positions that

referenced the principles of standing laws, regulations, or the Afghan Constitution tended to be more successful.

Take It or Leave It

Security sector advisors often have the ability to give advice in a “take it or leave it” approach. Ultimately, a counterpart will determine whether that advice is prudent, useful, or sustainable. As a result, advisors are often in a position to share their advice on handling a situation, or identifying a problem, without having to win every discussion. When this approach is applied to negotiations in the advising space, a security sector advisor can sometimes be more successful (Gerspacher 2012a). If the counterpart does not agree, but the advice was prudent, the ramifications of counterpart actions will often result in some shortfall or failure that the advisor can come back to in a subsequent negotiation and use as leverage. This best practice helps an advisor realize that each negotiation—especially the micro-negotiations—will usually be revisited or discussed again. With this understanding, an advisor can be more patient in their work and in developing and implementing negotiating strategies.

Humility

Being modest, deferential, and self-effacing during advisor negotiations—especially micro-negotiations—is another way to gain trust and build relationships with your counterparts. The recognition inherent in humility is that the counterpart must ultimately own and shape the security sector reforms being undertaken. When applied to negotiations, this advisor trait will help guard against the instinct to force changes that would be uncommon in the counterpart’s native context. Humility in negotiations also tends to lead to less assertive negotiating positions, which tend to have higher degrees of success. While in some cultures being too modest or deferential during an actual negotiation discussion may backfire (and a good advisor will know if this is the case in their con-

text), this best practice emphasizes the need for an advisor to be humble in their scoping of the negotiation terms and conditions. In this way, an advisor will build into their negotiating approach a respect for the complexity of their counterpart’s security sector context—one that is often fraught with spoilers or power dynamics that must be nimbly navigated.

Find the Value Sets

Through a well-executed diagnostic of the security sector and the advisor’s counterpart (their position, role, and personal/professional profile), an advisor will be able to identify the main values or motivational factors that guide their counterpart. Some security sector leaders are motivated by appeals to logic and reason, while others may be more inclined to support an advisor’s negotiating stance if it is grounded in appeals to patriotism or duty. The advisor may also be able to identify what aspects of the security sector are frustrating the counterpart and use these frustrations in negotiations to motivate counterpart action. In some cultures, the advisor’s educational background and pedigree may carry particular weight, which will allow negotiations to start off on a better footing. Some younger advisors or female advisors will encounter biases favoring age (as a surrogate for knowledge) or the male gender (as a surrogate for power), which may hurt their negotiating leverage. A successful security sector advisor will use the information they have gathered as they orient to their context and develop negotiating positions and arguments that play to the value sets of their counterparts. This may require bringing in other actors to account for advisors’ shortfalls (e.g., an older advisor or security sector official who supports the advisor’s views).

The Value of Training

Security sector advising requires a degree of professionalism and range of skills not often found in the security sector itself. The ideal

advisor has five different categories of skills: (1) regional or country-specific expertise, (2) project management, (3) organizational consulting experience, (4) technical skill in the security sector topic in question (e.g., legal, policy, personnel management, resource/financial management, logistics, etc.), and (5) advising skills. It is rare that someone generates this range of skills for security sector advising simply through his/her native career track. Without these skills, or the pre-advising assignment training to develop them, a security sector advisor could fail or, worse, cause significant harm to a country (Gerspacher 2012b).

My observations of unprepared security sector advisors in Afghanistan reinforce these conclusions. Frequently, the United States or NATO countries would deploy advisors to work at the highest levels of the Afghan government, with little or no advising training. The results were devastating. Some advisors openly belittled their counterparts, other advisors had no technical skills or experience in the area of their advising work, and some made recommendations that ran contrary to Afghan law and custom. Absent a training and assessment mechanism, security sector advisors can degrade capacity in a security sector or, worse, influence outcomes that undermine human security.

A major area of weakness in many advisors was their inability to sustain repeated micro- and macro-negotiations referenced earlier in this article. The work can be exhausting, tedious, and unsatisfying. Progress comes slowly if at all. Without training and preparation for this type of negotiating environment, many advisors burned out and gave up on their mission as well as their principal.

Aside from helping to prevent ineffective or disruptive advising, training can also advance a security sector mission's success. With more capable advisors, there is a higher probability that the objectives of the security sector mission can be met. All five of the major skill categories listed above can be improved through training, thereby increasing the capability of the advisor. Depending upon the candidate, such training can also build up some of these skills from scratch,

e.g., project management, creating better rounded and effective advisors.

A fundamental element of the "advisor skills" portion of training needs to cover negotiations. Training modules on the theory of negotiation, case studies on negotiation, and how to use or recognize styles of negotiation can all be helpful to an advisor's training. Given the international context of security sector advising, learning about how negotiations are conducted well (and not well) in the country or culture in question is invaluable. The local context for advising will significantly shape the parameters of many of the advisor's negotiations, so learning cultural taboos and popular cultural negotiating styles is significantly helpful. In many cultures, for example, deference or agreement to an advisor's points may seem to indicate success or agreement. After a week, the advisor's expectations of agreement may fall apart however—as their counterpart reveals that they never intended to go along with the advisor's suggestions (Gillette 2011). Training can prepare an advisor for what their counterpart's negotiating behavior may actually mean in a security sector context.

Unbeknownst to the advisor, there may be real reasons for their counterpart not being able to get to "yes." A well-trained advisor will not push external solutions in such situations. Rather, the successful advisor will use their advising tradecraft to indirectly guide their counterpart to identify local answers and fixes to the unique problems of each country's security sector.

Proposed Training Plan for a Security Sector Advisor

Training for a security sector advisor is essential. Unfortunately, in many security sector reform environments, these advisors are deployed without such training or only minimal time preparing for the demands of these assignments.

As an example, after the first few months in Afghanistan, I began to see other advisors struggling with their interactions and negotiating outcomes. They would fail to secure meetings with their counterparts or find that their suggestions

for improving the Ministry of Defense or the conduct of the Afghan National Army were not being accepted. In conjunction with others at the military headquarters we were assigned to as advisors, we hypothesized that many of our fellow advising cadre (over 100 advisors from the NATO coalition) received insufficient pre-deployment training in advising, negotiations, or organizational management diagnostics. In turn, I adapted our quarterly assessment surveys to ask the advisors about the nature, length, and usefulness of any pre-deployment training they received. These surveys focused on the team of the most senior security sector advisors working in the Afghan Ministry of Defense, roughly 30 personnel. The findings unfortunately confirmed our hypothesis. An overwhelming majority of the advisors, especially those that were military officers, received minimal to no training in advising, negotiations, or Afghan politics, culture, and law. Some advisors only received the minimum training required to deploy to a war zone—mostly weapons qualification, safety instruction, and orientation to deployment regulations—with country orientation training as a suggested element, usually through online means. It was not uncommon that these senior advisors would have only 1–2 weeks of preparation for their roles, inclusive of days associated with administrative preparation, medical tests, and equipment provisioning.

This is unfortunate, as examples of good training regimes are found in online versions as well as in structured pre-deployment systems. The Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) provides useful training schemes via their International Security Sector Advisor Team (ISSAT). Their online courses provide a range of preparatory modules, in a user-friendly course of instruction, supplemented by recommended additional reading, interviews, and simulations (The Geneva Center 2014a).

Additionally, in the United States, the US Department of Defense has developed an increasingly effective and flexible training program for security sector advisors being employed in Afghanistan, as well as other countries such as Kosovo and Montenegro. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense Advisor (MoDA) program (US Department of

Defense 2011), this training was developed in conjunction with experts from the US Institute of Peace and drawing on lessons from former security sector advisors. In my role as a MoDA during my time in Afghanistan, I found myself drawing on this structured course of training repeatedly during my assignment. Over the years, the MoDA training program has also sought to improve its course content and methods, providing even more enhanced and relevant trainings to security sector advisors deploying currently.

Based on observations from my own experience in training for advising Afghanistan, in my work associated with security sector reform since then, and on findings from conversations with other former security sector advisors, there appear to be several fundamental elements of a good training program. These elements also build on very useful findings assembled by security sector advisor trainers (Gerspacher 2012b). The proposed training regime below could be used as a guide for self-study or, ideally, would inform more structured and formal systems of preparation.

A minimal advisor training program should include:

1. *Orientation to the region and country where the advising will take place.* These modules should ideally include a detailed history of the security sector from present day to its variations over time. Associated treatment of government structures, regulations, and capacities is helpful, as well as associated legal and judicial issues. Economic, cultural, and social modules will help orient an advisor to other aspects of the security sector environment, norms of behavior, and motivational factors in a society. A pre-deployment visit to the country can be especially useful if at all possible. As mentioned above, this training should also include specific treatment of negotiating norms and practices in the country.
2. *Project management principles and methods.* Advisors need to have an understanding of how to manage their deployment as one large “project,” with associated schedules, costs, and workflow plans. Additionally, since many advisor duties will be in support of a security

sector office that is likely responsible for conducting multiple projects in an annual budget cycle, such project management experience will be extremely useful for the capacity-building work an advisor will be conducting. If there are unique cultural or country aspects to project management, these should inform the training.

3. *Organizational consulting methods.* Training in how to observe an organization and understand its processes, culture, and rules will help an advisor work with their counterparts to identify areas for organizational improvement or reform. Training that links this expertise with how such knowledge can be used in negotiations is particularly useful.
4. *Knowledge transfer training in the advisor's technical competence areas.* Being a subject matter expert is essential to being a security sector advisor. Being able to transfer that knowledge in a culturally respectful and structured way often requires training however. Training should emphasize how to communicate technical expertise at basic, intermediate, and advanced levels while preparing an advisor for being able to diagnose what level of knowledge transfer is best given the education, willingness, and capacity of those receiving such knowledge.
5. *Advising and negotiation skills.* Advising has many tradecraft elements associated with it, such as relationship building, developing trust, and earning respect. Training modules exist for these; some are tailored specifically to development and security sector contexts (The Geneva Center 2014b). An advising module is incomplete, however, without significant familiarization with negotiating principles, methods, and lessons learned. These are best complemented with practice sessions, using role-players if at all possible (see 7, below).
6. *Self-knowledge.* Given the challenges an advisor will face in their interpersonal negotiations, training in self-examination, health and wellness, meditation, and introspection is a particularly useful and frequently overlooked aspect to advisor training (see Chap. 16). Successful negotiation and

mediation involve also interpersonal and intrapersonal competence to understand perceptions, biases, personal grievances, and cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes at stake (Galluccio 2011). These abilities will help to build social and resilience skills in the face of stress (Galluccio 2011). This training should also include examination of an advisor's own country and its history, especially the history of their own security sector and its formulation/reform over time. With this knowledge, an advisor is better able to reference their own motivations, shortfalls, and national lessons when negotiating and advising. One of the most powerful negotiating methods is to reference an advisor's own failures when seeking to influence the counterpart to a different outcome.

7. *Simulations and exercises.* While not always available to an advisor in person, simulations and exercises will help deepen training. Exercises that place an advisor in situations where they must conduct formal negotiations and micro-negotiations in a dynamic, culturally simulated environment are ideal. Advisors should be placed in stressful situations, interacting with role-players of the culture in question, where they must conduct micro-negotiations over issues like scheduling meetings, gaining access to their counterpart, and requesting documents to review. This type of training should also familiarize an advisor with how they may need to work through an interpreter to conduct negotiations, which becomes another dimension of crafting a successful negotiating strategy.

Conclusion

Security sector advising, despite its complexities and challenges, can be an incredibly rewarding and impactful experience for the advisor and their counterparts. The opportunity to support another country's establishment or reform of a security sector—ranging from high-level government ministries to small headquarters at remote border outposts—is a professional crucible that in many ways reforms the advisor as well, giving them

new perspectives on their career, their skills, and their interpersonal bearings. For the government and security force professionals of a country undergoing change in their security sector, working with and negotiating with external advisors should bring equally rewarding insights into how to improve their organizations and new motivation and inspiration for doing so.

The burden for generating these outcomes from security sector advising is a shared one, but ultimately, most of this responsibility falls on the advisor and the national or organizational officials preparing, training, and deploying them. As the intervening party (even if invited or hired), the advisor needs to ensure that their preparation and approach to fostering change in a country's security sector is done respectfully, with good design and best practices, and through appropriately calibrated negotiations at all levels. For those training and deploying advisors, the responsibility to adequately prepare the advisor through well-resourced, rigorous, and thoughtful training is paramount. The security sector capacity-building mission is a serious and potentially disruptive force in countries undergoing reform. These countries deserve well-prepared and tested advisors to support their citizens' aspirations for improved security and the prosperity that can follow.

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Gerardus Gielen

General Context: ACP-EU Relations in a Nutshell

International development cooperation implies that certain countries finance interventions to the benefit of other (developing) countries, through various instruments, such as bilateral cooperation from state to state, activities undertaken by non-governmental organisations, financing through development banks, international organisations, trust funds, public-private partnerships, etc. A very long-lasting and specific type of development cooperation is the one between the European Union (EU) and the Group of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP). Cooperation with ACP countries goes back to the Treaty of Rome in 1957, when the six EU founding fathers put in place a special regime for overseas countries and territories (OCTs), including a Development Fund. As certain OCTs became independent, a new type of association agreement was concluded with them in 1963. This gave rise to the Yaounde Convention, followed later on by the

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Lome Conventions and finally the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, signed in Cotonou in June 2000 for a period of 20 years, after several years of negotiations (Cotonou Agreement 2014). Over the years, the number of signatories has steadily increased to 28 EU Member States and 78 ACP States.¹

The Cotonou Agreement contained initially three pillars: development cooperation, political relations and trade relations. Since 2008, trade relations are being dealt with separately through what is called the Generalised System of Preferences and Economic Partnership Agreements. This article will focus essentially on negotiations related to development cooperation. It builds on the results of research on ACP-EU negotiations, undertaken by Francesco Aquilar and Mauro Galluccio and published in their book *Psychological Processes in International Negotiations* (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008).

The main instrument for development cooperation under the Cotonou Agreement is the European Development Fund (EDF). It is a fund set up by EU Member States with a specific legal basis outside the EU Treaty and not part of the EU Budget. This implies that it is implemented according to its own rules, even though these have been harmonised as much as possible with those of the EU

¹The Group of ACP States has been set up under the agreement initialled in Georgetown, Guyana, 6 June 1975, and amended in 1992 (Georgetown Agreement 1975).

Budget. EDF resources are used for cooperation with ACP States under the Cotonou Agreement, cooperation with overseas countries and territories of EU Member States and Commission expenditure related to programming and implementation of aid. Since the signature of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000, three instalments have been decided: the ninth EDF of 13.8 billion euros for the period 2000–2007, the tenth EDF of 22.682 billion euros for 2008–2013 and the eleventh EDF of 30.506 billion euros for 2014–2020 (Internal Agreement 2000, 2006, 2013).

Development cooperation under the Cotonou Agreement has a strong degree of ownership by ACP Partners. For the bulk of funding, the European Union and ACP Partners define together priorities under multiannual programming documents, agree on project formulation and share responsibilities on aid implementation. On the EU side, this is done by the European Commission, in cooperation with EU Member States (policy dialogue and *ex ante* opinion on multiannual programming documents and financing decisions) and under the control of the European Parliament (policy dialogue and discharge on the management of funds) and the Court of Auditors. The preparation of multiannual programming documents is a shared responsibility between the services in the European Commission and in the European External Action Service, created in 2011. The implementation of the EDF is the responsibility of the European Commission (and the European Investment Bank for a smaller part of the EDF, the Investment Facility).

A Strong Need to Cooperate on a Continuous Basis

As Francesco Aquilar and Mauro Galluccio have indicated in 2008, “...stability and prosperity ...—the goal of foreign policy in almost all nations—can only be achieved if international subjects can act together in pursuit of interests that transcend their boundaries” (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008, p. 4). They have also given a definition of international negotiation which is particularly pertinent in the context of the ACP-EU Partnership:

“International negotiation could be defined as an interdisciplinary tool that facilitates international activity in an effort to manage the interdependence between international subjects in a peaceful manner through compromises and agreements that have the capability of mutually satisfying all main interested actors. It is a joint decision-making process through which negotiating parties accommodate their conflicting interests into a mutually acceptable settlement. It involves at least two parties, but may, in the multilateral case, engage several hundred actors representing governments and governmental or nongovernmental organisations” (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008, p. 6).

In the specific context of the ACP-EU Partnership as described above, development cooperation and the negotiations which are necessary to make it happen require developing a sustainable long-term working relationship. Unless in really exceptional cases, there are no one-shot negotiations in the field of international cooperation: one negotiates over years with the same people or institutions in various cases and settings. It is thus important to be aware of the long-term effects of any interaction. I will try to illustrate this with a few concrete—and simplified—positive examples, from my personal experience, when working in EU delegations or in EU headquarters. Since it is about my experience, it is also based on my perception as an official from the European Commission. Other actors involved in the same processes may have had different perceptions.

Negotiating a Working Relationship at Bilateral (Country) Level: Development Cooperation in Benin (1995–2000)

How the Ice Was Broken

Upon my arrival in Benin in October 1995 (I stayed until July 2000), colleagues from the EU delegation briefed me on the working relations with the national authorities. The ministry in charge of coordination of development cooperation tried to keep strong control of contacts on development projects between representations of development partners and technical ministries. The EU delegation was criticised in cases where

it undertook direct contacts with technical ministries, without prior agreement of the coordination ministry. All this led to relatively formal and rigid working relations between the government and the EU delegation, not helpful for development cooperation that requires a certain degree of flexibility and informal contacts on top of institutional relations, in order to be fully operational.

As an economic adviser at the EU delegation, I was in charge, amongst others, of support to the health sector and public finance management. Part of our support to the health sector was channelled through the national budget for implementation in line with national health priorities by using the country's own procedures (commonly called budget support²). In spite of this relatively flexible aid modality, health expenditure remained weak. When I spoke to officials in the health ministry, they signalled difficulties with the finance ministry in the expenditure cycle. Vice versa, officials in the finance ministry were critical on expenditure management by the health ministry. However, it appeared that none of my interlocutors had a full picture of the expenditure cycle. It was thus not possible to really understand the issues that held up health expenditure.

I then asked for a technical meeting with colleagues from the ministries in charge of coordination, finance and health. They explained to me how they worked on expenditure at the various levels, which was the beginning of a better understanding of the issues at stake. What started as a meeting to explain the expenditure cycle to me turned into an informal meeting between officials from the different ministries. At the end of the meeting, participants concluded that they should meet more often this way,

because it really helped to understand each other better. The ice had started to break.

One of the next steps was a public expenditure review in 1996. A team of consultants, co-financed by the World Bank and the EU, reviewed public expenditure in key ministries. At the end of the process, we invited a team of key officials in the ministries involved to write the final recommendations for future implementation. We invited them to Brussels in order to free them from their daily workload and pressures and create an appropriate atmosphere for in-depth analysis. This was done without the involvement of the consultants. The only other participants were the country desk officer from the World Bank and me, in a role of facilitators. The end result was a series of recommendations that had been prepared and supported by this group of officials. They were later on adopted by the government and became a national agenda. The ice was now really broken, because people realised that the expenditure review had become their affair and that recommendations for policy measures were not imposed by international donors but the result of their own analyses.

At the time of the public expenditure review, budget support by the EU was based on "conditionalities". This implied an agreement between the government and the European Commission, on reforms and policy measures to be undertaken by the government. Disbursements by the EU were conditioned by the implementation of such reforms and measures. However, experience has shown that an international donor cannot "buy" reforms. Where reforms are objectively necessary for a country for a sustainable development process, they should at least be owned or supported by those segments of society who are convinced of the need for change. Outside pressure can then help such segments to make the necessary changes.

During several years after the public expenditure review, the Commission and the government agreed to take recommendations from the public expenditure review as "conditionalities" for EU Budget support. For the EU delegation, it had become relatively easy to negotiate new

² "Budget support is an aid modality. It should not be seen as an end in itself, but as a means of delivering better aid and achieving sustainable development results. It involves (1) dialogue, (2) financial transfers to the national treasury account of the partner country, (3) performance assessment and (4) capacity development, based on partnership and mutual accountability." (EuropeAid 2012, p.5).

budget support programmes with the government. Officials in Beninese ministries were reassured that they were taken seriously and took a positive attitude towards EU Budget support. Dialogue was more and more open and frank and with less and less formalities. This went so far that at a certain moment, the delegation could send convocations directly to officials in ministries for meetings on the budget support programme. People responded, without any formalities or criticism (as was the case before), simply because they were convinced that it was done in good faith and in their interest.

This is a simple example of how working on a positive long-term relationship, building up trust and confidence, can make things easier. It is also a simplified example. The context was of course much more complex. For example, in parallel to the work with the national administration, lots of efforts went into coordination with other international partners, including EU Member States locally represented. And the EU delegation was working with headquarters in Brussels on developing the approach explained above. And headquarters in turn had to defend financing proposals to EU Member States (through the European Development Fund Committee). Maintaining or building up trust with international partners was as much necessary as with Beninese partners. This worked and Benin was chosen as a pilot country for innovative forms of budget support, both by the EU and the World Bank.

The above example shows in a nutshell how important a long-term working relationship can be for successful international negotiations. As Aquilar and Galluccio wrote, based on literature study:

“Cooperation is ... an outcome of a complex never-ending process of cognition, motivation, emotions and communication, to set up first of all a sustainable and lasting relationship during the negotiation process. The cooperative process of working out an agreement may produce a psychological commitment to a mutually satisfactory outcome, and perhaps if we understand the process better, we can use our foresight to speed up the evolution of cooperation. Working relationships, where trust, understanding, respect and friendship are built up over time tend to maximize

the long-run mutual benefit and can make each negotiation smoother and more efficient” (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008, p. 10).

An Example of ACP-EU Negotiations at Multilateral Level: The Creation of the Peace Facility (2002–2004)

Aquilar and Galluccio had found as an outcome of their survey on ACP-EU negotiations: “...a possible positive win–win approach to the negotiation is to start from an efficient and secure communication base, from a good amount of creativity, empathy and awareness and confidence with our own and the counterpart’s feelings and emotions” (Aquilar and Galluccio 2008, p. 102). The following example shows how the team responsible for setting up the Peace Facility had to use all their creativity, empathy and confidence to find a solution that did not seem evident from the start.

Institutional Context

The Cotonou Agreement allows the Joint ACP-EU Council of Ministers to take certain decisions, for instance, on reallocations of resources between major headings of the European Development Fund for ACP countries. This procedure was used to set up a facility to finance peace support operations in sub-Saharan Africa, the Peace Facility.

Decisions by the Joint Council require a long preparation process. They are based on a proposal by the European Commission, endorsed or amended by the EU Council of Ministers and negotiated with the ACP Partners before formal adoption by the Joint Council of Ministers (either at its annual meeting or by written procedure or by delegation of powers to the ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors). They require solid technical preparation inside the Commission and negotiations at many levels. Just to give an idea of what that means, here is a (simplified) summary of the major steps:

European Commission

- (a) Preparation at technical level inside the Commission lead DG³
- (b) Approval by Management and Cabinet of the responsible Commissioner
- (c) Preparation of a draft Commission decision (for a draft EU Council of Ministers decision on the position to be adopted by the EU in the Joint Council)
- (d) Consultation of other Commission DGs (inter-service consultation)
- (e) Adoption of the decision by the College of the Commission
- (f) Transmission to the EU Council and the Group of ACP States

EU Council

- (g) Negotiation in the ACP Working Party of the EU Council
- (h) Approval of the EU position in the Committee of Permanent Representatives
- (i) Decision by the EU Council of Ministers on the position to be adopted in the Joint Council

ACP

- (j) Presentation of the proposal to an ACP committee.
- (k) ACP committee prepares a recommendation to the ACP Committee of Ambassadors.
- (l) ACP Committee of Ambassadors defines ACP negotiation position.

ACP-EU

- (m) Discussion in the ACP-EU Development Finance Cooperation Committee (authorised representatives level)
- (n) Discussion in the ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors
- (o) Discussion in the ACP-EU Development Finance Cooperation Committee (ministerial level) for recommendation to the Joint Council
- (p) Decision by the Joint Council of Ministers

Experience shows that the preparation and negotiation of Joint Council decisions can take between 6 months and 2 years.

Presentations and negotiations with EU Member States and ACP States are to a certain extent done in parallel. If there is sufficient trust and a positive perception of the justification of the issue to be negotiated, this can help to simplify and accelerate the process. For the European Commission's services, it can be useful to have early informal discussions with the EU Member States and representatives of ACP States or their Secretariat, for testing ideas or getting an impression of the feasibility of a proposal in the making. It also allows the partners to know what is coming up and to prepare for it. But it can also be counterproductive if it is not well thought through or presented. For example, the Commission can then be accused of advancing too much with ACP Partners without having consulted the EU Member States. Or ACP Partners can accuse the Commission of asking for their opinion without having sufficiently developed its proposal. It remains a matter of judgement, based on trust developed with partners and confidence in one's own proposals to determine what is the best option: start discussing with ACP States and/or EU Member States when the Commission proposal is still in the making or only after it has been formally adopted by the College of the Commission.

Something similar is true when the EU Council is defining the position to be taken by the EU in the Joint Council. If the "EU Council" steps (g)–(i) signalled above are done in parallel to the "ACP" steps (j)–(l), it can allow the EU to adapt its position in the light of the exchanges. It avoids that the ACP side criticises the EU position as imposing a "fait accompli" and can make it easy for the Joint Council of Ministers to take its decision. On the other hand, e.g. if the ACP side is critical on the proposal, it may well argue that it must see the formal EU position first before discussing. Here again, it is a matter of building trust and understanding the other party's concerns and interests, especially through informal meetings and exchanges, to choose what seems the best option and work towards a consensus or a compromise, in view of a Joint Council decision.

³Since 2011, for certain issues, this is done jointly with the European External Action Service.

The reactions in such chicken-and-egg situations will very much depend on the interests and perceptions on each side. But they certainly contribute to a better anticipation of issues that may come up during the formal negotiations and can allow for adapting proposals or positions accordingly.

The Peace Facility

The Peace Facility was set up after the launching of the African Union in 2002, as a successor to the Organisation of African Unity, with a strong mandate in the field of conflict prevention and resolution. The EU could only give limited support to peace building in Africa. Its treaty did not allow for the financing from the EU Budget of operational expenditure with military or defence implications. Still, the Commissioner for Development asked the Commission's services to find a solution that would allow the EU to finance peace support operations in Africa, with strong ownership on the African side.

A small working group was set up with colleagues from the Directorates-General in charge of development, external relations and the legal service. With a clear mandate from the political level, the working group members used all their creativity, empathy and confidence to find a solution, which would be sufficiently ambitious and have a chance to make it through the system. With its combined membership, the working group had the right know-how, network and experience to determine the right approach inside the Commission, towards the Council and the African Union and with the ACP States. I participated in this working group and brought with me several years of experience in negotiating Joint Council decisions on the EDF.

The very first requirement was to find a legal solution. We argued that even though the EU Treaty did not allow for operational expenditure with military or defence implications under the EU Budget, this limitation did not apply to the EDF. The Cotonou Agreement was an agreement on its own, between EU Member States and ACP countries, and the EDF was set up outside

the EU Budget and could therefore finance activities foreseen in the Cotonou Agreement, even if they went further than what could be done on the basis of the EU Treaty. It clearly took creativity to come up with such an interpretation. But considering the political context, it had a chance to fly and it ultimately did.

The next major issue was the financial architecture. As said above, the mandate was to seek strong African ownership. Simply taking money from a general reserve was thus not good enough. The option chosen was to propose to take half from the EDF reserve of unallocated resources and half from funds allocated to individual sub-Saharan African countries, as an expression of ownership and solidarity (since all countries would contribute, whilst only countries in conflict or post-conflict could benefit). In order to improve the odds, we shared this idea with colleagues from the African Union, preparing for the Summit of African Heads of State in Maputo in July 2003. It was put on the agenda, and the Heads of State asked officially for a peace support operation facility to be set up from resources allocated to each of them under the existing cooperation agreements with the European Union and to be supplemented by an equivalent amount of unallocated EDF resources.

Subsequently, the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council in its meeting of 21 July 2003 confirmed the will of the EU and Member States to contribute to the strengthening of African capacities in peacekeeping. It also invited the Commission to present proposals on the possibility of setting up a peace facility as requested by the heads of state of the African Union.

With the appropriate preparatory work and the right political environment, the highly complex decision-making procedure as described in section "Institutional context" went very quickly. The formal Commission proposal was adopted in October 2003 (European Commission 2003), and the Joint Council took its decision in December 2003, creating a Peace Facility of 250 million euros (ACP-EC Council of Ministers 2003). A financing decision of the same amount was taken by the Commission in 2004, with the

understanding that it would seek a consensus of the EU Member States in the competent bodies of the Council on the political appropriateness of each operation proposed. (Since then, with subsequent allocations, more than one billion euros from the 9th and 10th European Development Funds have been implemented under the Peace Facility for operations in sub-Saharan Africa.)

The experience with the Peace Facility shows that the system can work very smoothly if the proposal is solid and consensual, with common understanding and trust between negotiators. In other cases, when the proposal is less consensual or less convincing, any party can use the bureaucratic setup to find formal arguments to slow down the negotiations, either to block the proposal completely or to negotiate what would be considered as a better deal.

Multilateral Negotiations of the Legal Bases for the 11th European Development Fund (2011–2014)

Changes in the Context

The example of the Peace Facility showed the importance of a good understanding of the context of the negotiation. Any negotiator operating during the second decade of the Cotonou Agreement (2010–2020) must be aware that the context has changed fundamentally since 2000. Just to give a few (objective) examples:

- (a) A first major change has been the enlargement of the EU, moving from 15 to 28 Member States, with new Member States from Central, Eastern and Mediterranean Europe. They have adhered to the Cotonou Agreement as part of the “acquis” they had to accept in order to become an EU Member State. This has led to a situation where the majority of EU Member States have no “historical” relations with ACP countries.
- (b) As a combined effect of the enlargement of the EU and economic growth in a certain number of ACP States, the number of ACP States with per capita revenue superior to at least one EU Member State has grown from one ACP State in 2000 to 16 ACP States in 2010.
- (c) With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the equilibrium between the EU institutions and Member States has changed, with a more intergovernmental approach as well as increased influence for the European Parliament and National Parliaments.
- (d) Europe was going through a major financial and economic crisis, at the time when the EU institutions had to issue their proposal for their multiannual budget, the “Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020”. The 11th EDF, although outside the EU Budget, had to be negotiated at the same time.
- (e) National Parliaments in several EU Member States have become more critical and demanding on development aid and its impact. For the responsible ministries, this requires the need to further strengthen the justification of the level and type of aid, including the resources channelled through the EDF. Individual Member States’ positions on development aid can change fundamentally at short notice, in accordance with electoral results and subsequent coalition negotiations.
- (f) Since 2011, for the first time in the history of the ACP-EU Partnership, there is no longer a unique structure for cooperation with the ACP States. Both the European External Action Service and the Commission’s Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation EuropeAid have organised their geographic directorates on a continental basis.
- (g) The partnership between the African Union and the European Union is taking more weight.
- (h) The role and influence of emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil in ACP States have increased.

Experience from the Negotiations of the 11th EDF Legal Bases (2011–2014)

I have been in charge of negotiating several legal bases for the 11th EDF over the period 2011–2014, with a small team of colleagues, two from the Commission and one from the EEAS. Over the period 2008–2010, I had been involved in negotiations with EU Member States in the Council and ACP Partners represented in Brussels, on issues related to the 10th EDF. I was thus already in a long-term working relationship with the other parties.

In what comes, I will refer to the steps in the negotiation process as described in section “Institutional context”, as well as some of the factors identified by Aquilar and Galluccio (2008, Appendices 1–3, pp. 146–152) in their survey on negotiations in the ACP-EU context:

- “Dangerous human characteristics”: hostility, rigidity, aggressiveness, deceit suspect, high expectation, ambiguity and uncertainty
- “Less negative factors” (depending on different perceptions): breakdown, mass media, expectation and timing
- “Positive factors”: emotions, assertiveness, creativity, communication and empathy

Preparation of Commission Proposals

The preparatory work inside the Commission (steps a–d in section “Institutional context”) can be long and tedious. Before the adoption of the draft legal texts (a first package in December 2011 and a second package in 2013), a public consultation was undertaken in 2010 and then an internal impact assessment, with an analysis of various options. It may seem strange for an outsider that it can take 1 or 2 years before a text of 10–20 pages comes out of the Commission, but it can actually be the most difficult phase in the whole negotiation process (this is however not specific to the policy area of ACP-EU relations). Services inside the lead DG as well as the other DGs can push for their opinions and interests to be taken into account, and this can in cases be done in a fairly harsh manner. Our little team was clearly confronted with almost the full

range of negative and positive factors identified in Aquilar’s and Galluccio’s study. It had to find solutions with lots of assertiveness and creativity to find the right arguments and the right tone to get the necessary Commission proposals adopted. The major ones were:

- A proposal for the so-called Internal Agreement for the 11th EDF which is the agreement between EU Member States to set up the 11th EDF (European Commission 2011a). It defines amongst others the breakdown of the EDF in major envelopes (cooperation with ACP countries, cooperation with overseas countries and territories and the part of the funds that the Commission can use to programme and implement the EDF), individual contributions by Member States, voting rights in the EDF Committee, the role of the European Investment Bank, etc.
- A proposal for a new annex to the Cotonou Agreement, defining the financing for ACP countries under the 11th EDF—Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020 (European Commission 2011b).
- A proposal for an implementation regulation, defining modalities for issues such as multiannual programming, decision-making procedures, monitoring and reporting (European Commission 2013a)
- A proposal for a “bridging facility”, transitional measures for the period between the expiry of the 10th EDF and the entry into force of the 11th EDF, probably in 2015, after the conclusion of the ratification process of the Internal Agreement (European Commission 2013b)

(The second proposal was the only one for an ACP-EU decision; the other three were for decisions at EU level only.)

The team also contributed to the preparation of two other proposals, which were coordinated and negotiated by a different team: the 11th EDF financial regulation and a partial revision of annex IV to the Cotonou Agreement on implementation modalities. All this was done in the wider framework of preparing for the EU’s overall multiannual budget, the multiannual financial framework for the period 2014–2020, with a

need to simplify and harmonise as much as possible the provisions for the EDF with those for the EU Budget.

Negotiations with EU Member States in the ACP Working Party of the EU Council

How Does It Work

The ACP Working Party is chaired by an official from the EU Member State holding the rotating presidency (changes every 6 months), assisted by the Secretariat-General of the EU Council. It meets usually once or twice per week and has to deal with a large variety of issues. All 28 Member States are represented in the ACP Working Party, usually by officials from the Permanent Representations to the EU. They are the interface between the group and ministries in their capitals, from which they receive instructions, requests for information, clarification, etc. and to whom they have to report back. Their margin of manoeuvre can be relatively limited, leading to iterative negotiation processes, including many question and answer sessions.

In theory, if negotiations get stuck, there is a possibility to bring outstanding issues from the technical level of the ACP working party up to a higher level, the Committee of Permanent Representatives and ultimately the Council of Ministers. In practice, this rarely happens for the EDF, and solutions must therefore normally be found in the context of the ACP working party. It means that negotiators must look for a consensus or compromise, which can be challenging, especially when the texts have to be adopted by unanimity, as was the case for the 11th EDF legal bases we had to negotiate. It means that any individual Member State can take a strong position on whatever issue and even force the Commission or other Member States to make concessions. In such situations, informal preparatory meetings between the Presidency, Council Secretariat and the Commission, bilateral contacts and parallel negotiations with smaller groups of Member States can be crucial to find a common understanding and move to an acceptable compromise. Where necessary, particularly sensitive issues are sometimes brought up

in parallel to a higher administrative or political level, with bilateral contacts between high officials or ministers and commissioners to try and find a solution.

Since the enlargement of the EU from 15 to 28 Member States (see section “Changes in the context” on changes in the context), it is no longer possible to give everybody the floor for every issue on the agenda. This means that certain Member States can remain silent on certain issues for a long time, so that nobody knows what their real position is. And for Commission officials, it is also not possible to know each Member State representative personally. It means one has to find different ways, including more collective means, to build trust and confidence with the other negotiators and get an understanding of Member States’ perceptions and positions. It also strengthens the need for teamwork to increase observation capacities and networking. It makes it all the more important to invest in the quality of the Commission’s proposals and the proper arguments to make them easier to defend.

During the first semester of 2012, we negotiated with the ACP Working Party of the Council the text of the Internal Agreement. It was not very challenging, since the text had not changed much from the one for the 10th EDF and the amounts were not determined yet. But it was a good occasion for the team to understand the group dynamics and to be known from the ACP Working Party members.

Negotiations became more demanding after February 2013, when the European Heads of States and governments had determined the multiannual financial framework for the period 2014–2020, including the amount of the 11th EDF. It was fixed at 30.5 billion euros, representing a stabilisation of EU aid to ACP countries in real terms. Considering the context of the crisis (see section “Changes in the context”), it was not a surprise that the amount came out lower than what the Commission had initially proposed. But the fact that the level of aid was maintained in real terms was a very positive outcome, especially taking into consideration that the overall EU multiannual financial framework was reduced.

So, in February 2013, the real negotiations of the legal and regulatory framework for what was to come under the EDF for the period 2014–2020 started. It was the time when the more sensitive issues came on the table. These issues were typically related to policy stances in one or more Member States, at the highest political level (government and/or parliament) or to the evolutions in the relations between the EU and ACP countries or between the EU and its Member States (see section “Changes in the context”). Some examples include:

- The continuation of bilateral aid from the EDF to high-income and upper-middle-income ACP countries (as foreseen in the Cotonou Agreement), whilst similar non-ACP developing countries would no longer receive bilateral aid from the EU Budget as from 2014
- References to the possible integration of the EDF in the EU Budget after the expiry of the Cotonou Agreement in 2020
- The part of the EDF to be used for “support expenditure”, resources for the Commission to programme and implement the aid to ACP countries and overseas countries and territories
- Financing based on performance, more particularly in the field of democracy, human rights, rule of law and other issues of good governance
- Focus on the results of EU aid
- The division of responsibilities between the Commission, the EEAS and EU Member States on the programming and implementation of the EDF

These issues appeared progressively in the negotiations in the ACP Working Party.

Typically, negotiations in the ACP Working Party start with a presentation by the Commission of its proposal, followed by questions or observations by Member States and answers or reactions by the Commission. It allows Member States representatives to get a better understanding of the Commission’s proposal and to test how solid it is and if the Commission’s staff is capable of giving the necessary explanations and arguments. They need all this to report back themselves to their headquarters. But questions can also be a means to get extra information that

can be used later on in the negotiations. And repeating the same questions at successive meetings can either be a tool to improve understanding or to see the consistency of the answers and get extra arguments for negotiations later in the process and for preparing counterproposals or even to obtain data for use in a completely different context.

After some initial question and answer sessions and exchanges of views, the detailed discussions of the proposal, article per article, progressively reveal or confirm major issues for negotiation, such as the ones indicated above. This is where the right combination of negotiation factors as mentioned at the beginning of section “Experience from the negotiations of the 11th EDF legal bases (2011–2014)” becomes really important.

When It Gets Serious

If an issue is brought up by a Member State representative, a long-term working relationship with appropriate communication and empathy can help to understand how important it is for this particular Member State. It can also help to get a feeling of the person’s negotiation attitude: is he/she playing the role of an honest broker, who tries to work towards an equilibrium between the position of his/her headquarters and the position of the others in the Working Party or on the contrary using every opportunity to get more out of the process for his/her Member State. It is probably one of the most difficult assessments to make in a negotiation process. As long as you are not sure about this, it is also hard to determine if it is appropriate to give extra information, especially in writing, when so requested: will the information be used against you or to work towards an honest deal?

Where there is not yet a sufficient relation of understanding and confidence to make this assessment, other positive factors can help to complete the picture: being assertive on the Commission’s position, coming up with the right arguments to defend it, being creative in developing the argumentation and in some cases letting your emotions come out to show that it is really important for your institution. It will probably lead to reactions, either

inside or outside the meeting room, which will give you a better vision of the interlocutor's negotiation attitude. And it will also make the other participants in the negotiation group think about the position or attitude they should take and communicate about it.

As explained above, the legal texts mentioned above have to be adopted by unanimity. The kind of sensitive issues mentioned above can lead to different situations, for instance, a wide coalition of Member States against the Commission or conflicting opinions between Member States, with the Commission somewhere in between or aligned with one or the other side. In such a situation, the role of the Presidency becomes all the more important to work towards an acceptable compromise. Will it lean towards the most extreme position, thinking that this is necessary to reach unanimity, or will it stay more neutral, trying to bring the parties closer together with concessions on all sides? It is evident that the latter is more conducive to a fair deal, which can be considered as a win-win situation.

As indicated before, where necessary, particularly sensitive issues can be brought up in parallel to a higher administrative or political level, with bilateral contacts between high officials or ministers and commissioners to try and find a solution. This also happened in the EDF negotiations on issues such as the resources for support expenditure and the results of development aid and performance-based financing. In such situations, trust and understanding between negotiators at the technical level are clearly helpful to brief hierarchies on both sides and help them to strike a deal.

Negotiations of the documents mentioned in section "Preparation of Commission proposals" (first, third and fourth indent) were concluded in May 2013 for the Internal Agreement (see Internal Agreement 2013 for the final text), in November 2013 for the "bridging facility" (see Council decision 2013) and in March 2014 for the text of the implementation regulation (not yet published).

In the end, there is always a solution, but its effect on the long-term working relationships will largely depend on the attitude of the negotiators in the process. One should think twice before being

too rigid or aggressive on a subject, considering its possible negative impact on subsequent negotiations.

Negotiations with ACP Partners

As explained in section "Preparation of Commission proposals", only one of the (major) proposals prepared by our team was for adoption by the ACP-EU Council of Ministers: a new annex to the Cotonou Agreement defining the financing for ACP countries under the 11th EDF for the period 2014–2020. We had prepared the Commission proposal for this new annex, which was adopted in December 2011 (European Commission 2011b). In the course of 2012 and during the first months of 2013, we have given presentations and explanations to ACP Partners on the preparation and negotiation of the multi-annual financial framework—step j) indicated in section "Institutional context". It helped the ACP side to improve its understanding of things to come and the EU side to learn about possible sensitive issues for the ACP side. The subsequent steps (k)–(p) intervened after the EU Decision determining the amount of the 11th EDF in February 2014.

The final negotiations of the text between the EU and the ACP States were done in parallel to the negotiation of the Internal Agreement (see section "Negotiations with EU Member States in the ACP Working Party of the EU Council"), between February and June 2013, since both documents had to be coherent. The formal negotiations were done between an EU Member State holding the Presidency of the EU and an ACP State holding the Presidency on its side. The European Commission accompanied the EU Presidency in these negotiations.

The negotiation of the new annex to the Cotonou Agreement went relatively smoothly, as illustrated by the fact that they were concluded in 4 months time, between the decision on the amount by the EU in February and the adoption by the Joint Council in June 2013. Even though the ACP States had hoped for a higher level of financing, there was understanding on their side that, given the ongoing financial and economic

crisis, the overall level of financing was a fair offer from the EU. There were furthermore discussions on the way to refer to the financing of institutions and bodies created under the Cotonou Agreement, a future performance review and possible references to what could happen after the expiry of the Cotonou Agreement in 2020. They were dealt with efficiently by the two presidencies, with the appropriate support from the Commission, the EU Council Secretariat and the ACP Secretariat. It required the right combination of official meetings with large attendance and more restricted meetings between representatives of the presidencies and institutions. The new annex to the Cotonou Agreement was adopted by the ACP-EU Council of Ministers on 7 June 2013 (ACP-EU Council of Ministers 2013 and Cotonou Agreement 2014, pp. 115–117).

Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research

I have tried to illustrate some of the findings of the research by Francesco Aquilar and Mauro Galluccio on negotiations in the context of the ACP-EU Partnership. I hope that the various examples show that they are a good framework for a negotiation strategy in this context, with potential positive outcomes in the short, medium and long run. However, there is a need to complete the picture.

The interviewees were nationals from the 15 European States who constituted the EU at the time of the research. The vast majority of the interviewees come from countries with specific historical ties with the ACP States, either as former colonial powers or having supported independence movements. The context has changed considerably since then, as illustrated in section “Changes in the context”. It would be useful to see if these changes have led to a change in the EU negotiators’ attitude. It would furthermore be interesting to extend the research to ACP negotiators. When observing negotiations on sensitive issues such as Economic Partnership Agreements and the level of aid to high-income and upper-middle-income countries, the attitude

is clearly different between EU and ACP negotiators. Both sides of the table should be looked at to get the profound understanding which is necessary to prepare both ACP and EU negotiators for the best possible outcomes of their interaction. It would furthermore be useful to widen the scope of the research by focusing on other stakeholders, such as parliamentarians, civil society representatives and EIB officials.

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Diplomacy Meets Science: Negotiating Responsible and Inclusive Growth

30

Mauro Galluccio and Laura Vivani

I love science, and it pains me to think that so many are terrified of the subject or feel that choosing science means that you cannot also choose compassion, or the arts, or be awed by nature. Science is not meant to cure us of mystery, but to reinvent and reinvigorate it.

—Robert M. Sapolsky, *Why Zebras Don't Get Ulcers*, p. XII

We're working with Muslim communities around the world to promote science and education and innovation.

—President Barak Obama,
State of the Union Address, 2010

Scientists need to inform politicians in a simple manner that can be readily understood, but the message must always be scientifically exact. In reality, little of what we know as scientists is politically interesting or even understandable.

—Bert Bolin, 2007, First Chair
of the IPCC (1988–1997)

Introduction

Over the years, science has been deeply invested in understanding how it can help decision-making processes by providing evidence-based strategic

advice to policy makers on matters of global interest. Sometimes interpersonal communication has worked; other times it has been like a dialogue between deaf people without an understanding of the real meaning underlying the exchange of information and opinions. Many interested actors have provided different definitions of the construct of science diplomacy. Not only scientists but also politicians and philosophers have tried to help in this regard, providing a wide variety of concepts from other disciplines such as soft power, public diplomacy, preventive diplomacy, and more. On one side, science diplomacy is seen as a tool to improve relations between states through scientific collaborative projects on strategic issues of interest, while, on the other hand, it underlines how the effect of science can impact the international scenario (for better or worse). It is precisely across these two dimensions that science demonstrates its importance for diplomacy, illuminating how it can positively affect global issues through research activity and the development of new technologies that foster innovation processes.

Science Diplomacy

Science diplomacy can be identified, especially for the contribution of the USA as a tool of “soft power” (U.S. [National Research Council 2012](#)). The construct of soft power informs the goal of achieving results through cooperation instead of force. Nowadays, the international distribution of

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power operates on a multilevel dimension, where less tangible forms of culture, information, communication, and science are increasingly effective sources and expressions of power. The final decade of the last century witnessed the information revolution which influenced the way knowledge is produced, exchanged, and disseminated. Nye (2011, p. 23) puts forward the concept of *soft power*: “The ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.” Nye described soft power used in foreign policy as the ability to shape the preferences of other people enhancing cooperation between states, supporting institutions, and promoting international economic cooperation (Nye 2005). However, it should be noted that some scientific and diplomat participants are more interested in building and controlling relationships through power-related tools. Do not forget that even if the most familiar definition of science diplomacy is that of strengthening partnerships in different fields, the hidden motivation may be the “real” mission of a diplomat: to defend a country’s interests and achieve political goals.

The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) is an international non-profit organization, whose mission is promoting science for the benefit of all people. One of the aims of AAAS is to advance international cooperation in science in order to build bridges between countries through scientific cooperation and improvement of foreign policy decision-making processes. Scientists are increasingly working across borders, even when their governments do not get along, because, like music, the language of science is universal. The potential of science diplomacy lies in a simple premise, according to Sergio Jorge Pastrana, Foreign Secretary of the Academy of Sciences of Cuba: “Scientists can talk in spite of differences between nations, in spite of political tensions” (AAAS-TWAS Course 2014). “Science diplomacy is the use of scientific collaborations among nations to address common problems and to build constructive international partnerships,” as stated by Dr. Nina Fedoroff, Science and Technology Adviser to US Secretary of State (2009, p. 8). The Royal Society emphasizes the importance of using different tools in

foreign policy, constantly adapting to a world in which the level of scientific and technical complexity continues to grow: “Science diplomacy is not new, but it has never been more important. Many of the defining challenges of the twenty-first century from climate change and food security, to poverty reduction and nuclear disarmament—have scientific dimensions. No one country will be able to solve these problems on its own. The tools, techniques and tactics of foreign policy need to adapt to a world of increasing scientific and technical complexity” (Royal Society 2010, p. v). It seems that science diplomacy is increasingly seen as a strategic tool that can aid difficult negotiations by enabling dialogue and the successful engagement of third parties.

While from these selected definitions we can understand that the debate about “science diplomacy” is open and challenging, it is still a fluid concept that can usefully be applied to the role of science, technology, and innovation in three dimensions of policy (Royal Society 2010):

1. Contributing to foreign policy objectives with evidence-based scientific advice (*science in diplomacy*). Science in diplomacy demonstrates the ways in which science is used in order to contribute to different policies and diplomatic decisions. This scientific approach aims to facilitate conflict resolution between countries.
2. Facilitating international science cooperation and spreading the universal language of science (*diplomacy for science*). Diplomacy for science aims to bring together different countries around specific scientific projects.
3. Using science cooperation to improve international relations between countries (*science for diplomacy*). Science for diplomacy aims to apply a scientific approach to foster relationships and negotiation processes between different countries.

The overall idea is that science diplomacy is intended as a tool in order to mediate issues in foreign policy. Here the concept of science diplomacy has been addressed from both the AAAS and The World Academy of Sciences for the Advancement of Science in Developing Countries (TWAS) focusing on the actual difficulty of mastering negotiations in the

international arena. Science is highly embedded in foreign policy and in the progress of foreign policy (AAAS-TWAS Course 2014). TWAS considers science diplomacy closely related to the topic of global sciences cooperation. With the progress of information and technology, both science and innovation aim to bring together global equality and sustainable development. The intention is to make science a valid tool for increasing conflict resolution. Thus, to the three dimensions of policy, we think it should be added a fourth to better clarify the ultimate meaning of science diplomacy:

1. Developing strategic evidence-based scientific knowledge without losing sight of ethical guidance and public engagement to help diplomatic processes for the sake of humanity (*science and diplomacy for the people*)

When science meets diplomacy, a beneficial mix of knowledge, skills, experiences, and humanity comes to the fore. This “union” should also be nurtured to improve understanding of each other, influencing each other in a way to gain mutual benefit from this marriage of ideas, experience, strategies, and cooperation. At the end of the day, all social movements involve conflicts which are reflected intellectually in controversies (Dewey 1997, p. 5). Active listening, mutual understanding, respectful stances, curiosity about what you can learn from the other, and most of all the understanding of other professional cultures are key elements to strengthen the relationship between science and diplomacy. If we do not try to understand the other’s reasoning, needs, and interests, we are going to contribute to a marriage of interests and not of souls.

This book, of which this chapter is a part, is an example of science that meets diplomacy. One of the authors of this essay has been researching, for more than a decade, cross-cultural negotiating styles and interdisciplinary problem-solving modalities in the light of sustainable international partnership. The aim is to expand knowledge and reach public awareness on international negotiations and the multidisciplinary of interpersonal, intercultural, and diplomatic perspectives to better understand such complicated human mechanisms for conflict resolution as international negotiation and

mediation. The final aim is to try to convince diplomats that the psychological sciences represent an important resource that can be applied to the realm of international negotiation and decision-making processes in general.

Science, together with diplomacy, should be able to help solve common global problems (overcoming preconceived beliefs and stereotyped solutions) focusing attention on the understanding of problem-solving processes and how to use a broad range of experience to learn about a particular topic, concept, or construct so as to better contextualize other problems in cross-cultural contexts. Reflective thinking processes and action on the international scene, for science diplomacy to solve problems, could be improved with the scientific contribution of a learning approach (Dewey 1997):

1. Specify problems as best as you can.
2. Collect and select information to gain fact-meaning and a better awareness of problems from different perspectives at the intersection of the people involved and the context.
3. Identify patterns: Use your experience to gain knowledge about a situation, trying to understand the process instead of focusing on the final result of your (premeditated) action. This is a step-by-step learning experience-based process without fixed mindsets, aimed to sustain adaptive decision-making processes.
4. Examine options: Brainstorming sessions may help a lot. Select information in a way that accommodates the history of the problem. It is important to suspend judgments and preconceived conclusions.
5. Narrow options and verify your hypothesis.
6. Compare, revise, and replace your hypothesis.
7. Extend to other situations your problem resolution process. If you learn the successful process of reaching a solution, instead of just applying preconceived techniques to get an outcome, you will learn how to collect the best knowledge to advance the process and find tailored solutions to problems. Techniques acquire a meaning only if they are related to the context. Cognitive, emotional, motivational, communication, and negotiating processes are at stake in this adaptive decision-

making process cycle, focused on knowledge construction and public engagement.

This is also the meaning of the fourth dimension (public engagement): human beings' empowerment. Without this aim, science diplomacy will strengthen the links between states only as far as uniting states but not peoples, failing to provide new tools for the empowerment of human beings in terms of fostering sustainable peace processes.

Fostering Responsible and Inclusive Growth

Diplomacy is indeed seen as the science and the art of avoiding difficulties in addressing and solving common problems and constructing successful working relationships. Science is seen as an important "engine" for the progress of society. If science is perceived as an instrument to manage relations, it should be used to strengthen foreign policy issues (Diesing 2005, p. 133). It can therefore have a constructive role in the issues that are raised in foreign relations, and it can help to generate political consensus. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between basic and applied science, with the bigger question being to what extent can science be applied to policy. In this scenario, it is difficult to assess to what extent science can have or not have a positive impact over policy (Skodvin 2003, p. 59). In order to assert the validity of science, considering it as a useful tool for the development of better relations in foreign affairs, it is important to declare its status as a reliable source. Declaring science as a legitimate source is one of the most difficult tasks because of the uncertainty that surrounds both the scientific and political framework. Moreover, science communication is a field where cognition and emotion strongly come to the fore and where in interfacing with another discipline and related field (diplomacy) we can appreciate that strategic communications may collide and good intentions of communication could be impaired by misunderstandings and reciprocal mistrust. We all know that the road to the hell is paved with good intentions! However, "scientific communication" could be used as a

functional tool for global engagement in order to gain trust and consensus. Science can also accommodate people with a simple language and a friendly, "bottom-up" communication attitude. Scientists and diplomats need to change their strategic leadership methods: they should lead and advise from the middle of society. Their leadership credibility depends on being perceived as part of the societal fabric rather than as mysterious entities.

The scientific community has an important role because progress obtained in this area frequently helps to shape governance processes and better relationships (Lidskog and Sundqvist 2011, pp. 164–166). If science diplomacy could achieve and share practical solutions for international policies, it is important to consider the level of integrity and the respect for science over political discussions. Therefore, science should provide transparency of objectivity of results, ethical credibility, and guarantee of the whole process. Indeed, what is achieved through scientific development should be automatically identified as reliable. In this context, it is important to consider the Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) principles representing a guarantee of affiliation, transparency, fairness, and integrity of the science and the research community. The focus of the RRI is an essential pillar in the policy of the European Union (EU) because it fosters the creation of a sustainable and inclusive growth (The European Commission 2013). Furthermore, RRI is known as an interactive process through which social actors become responsible in order to allow a proper embedding of a scientific approach into our society. Hence, the consideration on the RRI is important because it has the power to make research and public investment more efficient and more responsive to social challenges. In this way, people are more willing to trust advice that emanates from the scientific world, because they recognize the benefit of science contributing to the interactive process.

Overall the use of a scientific approach in order to improve the development of society should never be doubted. One of the biggest issues today is that there is no apparent truth whereby scientific development can be proven to

be totally credible. RRI is also looking at the research ethical dimension. When discussing scientific progress, it is important to say how ethics can have an impact over scientific development. For all of those who work in the research sector, it is important to assess how science can be autonomous and independent from any kind of limiting factors. The real need of society is to achieve a common agreement where the relationship between science and ethics should not limit the autonomy of research but at the same time be respectful of every single human being. Considering the difficulty of assessing whether or not ethics is present in the scientific area, this concept of RRI should be strengthened so that researchers and research institutions acquire better social skills and develop their activities in accordance with RRI principles.

Funding Science Diplomacy

Science diplomacy could have a major impact on shaping international relationships by actively engaging countries in which diplomatic relations have always been strained. In this sense, science diplomacy is a tool of conflict prevention and can be defined as well as preventive diplomacy. Here it is important to recall the fact that in order to achieve cooperation between states, there has to be a consistent level of funding and cooperation. It is especially here that the funding problem becomes critical as it is not easy to obtain economic support in order to enhance the progress of diplomacy. As an example about cooperation, at the European level, there are different programs implementing the development policy and fostering international cooperation, while there is a specific program called Horizon 2020 to implement research and innovation in the EU policy. Horizon 2020 is open for participation worldwide, with some restrictions, to obtain direct financing for those countries considered “emerging” or “industrialized.” Those programs have indeed huge potential as strategic tools for the EU science diplomacy activity, if the EU synergies and a better cooperation between these two specific and strategic programs of the EU are strengthened. The only way for science to focus

on societal problems, through a problem-solving approach, is by fostering cooperation, credibility, communication, trust, ethical tension, and a firm civic engagement.

Conclusions

Science diplomacy can be considered as a means of promoting development and spreading a culture of peace processes. However, science has also brought to mankind the huge potential for destruction. Moreover, science alone and of itself does not reduce poverty nor abolish inequalities around the world. Science can certainly prepare the field for policy makers and diplomacy and can benefit from international agreements but cannot alone provide problem-solving and peace facilities. Science should start to better communicate to society as a whole in a bottom-up rather than a top-down manner. There is hope for the future, but only with awareness of the challenges ahead of us. These challenges require better coordinated work, persuasive skills, and creativity on behalf of scientists and diplomats. However, science diplomacy cannot help without coordinating efforts that support deep understanding in the ways people think, feel, and act at both the individual and collective levels. We cannot influence a world we do not understand! We cannot influence geographical areas, countries, people, and categories if we do not acknowledge and appreciate their frames of reference, their culture, belief systems, values, needs, and motivations. The use of science diplomacy is a breakthrough which could encourage transformative processes in scientists, diplomats, and people as a whole. At the end of the day, science diplomacy should be a catalyst for political and social change.

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Afterword

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The interdisciplinary approach to international negotiation used throughout this book is the one we prefer in working with conflict in different cultural settings. This requires sensitivity and creativity to cultural differences to enable the building of trust, respect, and good relationships among all parties. We suggest that it is necessary to enter a conflict looking beyond its material manifestation, to the web of intricate relationships. It has been our goal to encourage the development of new lenses to broaden our perspective so that we can prevent and transform conflict through the challenge of peace negotiations. The way political leaders, negotiators, and mediators manage interpersonal dynamics and working relationships tells us whether we are fostering international cooperation and preventative behaviors. The generation of long-term research and teaching agendas tailored to these goals is the key purpose of this book.

The events of September 11 made evident that a few individuals can produce havoc, fear and panic on a global scale. The heritage of conflicts, especially of violent conflicts, could be the source of such negative emotions as grievances, hatred, envy, rage, disgust, contempt, and impotence, leading to internal and external destruction. The invisible enemies, against whom even the most powerful state and legal frameworks are powerless, are *affective problematic states* and above-mentioned strong powerful emotions and moods.

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They fuel resentment that festers in people who feel oppressed and without hope. Further, emotions are contagious. Rage and fear are primitive emotions that are strengthened by the new technologies that facilitate virulent aggression. Violent conflicts, a consequence of failed negotiations, threaten our existence. Negotiation in our time constitutes, as never before, a hope for preventing, resolving, and transforming conflicts for millions of people, if not for whole of humankind. Negotiations can be improved by analyses of how people think, feel, and act, because ultimately mechanisms of conflict prevention and resolution cannot succeed without a willingness to cooperate toward a consensus facilitating commitment processes. But cooperation is only a first stage toward conflict transformation. It is also necessary to shift perspectives on sources of conflict and their remedies to understand real reasons behind conflict to try to defuse hostility and violence. This does not mean looking for ultimate causes, but it does mean taking into account the thinking and feeling of people in conflict by seeking to understand their own explanations and justifications for their actions and behaviors, whether they intend to act in good or bad faith.

We aspire to develop tools that can facilitate the art of integrating diverse perspectives in a complex world. But first we must understand our own mental states and those of others. We are “mentalizing” folks. “Mentalizing” is the process through which we understand our own mental states and those of others (in relation to the contextual environment) in order to interpret behaviors (ours and others) as consistent with

intentional mental states (thinking, emotions, desires, motivation, imagination, etc.). The tools must take into account the way cognition and emotions drive imagination and intentions. It is important to understand the reasons for behaviors and actions that appear at first blush incomprehensible. Realities are in large part constructed. The same event yields to multiple interpretations. Regarding our minds as resources that can be molded is a realization that contributes to greater awareness of the vicissitudes of human motivation. Paraphrasing Albert Einstein, we may say that the mind is like a parachute as it works best when opened. If not, its huge potential and

possibilities will be lost. But we will be stronger if we unite our various perspectives to better understand and solve problems in all of their complexity, opening minds in a preventive fashion at the first sign of a threat, rather than when a conflict has escalated in a direction of no return. We all have a responsibility to open the parachute before it is too late. We hope this volume will help to open infinite parachutes, new paths of research, and studies that penetrate the human side of conflict. To the extent that we are successful, we will have fostered changes instrumental to making peace negotiations work.

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